A CONVEYOR BELT OF FLESH
URBAN SPACE AND THE PROLIFERATION OF INDUSTRIAL LABOR PRACTICES IN ISTANBUL’S GARMENT INDUSTRY

UTKU BALABAN

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
Association Turkey Office
Cihannûma Mah.
Mehmet Ali Bey Sk. No:12 D:5
34353 Beşiktaş / Istanbul
Tel + 90 212 310 82 37
Fax +90 212 258 70 91

Ankara Office
Abidin Daver Sk. No. 5 D:9
06550 Çankaya / Ankara Türkei
Tel +90 312 4418596 / 97
Fax +90 312 4418598

E-mail: contact@festr.org
Website: http://www.festr.org

FRIEDRICH EBERT STIFTUNG
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
Commitment to social democracy - since 1925 this has been the motto of the political education and advisory work of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES). Promoting democracy and development world wide, contributing to peace and security, shaping a responsible globalised world, as well as supporting the enlargement and development of the European Union. These are the international aims of the work of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

FES's Turkey office has been promoting the cooperative dialogue of committed people and civil society organisations in both Germany and Turkey since more than twenty years.

Cover Design: www.advira.net
Print: Bilnet Matbaacilik Biltur Basim Yayin ve Hizmet A.S.
Dudullu Organize Sanayi Bolegesi
1.Cad. No:16 Umraniye / ISTANBUL
Tel +90 216 444 44 03

© Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Turkey

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Association Turkey Office
Cihannüma Mah. Mehmet Ali Bey Sk. No:12 D:5
34353 Besiktas / Istanbul
Tel +90 212 310 82 37
Fax +90 212 258 70 91

Ankara Office
Abidin Daver Sk. No.5 D.9
06550 Çankaya / Ankara Türkei
Tel +90 312 4418596 / 97
Fax +90 312 4418598

E-mail: contact@festr.org
Website: http://www.festr.org
A CONVEYOR BELT OF FLESH
URBAN SPACE AND THE PROLIFERATION
OF INDUSTRIAL LABOR PRACTICES IN
ISTANBUL’S GARMENT INDUSTRY

UTKU BALABAN

April-2011
Introduction

1.1 The Question

1.2 Questions for the Empirical Investigation

1.2.1 Three Social Dynamics of the Multiplication Process

1.2.2 Tensions among Tensions

1.3 A Note on the Methodological Choices

Part I: Tendency Towards the Equilibration of the Rate of Profit and the Multiplicity of Labor Practices in the Apparel Sector in Turkey

2.1 The Theoretical Link Between Equilibration of the Rate of Profit and the Proliferation of Labor Practices

2.2 The Transformation of the Turkish Apparel Industry Since 1980

2.3 Spatial Distribution of Workforce and Competition

2.4 Volatility of Capitals in Istanbul’s Apparel Industry

2.5 History of Target Factories and Sweatshops

2.6 High Politics of the Sector: Annual ITKIB Elections

2.7 Competition and the Proliferation of Labor Practices in the Apparel Industry

Part II: Departmental Homogenization and the Possibility for the Coexistence of Multiple Industrial Practices

3.1 Circuits of Capital and Harmonization of the Labor Processes

3.1.1 Disproportionality and the Systemic Need for the Adoption of Multiple Labor Practices

3.1.2 Auto-Centric Accumulation and the Institutional Basis for Multiple Labor Practices

3.1.3 The Possibility of Concentration without Centralization: Departments of Production and Circuits of Capital
3.1.4 Mobility and Cooperation among Capitals in Istanbul’s Apparel Industry ..........102
3.2 DIVISION OF LABOR AND SPACE IN BAĞCILAR .......................................................103
3.2.1 Bağcilar: A Representative Industrial District in Istanbul .................................103
3.2.2 Occupational Characteristics of the Population in Bağcilar ...............................110
3.2.3 Division of Space in the Supply Chains of Bağcilar’s Apparel Industry ..............113
3.3 FORMS OF SUBCONTRACTING .................................................................................121
3.3.1 Integral-Independent and Short-Term Subcontracting ..................................121
3.3.2 A New Sub-Contracting Relationship and a Semi-Functional Assembly Line ......123
3.3.3 Hierarchical Relations in the Horizontal Supply Chains ..................................126
3.3.4 Failed Attempts to Structure the Clustering in Bağcilar’s Industrial Basin ..........129
3.4 SPACE OF THE SUPPLY CHAINS ..............................................................................132

PART III: HOMOGENIZATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL LABORS INTO ABSTRACT LABOR ...134
4.1 LITERATURE ON THE REDUCTION OF INDIVIDUAL LABORS INTO ABSTRACT LABOR ...135
4.1.1 Theories of Homogenization and Segmentation of Labor ...............................135
4.1.2 Proliferation of Industrial Labor Practices in Recent Case Studies ..................144
4.1.3 Three Layers for the Investigation of the Reduction Process in Istanbul’s Apparel Industry ..............................................................................................................................153

QUESTION I: ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REDUCTION PROCESS ...155
4.2 OBSERVATIONS ON THE FACTORY SYSTEM ..............................................................155
4.2.1 The Factory: An Integrated Labor Process in a Disorganized Industry ..............155
4.2.2 The Labor Process in the Sewing Section: Running a Conveyor Belt of Flesh ....156
4.2.2.1 Sweepers and the Conveyor Belt of Flesh ......................................................156
4.2.2.2 The Division of Labor on the Assembly Line ..............................................158
4.2.2.3 Gendered Division of Labor: Brick and Concrete Walls ...............................159
4.2.2.4 Ethnic and Regional Diversity and Forms of Socialization .........................160
4.2.2.5 Timing of Migration .....................................................................................162
4.2.2.6 Tensions on the Assembly Line ..................................................................164
4.2.3 An Intersectional Analysis of the Labor Force ....................................................167
4.2.3.1 The Quality Control-Ironing-Packaging Section .......................................167
4.2.3.2 The Hub ........................................................................................................170
4.2.3.3 Capital-Intensive Departments ....................................................................171
4.2.3.4 The Inter-Departmental Analysis of the Workforce: Gender and Migration ..174
4.2.3.4.1 The Relationship between Gender and Positions in the Labor Process ....175
4.2.3.4.2 Timing and Origin of Migration ..............................................................176
4.3 OBSERVATIONS ON SWEATSHOP LABOR .................................................................179
4.3.1 The Follower Sweatshop: The Subcontracting Relationship and Employment Practices .................................................................................................................................179
4.3.2 The Independent Sweatshop ..............................................................................186
4.3.2.1 Multiple Orders on a Limited Assembly Line ..............................................186
4.3.2.2 The Workforce: Easy Entry, Easy Exit .......................................................187
4.3.3 The Family Sweatshop .....................................................................................198
4.3.3.1 Modern Industry without Modern Division of Labor: Organizations for Small Numbers ..........................................................198
4.3.3.2 Discipline and Its Consequences .................................................................201
4.3.3.3 The Kurdish Identity in the Urban Setting: The Language of Community, Class, and Ethnic Politics ................................................................................................................204
Preface

Founded in 1925 as the political legacy of Friedrich Ebert, the first democratically elected president of Germany, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation is the oldest and largest social democratic think tank in the world. FES started working in Turkey more than 20 years ago and is currently active in the fields of democracy and good governance, economy and social affairs and foreign policy. We are committed to the basic principles of peace, respect of human rights and social justice.

In order to achieve social justice within a society one has to look at the labor practices and analyze the social dynamics behind them.

New communication and transport technologies have created a worldwide economic area without borders. This process also changed the labor practices in all branches of industry. Production has become more and more differentiated and manufacturing bases have been transferred to countries, where human labor is cheap. Nearly all the economic systems have to adjust to these developments in order to survive.

In Turkey one of these adjustments is the commonly used practice of subcontracting. This means that a subcontractor is hired by a general contractor to perform a specific task as part of the overall project. The general contractor can save costs or reduce risks by this mechanism. The problem is that often subcontracting widens the work process into the informal sector where workers don’t receive social insurance and work protection.

Utku Balaban analyzes the social dynamics behind the multiplicity of labor practices in the apparel industry in Istanbul. To document these dynamics that contribute to the proliferation of labor practices in the apparel industry he conducted a research project in Istanbul by investigating the forms of industrial labor within a comparative analysis of the factory system, sweatshop labor and home-based work. He worked himself in different workshops as a garment worker and observed the daily industrial relations in the particular urban setting of Bağcılar. At the end of three years of collaboration with FES - not to mention his previous research on the field – Utku Balaban accomplished a very rich analysis of the industrial relations of the district, which is not only useful for academicians, but also for trade unionists who need a comprehensive analysis of their field of organization.

We hope that the current publication can explain the mechanisms that determine labor practices in the Turkish apparel industry which stands in direct competition with the garment industry in other parts of the world, especially Asia. It also helps to understand the social dynamics in this industrial sector and districts of Istanbul. Maybe one can also draw conclusions for the theory of political economy out of the findings of this publication. We do hope that our contribution can help to improve working conditions in the Turkish apparel industry and to promote social justice in Turkey.

Michael Meier
Resident Representative
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Turkey
Foreword

Even though this book has one author, many contributed to its making.

First, this book project could not have been possible without the support of Friedrich Ebert Foundation. In particular, I am grateful to Luise Rürup, Michael Meier, and Cihan Hüroğlu for their help in the entire process. I also would like to thank the Center for Economic and Social Research, Fernand Braudel Center at Binghamton University, Migration and Environment Foundation-MIREKOC at Koç University, TAREM, and Social Policy Forum at Boğaziçi University for their support.

This book reflects the findings of my dissertation research. Sociology Department at Binghamton University hosted me as a graduate student for several years and opened new intellectual venues for me. The help of the members of my dissertation committee shaped the entire research. I am indebted to Prof. Lourdes Beneria at Cornell University, Prof. Benita Roth at Binghamton University, Prof. Martin Murray at University of Michigan, and Prof. Çağlar Keyder at Binghamton University for their support, precious ideas, and mentorship.

I deeply regret that I was not fast enough to deliver this book to Prof. Quataert, another member of my dissertation committee. This was one of the last dissertation committees he took part in. He is unfortunately no longer with us and I feel fortunate because I had the opportunity to work with him, to have him on my committee, and to know him in person. His contributions to our knowledge about the world will live forever.

The field research was difficult. It was a mental, physical, and emotional challenge. The institutional support of the Bağcılar Municipality and the personal zeal of the staff members had been essential for this field research. Similarly, Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, Istanbul Textile and Apparel Exporters’ Association, the Library of Istanbul Chamber of Industry, Küçükçekmece Municipality, and Turkish Statistical Institute provided important data and insights for the project. I am grateful to the staff of these organizations for their help.

This book has a couple of new ideas and new ideas are always a product of intellectual collaboration. Many of those ideas in this book became tangible in my long conversations with my dearest friends in the long and cold nights of Binghamton. Thus, I see them as the coauthors of this piece and I am thankful for their companionship.

This book also intends to remind the reader of a couple of old ideas. Old ideas to be challenged within the context of new times are always remembered thanks to the wisdom of the previous generations. My father has always been my guide for my political and philosophical orientations. His implicit influence is immersed in every page of this book.

Younger generations give one the courage to take the right steps. My brother’s unconditional support during my graduate education gave me the strength to convince myself that I was on the right track whenever I had my own hesitations about the goals of this research.

Last paragraphs of the forewords are usually reserved for the most important people for the author. This foreword is by no means an exception to this rule.

My mother simply made it possible for me to go over many physical and emotional challenges that I experienced in these years. I could finish this book thanks to her.

The long journey to this book also gave me a very precious gift, who was and is a new beginning in my life. This book is her project as much as mine.

Of course, my coworkers at the factories and sweatshops of Bağcılar are the ones, whom I am indebted to the most. I wrote this book for them. Thus, I am looking forward to sharing it with them.
Foreword for Conveyor Belt of Flesh Urban Space and Proliferation of Industrial Labor Practices

Professor Lourdes Beneria
Department of City and Regional Planning
Cornell University

During the past decades, globalization, and the multiple economic and social transformations that it has generated, have been a continuous topic of debate and study by scholars, activists and policy makers. From its economic and financial aspects to its social and cultural repercussions, it has captured the attention of many across the disciplines and institutions. From the earlier internationalization of capital and multinational investment in the 1970s to the intensification of global competition and the adoption of export-promotion development models in developing countries, to the speed at which financial crises have spread across the globe, we have followed the ways in which different countries and people have been deeply affected by these processes. In the area of production and labor markets, studies have illustrated how they have affected the North-South shifts in employment, trade and regional development; the informalization of production and labor conditions; and the feminization of the labor force, among other transformations.

Within this context, Utku Balaban’s study gives us a specific example of how these changes shape production and labor markets in a developing middle-income country with export-oriented production for global markets. Based on first-hand data from fieldwork conducted in 2008 in an industrial district of Istanbul, he examines the urban dynamics that contribute to the proliferation of informal industrial labor practices in Turkey. The project focused on a factory, three sweatshops, and a home-based work network in the garment industry. In addition to having a first hand knowledge of the city and the area previous to the study, the author worked as an unskilled worker at the factory and the sweatshops. He also resided in the research setting throughout the research project.

The project provides an extensive and comparative analysis of three different industrial labor practices. As a member of Utku Balaban’s dissertation committee, I followed closely the different phases of the project; and as someone interested in the way globalization has affected industrial development and changing local labor practices, I found the study interesting since its inception. Conveyor Belt of Flesh is the final product of this research and it has significant academic value on multiple grounds.

First, the study illustrates the current characteristics of the garment industry in today’s Turkey. Even though it is one of the most important employment sources in the country, its informal labor practices have been scarcely studied and information about the interaction between the industry and the global context is even scarcer. The book documents these relations with a great deal of detail based on extensive data and ethnographic information. It presents a detailed moving picture of industrial and labor relations in a country the sits on the crossroads of North-South links and differences. Thus, the book is an important addition to the extensive set of studies on labor and globalization, but it also fills an important gap in the literature.

Second, the book provides a great deal of background information about the research setting that will help the reader not familiar with the Turkish context understand the socio-economic conditions behind the study. One of the central arguments of the book is that urban dynamics contextualize the role of different labor practices used in global supply chains. In fact, the urban space is given a theoretical and empirical priority to understand the local/global connections. The garment industry in Turkey faces fierce global competition. Thus, it is interesting to examine the strategies of local entrepreneurs to meet these challenges. The findings in the study help us acquire
a deeper understanding of the impact of local conditions on economic globalization. In many ways, the study can help gain a perspective that can be very useful for comparative research in other locations and other countries.

Third, since the research focuses on the organizational characteristics of different labor practices, the book has useful insights into the analytical and practical distinctions between formal and informal labor practices. Given the multiple processes and degrees of informalization that have taken place across countries as a result of globalization, this is a very important contribution to the extensive literature that has emerged on the topic. Utku Balaban’s research experience at various work locations and environments helped him gain new insights into the capitalist labor process and also provide a critique of existing theories on this subject. Likewise, his analysis of the integration of immigrant labor from rural areas into the industrial labor process and the gender division of labor provide an interesting picture of industrial and urban dynamics.

Finally, the book provides information about quite different workplaces --from a factory employing more than three hundred workers to a family sweatshop employing less than ten workers. In each case, labor practices and the conditions of employment vary significantly, including differences resulting from the gender norms and the domestic division of labor. Thus, this is not a case study focusing on one single labor practice but on three different labor practices. At the same time, the study illustrates the extent to which changing employment practices can intersect with family arrangements. And it represents a comprehensive analysis of the similarities and differences among a hierarchy of labor relations. In order to tackle the difficulties resulting from the comparative nature of the project, the author had to develop particular methodological strategies, which can be useful for other ethnographic studies and comparative work.

To sum, the book presents a fresh perspective on the relationship between globalization, urban transformation, and the proliferation of a variety of industrial labor practices. It is a rare ethnographic study dealing with multiple dimensions of work and life through which industrial development affects employment, labor hierarchies, and people’s daily living. By looking at the Turkish garment industry, it provides a very useful reference not only to discuss the current dynamics of Turkish development and of its garment industry but also to examine the ways in which local conditions interact with the competitive pressures and requirements of global markets.
List of Charts

Chart 2.1 Employment, Wages, Productivity, and Production in Manufacturing 1980–2000
Chart 2.2 Cotton Imports-Apparel Exports (1990–2008)
Chart 2.3 Trends in Largest Export Sectors (1990–2008)
Chart 2.4 Apparel and Textile Exports in the National Exports (1980–2007)
Chart 2.5 Labor Productivity and Real Wages in Turkish Manufacturing (1950–2005)
Chart 2.6 Hourly Wages in Manufacturing Industries (1988–2006)
Chart 2.7 New Businesses Registered for the Membership of Istanbul Chamber of Commerce (1950–2008)
Chart 2.8 Liquidated and New Firms in the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce (1970–2007)
Chart 2.9 New/Liquidated Firms (1985–2008)
Chart 2.10 Number of Enterprises in ‘The Top 500 Industrialist Enterprises’ List per the Number of Years (1993–2007)
Chart 2.11 Top Enterprises in the Apparel Industry
Chart 2.12 Number of ITKIB Members (1985–2009)
Chart 3.1 Average Duration of Residence for Households in Bağcılar
Chart 3.2 Age Groups in Bağcılar
Chart 3.3 The Primary Source of Income for Households
Chart 3.4 Occupational Groups in Bağcılar
Chart 3.5 Income Groups in Bağcılar
Chart 3.6 The Number of Individuals Working in the Household
Chart 3.7 Homeownership in Bağcılar
Chart 3.8 Number of Registered Medium-Sized Industrial Establishments in Bağcılar
Chart 4.1 Positions on the Assembly Line at the Sewing Section of the Center Factory
Chart 4.2 Place of Birth of the Workers at the Sewing Section of the Center Factory
Chart 4.3 Date of Birth of Workers at the Sewing Section of the Center Factory
Chart 4.4 Timing of Migration of Workers at the Sewing Section of the Center Factory
Chart 4.5 The Performance of Three Overlock Machine Operators at the Sewing Section of the Center Factory
Chart 4.6 Distribution of Positions at the QCIP Section
Chart 4.7 Position of the Sections in the Internal Division of Labor of the Center Factory
Chart 4.8 Gender Distribution in the Departments of the Target Factory
Chart 4.9 Location of Birth by Geographical Regions
Chart 4.10 Duration for the Completion for the First and Last Piece in a Selected Party
Chart 4.11 Time Difference for the Completion of the First and Last Piece in a Selected Party
Chart 4.12 Location of Birth of Workers at the Independent Sweatshop
Chart 4.13 Characteristics of Two Orders
Chart 4.14 Total Hours Homeworkers Spend Working
Chart 5.1 Kurdish- and Zaza-Speaking Residents in Bağcılar
Chart 5.2 Geographical Origin of Migration (Yenimahalle)
Chart 5.3 Duration of Residence in Bağcılar
Chart 5.4 Duration of Residence in the Current Building
Chart 5.5 Intra-City Migration to Bağcılar
Chart 5.6 Intra-City Migration to Bağcılar (Industrial Regions)
Chart 5.7 Homeownership in Bağcılar

List of Maps
Map 2.1 Large-Scale Industrial Activities in Istanbul
Map 2.2 Apparel Enterprises in Istanbul
Map 3.1: Districts of Istanbul
Map 3.2 Geographical Regions of Turkey
Map 3.3 Places of Birth of the Residents of Bağcılar
Map 3.4 Location of Identification Records of Residents of Bağcılar
Map 3.5 Large-Scale Industrial Establishments in Bağcılar
Map 3.6 Apparel Facilities in Bağcılar
Map 3.7 Map of Industrial Establishments/Residential Buildings in Bağcılar
Map 3.8 Map of Apparel Sweatshops/Residential Buildings in Bağcılar
Map 5.1 Iğdır Quarter of Halkali
Map 5.2 Largest Provincial Migration Groups in Bağcılar

List of Pictures
Picture 3.1 Bağcılar
Picture 3.2 Tekstilkent
Picture 3.3 Giyimkent
Picture 4.1 Homeworkers Kırçağ
Picture 4.2 Place of Production for the Home-Based Work
Picture 4.3 Homeworkers at HBW-shop
Picture 4.4. Daily Factory Workers
Picture 5.1 A Street in Yenimahalle
Picture 5.2 A Luxurious Building Complex in Bağcılar

List of Tables
Table 2.1 Industrialization Policies in Turkey (1923–2008)
Table 2.2 Terms of Foreign Trade (1960–2008)
Table 2.3 Urban and Rural Population in Turkey, 1955–2007
Table 2.4 Population of Istanbul after the Foundation of the Republic of Turkey
Table 2.5 Net Migration to Istanbul (1975–2010)
Table 2.6 Wages in National Income (1985–2005)
Table 2.7 Average Share of the Inputs for the Enterprises in the Turkish Apparel Industry
Table 2.8 Hourly Wages in Textile Sector in Different Countries, 2007
Table 2.9 Istanbul’s Exports in 2007
Table 2.10 Number of Apparel Firms in the Top 500s
Table 2.11 Apparel Exporting Manufacturers in Istanbul (2000–2009)
Table 3.1 Population of Bağcılar
Table 3.2 Number of Large-Scale Industrial Establishments in the Neighborhoods of Bağcılar
Table 3.3 Distribution of Apparel Facilities in Residential Areas of Bağcılar
Table 3.4 Non-Residential Use of Space in Residential Buildings and Plots in Bağcılar
Table 3.5 Characteristics of the Observed Forms of Subcontracting in Bağcılar
Table 3.6 Basic Outline of the Orders of the Follower Sweatshop for One Week
Table 4.1 Migration Period of Workers at the Center Factory
Table 4.2 Record for Consecutive Parties in a Single Day at the Follower Sweatshop
Table 4.3 Basic Formula for the Coefficient of Variation
Table 4.4 Coefficient of Variation for Selected Workers at the Follower Sweatshop
Table 4.5 Coefficient of Variation for Selected Workers at the Follower and Family Sweatshops
Table 4.6 Earnings of Homeworkers
Table 4.7 Basic Demographic Indicators Concerning Homeworkers
Table 4.8 Basic Demographic Indicators for Target Labor Practices
Table 4.9 Gender Distribution, Marital Status and Fertility for the Target Workplaces
Table 4.10 Occupations of the Spouses of Male Workers
Table 4.11 Migration Period of the Workers at the Target Workplaces
Table 4.12 Homeownership of Workers
Table 4.13 Landownership in the Hometown Before and After Migration
Table 4.14 Landownership in the Hometown (Migration Period)
Table 4.15 Method of Procurement of Agricultural Income
Table 4.16 Agents Who Work the Land in the Hometown
Table 4.17 Frequency of Intra-City Migration
Table 4.18 First District after Migration
Table 4.19 Number of Previous Jobs in the Sector
Table 4.20 Duration of Employment in the Apparel Industry
Table 4.21 Methods of Job Hunting
Table 4.22 Number of Related Co-Workers
Table 4.23 Analytical Categories for Sweatshop Labor and the Factory System in the Apparel Industry
Table 5.1 Spatial Concentration of Provincial Groups

List of Characters
A.H.N.: Mr. Follower’s business partner
A.M.T.: Worker at the ironing department of the Center Factory
A.Y.A: Overlock operator at the sewing section in the Center Factory
B.I.: Worker at the sewing section in the Center Factory
E.L.: Nakhchivani neighbor in Halkali; H.A. and G.U.’s son
E.N.N.: Worker at the sewing section in the Center Factory
F.A.: Worker at the sewing section in the Center Factory
F.M.F.F.: Worker at the Independent Sweatshop; M.L.’s friend
G.B.B.: Worker at the sewing section in the Center Factory
G.R.R.: Mr. Self-Made Man’s business partner
G.U.: Nakhchivani neighbor in Halkali; H.A.’s wife
H.A.: Nakhchivani neighbor in Halkali; G.U.’s husband
H.A.B.: Worker at the Independent Sweatshop
H.C.K.: My landlord in Halkali
I.H.M.: F.M.F.F.’s friend in Yenimahalle
I.R.R.: One of the owners of the Family Sweatshop
K.R.R.: Worker at the ironing department in the Center Factory
L.K.M.: I.R.R.’s big brother
M.E.: Worker at the sewing section in the Center Factory
M.I.: Neighborhood Head of Yenimahalle
M.L.: Worker at the Independent Sweatshop
M.M.: Worker at the Independent Sweatshop
M.U.: Worker at the sewing section of the Center Factory
Mr. Follower: Owner of the Follower Sweatshop
Mr. Independent: Owner of the Independent Sweatshop
Mr. Self-Made Man: Owner of the Center Firm
Mr. Survivor: Owner of the Family Sweatshop
Ms. Networker: Owner of the home-based work shop in Gaziosmanpasa
O.S.M.: Manager of Giyimkent
O.Y.Y.: Manager of the sewing section in the Center Factory
R.H.M.: Worker at the sewing section in the Center Factory
S.N.D.: Worker at the sewing section in the Center Factory
S.P.Y.: Worker at the sewing section in the Center Factory
S.Z.A.: Worker at the sewing section in the Center Factory
T.M.: Worker at the sewing section in the Center Factory
U.R.F.: Worker at the sewing section in the Center Factory
U.Y.: E.N.N.’s older brother’ Worker at the sewing section in the Center Factory
V.E.: Father of U.R.F.
INTRODUCTION

1.1 THE QUESTION

This book aims to analyze the social dynamics behind the multiplicity of labor practices in the apparel industry in Istanbul, Turkey. In the contemporary world economy, it is almost impossible to miss the great variety in the organizational dynamics of industrial production in relation to the control of labor. Factories, sweatshops, and home-based work organizations both substitute for and complement each other in different industrial sectors. The same use-values are produced in diverse work environments with different organizational principles along with different kinds of tension between workers and their employers. In fact, heterogeneity characterizes contemporary industrial practices despite strong economic dynamics that work to homogenize labor practices.

The founding fathers of modern sociology, namely Marx, Weber, and Durkheim, had their predictions, albeit with different perspectives, about the eventual homogenization of industrial labor practices. For instance, Durkheim (1947) expected work organization to be the basis of the social cohesion because of the increasing similarity among the work experiences of workers. For Weber (1992), the organizational varieties are reduced to a singular bureaucratic structure through the process of “disenchantment”. And, in many works by Marx, the emphasis in the political message is the prediction for progressive resemblance among workers in terms of their work-related experiences, rather than differences.

In the realm of industrial work, we certainly do not observe this kind of homogenization at the global level, especially in the late twentieth century. It is rather the diversification of industrial labor arrangements which characterized both the last quarter of the past century and our own. Thus, it is a colossal task to account for this divergence between the realities of the last two century and the predictions of social theory. Many have contributed to this project so far and this study is devoted to the same cause.

In order to provide an alternative perspective on this subject, I will present the empirical findings of a research project conducted in Istanbul, Turkey, in 2008. This project intends to document various social dynamics in the apparel industry that contribute to the proliferation of its labor practices. In this regard, the first objective is to analyze the impact of the interaction between global industrial connections and local organizational dynamics on the proliferation of labor practices in a particular urban setting.

Accordingly, I investigated three major forms of industrial labor in this sector within a comparative analysis: factory system, sweatshop labor, and home-based work. As these labor practices can and do substitute for each other, I will seek an answer to the question of why the multiplicity of labor practices do not eventually give way to the domination of one particular labor practice. For the investigation of the subject, I will focus on the impact that the characteristics of the market, the supply chains, and the labor procurement in this industry has upon on these labor practices.

The second goal is to discuss the theoretical significance of each of these dimensions with regard to the theory of political economy. In other words, the question is not only why and how
different labor practices coexist in the same industry, but also what this multiplicity means for the theory of political economy. In fact, the challenge is to situate the observations in a theoretical framework as much as to document them. Thus, presentation of the research findings about different labor practices aims to verify the theoretical arguments of this study.

The subject at hand is the conditions for the sustained multiplicity of labor practices in the apparel industry in Istanbul. In 2008, I worked at an apparel factory and three sweatshops as an unskilled worker for ten months. I conducted a survey at the target workplaces and organizations. Moreover, I conducted interviews with homeworkers in 2002, 2006, and 2008, in order to investigate the organizational characteristics of this labor practice. I resided in two neighborhoods in the research setting in order observe the urban culture of workers. The setting is the most populous district of Istanbul, Bağcılar. I also interviewed the managers, sweatshop owners, and middlepersons who play an important role in the organization of different labor practices. These interviews were enriched by my observations at the annual election for the Istanbul Textile and Ready-Made Clothing Exporters Association in 2008. In addition to these ethnographic and quantitative data, I used additional information supplied by the municipality of the target district, Istanbul Chamber of Commerce, Istanbul Textile and Ready-Made Clothing Exporters Association, and Istanbul Chamber of Industry. These sources of knowledge could certainly be read in multiple ways. Thus, without particular paradigmatic choices regarding my analysis of the research findings, the narrative here would be a dry presentation of only facts and my observations.

These choices will be based on a sociological reading of Capital1 by Karl Marx. The argument is that each volume of Capital describes a historically relevant social dynamic in its general theory of capital accumulation. These dynamics shape the characteristics of the market conditions, the relations among enterprises, and the characteristics of the labor process. The historical condition of each of these dynamics in a particular era shapes the extent of the organizational uniformity/multiplicity of industrial labor practices.

In addition to this, urban space will be regarded as the theoretical proxy for industry-wide and market-related dynamics. Thus, the role of the urban space in the industrial practices will be an integral element of the analysis. In other words, characteristics of the urban setting will be investigated not only to decipher the research setting and the context of the labor process for the reader, but also to reveal the relationship of the labor process with the market conditions and intra-industry connections.

Accordingly, the first part of the empirical analysis will investigate the impact of market characteristics on the labor practices in Istanbul’s apparel industry. The second part focuses on industry-specific connections and their impact on the proliferation of labor practices. In this part, I will not only analyze the relations within the supply chains of this industry, but also the geographical distribution of industrial activities in the research setting. The last part will present the research findings about the organizational characteristics of these labor practices. Once again, the focus will be on the impact of urban space on the viability of different labor practices. More specifically, the question will be: how does the human geography of urban space affect the

---

organizational characteristics of the labor practices in its apparel industry? In each of these parts, I will first summarize the selected theoretical approaches accounting for the multiplicity of industrial labor practices from different perspectives. Then, I will present the research findings and discuss the relevance of these contributions to those findings.

In the next section of this chapter, I will provide a presentation outline for the research findings with a functional reading of Capital. This reading generates a number of hypotheses or expectations to be investigated in the rest of this study. The analysis will both provide a discursive context for the presentation of the findings in a systematic manner and help inquire into the relevance of Marx’s framework in contemporary industrial relations.

1.2 QUESTIONS FOR THE EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION

Capital has long been read as a critique of political economy. Thus, the presumption for many is that it is the foundational work of an alternative theory of political economy. This judgment is to a great extent well-founded. However, I believe this particular interpretation limits the possibilities to use this piece as a guide for an empirical investigation of industrial relations, as it implies that social dynamics, which are not clearly defined within the language of political economy, are outside the scope of the analysis in Capital.

However, it is just amazing to find that Capital has great potential as a useful starting point for an industry-specific analysis. Especially when we read Capital as a theory of the basic social dynamics characterizing the contextual characteristics of capital accumulation, rather than a theory of universal laws of capital accumulation, it provides a research agenda about the reasons for the multiplicity of labor practices in a particular industry. This interpretation is not particularly interested in the validity of the “law-like” statements such as the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. It rather focuses on those social dynamics making it possible for capital accumulation to describe the current state of production relations. Accordingly, it is possible to decipher a particular social dynamic in each volume of Capital. In the following section, I will describe these dynamics and the potential interactions among them. In the last section, I will formulate three conditions, which, I argue, are necessary for the proliferation of labor practices in an industry. The following chapters will provide the research findings in order to investigate the relevance of these conditions in Istanbul’s apparel industry.
1.2.1 Three Social Dynamics of the Multiplication Process

1.2.1.1 Reduction of Individual Labors into Abstract Labor

The first volume of Capital discusses “the process of production of capital.” After the commodity is defined as a unity of use-value and exchange-value, the notion of value ceases to be a trait attached to the objects. The dynamic nature of value becomes most visible in the continued transformations between capital and money or in the transformations between productive and symbolic faces of the value. This process is socially meaningful and sustainable, only if these transformations are fed with the continued insertion of additional value to the accumulation of capital. This residue is called surplus value. Its insertion becomes possible, only if labor process becomes an integral element of the relationship between capital and money. This requires the real subordination (or subsumption) of labor in the labor process. Only after or when this process becomes socially relevant in production relations, surplus value increases at an incremental rate to the existing value: surplus value becomes the relative surplus value. This particular point signifies the replacement of the simple reproduction with expanded reproduction. The expanded reproduction of capital signifies the beginning of the accumulation process of capital.

The real subordination of labor, however, is by no means a technical process only. The transformation of the use-values into exchange-values takes place in the realm of money, a symbolic constant agreed upon by or superimposed on the productive forces. Money is, thus, a proxy of value, inasmuch as it acts as a constant that renders distinct social relations commensurable. Capital is, however, a reflection of value. As a result of the interactions among productive forces, value undergoes constant change and capital is redefined along with the changes in the production relations. In fact, what we understand by “capital” changes according to our perception of values for different objects.

The tension between money and capital is a major obstacle to the expanded reproduction of capital and a major reason for hoarding. Hoarding is the reaction to the problems concerning the conversion of money into capital. Unless the monetary form of capital is in effect, money is kept in the form of financial instruments such as scarce metals and (productive or unproductive) assets are kept as material objects outside the relations of production.

This tension can be resolved with the creation of another constant: abstract labor. It is the outcome of a social process, that is, the homogenization of individual labors in the labor process. Abstract labor conceptually implies the commensurability among individual labors, as money implies the commensurability among individual capitals and among different forms of capital. In the absence of abstract labor, money cannot render different capitals commensurable, since the relationship between capitals, which are involved in the labor process, cannot be systematized in exchange relations. Thus, in order for the money to fulfill its function as the proxy of value, abstract labor should be widely recognized as an assumption of the similarity among the qualities of individual labors. This recognition renders abstract labor a social category within the actual production relations. The most visible reflection of this social category is wage-labor.

The social realization of abstract labor requires the homogenization of productive activities within a particular labor process regardless of the characteristics of the use value produced. This
amounts to an increasing similarity of the activities of individual labors within an individual labor process. Thus, only after or when the individual labors are actually homogenized as abstract labor within the labor process, can individual labors be bought and sold as labor power. Once this homogenization becomes the predominant principle of productive activities, the tension between money and capital is solved. Money as the proxy of value can be converted to capital. In return, capital as the proxy of abstract labor can be converted to money.

The first volume of Capital enhances this approach with ample historical examples concerning the emergence of the capitalist relations of production. The rural-to-urban migration forcing the working population to work for prospective capitalists was an essential step in the emergence of capitalist relations. However, this historical process by itself signified the emergence of a set of lively market relations only. Surplus value was still an erratic phenomenon at this phase of the development of capitalist production relations. The tendency to hoarding was as powerful as before, since abstract labor was socially not realized. Thus, the tension between money and capital was not resolved until the emergence of modern industrial relations.

Only after abundant individual labors yielded the real subordination in diverse industrial environments, such as the plantations in the Caribbean Region or the factories in Northwest Europe, did the relative surplus value become an endogenous part of the labor process. Money could be expanded as capital, while still continuing to assume its role of “the symbolic constant” as a proxy of value.

Accordingly, the first volume of Capital identifies the homogenization of individual labors in the form of abstract labor as an inherent tendency of and a social requirement for capital accumulation. In other words, the first social dynamic behind capital accumulation is this particular tendency towards homogenization. This tendency can be called “the reduction process,” as David Harvey (1982) suggested, or the reduction of individual labors into abstract labor.

The reduction process accounts for the tendency to the homogenization of the work conditions for individual labors within an individual labor process. The realization of this tendency can take the form of “deskilling,” as suggested by the Labor Process Theory, which I will analyze in the last part of this book, while capitalist slavery historically fulfilled a similar function. This reduction process can be argued to have played an important role in the bureaucratization of industrial production as well. Historically, meanwhile, it generated the most visible dimension of class struggle. Thus, analysis of the conditions of the reduction process has been prominent in the history of organization theory. However, investigation of the reduction process in the historical or contemporary context is limited,

---

2. A common misunderstanding regarding the argument in the first volume of Capital is the supposed relationship between wage-labor and the reduction process. Although the emergence of abstract labor was certainly related to the monetization of the compensation of laborers in the form of labor power, abstract labor does not necessarily require one particular form of compensation such as wage-labor. In other words, although the historical emergence of wage-labor as the primary form of compensation in the early industrial practices in Western Europe can by no means be ignored, the form of compensation should be taken as a reflection of the relationship between the emergence of the notion of abstract labor and the new role of money pertaining to the capitalist relations of production. The development of modern industrial activities in diverse spaces of production, such as the plantation system and the factory system, accounted for the realization of abstract labor in actual social relations just as much as the emergence of wage-labor as one of the primary means of the real subordination of labor in Western Europe in the context of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did. See Bythell 1978 for a debate on the historical relationship between time-wage and piece-wage in his historical account concerning the interaction between factory system and putting-out system in the context of the nineteenth century England.

3. See Tomich 2004 for a debate about the systemic role of slavery in the formation of capitalist relations of production world-wide.
in that it reveals only the homogenization of the individual labors within individual labor processes. The question of the multiplicity of labor processes in a particular industrial sector requires analysis of the other two social dynamics described in the following volumes of Capital.

1.2.1.2 Departmental Homogenization

The second volume of Capital discusses “the process of circulation of capital.” Insofar as the homogenization of individual labors into abstract labor characterizes the production relations, the tension between money and capital is resolved. Money ceases to be a mere proxy of value and begins to be a form of capital. From this point on, capital assumes three different forms, those of money, productive assets, and unproductive objects. At this point the question ceases to be about the relationship among individual labors, who regardless of their individual traits produce value and make it possible for money to be converted into capital. Since individual labors become the same in the form of abstract labor via their homogenization in the labor process, everything that is a part of the realm of exchange becomes commensurable even before the actual act of exchange.

However, this association between abstract labor and capital bears another tension due to the heterogeneous conditions in the circulation of different forms of capital. This heterogeneity is, in the most concrete terms, reflected in the conditions of turnover of fixed, circulating, and variable capital. Unless these conditions are homogenized, circuits of money capital and commodity capital cannot be harmonized with productive capital. Unless this harmonization is established, the total social capital cannot be circulated and reproduced.

In other words, once the tension between money and capital is resolved through the homogenization of individual labors in the form of abstract labor, another tension among the autonomous circuits of different forms of capital begins to endanger the circulation and reproduction of the total social capital. The underlying factor beneath this tension is the differences in the conditions of turnover of direct inputs in industrial production. In fact, the extent of the differences in the turnover of circulating, fixed, and variable capitals determines the extent of the transformations among money capital, productive capital, and commodity capital. In the absence of harmony among these forms of turnover, the tension between money and capital once again characterizes the entirety of production relations: capital cannot be expanded, since money cannot play its pivotal role as both a proxy of value and a form of capital simultaneously. Accordingly, the tension between exchange value and use value embedded in the commodity cannot be compromised within the homogeneous space of value. Not only expanded reproduction falls into disarray, but also value, which homogenizes all social relations of production in the form of total social capital, simply ceases to exist.

This tension is resolved through the harmonization of these distinct conditions of turnover of different forms of capital. In more concrete terms, financial flows, productive activities, and consumption patterns should be synchronized. This requires the substitutability of different forms of capital. With regard to productive activities in general and industrial production in particular, this

---

4. This temporal priority of the commensurability among use-values to the act of exchange can be regarded as one of the most important responses of the Marxist political economy to the Marginalists.
implies the necessity for the homogenization of individual labor processes in two Departments of Social Production.

As individual labors are homogenized in the form of abstract value in distinct labor processes in order to be regarded as labor power, individual labor processes are homogenized in two major Production Departments in order for productive capital to take on the role of constant capital. While the first Department is responsible for the production of means of production, the second Department produces the means of consumption. As individual labor processes in each of these Departments tend to become similar in terms of the methods whereby they homogenize individual labors, an important part of the tension concerning the circulation of capitals is resolved, resulting in an increasing resemblance of different industries in terms of their methods of labor control.

To recapitulate, money cannot be transformed into capital without the homogenization of individual labors in the form of abstract labor, since the prerequisite of the sustainability of capital, i.e. the generation of surplus value, is defined in terms of money. And this condition obtains only if different surplus values produced by different individual labors can be commensurable to each other so that conditions of the production-related activities of those individual labors are also commensurable to each other.

In the same vein of thinking, the total social capital cannot be reproduced, unless its different forms become commensurable in time through the homogenization of their production. This homogenization is reflected in the social tendency whereby individual labor processes become increasingly similar. This process constitutes two identifiable Departments of Production.

Thus, the second volume of Capital theorizes the homogenization of individual labor processes into two major Departments of Production. This amounts to an increasing resemblance in the production conditions for the industries within these Departments. The failure in the realization of this tendency generates discrepancies between the turnover rates of different forms of capital. Such discrepancies freeze each of these forms in their distinct spheres of circulation. Once the circulation among them slows down or comes to a halt, money can no longer be transformed into capital through the production of surplus value. At best, simple reproduction replaces expanded reproduction. At its worst, hoarding, not accumulation, begins to undermine the complex industrial relations.

Social processes associated with this “departmental homogenization” historically generated the institutional controversies concerning the policies of regulation. The political implications of departmental homogenization have been a matter of much debate since the beginning of the twentieth century. The famous polemic between Rosa Luxemburg (1968) and Nikolai Bukharin (1972) was one of the first debates to bring the matter to attention. Later, thinkers of quite distinct schools of thought such as Michel Aglietta and Immanuel Wallerstein focused on the same question from different perspectives. The common concern in their works was the possibility of expanded reproduction in a closed economic system. My interest here is, however, in the social dynamics that turn distinct industrial activities into Departments of Production, rather than in the analysis of the relationship between Production Departments. Simultaneous political struggles among and within classes against the homogenization of the labor processes take different shapes regarding the implementation of urban policies, national growth strategies, and international industrial standards and trade relations. Thus, the initiatives for and reactions against the homogenization of industrial
production techniques in strictly defined industrial sectors is another very important dimension of class struggle. I will discuss the actual repercussions of the social dynamics of departmental homogenization in industrial relations more specifically in the second part of this book.

The extent of the homogenization of individual labors as abstract labor accounts for the diversity within individual labor processes and determines the level of similarities between positions and responsibilities of individual labors within a particular labor process. The extent of the homogenization of individual labor processes in autonomous industries determines the coordination-related factors among capitals for the level of similarities among different labor processes. Thus, even though the analysis of these social dynamics helps us to understand the dynamics within and between labor processes, knowledge of them does not say much about the hierarchy among individual capitals and production techniques. This question is explored in the last volume of Capital.

1.2.1.3 Equilibration of the Profit Rate

The third volume of Capital discusses “the process of capitalist production as a whole”: the accumulation process begins and ends with money. The transformation of money into capital is the prerequisite of the emergence and reproduction of value. This process represents the primary social dynamic behind the homogenization of individual labors in the form of abstract labor. The harmonization of the relations among different forms of capital is the prerequisite for the emergence and reproduction of the total social capital. Social dynamics in the direction of this harmonization are responsible for the homogenization of individual labor processes in two Departments of Production. This social capital is, then, to be transformed back into the form of money in the process of the realization of profit. The establishment of the full circle in the relationship between money and capital, thus, requires another dynamic that characterizes capital accumulation.

This particular transformation takes place specifically between surplus value and profit. Surplus value is independently produced in individual labor processes. Thus, the tension between the already-produced value (capital) and the profit (the reflection of this value in money form) should be resolved once again in the realm of money. In this final phase, money assumes its role as “the constant” in exchange relations. It is only now able to homogenize distinct roles of individual labors and distinct roles of different forms of capital as commensurable elements of the accumulation process. The primary prerequisite for the conversion of the total social capital back into money form is the homogenization of the rates of profit.

Surplus value is transformed into profit in a ratio between variable capital and the total capital expended in the labor process. This ratio is a proxy of the actual relationship between capital (or dead labor) and labor (or variable capital). Thus, different rates of profit pertain to different labor processes as a result of the differences in the conditions of contact between capital and labor. They gradually form a general rate of profit through competition. The total profit is, then, divided among interest-bearing capitals and entrepreneurial capitals. The surplus profits are further re-channeled through the institution of ground-rent. In the form of differential rent, this form of profit circulation re-allocates the surplus profits, which once again take the form of capital.
This entire process necessitates the universal equilibration of the profit rate. The equilibration process amounts to the homogenization of the surplus values in the form of money. Without this particular tendency to the homogenization of the surplus values, the tension between surplus value and profit generates the residue of use-values, which cannot be realized as exchange-values. In this case, expanded reproduction takes the form of hoarding: use-values are either sold under their values or removed from the homogeneous space of value as a result of the use of various means of destruction. Thus, as individual labors and individual labor processes, the individual rates of profit need to be homogenized in order for expanded reproduction to be sustained.

In the case of uniform wages, ground rent, and geographical conditions, the equilibration of the individual profit rates within and among industries acts to eliminate alternative labor practices on behalf of the most efficient labor practice. Thus, insofar as the equilibration of the rate of profit is pertinent to the core of capital accumulation, there is lesser room for a variety in industrial practices. For this reason, the “equilibration process” signifies the third front of class struggle in the history of capitalist relations of production. The relevant actors of history have done their best to disrupt this process in order to prevent an “even” field of game from coming into existence. Such interventions take two major forms.

The first one has certainly been the struggle of political reactions over the crisis of overproduction. Even when the regulatory policies run by national or regional governments achieve harmony, the paces of productivity still increase in different industries, and the establishment of institutional barriers to the equilibration process leads to commodities that are no match for the effective demand, i.e. the consumptive capacity of the working class. The second form of tension is the outcome of such barriers at the scale of world economy: “the unequal exchange” between geographical units of governance historically characterized a series of institutional and political obstacles to the allocation of capitals on the basis of the allocation of labors. This heterogeneous allocation is the basis of geography-based forms of exploitation, while it is also cause for the basic motivation behind international, inter-regional, and hegemonic competition, which has taken different forms such as colonialism or imperialism. In other words, historically, political interventions have manifested themselves either in the disruption of the equilibration process or in the manipulation of wages, ground rent, and access to major, location-specific sources.

1.2.2 Tensions among Tensions

1.2.2.1 Inherent Tensions within the Tendencies of Homogenization

To recapitulate, if we read Capital as a theory of social dynamics characterizing the conditions of capital accumulation, rather than as a theory of “laws of motion of the capitalist mode of production,” then the following three dynamics appear as the tendencies of homogenization in different phases of the accumulation process.

First of all, the tendency towards the homogenization of the individual labors in the form of abstract labor shapes the conditions of interaction of the individual labors vis-à-vis the productive capital within individual labor processes. Individual labors are to be stripped of their particular characteristics to the extent that their fickle activities are transformed into disciplined mental effort
and physical motions. Accordingly, abstract labor can be treated as an “entity” as constant as the money form. Resolution of the tension between money, as the constant, and capital, as the expanding vector, is sought via the homogenization of different labors into abstract labor.

Second, individual labor processes tend to become increasingly similar first in their own sectors and in their Production Departments and to achieve harmony between different circuits of capital. The interaction among variable, fixed, and circulating capital is to be disciplined to the extent that the organizational variety in individual labor processes is reduced into two major patterns of production. The tension between circuits of productive, money, and commodity capital is compromised with the homogenization of the individual labor processes.

Third, the tendency towards the homogenization of the rates of surplus value in Departments of Production as a universal rate of profit shapes the respective positions of different productive activities within their individual industries. This interaction is to be disciplined to the extent that differences in the rates of surplus value are reduced into one rate of profit pertaining to individual industries. The tension between surplus value and profit is resolved, as the surplus value takes the form of money and generates new capitals through the reallocation of surplus profits.

This reading implies the presence of particular social dynamics for an empirical investigation of industrial relations. Each of these dynamics generates different tendencies towards a particular form of homogenization in the realm of industrial production: homogenization of the individual labors, individual labor processes, and profit rates. The extent of the realization of these tendencies characterizes the conditions of capital accumulation. Accordingly, it can be argued that workers, labor practices, and industrial sectors become more and more identical across workplaces, industries, geographies, and eventually Departments of Production. However, two obstacles are embedded in the very core of these social dynamics that retard and even reverse the tendencies towards the homogenization of labor, industries, and profit rates. The first obstacle is the internal tensions pertinent to each social dynamic.

It is true that individual capitals need to homogenize their labors in the form of abstract labor in order to turn their invested money into capital, while money invested in individual labor has temporal precedence over the production of relative surplus value; the prerequisite of capital. This is the basis of Marx and Engels’s prediction for the prospective intensification of workplace unrest. That is, increasing homogenization of labor would result in workers having an interest in collective reaction, and a higher capacity to collectively react, against the capitalists. Thus, as “the reduction process” provides opportunities for workers to act as a social class, capitalists have a vested interest in segmenting the working class in different labor practices, even though this reaction can be detrimental to the expanded reproduction of the total social capital.

Moreover, the unrest can take another form: as the labor becomes replaceable, it can be exploited by multiple capitals. This, in return, assigns the individual labors the ability to choose the site for their exploitation. Especially in the apparel industry characterized by a competitive market, this form of action by individual labors results in a high turnover rate in the workforce for individual industrial establishments. The high turnover rate of the labor force among individual enterprises substitutes for the collective action by the individual labors against the capital, albeit partially and poorly. In this case, the unintended consequence of the individual resistance of workers is greater room for multiple labor practices. All in all, regardless of its content, the tension between capital
and labor in the labor process disrupts the reduction process, inasmuch as it necessitates the same social dynamics.

Second, individual labor processes tend to become increasingly similar first in their own sectors and in their Production Departments, and to achieve harmony between different circuits of capital. However, the homogenization of productive capitals in identical organization structures generates two intrinsic problems. The first is that the homogenization of labor processes within Departments of Production does not necessarily cause the homogenization of the pace of productivity increase between the Departments. Thus, as the theories of disequilibrium such as Luxemburg’s (1968) or Bauer’s (1913) discuss in detail, industries producing the means of production usually develop a higher productivity rate than ones that pertain to industries producing the means of consumption. The second and related problem is certainly the increasing frequency of overproduction crises: as the three circuits of capital are ultimately harmonized because of the homogenization of different labor processes within their respective Departments of Production, the gap between the total wages and the total value of the commodity capital can no longer be financialized in the circuit of money capital. The temporal framework for the market failures becomes progressively shorter with the unavoidable consequence of significant political crises and human tragedies, or “devalorization,” to put it in the language of political economy. The devalorization process essentially redefines the organizational borders between hitherto autonomous industries. The concordant failure in the departmental homogenization disrupts the harmonization among different circuits of capital.

Third, individual rates of surplus value within individual labor processes and Departments of Production tend to be homogenized through a universal rate of profit, while this process points to a mechanism of allocation of surplus profits among individual capitals. In other words, equilibration of the rate of profit by no means guarantees the elimination of surplus profits. On the contrary, the equilibration process is the leading mechanism of the allocation of surplus profits. Thus, it can rather be a means of punishment for the smaller capitals in respect to their size in the market. In fact, this tendency can and does enhance the monopolistic dynamics in the market. And, as everyone knows, monopolies disrupt the equilibration process.

The second obstacle to the ultimate homogenization of individual labors, labor processes, and profit rates is the very fact that each of the social dynamics disrupts the other two. First, as different labor processes develop authentic methods to control the labor and to standardize production techniques, they become increasingly different from each other in terms of their organizational characteristics. Second, the more similar the characteristics of different labor processes become, the more difficult is it for a labor process with lower rate of surplus value than the average to remain as an autonomous industrial sector and to keep its organizational independence from other labor processes. The homogenization of the labor processes amounts to the blurring of the dividing lines among industries. Third, once a single rate of profit applies to all labor processes and both Departments of Production, the surviving labor practices are by definition able to keep using their existing organizational characteristics. Unique technical arrangements pertain to such industries, as they could survive the competition. In other words, different forms of labor control with approximately similar rates of exploitation remain as they are, regardless of their organizational differences.

To recapitulate, first, there are particular internal barriers to the ultimate realization of each
of these tendencies. Second, the realization of one of these tendencies (or a movement in this
direction) disrupts the realization of the other two. Thus, Marx’s account of the shift from money to
capital, from capital to surplus value, from surplus value to profit and money form is rather a theory
of these conflicting social dynamics than a prophecy about the eventual and final crisis of capital
accumulation. I believe that he chooses to define each of them as a form of homogenization, while
he also argues that their ultimate realization points to an impossibility, given that capitalist relations
of production are based on the conflicts between capital and labor, competition among capitals,
and tension among industrial sectors.

In other words, we need to explore why individual contradictions, which pertain to the logic of
accumulation, have not brought about the long-expected collapse of capitalist relations of production.
These contradictions are defined in the form of crises: underconsumption crises, overproduction
crises, crises of disproportionality (between Departments of Production), accumulation crises, or
even “underaccumulation” crises. It is certainly true that these contradictions cause and represent
crises in the accumulation process. Moreover, these contradictions cannot be resolved within
capitalist relations of production.

However, it is also true that the error to prioritize one of these contradictions over the others
is cause for a limited understanding of the capitalist relations of production. For instance, many
did and do regard the tension between capital and labor in the labor process as the “core”
contradiction of the capitalist relations of production. This one-sided perspective expects industrial
relations to “naturally” increase the similarities among labor practices and, hence, workers. These
similarities are also expected to create class consciousness among workers. It is necessary to see
that the emergence of such an industrial environment is only one of the possible configurations
of capital accumulation along many other hypothetical and historical variants. In the case of
alternative conditions of accumulation, such expectations are not put to practice and the class
consciousness as such cannot be attained. The overemphasis of the direct confrontation between
capital and labor in the labor process makes it impossible for the observer/activist to analyze the
conditions of class struggle in a different configuration of interactions among these major social
dynamics of capital accumulation. In other words, for such a perspective disregarding the analysis in
the later volumes of Capital, if the reduction process does not generate one homogeneous working
class, then there is no class struggle. Accordingly, “class consciousness” is chained within the
confines of the rigid expectation concerning the worker’s awareness of surplus value. Alternative
expressions of the worker’s awareness of class antagonism cannot be successfully analyzed and
politically manipulated.

Thus, the focus should be on the reflection of the social processes that characterize the
conditions of these three social dynamics of capital accumulation. In other words, intellectual
effort should be spent on revealing the content of the struggles that characterize these processes,
rather than on merely emphasizing the contradictions. The analysis of these processes provides
knowledge of the multifarious nature of the class struggle within the bourgeoisie and between
the working class and the bourgeoisie. Accordingly, quite different political controversies appear as
distinct reactions to different tendencies of homogenization. For instance, racist political reactions

5. Henryk Grossman suggested one of the short-lived versions of Marxist crisis theories, which argued for a tendency of
overaccumulation within capitalism that brought about the collapse of the markets. For a critical review, see Lapides 1992.
of workers in high-income regions of the world economy can be read as a political intervention against the equilibration process. While post-colonial national development policies in the post-war period should be seen as attempts to enhance the departmental homogenization, ethnic separatist movements in low-income countries appear as reactions to the reduction process.

Moreover, although differential rates of profit do not necessitate different wage levels (this argument at best refers to Ricardian-Marxism), higher wages can be politically used to mobilize the masses in order for particular institutional policies to keep differentials in the profit rates among geographies intact. For instance, the coalition of this sort between bourgeoisie and the working class in European countries seems to have given the European Union its political legitimacy. And, insofar as these examples appear as reactions to particular tendencies towards homogenization, they at the same time enhance other tendencies. Thus, a particular social movement aiming to disrupt a particular tendency towards homogenization also plays a role in the realization of other tendencies to homogenization. Characteristics of capital accumulation in a historical period are determined by this multiplicity of reactions to different forms of homogenization.

The objective of this book is to analyze the contemporary conditions of the multiplicity of industrial forms of labor in a particular locality. Thus, the next step will be to describe the conditions, which derive from the hitherto analysis, for such multiplicity in a particular industry.

1.2.2.2 Three Conditions for the Empirical Investigation

This particular reading of Capital describes three tendencies of homogenization in the accumulation process. These tendencies generate abstract labor, establish uniform labor processes within industries, and form a universal rate of profit. If these tendencies were practiced completely, we would see the domination of one single form of industrial labor in the world economy, probably either the ideal-typical factory or the ideal-typical home-based work network.

However, not only do social dynamics accounting for these tendencies generate their own counter-tendencies, but each tendency also disrupts the other. Thus, the ultimate homogenization of individual labors, labor processes, and profit rates is simply one possibility among all others. It is a special (and hardly possible) case, rather than a point of systemic equilibrium. Accordingly, the related social dynamics imply particular conditions for the proliferation of labor practices as much as trends for the uniformity in and among labor practices. Now, let us see which repercussions the hypothetical practice of each of these tendencies generates with regard to labor control in a particular industrial sector.

First, a universal rate of profit implies uniform revenue per commodity. This should eventually urge the individual capitals to adopt similar work organizations under the duress of competition. If the multiplicity in work organizations and, hence, labor processes characterizes an industry despite the presence of a uniform rate of profit, this signifies a dynamic and competitive market structure and relatively short longevity for the average enterprise. In other words, individual capitals enter the sector as small organizations, grow to a particular threshold, and then collapse due to the competition posed by smaller organizations.

“The bubbles in a can of soda” can be a useful metaphor to illustrate this process. The pressure for an individual bubble in the can increases as it approaches the surface of the liquid, since other
bubbles follow and push it further along, until the point where the bubble comes in contact with air and finally bursts. This dynamic industrial environment will in return contribute to the equilibration of the rate of profit, as monopolization is effectively obstructed.

In this empirical analysis of the apparel industry in Istanbul, one way to establish the relevance of this proposition is to look at the changes in the industry in terms of the relevant actors. To this end, I will investigate the volatility of capitals in the industry. For example, if large-scale firms cannot hold their position in the industry in terms of annual sales for a long period of time, then those firms are frequently replaced by others, which had formerly adopted non-factory forms of labor in their earlier stages of growth.

A particular way to enhance this proposition is to investigate the shifts in the location of industrial establishments in the city. If the primary geographical centers of the apparel industry geographically shift over time, this supports the argument that relatively small work places have a short longevity when compared to larger firms. To this end, I will narrow down the scope of the inquiry to Istanbul, which is the center of the Turkish apparel industry. The expectation here is to observe successive shifts in the industrial centers of apparel production in Istanbul. Accordingly, this study will investigate the relevance of the intuition that the multiplicity in labor practices can take place even in the presence of a unitary profit rate, only if there is a high volatility of capitals in the sector. The data illustrating the conditions of competition in Istanbul’s apparel industry will also shed some light on the question concerning the disturbance of monopolization in the city, due to the constant migration to and the geographical expansion of the city.

Second, the tendency towards the homogenization of the individual labor processes in two Departments of Production implies a unitary labor process for a particular industry. Thus, the presence of multiple labor practices in a single industry appears as an anomaly in the case of the ultimate realization of this tendency, unless these practices complement each other in a particular way within unitary supply chains so that the employment of circulating, fixed, and variable capitals through these distinct labor practices constitute a unitary circuit of productive capital.

The formation of this circuit bears at least two notable repercussions. The first one is strong organizational links between different labor practices that go beyond the arm’s length relations. The second one is a particular spatial division of labor between such practices that assign different roles to them in the procurement of labor. In regard to the first repercussion, I will present my observations about the history of the relations between the target factory and its subsidiary sweatshop. For the second suggested effect, I will provide data on the geographical distribution of industrial facilities in the research setting, Bağcılar. Numerous small- and large-scale industrial establishments cluster in different areas of this district. The geographical binary between industrial facilities of different sizes generates and reveals a spatial division of labor among these establishments in Bağcılar. In other words, different labor practices cluster in different regions of the research setting and complement each other.

Third, the tendency towards the homogenization of individual labors as abstract labor, implies an identical labor process based on the same principles of labor control within a particular industry. The variety in labor processes within a single industry, then, signifies a major disruption of this tendency, unless individual labors are already homogenized in different categories before their transformation in the labor process.
In other words, if individual labors are already segmented along identity-affiliations before their subordination in the labor process, this tendency generates more than one labor process and more than one particular form of abstract labor. The concordant differentials in the surplus value generated by each form cause the subordination of one form to the other. Accordingly, a hierarchy among different forms of industrial labor shapes the characteristics of the industry. More specifically, the factory system, which practices this tendency in its ideal-typical form, establishes its domination over sweatshops and home-based work networks. “Sweatshop labor” is based on small-scale industrial establishments with semi-functional assembly lines. Industrial production based on piece-work, which is mostly conducted in domestic spaces, appears as “home-based work.” From the perspective of the management, the challenge appears as “the costs of homogenization of labor.” Enterprises that afford these costs also afford to utilize a labor process based on the factory system. Others need to control the labor through other organizational practices such as sweatshop labor and home-based work.

The analysis in the last part of this book will examine the differences in the demographic and cultural characteristics of the workforce for the target labor practices. If these differences are already significant, then it will be possible to conclude that the homogenization of individual labors takes multiple forms as a result of the segmentation of the labor force prior to their direct interaction with the labor process.

The examination of the relevance of these arguments required field research on the conditions of labor control for different forms of industrial labor. If the observations support the intuition that conditions of labor procurement has a significant impact on the labor process, then the argument is supported. The last part of this section will establish the backbone of the analysis, since the strategic aim is not only to demonstrate the possibility of the multiplicity of forms of industrial labor even in the presence of the tendencies to the homogenization of labor, labor processes, and rates of profit. The motivation is also to provide empirical insights about how these tendencies are actually put into practice in the multiplicity of labor forms with an analysis of the industrial relations in Istanbul’s apparel sector.

To recapitulate, I argue that the following conditions should be obtained, if the multiplicity of forms of industrial labor pertains to a particular industry:

1. The average longevity of industrial establishments should reflect a cycle for individual enterprises from small-scale establishments to large-scale supply chains and ultimately to their downfall.

2. Different forms of industrial labor should complement or substitute for each other within a single circuit of productive capital. This circuit should be observable in the form of a close division of labor among these organizational arrangements within a unitary supply chain and in the form of a particular spatial distribution of industrial activities.

3. The social segmentation among individual labors in different identity categories should take place prior to their interaction with and their transformation in the labor process. Depending on their organizational ability and financial resources to manipulate the relations between different social categories in the labor process, individual enterprises
utilize different strategies of labor procurement. These strategies bear different methods of labor control through particular means of remuneration and organizational arrangements.

Thus, this book will analyze the three above-mentioned conditions. In fact, each chapter will respectively deal with the characteristics of market, content of division of labor among individual enterprises, and the conditions of labor control for each target labor practice. The focus will be the mobility of labor and capital within the context of these conditions.

The apparel industry produces means of consumption. In Turkey, this industry utilizes three distinct forms of industrial labor: factory system, sweatshop labor, and home-based work. It has historically (and globally) been and currently is an “easy-entry” industry. There are no significant institutional barriers in the circulation of capital within this industry. It is labor-intensive. Thus, the location and relocation of the industrial activities are mostly exempt from high technical costs as a result of the low ratio of the constant capital used in the labor process. Furthermore, it is amenable to multiple production techniques. These features of the industry make it an ideal case for empirical investigation. Moreover, as the single biggest source of industrial employment in Turkey, the sector needs to be empirically investigated in order to provide useful data for the individuals and agencies of pro-labor politics.

The suggested conditions above draw the outline for the presentation of empirical data. First, I will provide the selected data in order to demonstrate the general characteristics of the industry in terms of the longevity of individual enterprises in this industry. Second, I will analyze different forms of subcontracting in the industry by relying on my observations concerning the relations between an apparel factory and its subsidiary sweatshop. I will further enrich this analysis by recounting my observations concerning two sweatshops, which do not work closely with a particular factory. In the last and longest chapter I summarize my observations concerning the target factory, sweatshops, and home-based work organizations in order to evaluate the differences in the conditions of labor procurement for each of these forms of industrial labor.

1.3 A NOTE ON THE METHODOLOGICAL CHOICES

Since this project was designed to make comparative observations within and outside the work organizations of different forms of industrial labor in the apparel industry, I used multiple research methods in order to demonstrate the impact of various social dynamics on the characteristics of the labor process and the organization of work within the industry.

The most significant method adopted was undoubtedly participant observation at the target factory and sweatshops. My direct observations as a worker shaped the way I evaluated the quantitative data. As I took notes every day after my shift was over, I tried to reflect as realistically as possible a true account of daily conversations and events. In the following chapters, I quote the dialogues of my coworkers. These scripts are certainly not the direct transcriptions of the actual dialogues, but only what I can recount of what remains in my memory. In fewer cases, I also recorded some conversations with the permission of my interviewees. As I translated these dialogues into English, I used a colloquial language in order to reflect the true spirit of the conversations.
My decision to conduct participant observation was rooted in my belief that revealing the complexity of social networks in the research setting lies in the advantage of being an “insider researcher.” As Zavella (1996) argues, “the insider research” provides certain advantages for the social scientist, such as familiarity with the nuances of the use of language and easier access to the target community. My past research experiences in Bağcılar also led me to believe that I would be able to take up the role of an “insider researcher” as a former resident of a similar neighborhood of Istanbul. Renting an apartment and thus gaining access to the dynamics of the community as a resident of the neighborhood was a strategy that I adopted to gain further insight into the urban dynamics.

Being aware of the ethical problems of ethnography in general and participant observation in particular (Kaplan 1964, Jackson 1983), following John A. Barnes’s suggestions (1977), I revealed my identity to the informants and provided them with the knowledge of the content of this research by means of participant observation. At the target factory and one of the sweatshops, workers did not know my researcher identity in the first few weeks of the project. As an undercover agent, I used this as an opportunity to make uninterrupted observations about the labor process. However, as I gradually disclosed my identity to the workers, the workers’ interest (or disinterest) in the project also widely contributed to my observations and the general course of the project. I believe this strategy both alleviated ethical and moral questions and enhanced my observations, though it was impossible to completely avoid or eliminate the ethical burdens of participant observation as a research technique.

As an insider researcher, my methodological perspective can be regarded as in between grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967) and extended case method (Burawoy et al. 1991). The very aim of this project was to read the interaction between global relations of production and the microcosm of an industrial and residential district. Thus, the extended case method gave me the opportunity to act as “a global ethnographer.” In fact, to situate the global effects influencing the multiplication process in the local context was the major theoretical challenge of the research project.

However, my prior knowledge of the setting also provided me with a deeper insight into just how intertwined production life and social life in Bağcılar are. Furthermore, the relative scarcity of studies regarding this problematique in the Turkish context left me with the task of theory generation. Different embedded networks of politics, employment, and housing all function separately yet interactively. Understanding this dynamic environment meant trying again and again in order to elaborate the initial hypothesis and, accordingly, to generate a grounded theory through systematic induction.

Thus, although these two approaches seem diametrically opposed, I attempted to reach a synthesis: on the one hand, as “a ground theorist,” I explored the world of the local by moving forward step by step through continuous modifications of the initial hypothesis with every new observation. On the other hand, as “a global ethnographer,” I caught the nodes where this world of the local was linked to the global, and kept the theoretical integrity throughout the extension of theory.

In order to further substantiate my observations, I used multiple sources of quantitative data as well. The first and most important source was the questionnaires conducted with the workers
employed at/by the target factory, two sweatshops, and the home-based work network. The questionnaire was filled out by the workers. Thus, some of the questions were not responded to with a high rate of return, and I chose not to use them as a reliable source of data. However, the overall return rates of the questionnaires were exceptionally high. Of the questionnaires disseminated at the target factory, which employs approximately 300 workers, more than 254 were returned. Both sweatshops employed approximately sixty workers. Fifty two and thirty questionnaires were returned respectively. The target home-based work organization gave piecework to approximately fifty homeworkers at a time and twenty-eight questionnaires were returned. The questionnaires were designed to gather concrete information on the residential, migration, and occupational history of the workers. Given the lack of proper data concerning the working class in Turkey in general and the workers in the apparel industry in particular, I believe the data presented here will be useful for the interested reader.

The second most important source of quantitative data was a household survey conducted by the municipality of the target district, Bağcılar, in 2006. The survey provides information concerning migration and occupational history of the households and residential and industrial dynamics of the district. The survey, presenting data for 655,000 residents and 152,000 households in Bağcılar, is an exceptionally rich source of information concerning a district of Istanbul that is representative of the industrial regions of this city. I would like to thank the Bağcılar Municipality for granting me permission to use their survey data in this study. Most of the information I provide about Bağcılar comes from this survey. The use of a single source of data for a comprehensive analysis of an industrial and residential district certainly generates methodological problems. However, Bağcılar, as many other working class districts in Istanbul, is characterized by informal housing and employment practices. All other sources of data available to me were at best fragmented, if not deceiving. Thus, I certainly take the responsibility of any misleading interpretation of the survey data regarding the social characteristics of the research setting. Also, the employees of the Department of Machinery and License of Bağcılar Municipality gave tremendous support for the pilot project in the Summer of 2007, as I struggled to receive permission to conduct my research at an apparel factory. I cannot express my gratitude for their contribution to this project.

Other major sources of information are the websites and publications of the Turkish Statistical Institute, Istanbul Chamber of Commerce, Istanbul Textile and Ready-Made Clothing Exporters’ Association, and Istanbul Chamber of Industry. The information analysis department of the Istanbul Textile and Ready-Made Clothing Exporters’ Association, the Department of Geographical Information Systems of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, and the librarians of Istanbul Chamber of Industry in particular all provided precious data which helped me to substantiate the arguments in the first part of this book. I am grateful for the institutional support these organizations provided for this project.
PART I: TENDENCY TOWARDS THE EQUILIBRATION OF THE RATE OF PROFIT AND THE MULTIPLICITY OF LABOR PRACTICES IN THE APPAREL SECTOR IN TURKEY

2.1 THE THEORETICAL LINK BETWEEN EQUILIBRATION OF THE RATE OF PROFIT AND THE PROLIFERATION OF LABOR PRACTICES

The fourteenth chapter in the third volume of Capital is one of the best examples in Marx’s writings for the dialectical nature of his theory. After he presents his theory of the Law of the Tendential Fall in the Rate Profit, he puts a great deal of effort into demonstrating the circumstances relevant to this tendency. Profit rates tend to be equilibrated, as long as the circuits of capital are not obstructed due to institutional or technical barriers. However, even under such circumstances of “perfect competition,” particular counteracting factors such as increased exploitation of labor, reduction of wages below their value, or cheapening of the elements of constant capital, all limit the realization of this tendency. In other words, as in the cases of progressive proletarianization and the concentration of social capital in two Departments of Production, dynamics behind the universal rate of profit appear as the reflection of one of the three major social conflicts that characterize the conditions of capital accumulation.

The strong assertion in the third volume about the empirical relevance of a falling tendency of the rate of profit generated a lively debate in the last century. Rather than providing a comprehensive summary of this debate, which has been locked within the confines of the question of the relevance of this “law” in actual production relations, my motivation in this chapter is to discuss the impact that the presence of a particular rate of profit has upon actual industrial labor practices.

In other words, I would like to skip the disagreements concerning the actual existence of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, since the impact of this tendency, if it ever exists, does not refer to a dynamic exogenous to the industrial relations. I believe that the realization of this tendency rather is the outcome of particular conditions of industrial relations. However, this assertion should not be taken in a misleading direction: dynamics that equilibrate the rate of profit within and among different industries certainly shape the industrial activities as well. Thus, the starting point should be the case, whereby industrial establishments react to [a] particular rate[s] of profit.

My concern in this chapter is to discuss the theoretical conditions of a competitive market for an industry with multiple labor practices. In other words, competition generates a more or less uniform rate of profit. Such a profit rate puts significant pressure on individual enterprises to utilize

---

6. An earlier version belongs to Henryk Grossman (1992), who argued that economic crises were useful in that they restored pre-crisis profit rates. Nobuo Okishio (1961) argued that, as long as the rate of real wage remains constant, new techniques contribute to an increase in the rate of profit, rather than a systemic drop. Anwar Shaikh (1978 and 1980) questions Okishio's presumption that, even in the absence of competition, capitalists are able to find the optimal production technique and mechanization. See Walker 1971, Hodgson 1974, Itoh 1975, Lebowitz 1976, Christiansen 1976, and Olin-Wright 1977 for other contributions. The common theme in these articles is the relevance of the trends in profit rates in the global crisis of the 1970s. In the 1990s, renewed attention to the subject was closely associated with the progressive elimination of trade barriers, which were one of the pillars of globalization'. See Reuten 1991 and Webber and Rigby 1999 regarding recent views on the classical positions regarding 'the law' of the rate of profit to fall. In short, the debate surrounding the role, relevance, or even existence of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall seems to have been more heated especially during the major global financial crises of the twentieth century.
the most productive production technique available. The presence of a uniform rate of profit thus
should generate a tendency for individual enterprises to adopt similar organizational arrangements.
Since the apparel industry in Turkey operates in both domestic and global competitive markets,
the presence of multiple labor practices in this industry contradicts this theoretically well-founded
intuition. I will argue here that two dynamics are particularly important in establishing the
relationship between competition and variety of labor practices.

The first one is the conditions of labor supply. In the case of continuous growth of an industry's
labor pool, even when competition characterizes said industry's market, it is possible for individual
enterprises to adopt different labor practices. The second dynamic is the conditions of capital
inflows to the investigated sector. In the case of continuous capital inflows and outflows in an
industrial sector, the competition takes place between capitals of short longevity. The implication
of this market structure for the organizational characteristics of individual enterprises is the enterprise-
level organizational evolution. Individual enterprises adopt different organizational arrangements
during different phases of their growth. These arrangements signify different labor practices. In
this section, I will summarize the arguments put forward by Maurice Dobb, Arghiri Emmanuel, and
Howard Botwinick in order to specify this proposition.

One of the heuristic contributions concerning the relationship between conditions of labor
supply and the effects on the rate of profit is Maurice Dobb's Political Economy and Capitalism
(1975). In this piece, Dobb regards the tendency of the rate of profit to fall as the most important
element in the transformation of the conditions of accumulation. For Dobb, any theory of demand
including the theory of the Marginalists is in one way or another dependent on a cost principle
(Dobb 1975: 27–31). In addition, any theory of value needs a reference outside the defined value
system (Dobb 1975: 9). Thus, even though the Marginalists’ position of keeping “the increments
in utility” as the source of the values is sustainable to the extent that their position is a theory of
demand, it is not as heuristic as Marx's labor theory of value. Through his critique of Ricardo's
theory, Dobb legitimizes his Marxian position: crises demonstrate the dynamics of the system, so
the analysis of accumulation crises is central in Dobb's inquiry (Dobb 1975: 80).

Marxist political economy argues that there is not necessarily a relationship between the
paces of productivity increases of Departments of Production. Moreover, the first Department of
Production (i.e. industries producing the means of production) historically enjoyed a higher pace of
productivity increases. Thus, it has long been argued that this “disproportionality” is an essential
contradiction of capital accumulation and a cause for systemic accumulation crises.

Dobb is critical of this argument. Disproportionality results in overproduction because of savings
for the consumer, yet such crises can be resolved without a depression, since savings do not lead to
absolute fall in consumers' demand (Dobb, 91). Dobb believes that overproduction in Department
I (industries producing the means of production) can generate new employment, which in return
increases effective demand (i.e. demand for Department II) over time. Similarly, growth in the
volume of the means of production means a positive change in the organic composition of capital
[from now on, OCK]. This change reduces commodity prices and has a positive and indirect impact
on effective demand. That is, Dobb does not give Rosa Luxemburg's thesis on disproportionality.

---

7. I will summarize Luxemburg’s argument in Part II.
any credit: the productivity differences between Departments of Production do not necessarily lead to a systemic crisis of overproduction. Equilibration between departments is satisfied, as long as exchange relations hold (Dobb 1975: 91–102).

The systemic problem of capitalist relations of production is closely bound to profit rates: even if the growth rate of surplus-rate declines, the growth in the OCK causes the rate of profits to decline (Dobb 1975: 97). Dobb criticizes two assumptions in Marx’s reproduction schemas. The first assumption is that new investment does not give rise to a growth in OCK. The second is that expanded production proceeds at a constant rate (Dobb 1975: 105-07). In order for these assumptions to be valid, “unlimited reserve army of labor” should be taken as a premise (Dobb 1975: 105-07). Not only is this presumption not realistic, but also capital accumulation practically causes a positive change in the OCK. This change precipitates the falling tendency of the rate of profit [from now on, “the falling tendency”] (Dobb 1975: 108). Thus, although Marx mentions some countertendencies working against the falling tendency in the third volume of Capital, he concludes that “the falling tendency” still accounts for the general trend (Dobb 1975: 109).

Maurice Dobb also doubts the empirical relevance of “the theories of underconsumption.” His emphasis on effective demand leads to the analysis of the growth of the labor force. In the case of “relative overpopulation” (i.e. labor force growing at a rate faster than that of accumulation), exploitation can continue with accumulation. Without a systemic urge for a rapid change in the OCK, “the falling tendency” slows down. However, in the cases of slow population growth, slow proletarianization, or fast wage increases, the falling tendency disturbs the equilibrium of productivity rates among different industries in correspondence to the growth in the OCK. Thus, Dobb argues that Marx’s theory is not one of underconsumption, because new investment does not necessarily cause overproduction. Similarly, higher wages do not necessarily prevent crises. Moreover, deficiencies in the consumption ability of the working class do not necessarily lead to a crisis in Department II (Dobb 1975: 110-18). Thus, the case of “underconsumption” is a special case rather than a generic outcome of the accumulation process.

The total volume of consumption and investment determine the rate of profit at a given distribution of capital between Departments of Production. An increase in consumption leads to an increase in the rate of profit. However, an increase in wages does not necessarily increase consumption (and, hence, the rate of profit), since wage increases also lead to increases in prices. In other words, inflation cancels out the possible positive effect of wage increases on rate of profit

Along with the growth of the labor force, another important factor determining the rate of profit is the characteristics of investment. For Dobb, throughout the competitive period, the investment had been “extensive”: periodic recruitment of a reserve army of labor had been “the classical method of preserving the rate of profit.” However, after the third quarter of the nineteenth century, “rigidities” in the labor market thanks to the intensification of labor struggle and the cheapening of foodstuffs thanks to colonial imports caused real wage increases. Accordingly, the falling tendency became more severe:

8. Yet Dobb does not speculate on the increase in real wages. Thus, it is difficult to understand his viewpoint on the impact of the real wage increases.
It is the difference between ease and difficulty of these basic forms of compensation for a falling rate of profit which seems to constitute the primary difference between the crises of the earlier and the later stages of capitalist economy (Dobb 1975: 126).

In fact, for Dobb, the availability of labor power and the characteristics of investment account for the relevance of the falling tendency as the primary cause for accumulation crises. For the purposes of this investigation, the implication of this conclusion is the need for the continued enlargement of the labor pool in order to sustain the existing rate of profit in the absence of wage increases. If the causality in the argument is expressed in the opposite manner, the sustainability of the competitive nature of a particular industry depends on the growth of its labor pool. Thus, I will provide the demographic data concerning the growth of the labor pool for the manufacturing industries in Istanbul in section II in order to explore the question of the labor force expansion in the apparel industry after the 1980s.

Dobb’s argument emphasizes the impact that the relationship between conditions of labor supply and competition has upon the variety of labor practices. The extent and characteristics of capital mobility, however, also have an impact on the level of variety of labor practices in an industry operating in competitive markets. Arghiri Emmanuel’s Unequal Exchange (1972) in this context investigates the impact of the relative mobility of capital and labor on the profitability differences. For Emmanuel, the availability of labor is a question of the geographical organization of capital as much as it is of the technical developments in the production process.

Emmanuel’s basic concern is to investigate the well-established assumptions regarding the international factor of mobility. Because specialization provides at best a relative optimum, when factors are noncompetitive, elasticities of demand for certain products are established as a result of political struggles, rather than the mechanical conditions of production (Emmanuel 1972: xiii). For example, despite the common forecast by nineteenth century thinkers regarding the prospective rise in the prices of primary products, the terms of trade for primary products had actually begun to deteriorate in their own day. For Emmanuel, this is an “optical illusion”: Caribbean sugar is a commodity no less manufactured than Scotch whiskey (Emmanuel 1972: xxx). What is “primary” and what is “industrial” are defined through the political relations between trading partners.

In fact, the determinant of the elasticities of demand cannot be the differentials in the technical (or, for that matter, organic) composition of capital. Nor can the “demand” account for why particular products are sold above or under their value. Demand should rather be regarded as one of the external factors, such as climate or natural resources, affecting value (Emmanuel 1972: 13). Because values practically diverge from prices and infinite number of equilibrium prices is, thus, possible, the major determinant for the exchange rates among commodities exchanged at the international level is not a set of universal values or prices (Emmanuel 1972: 15, 21, 23).

A crucial assumption here is the equalization of profits at the global level. Emmanuel makes this presumption because of the relatively free mobility of capital (Emmanuel 1972: 38). He criticizes Sweezy (1970) because of his failure to include the export of capital in his model: there is no empirical foundation for this assumption (Emmanuel 1972: 43). Even imperfect mobility brings about equalization (Emmanuel 1972: 45).
Moreover, even if the differentials in the intensity of labor across countries are taken into account, productivity differences are still far from being able to account for wage differences. In fact, wage differences are much larger than productivity differences (Emmanuel 1972: 48–53). This is an interesting argumentation: by eliminating most of the frequently used parameters of political economy, Emmanuel links wages to the general level of prices, rather relative prices. Determined historically, prices account for wage differentials (Emmanuel 1972: 25–27). Noncompetition of labor makes different rates of surplus in different countries possible, whereas competition of capital produces more or less equal profits. Inequality of wages accounts for the unequal exchange:

Regardless of any alteration in prices resulting from imperfect competition on the commodity market, unequal exchange is the proportion between equilibrium prices that is established through the equalization of profits between regions in which the rate of surplus value is ‘institutionally’ different- the term ‘institutionally’ meaning that these rates are, for whatever reason, safeguarded from competitive equalization on the factor market and are independent of relative prices (Emmanuel 1972: 60).

Once wages are taken as the independent variable (Emmanuel 1972: 64), differences between elasticities of demand for primary and secondary products become a secondary concern (Emmanuel 1972: 76). In his critique of the Singer-Prebisch thesis (Singer 1949, Prebisch 1950)9, Emmanuel argues that wages determine elasticities for demand (Emmanuel 1972: 80). The implication is clear: commodities produced in high-wage countries always have a high elasticity of demand regardless of the content or characteristics of those commodities.

The major check on the wages in high-wage countries is the competition among them rather than their (non-existing) competition with low-wage countries (Emmanuel 1972: 135). The only case in which productivities (hence, to a great extent, the OCK) determine differences in wages is the situation of perfect mobility of both factors: this is not the case, so the argument is sound (Emmanuel 1972: 136)10:

We have thus succeeded in integrating unequal exchange and the theory of international value into the general theory of value...In short, we have had to show that the formation of international value is a special case of the general theory of labor value in its developed form as the theory of price of production. This was done by using the assumption that seems to me the most realistic possible in the world of today, the assumption that the capital factor is mobile but the labor factor is immobile on the international plane (Emmanuel 1972: 267).

In fact, the quantum leaps in terms of wage differences both signify and reproduce particular wage zones. Through unequal exchange, a universal hierarchy of commodities allocates particular

9. This thesis regards the progressive development of productive forces in a country towards development of secondary trades as the central problem of growth.

10. I will not summarize all of his policy suggestions here, but one of the concepts that Emmanuel coins in this respect is particularly interesting: ‘organic composition of labor’ defined as ratio of the amount of social labor to the suitable positions in a given sector (Emmanuel 1972: 138). This ratio determines the productivity and the chances for gaining the maximum returns from the exchanges based on comparative advantage. In fact, appropriate organic composition of labor is a more important determinant of the shifts of industrial activities in low-wage zones than the positive change in the OCK.
commodities to these zones. The elasticity of demand for these commodities determines their respective prices in international trade. The respective prices reproduce the wage differences and complete the full circle. Accordingly, zones of high-wage accommodate labor practices of high productivity, since investment in constant capital is affordable thanks to the value transferred from low-wage zones. Consequently, labor processes in the high-wage zones have a higher organic composition of capital. The predominance of the constant capital in the labor process certainly has strong organizational implications for the actual labor practices.

This argument bears importance, as it convincingly demonstrates the dynamics behind wage disparities among different countries even in the case of intense international capital mobility. Capital mobility serves to equilibrate the profit rates across different countries. If wage disparities are sustained despite the competitive environment, different labor practices can be adopted by enterprises of a particular industry, which operate in different countries, in correspondence to such differentials in wages.

Emmanuel’s argument focuses on geographical differences in wages despite a unitary profit rate. As we will see in the next chapter, wage levels in the Turkish apparel sector are in between the levels of high and low income countries. This provides a large spectrum for the Turkish apparel enterprises of different sizes to operate either as “Fourth World sweatshops” or as “First World factories.”

More specifically, Howard Botwinick’s Persistent Inequalities (1993) provides an analysis of the same disparity within individual industrial sectors. The major question of this inquiry is the continued presence of competition in oligopolistic markets. How competition can still characterize the market of an oligopolistic sector despite the decreasing number of enterprises in that industry is a curious question. Botwinick is critical of the monopoly capitalism thesis (Baran and Sweezy 1966), because this perspective ignores the question of competition in its analysis of industrial relations. However, competition not only signifies the mobility of capital within and among industrial sectors, but also accounts for one of the basic paradigmatic premises of Marx’s theory. Thus, the observed competition even in the oligopolistic markets not only belies the empirical relevance of the monopoly capitalism thesis, but also asks for a description of the structure of and relations in such markets.

The most important proposition in Botwinick’s piece for our purposes is the one about the impact of the capital inflows on the wage disparities in a particular industry. As long as continuous inflow and outflow of capitals operating with different costs of production and technical compositions characterize the market of a particular industry, regulating capitals shape the competition, while they do not/cannot eliminate the competition (Botwinick 1993: 205–10). In such a market, competition is neither perfect nor imperfect, but just real. For the same reason, a market dominated by few players is not necessarily less competitive. Thanks to the differentials in the turnover periods for fixed capital, differentials in profit rates appear as a structural characteristic for any industry (Botwinick 1993: 123–39). Deriving from the differences in profit margins thanks to the differentials in the reserve capacities, equilibration of the rates of profit among industries remains mostly as a long-run tendency. Real competition creates segmentation, not homogenization, in labor practices. Accordingly, even in the oligopolistic markets, persistent differences in wages across the industry are theoretically possible (Botwinick 1993: 174–78).
An important inference to be drawn from Botwinick’s argument is the proposition concerning the impact of competition on the capital mobility within individual industries. If this argument were applied to a competitive sector, the same principle would still hold, probably with greater significance. Competition may signify continuous inflows of capitals, which replace the capitals exiting the sector. Thus, if this study can effectively demonstrate that the apparel industry in Turkey and more specifically in Istanbul is systemically exposed to such a high turnover of individual capitals, this will support our argument: one of the primary reasons for the multiplicity of labor practices in the Turkish industry is the extent of the turnover of individual capitals within this sector despite the highly competitive market environment, which could be expected to push individual enterprises to adopt, productivity-wise, the leading form of labor control.

Following these contributions, I will investigate the following parameters in the next section: the place of the apparel industry in Turkish economy; changes in the industry-wide wages and the labor pool; and the extent of the volatility of the positions of the individual enterprises in this sector.

2.2 THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE TURKISH APPAREL INDUSTRY SINCE 1980

2.2.1 Characteristics of the Export-Led Growth Strategy after 1980

As a result of the macro-economic changes in Turkey, the Turkish apparel industry has undergone two major transformations since 1980. The period between 1980 and 1995 marked a significant increase in the share of apparel exports in national exports. Apparel exports accounted for the backbone of the new export-led growth (ELG) policies deployed in the aftermath of the coup d’état in 1980. After 1995, the overall share of apparel exports began to fall. Policy changes after the financial crisis in 2001 resulted in the appreciation of domestic currency and hit the international competitiveness of the sector. The post-2001 period, thus, changed the characteristics of domestic competition within this sector.

Successive Turkish governments pursued import-substituting industrialization (ISI) policies between 1960 and 1980. Industrialization policies in this period emphasized domestic consumption. Accordingly, manufacturing enterprises were given significant incentives for the establishment of the national industrial basis. In 1980, this development agenda was left aside when the military took over the government with a bloody coup d’état and passed a new constitution that severely limited the democratic rights of organized labor. The post-coup governments in this undemocratic political environment adopted a new growth agenda that shifted the political emphasis from import-substitution to export-led growth (Keyder 1987). The chart below provides a tentative outline of the differences in industrialization strategies in the twentieth century.
|-----------------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|

Since the chronic scarcity of foreign exchange had been one of the most important weaknesses of the ISI strategy, one of the basic elements of the ELG-strategy was to restructure the industrial basis of the Turkish economy for export-oriented activities in order to ensure the inflow of foreign currency to the domestic markets. Accordingly, particular incentives such as cash bonuses were provided in the new era for the exporting enterprises. Bureaucratic procedures associated with exports were simplified. In this new institutional environment, export-based enterprises flourished. These policy choices established the institutional basis for the export boom from the 1980s on. As in East Asian countries, apparel production was the first choice for the new post-coup generation of industrialists (Öniş 1991). In other words, the post-coup economic policies established a new institutional framework for the apparel industry.
### Table 2.2 Terms of Foreign Trade (1960–2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Balance of Foreign Trade (million $)</th>
<th>Volume of Foreign Trade (million $)</th>
<th>Proportion of Imports covered by Exports (%)</th>
<th>Balance of Foreign Trade (million $)</th>
<th>Volume of Foreign Trade (million $)</th>
<th>Proportion of Imports covered by Exports (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>-147</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>-18947</td>
<td>72895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>-108</td>
<td>1035</td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>-14084</td>
<td>67258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>-359</td>
<td>1536</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>-26727</td>
<td>82277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>-3337</td>
<td>6139</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>-10064</td>
<td>72733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>-4999</td>
<td>10819</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>-15494</td>
<td>87612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>-3385</td>
<td>19301</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>-22086</td>
<td>11659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>-9342</td>
<td>35261</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>-34372</td>
<td>160706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>-14071</td>
<td>57346</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>-43297</td>
<td>190250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>-20402</td>
<td>66851</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>-54041</td>
<td>225110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>-22297</td>
<td>74819</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>-62790</td>
<td>277334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>-69936</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The chart above illustrates the export boom between 1980 and 2000. This export boom was accompanied by a productivity increase of approximately 2.5 times and increases in aggregate manufacturing output by almost four times. Also, the workforce in these industries doubled in two decades. However, real wages did not keep up with productivity gains in manufacturing.
The chart above illustrates that the most visible changes in the Turkish economy after the 1980s were the export boom, significant productivity increases in manufacturing, and stagnation in manufacturing wages. The apparel industry had a relatively insignificant share in national exports until the 1980s. In the two subsequent decades, however, it incessantly increased its share in national exports. In other words, not only exports increased their nominal value in the GDP, but also the apparel industry increased its share in national exports. Thus, this sector was the growth engine in this new economic environment.

The apparel industry had kept its leading position in exports until 1995. Two successive financial crises in 1995 and 2001 resulted in severe devaluations of the domestic currency and necessitated a change in the hitherto unchallenged depreciated domestic currency-high inflation policy. In order to eliminate the chronic problem of high inflation and to discipline the banking system in Turkey, a new policy agenda began to be implemented after 2001. Although governments after the 1995 crisis undertook several attempts to transform the dysfunctional aspects of the original ELG strategy, major institutional and legal reforms had to wait until 2001. Thus, I call the post-2001 period the second ELG period. Three outstanding features of the second ELG period changed the composition of exports.

First, Turkish currency was institutionally devalued with the cost of the chronic problem of high inflation between 1980 and 2001, since one of the major motivations behind the ELG-strategy was...
to earn foreign currency for the domestic economy. This trend partially accounted for the end of the harmony between productivity and wages after 1980. This depreciated domestic currency-high inflation policy became unsustainable in 2001 with one of the most severe crises of modern Turkish history (Kargi 2007). The appreciation of domestic currency after 2001 rendered labor-intensive industrial sectors less competitive in international markets. This change in the currency policy further motivated apparel enterprises to use informal labor practices in order to cut the labor costs.

Second, while the development of wages and productivity in manufacturing industries had already lost their synchrony since 1980, they began a reverse relationship after 1995, at least in the formal segments of the manufacturing industries. This is another sign for the pervasive use of informal employment.

Third, another financial cost of new macroeconomic policies after 2001 was high interest rates: in 2008, Turkey had the highest real interest rate in the world (Yurdakul 2009). High real interest rates certainly attracted short-term capital inflows to the domestic economy, which were celebrated as a temporary solution for increasing current account deficits; a chronic problem since 2001 thanks to the overvalued domestic currency strategy. As Boratav (2009) argues, such short-term capital inflows have become a major source of the current account deficit, rather than a consequence of the deficit. The share of imported inputs in the apparel industry increased after 2001. The industry lost many of its cost-advantages related with cheaper domestic non-labor inputs. The most important one of these inputs is domestic cotton. The value of cotton imports increased from $300 million to $2.3 billion between 1990 and 2008. As the chart below illustrates, the paces of growth of apparel exports and cotton imports lost their synchrony after 2001.

**Chart 2.2 Cotton Imports-Apparel Exports (1990–2008)**

![Chart 2.2 Cotton Imports-Apparel Exports (1990–2008)](chart2.2.png)

In fact, economic policies adopted after 2001 generated significant increases in exports by steel, machinery, and motor vehicle industries. The apparel industry lost its position as the primary export industry. In other words, as the chart below demonstrates, although the scope of output by the apparel industry is by no means in decline, its share in the national exports has been relatively less important in the 2000s in comparison to the 1990s.

**Chart 2.3 Trends in Largest Export Sectors (1990–2008)**

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute; http://www.tuik.gov.tr/disticaretapp/Basla.do

In this context, the Turkish apparel industry went through a second transformation. In 1980, apparel exports constituted 3.6 percent of total exports from Turkey and 10 percent of industrial exports, while this sector accounted for 29 percent of total exports and more than 35 percent of industrial exports at its peak in 1995 (Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade 2008). However, as the chart below illustrates, the share of apparel exports has been declining since 1995.

**Chart 2.4 Apparel and Textile Exports in the National Exports (1980–2007)**

Source: Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade (Dış Ticaret Müşteşarlığı)
Turkey is now the second biggest clothing exporter to the European Union after China and the sixth biggest apparel manufacturer in the world. Four percent of the global garment production takes place in Turkey (World Trade Organization 2008). It is the second capital goods importer after China in this sector (Ministry of Industry 2008). In other words, the apparel industry is a significant part of Turkish manufacturing. However, the sector took on different shapes during the first and second ELG periods.

Now, let us have a closer look at the socio-economic environment after 2001, focusing upon migration and wages in the apparel sector. Fast rural-to-urban migration between 1980 and 2000 provided the workforce for sweatshop labor. The relative slowdown in domestic migration to the urban centers and more specifically to Istanbul gave rise to the need to use the hitherto unused segments of the urban population. Wages remained at best stagnant, although they are neither low enough to provide competitive advantages in international markets nor high enough to employ highly skilled artisan labor. Moreover, wage differentials in the sector are significant and generate significant room for different labor practices.

The concordant changes put their mark on labor practices. The first period signifies the emergence of sweatshop labor: wage competitiveness in this period was based on an initial wave of informal employment in small-sized apparel facilities. In the post-2001 context, as inputs and labor were no longer competitive according to international standards, the new tendency was to use the labor of homemakers. Home-based work is the outcome of the need of the local capital to utilize this hitherto unused segment of the workforce.

### 2.2.2 Size of the Workforce and Wage Differentials

The increase in apparel exports by 130 times between 1980 and 2005 is one of the most important factors behind the overall transformation of the industrial relations in Turkey that consolidated the ELG strategy. Between 1990 and 2002, textile and apparel exports accounted for more than one third of all exports of the Turkish economy. These two sectors still make up more than one fifth of all Turkish exports as of 2010. Despite the significance of the policy shift to export-led growth, this transformation could not have been possible without the massive growth in the urban population in Turkey.
# Table 2.3 Urban and Rural Population in Turkey, 1955–2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Population (in 1000)</th>
<th>City Population (in 1000)</th>
<th>Village Population (in 1000)</th>
<th>Proportion of City Population in Total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>24,064</td>
<td>6,927</td>
<td>17,137</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>27,254</td>
<td>8,859</td>
<td>18,859</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>31,391</td>
<td>10,805</td>
<td>20,585</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>35,605</td>
<td>13,691</td>
<td>21,914</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>40,347</td>
<td>16,859</td>
<td>23,478</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>44,736</td>
<td>19,645</td>
<td>25,091</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>50,664</td>
<td>26,865</td>
<td>23,798</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>56,473</td>
<td>33,326</td>
<td>23,146</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>67,803</td>
<td>44,006</td>
<td>23,797</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>70,586</td>
<td>49,747</td>
<td>20,838</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2000 Census of Population; Turkish Statistical Institute

Between 1980 and 2005, Turkish cities grew by more than thirty million in population. Istanbul, as the center of the apparel industry in Turkey, has been the most important recipient of the migrants from rural areas and smaller cities of Turkey.
Table 2.4 Population of Istanbul after the Foundation of the Republic of Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Annual Population Increase (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>806,863</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>883,599</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>991,237</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>1,078,399</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1,166,477</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1,533,822</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1,882,092</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>2,293,823</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>3,019,032</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>3,904,588</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>4,741,890</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>5,842,985</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>7,309,190</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>10,018,735</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>11,331,964</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>12,782,960</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, National Census Data

Istanbul’s population grew by 5.3 million people between 1980 and 2000. This accounts for twenty percent of the total growth in urban population in Turkey. This transformation in population has been the basis of the ELG-based industrialization. The high urbanization rate was coupled with a significant nominal change in the urban population. Especially in the case of Istanbul, the population growth has been a major force behind the growth of the apparel industry and a significant reason for the variety in labor practices. Istanbul’s population grew by another 2.5 million in the last decade. However, population growth and net migration to Istanbul slowed down in the same period.
Table 2.5 Net Migration to Istanbul (1975–2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Net Migration to Istanbul* (in 1000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975–1980</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980–1985</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985–1990</td>
<td>656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000–2010**</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Based on Permanent Residence Registrations;
** Estimate Based on the Annual Censuses of 2008 and 2009

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute; Census of Population 2000-Migration Statistics

Migrants of different periods provide the labor power for numerous small-sized enterprises in new districts. Although migration to Istanbul still brings a significant number of migrants, there seems to be a relative slowdown after the 2000s in comparison to the period between 1980 and 2000.

There was a direct relationship between labor productivity and wages in manufacturing industries between 1960 and 1980. Industrial wages could not keep up with increases in productivity after 1980. After 1995, productivity began to increase in an inverse ratio to the wages.

Chart 2.5 Labor Productivity and Real Wages in Turkish Manufacturing (1950–2005)

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, Annual Manufacturing Surveys; Courtesy of Erinç Yeldan (2006)

This drop in real wages probably reflects the spread of informal labor practices. Stagnation in wages is illustrated in a more dramatic manner, when the share of wages in GDP is compared to the share of wage laborers in the national labor force.
Table 2.6 Wages in National Income (1985–2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Wages in GDP (%)</th>
<th>Wage Laborers in the National Labor Force (%)</th>
<th>Ratio of Wages to the Disposable Income of the Household</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985–1989</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990–1994</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995–1998</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>38.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999–2005</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ar 2007

As the figures concerning exports demonstrate, the apparel industry is the major source of employment among all manufacturing industries. Wages account for the second largest cost in this sector.

Table 2.7 Average Share of the Inputs for the Enterprises in the Turkish Apparel Industry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inputs</th>
<th>Woven Garments</th>
<th>Knitwear</th>
<th>Hosiery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major Raw Materials (%)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplementary Raw Materials and Accessories (%)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Costs (%)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing and Overheads (%)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Cost Items (%)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (%)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Survey conducted by ITKIB R&D, 2005

Yeni Rekabet Ortamında Türk Tekstil ve Hazırgiyim Sektörü, ITKIB Araştırma Raporu, 2005, İstanbul

Wages in the apparel industry have been traditionally below the average for manufacturing industries. Although data on wages for informal labor practices is lacking, it is a fair assumption that informally employed apparel workers earn even less than the formally employed workforce does.
In the global context, the average wage in the Turkish apparel industry is 3.5 times higher than wages in high-wage areas of China and 10.5 times higher than in Bangladesh, while it is almost one third of wages in Taiwan and half of the wages in Hong Kong (Werner International 2007). In other words, although it seems that wages in the formal segments of the Turkish apparel industry are too high to compete with low-income countries, wages in the informal segments of the sector are still low enough to survive competition with newly industrialized countries.

### Table 2.8 Hourly Wages in Textile Sector in Different Countries, 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>$/Hour</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>$/Hour</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>$/Hour</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>$/Hour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>33.67</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>15.81</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>31.65</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>13.09</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>28.17</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>9.89</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>1.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>25.24</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>7.77</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>23.42</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>7.64</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>China (Coastal Regions)</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>22.69</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>7.15</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>21.61</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>6.21</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>20.05</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>4.90</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>China (Interior Regions)</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>18.01</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>4.62</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>17.63</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>4.14</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>16.92</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Report on Labor Cost Comparisons in Primary Textiles, 2007; Werner International
In fact, the position of the Turkish apparel industry in the global wage scale gives rise to significant room for the multiplicity in labor practices. Wages in the Turkish apparel industry are neither too low for the entire industry to use such an advantage in small-sized establishments with informal and unskilled employment nor too high for the entire industry to adopt sophisticated management strategies in large-scale establishments with formal and skilled employment. In other words, the current average wage level in the Turkish apparel industry renders both strategies viable. Although the absence of reliable data on the wages pertinent to the Turkish apparel industry makes it difficult to provide a conclusive statement concerning the wage differentials between small- and large-sized enterprises, the research data reveals the extent of such differentials. The average monthly earnings of a homeworker soar between $60 and $100. An average sweatshop worker earns approximately $400 a month, while the monthly cost of employment of a factory worker can be as high as $800 with fringe benefits.

Thus, in the global context, it is difficult to put the earnings of the Turkish apparel workers in a particular category. The significant variation in the average wage in the Turkish apparel industry both accounts for and reflects the viability of different labor practices under the duress of global competition. As the majority of enterprises strive to survive global competition by acting as Fourth World enterprises, a significant minority of enterprises act as First World factories.

To recapitulate, migration-related dynamics encouraged an extensive strategy of employment of migrants to Istanbul between 1980 and 2000 in sweatshops. Due to the relative decline in migration rates in the post-2000 context, this strategy based on the employment of recent migrants shifted to the intensive employment of the hitherto unused population groups in the city, namely homemakers. The latter shift gave rise to home-based work as a widely used labor practice. Wages in the Turkish apparel context are significantly higher than those in low-income countries and lower than those in recently industrialized countries. Furthermore, there are significant differentials within industry. These two dynamics allow the sector to adopt different labor practices. Wage differentials in the industry would be less significant if Istanbul had a permanent “garment district.” Urban sprawl gives rise to new areas of clustering for this sector and new pockets of workforce, who would be willing to work for different wages.

Thus, the next section will give an overview of the urban and industrial transformation of Istanbul. The argument in this section is that the above-mentioned dynamics would not have rendered the apparel industry in Istanbul a competitive sector characterized by significant wage differentials unless the urban transformation of this city had pushed the zones of clustering for apparel production to the edges of the city every two decades since the 1960s.
2.3 SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF WORKFORCE AND COMPETITION

2.3.1 Geographical Distribution of Industrial Activities in Istanbul

The geographical distribution of industrial activities in Istanbul is closely related with historical conditions of the urban development of this city. In its historical development, Istanbul brought about six major industrial regions: in the European part, the region close to the Golden Horn (the estuary on Bosporus) and the old city were the oldest industrial districts. The city has been expanding both to the east and west since the 1960s. This urban sprawl gave rise to four new industrial regions or basins. Some parts around the western borders of the old city are still within this old industrial basin. It is entitled the ISI-Basin III on the map below. This area covers the districts of Bayrampaşa and Fatih. It is still a prominent center of industry for various sectors ranging from plastics to light metal processing.

Map 2.1 Large-Scale Industrial Activities in Istanbul

Source: Courtesy of the Department of Geographical Information Systems, Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality

11. In 2008, Istanbul Municipality partitioned some districts into smaller new districts. Bağcılar kept its borders, but, for instance, Sultangazi is now a new district separated from Gaziosmanpasa. In this study, I will refer to the borders preceding the recent partition.
However, the old city lost most of its industrial capacity. City quarters in the old city have functioned as the administrative centers of Eastern Rome and the Ottoman Empire for the last two millennia: the infrastructure of these districts was insufficient for heavy industry. Major government authorities of the city are located here. This proximity amounts to the stricter enforcement of the labor code. Furthermore, from the Second World War on, the municipality made several attempts to oust the industrial activities from the old city. Most importantly, the rural-to-urban migration settled in the periphery of the city.

The partial solution was to establish heavy industry along the coast of Golden Horn. This region is entitled ISI Basin I. The massive concentration of industry in this area created numerous negative effects, such as the extensive pollution of Golden Horn. Especially in the 1980s, this problem became an urgent agenda item for the metropolitan municipality. Factories gradually moved to the outer skirts of the city and Golden Horn ceased to be an industrial region.

As Golden Horn swiftly became the center of heavy manufacturing from the 1960s on, Zeytinburnu and the surrounding neighborhoods of Bakırköy were the destination of light industries: entitled ISI-Basin II, Zeytinburnu attracted a large number of migrants. This region was a center of the incipient apparel industry. Zeytinburnu is still a lively place for apparel facilities, though it can no longer keep up with the ongoing industrial growth of other emerging industrial districts of Istanbul. The scope of the apparel industry went beyond the production capacity of Zeytinburnu.

In other words, until the early 1980s, the ISI–Basin III and the Golden Horn region were the primary industrial sites, while Zeytinburnu was the center for light manufacturing including garment production. Thus, it is no wonder that a significant portion of the current top industrialists in the apparel sector began their careers in Zeytinburnu as workers and sweatshop owners. In the 1980s, the municipality actively worked to relocate industrial establishments from the Golden Horn and Zeytinburnu to the outskirts of the city. Moreover, more than four million new migrants, who were unfamiliar with labor unions and urban politics, joined the ranks of the working class of Istanbul between 1980 and 2000. They were eager to have jobs in new industries. This inflow of labor became an incentive for the well-established entrepreneurs of the day to move their factories to the recently emergent peripheral neighborhoods of the city (Tekeli 1994).

This initial wave of industrial expansion from the old city contributed to the emergence of two industrial regions: the region on the European part of the city is entitled ELG-Basin I and the region on the Asian part of the city is entitled ELG-Basin II. The ELG-Basin I is composed of five city districts and constitutes the most populous region of the city; Gaziosmanpaşa, Esenler, Gündoğen, Küçükçekmece, and Bağcılar. The ELG-Basin II is composed of two city districts; Ümraniye and Sultanbeyli.

The research setting of this project, Bağcılar, is in the ELG-Basin I. This region became a strategic location following the construction of a highway connecting the two major highways of the city (E5 and E6). This connection highway is the border between Küçükçekmece and Bağcılar. It also links the largest industrial park (İkitelli Organize Sanayii Sitesi) of Turkey to the E5 highway. The target workplaces are close to this connection highway. The target home-based work organization is close to the E6 highway. The ELG-Basin I and II have been urbanized for the last three decades. Accordingly, industrial investment gradually shifted from the ISI-Basins to these regions of the city.
A further expansion, this time from the initial ELG-Basins, extended the geographical scope of industrial production, especially since the early 1990s. ELG-Basin III and ELG-Basin IV are the recently developing industrial areas of Istanbul. It seems that these regions have developed at the expense of the ELG-Basin I and II. In other words, ELG-Basin I and II have been going through a similar process, already undergone by the ISI-Basins due to the development of these initial basins of ELG.

Given the weight of informal sweatshops in the industrial scene of the apparel sector, it is certainly a challenge to track the changes in the geographical distribution of small-sized industrial establishments. A proxy can be, however, the number of firms registered with the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce. It is mandatory for all formal commercial and non-industrial firms located in Istanbul to register as members in this chamber.

**Chart 2.7 New Businesses Registered for the Membership of Istanbul Chamber of Commerce (1950–2008)**

**Chart 2.8 Liquidated Commercial Firms (Members of the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce. 1970–2007)**

Source: Courtesy of Istanbul Chamber of Commerce
Commercial activities in the ISI-Basin slowed down in the 1990s. The number of liquidated firms in the ISI-Basins has been much larger than all other industrial districts of Istanbul from the 1980s on. Although the ELG-Basin I, which includes Bağcılar, seems to have not lost its leading role in the commercial activities, the number of liquidated businesses in this basin increased drastically, especially after the 2001 crisis. It is possible to argue that this represents a new transformation of the industrial relations in Istanbul with the consequence of another centrifugal movement to the outer skirts of the city, which now covers ELG-Basin III and IV. These regions have been growing at a similar pace with ELG-Basin I and II, while they did not experience a fall in commercial activities as much as ELG-Basin I during the crisis in 2001.

To recapitulate, except for the ISI-Basin I around the Golden Horn, other industrial districts are mostly alive. However, a centrifugal shift of industrial activities to the outer skirts of the city is also visible. This physical movement is associated with the new waves of migration settling mostly in the relatively peripheral and new districts of the city.

In this context, since these regions received the inflow of industrial activities from the ISI basins in the past, ELG-Basin I and II host a multiplicity of migrant groups and industrial activities. They also began to lose some of those activities to the emerging new basins of the ELG. This particularity renders industrial and residential districts in these basins the appropriate sites for research investigating the conditions of multiplication of forms of industrial labor. Given its labor-intensiveness, the apparel industry is amenable to various labor practices. Since it is a light industry, the geographical shift of the concentration of apparel enterprises in Istanbul is mostly associated with the conditions of the location of the workforce. For the same reason, industrial establishments in the apparel sectors are usually located within or very close to the residential areas of the city.

2.3.2 New Forms of Labor in Istanbul’s Apparel Industry: A Nation of Tailors

Istanbul accounts for one fourth of industrial production in Turkey. In 2007, various sectors in Istanbul exported different forms of merchandise amounting to $55.2 billion: this value represented more than half of all Turkey’s exports in the same year ($105 billion). Ninety two percent of Istanbul’s exports in 2007 (ca. a value of $51.2 billion) were composed of industrial merchandise of various sorts (Istanbul Textile and Ready-Made Clothing Exporters Association; www.itkib.org.tr). Approximately one fourth of the exports from Istanbul (ca. $12 billion) were produced by the apparel industry.
### Table 2.9 Istanbul’s Exports in 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>3639</td>
<td>Chemical Materials and Products</td>
<td>4087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Produce</td>
<td>2072</td>
<td>Manufactures</td>
<td>42235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal Products</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>12013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood and Forest-Related Products</td>
<td>1044</td>
<td>Automotive Related Goods</td>
<td>9124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry (General)</td>
<td>51207</td>
<td>Electronics</td>
<td>4737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Processed Goods</td>
<td>4851</td>
<td>Steel Products</td>
<td>7702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles and Related Raw Materials</td>
<td>3648</td>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>449</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Within the exported manufactures, the largest three items are clothing, automotive-related products, and steel products. These are followed by steel- and metal-processing, machinery, and concrete. Apparel production is one of the largest sectors in industrial manufactures in terms of the value of its output. It is also the largest manufacturing sector in terms of the size of employment.

There is no reliable data about the geographical distribution of workplaces and the number of employees in Istanbul in the apparel industry. According to the most recent General Census of Industry and Business Establishments (2002), 342998 enterprises manufacturing apparel and processing fur were documented to employ 311,105 workers in Turkey. Given the informal employment practices in Turkey, a more realistic figure is the estimate proposed by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (2008): approximately 1.5 million workers.\(^\text{12}\)

The share of Istanbul’s exports in apparel in national apparel exports as a whole can be used to calculate an indirect estimate of the number of apparel workers employed in Istanbul. According to the data provided by the Turkey Exporters Assembly, apparel exports from Turkey in 2007 equaled $16 billion, while clothing exports from Istanbul in the same year equaled $12 billion.\(^\text{13}\) If we assume that the number of apparel workers in Istanbul corresponds to Istanbul’s share in apparel exports, then the estimate size of the workforce in Istanbul’s apparel industry is approximately 1.1 million workers. The estimate figure of industrial workers in Istanbul is 1.57 million.\(^\text{14}\) Thus, it is possible to argue that approximately seventy five percent of workers in Istanbul are employed in the apparel industry.

---

\(^\text{12}\) The report does not specify the basis of this estimate. However, it is possible to substantiate this estimate with the existing data: according to a 2005 survey by IKTIB, which was cited above, an average of 28 percent of the total costs of IKTIB’s members are spent on labor costs. Turkish garment exports in 2007 was $16 billion in value. If the average worker is assumed to be paid the monthly minimum wage, which is approximately $300, we can expect that the exporting segment of the sector employs at least 1.25 million workers.


\(^\text{14}\) TUIK, Bolgesel Gostergeler, 2008
A count by the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality in 2006 provides a rough map of the location of industrial facilities in the apparel sector. Covering the area from Küçükçekmece to Kağıthane, the low-income city districts of the European part of the city appear as the primary region for apparel production.

Map 2.2 Apparel Enterprises in Istanbul

Apparel-producing facilities were clustered in Zeytinburnu until the 1980s. Zeytinburnu was one of the first districts for squatter settlements in Istanbul and it was the largest one in the 1960s (Hart 1969). Thus, it is no wonder why apparel production began to flourish in this district. In the 1980s, the population density in the European part of the city shifted towards the north. The 1980s witnessed the boom in the apparel industry. The new area of industrial clustering was Merter, which borders both Zeytinburnu and ELG-Basin I. However, Merter quickly lost its significance in the apparel industry in the early 1990s. The new areas of industrial clustering for the apparel sector were ELG-Basin I and ELG-Basin II. The further expansion of the city with the further population inflow boosted apparel production in ELG-Basin III and ELG-Basin IV.

What is astonishing is that all of these shifts from Zeytinburnu, to Merter, to the first and second ELG-Basins, and, finally, to the third and fourth ELG-Basins took place in a time period of less than three decades. Certainly, all of the aging districts of industrial concentration still have a significant number of apparel enterprises, as the map illustrates. Accordingly, ELG-Basin I, as the most populous districts of the city, and ELG-Basin II still have the majority of apparel enterprises.
However, they are losing their industrial establishments to the new industrial basins probably as swiftly as Zeytinburnu did in the 1980s and Merter did in the 1990s.

### 2.3.2.1 Location-Bound Sweatshops

How does a small-scale enterprise respond to the shifts in the geographical concentration of industrial activities? Have the shifts in the geographical concentration of the apparel enterprises occurred because these enterprises moved to different locations or because these enterprises went out of business and were replaced by others in the new areas of population density? On the one hand, it is certainly difficult for small-scale industrial establishments to relocate in pursuit of cheaper labor. On the other hand, there are at least two substantial reasons for a small-scale enterprise to continue to operate in its original location, even when apparel-related activities begin to geographically cluster in other districts.

First, small-scale enterprises mostly rely on the local labor pool, as we will see in the following chapters. Moving to a different district is usually unfavorable as it carries the risk for the sweatshop owner of finding a reliable work force at the destination point. Second, even if it is inevitable for an enterprise to move to another city district in order to reach a cheaper labor force, it is usually financially difficult for small-scale industrial establishments to start a brand new business in a new district.

None of the sweatshops monitored during the course of this project had ever left their district. Although moving to a larger or smaller place in accordance with the changes in the productive capacity is common, sweatshops usually remain in the same district, since sweatshop owners are men of their locality. Regardless of the rate of worker turnover in their sweatshops, most of them do not see the relocation of their sweatshop to an emerging district as a viable option. Unless they feel that they find a pool of workers, who have close identity-affiliations with them as a result of such relocation, there is simply no point embarking upon a new adventure, with their business already in a downward spiral. In other words, a sweatshop owner outside his local context is like a fish out of water. For example, the firm, which owns the target factory, moved its production facility from Zeytinburnu to Bağcılar, only when it substantially increased its productive capacity. As we will see, one of the most significant reasons for this decision was to reach the local labor pool in a particular quarter in the research setting, since the local population had strong cultural affiliations with the owner of this firm. Thus, it was not only feasible for this firm to move to Bağcılar, but also the new location provided advantages in terms of easier access to the target workforce; i.e. workers, who migrated to Istanbul from the same hometown as the firm owner.

In other words, large-scale apparel enterprises ironically can and do relocate their production facilities, while small-scale enterprises are usually deprived of this opportunity, although it is usually the only possible option for such enterprises to remain in business. In fact, sweatshops are nailed down to their origin of birth thanks to their size. Thus, it is a relatively safe assumption that shifts in the geographical concentration of apparel enterprises within the last three decades in Istanbul demonstrate and cause the short longevity of the small-scale enterprises.
2.3.2.2 Geographically Expanding Home-Based Work Networks

The organizational success of home-based work (HBW) networks depends on their capacity to employ homeworkers from the most diverse cultural and social origins, as the key to success is to reach the largest labor pool possible. Since the primary form of remuneration for HBW is the piece-wage, homeworkers are not employed on payroll. Jobbers distribute the piecework to the homeworkers for individual operations. In the absence of formal contracts of employment, it is a fundamental challenge for jobbers to find the sufficient number of homeworkers for a particular order in one district. As the deadlines are usually short, jobbers work with complex networks of homeworkers. These distribution channels connect different groups of homeworkers in different districts of Istanbul.

In 2003 and 2006, I had the opportunity to talk with jobbers operating in different districts of Istanbul about the organizational details of such distribution channels. These middlepersons operate their business with motor vehicles. They are in contact with group leaders in different districts of Istanbul. The group leaders are responsible for establishing control over individual homeworkers. Each chain in these networks earns a certain commission on of the total money earned for the entire operation.

The involvement of homeworkers in these organizations has an erratic nature for two reasons. First, almost all homeworkers are housewives and most of them are not the major providers for their family. Since they regard their domestic duties as their primary responsibility, they take on piecework only to the extent that it does not obstruct the house chores and childcare. Second, low piece wages also generate a category of “freelancing” homeworkers, who bargain with multiple jobbers at the same time in order to earn the highest amount of money. Even small fractions of differences in piece rates shift large numbers of homeworkers from one jobber to another.

Accordingly, two factors are the key to success in the competition among HBW middlepersons. First, they have to have access to more homeworkers than their competitors. A larger portfolio of homeworkers guarantees the completion of the order until the deadline. Second, middlepersons also have to be able to employ the pieceworkers, who would accept the lowest piece wages. Unsurprisingly, such workers are usually late migrants to the city and live in the peripheral districts. These two factors urge the jobbers to work with multiple homeworker groups in different districts.

Thus, the very survival of the HBW networks is very much dependent on their capacity to geographically expand their workforce. In other words, sweatshop owners need to work in a particular district or neighborhood, as they know the codes of the local business and urban culture. Urban sprawl, however, brings new migrants to the peripheral districts of Istanbul. New sweatshops in these new districts of Istanbul are much closer to the new workers, who would accept lower wages. Accordingly, sweatshops in the relatively older districts face a serious challenge from their competitors in these newly emerging working class districts. In the case of the HBW networks, the urban transformation similarly brings about new conditions for competition. Jobbers, who successfully expand their distribution channels to these new districts, win over their competitors.

Most of these middlepersons are not the representatives of individual enterprises, but entrepreneurs working for multiple firms. Moreover, they usually begin their career at the lower echelons of the HBW networks and eventually establish their own distribution channel. As they go
through each layer of responsibility in the HBW networks, they take on different roles with regard to control of their sub-networks and homeworkers. Many such networks die within a couple of years thanks to high competition. New ones are established most of the time by the middle-level organizers of old networks.

In the fourth chapter, I will present my observations about one of the many existing sub-networks. The organizer of this sub-network, Ms. Networker, was working both for the target factory and mobile HBW jobbers. She worked as a worker at apparel sweatshops until she got married. Then, she quit her job in order to raise her children. In 2000, she began to organize homeworkers in Merter, the rising district for textile production until the early 1990s. However, by the time she began to work in this sector, Merter had lost its central position in the apparel industry of Istanbul. Most of the sweatshops and factories moved to the peripheral districts of Istanbul and were replaced with wholesalers of textile inputs such as accessories, thread, and special fabrics. Some of the accessory wholesalers were directly or indirectly involved in the organization of HBW. As export firms realized the potential in the HBW, special accessories and especially beadwork became a semi-independent industrial sector. Although Merter was no longer the center of the apparel industry in Istanbul, it was (and is) a rather lively quarter for the trade of beads and other accessories.

As a result of the competition among HBW jobbers for homeworkers in Merter, Ms. Networker’s business in this district failed and she decided to move to Gazi Neighborhood in Gaziosmanpaşa, in order to gain easier access to a more abundant labor pool ready to work for lower piece rates. She had grown up in this district and had connections with the local population. Consequently, she has been able to keep her business alive since 2001. She was not a mobile HBW jobber, but an organizer for a sub-network for city-wide HBW networks. She opened a shop for the distribution of piecework to the women in her district. As elaborated in the previous section, such shops are now common in the working class districts of Istanbul. I call them “HBW-shops.” These shops primarily function as distribution points of the piecework to the homeworkers.

Ms. Networker was one of the few HBW-shop owners in her neighborhood until a few years ago. However, verifying my previous observations, HBW-shops in her district have become increasingly widespread in recent years. The rising number of HBW shops in Gaziosmanpaşa (and other working class districts of Istanbul) points to the key position of this form of industrial labor in the apparel industry. Ms. Networker was astute enough to see the importance of access to a vulnerable labor pool for her business. As she and her family moved to her childhood neighborhood for the sake of her business, she was able to grow the scope of her business significantly. Her annual budget reached approximately $80,000 by the time of the project. Her exceptional success story managed to survive the death of Merter. Other organizers of sub-networks, who insisted on staying in Merter, went out of business. They also took many mobile HBW jobbers, who were not able to expand their operations to the new working class districts, down with them. In the fourth chapter, a closer investigation of the organizational characteristics of this network will help to decipher the characteristics of this particular form and its role in the target supply chain.

To sum up, the urban sprawl in the last half century has been shaping the human geography of Istanbul with successive waves of migration. The emergence of new districts on the outskirts of the city accounts for the high turnover for small-scale work organizations in the apparel industry. In
the case of sweatshops located in relatively older districts, the geographical expansion of the city as a result of migration amounts to intensified competition by sweatshops located in relatively newer districts. In the case of HBW networks, the same expansion sets new conditions for competition in the form of a race to reach the most vulnerable homeworkers in the emerging districts. Jobbers, who have easier access to this pool of labor, win over jobbers, who are well settled in the older districts, but fail to expand their network to the new districts. All in all, the urban transformation characterizes the structure of competition for small-scale work organizations in the apparel industry.

2.4 VOLATILITY OF CAPITALS IN ISTANBUL’S APPAREL INDUSTRY

Changes in the policies concerning export-oriented growth, migration, wage structure, and urban sprawl intensify the competitive dynamics in this industry. This section articulates the impact of such dynamics on the individual enterprises of the sector. The data about the upper and lower segments of the market reveals a high turnover rate of enterprises.

This finding helps to establish the theoretical link between formation of local industrial markets, characteristics of competition, and the multiplicity in labor practices. This section first looks at the longevity of large corporations and, then, investigates the volatility of medium-sized enterprises in the sector.

2.4.1 The Upper Echelons of the Sector: the Destiny of the Top Players

The average longevity of individual enterprises in a particular sector is a useful indicator to evaluate the turnover of individual capitals in that sector. A shorter average longevity means a high turnover of capitals. The high turnover of capitals accounts for a barrier to the emergence of oligopolistic competition and monopolization. The short average enterprise longevity has been a characteristic of the Turkish manufacturing industries since the late 1990s. Especially in the apparel industry, this acted as a countervailing force against monopolization.

The 1990s was the golden age for small enterprises especially in the apparel industry, which came to an end with a severe devaluation in 1995. Moreover, the peak of the apparel industry in the 1990s boosted the number of new manufacturing firms in the Turkish economy. The pace of growth in the number of manufacturing companies continued after the crisis in 1995, yet the new phenomenon was now a simultaneous rise in the number of liquidated manufacturing firms in correspondence to the number of new manufacturing firms.

15. See Shaikh 1978 and 1980 in regard to an extensive debate about the role of competition in investment-related decisions of enterprises.
As of 2008, one manufacturing firm is liquidated for every four new firms. The apparel industry significantly contributes to this high turnover of enterprises in Turkish manufacturing after 1997. The Istanbul Chamber of Industry annually publishes the list of “Turkey’s Top 500 Industrial Enterprises.” Between 1993 and 2007, sixty-two ready-made clothing enterprises were on this list. The average number of apparel firms in this list is 17.9 with a standard deviation of 4.3.

When we look at the distribution of the apparel firms on this list, we see that 21 firms were able to make it onto the list only once, while 38 firms remained on the list for less than four years. On the whole, the average amount of time that an apparel firm was able to remain on the list was only 4.3 years, with a standard deviation of 3.5 years.
Only seventeen firms were on the list longer than five years (i.e. for a period longer than average) and eleven firms were on the list more than seven years (i.e. for a period longer than the sum of average and standard deviation). Are these firms the “monopolies” of the apparel industry?

Most of the large-scale firms employ a significant number of sweatshops in their supply chains and the productive capacity of these sweatshops is most of the time “off the books.” Thus, the most reliable data on the size of a large-scale apparel enterprise is its annual exports. The average value of exports of the apparel enterprises in the “Top 500 Industrial Enterprises” is $34 million\(^\text{16}\) with a standard deviation of $24 million, while the average for the top eleven firms is $40 million with a standard deviation of $25 million. In other words, $65 million in annual exports appears as a limit of growth for apparel enterprises in Turkey. Apparel firms in the Top 500 Industrialists List for 2007 on average exported garments of a value of approximately $95 million. The annual value of garment exports of Istanbul and Turkey in the same year was respectively $12 billion and $15 billion. The largest enterprises of the Turkish apparel industry account for less than ten percent of Istanbul’s total apparel exports. The chart below illustrates the inability of large enterprises to maintain their position in the sector.

\(^{16}\) Figures, in this section, are nominal values.
We can interpret the data from The Top 500 Industrial Establishments of Turkey lists as follows: the first and most important finding for our purposes is the noteworthy fluctuation in the upper echelons of the apparel industry within the last fifteen years. This high volatility, marked by a slowdown in exports and the new currency regime after 2001, reveals the particular characteristics of this sector. Second, $65 million in annual exports represents a substantial limit or threshold of growth for apparel enterprises. Very few apparel enterprises grow beyond this limit. These firms cannot grow beyond another limit of $120 million in annual exports. Third, most of the firms which reach the “$65 million threshold” in exports are unable to maintain this figure for any longer than five years. Fourth, even though some firms have been above this threshold for longer than eight years, this does not demonstrate that they grow at the expense of other firms, since their average size is not particularly larger than the other firms on the list. Out of eleven firms that stayed on the list for longer than eight years, three of them were no longer on the list after 2003, while three new firms that had not appeared on the list before came to rank amongst the top 500 industrial establishments in Turkey and sustained their positions on the list from 2000 on.

Finally, an average of approximately eighteen apparel enterprises make it onto the list of top 500 industrial establishments every year (in other words, firms that export roughly more than $20 million a year), if the effect of the financial crises in 1993 and 2001 is momentarily ignored. These crises resulted in or from the devaluation of the Turkish currency and, hence, boosted the apparel exports. In other words, although most of the firms make it on the list for only a short period, the number of apparel firms exporting a value of approximately $30 million is more or less stable. Growth for even large-scale enterprises in the apparel industry has its limits. Moreover, growth is unsustainable.
2.4.2 The Lower Echelons of the Sector: the Destiny of the Fallen Soldiers

This picture of the most successful apparel enterprises bears significant similarities with the position of medium- and small-sized apparel exporting enterprises. All exporting firms in Istanbul's ready-made garment (or apparel) industry must be a member of the General Secretariat of Istanbul Textile and Apparel Exporters' Association (İstanbul Tekstil ve Konfeksiyon İhracatçıları Birliği-İTKIB) in order to receive the proper permit for exporting. Thus, the membership trends of ITKIB in recent years provide reliable information concerning the extent of the dynamism of Istanbul's apparel industry in terms of capital inflows and outflows. Since Istanbul accounts for more than eighty percent of Turkey's apparel exports, such trends are also representative of Turkey's apparel industry.

Chart 2.12 Number of ITKIB Membership (1985–2009)

The synchrony between emerging and liquidated enterprises is illustrated in the chart above. The membership numbers for this organization reflect the changes in the numbers of the exporting firms over the past two decades. Since 1985, every year, an average of more than 1,300 enterprises have become members in this organization. ITKIB has been keeping proper records of withdrawing members since 1996. The average number of withdrawing members since 1996 is 1,485.

In 2009, ITKIB had 7,844 members operating in Istanbul. The same year, 1,104 new apparel enterprises joined this association. As a reminder, every exporting apparel enterprise which is located in Istanbul must be a member of ITKIB. The membership of 2,256 apparel enterprises was terminated in 2009. These figures strikingly illustrate the rate of turnover of exporting enterprises in Istanbul's apparel industry. Enterprises which are no longer able to export apparels or simply exit the sector are replaced by new enterprises. Thus, it is possible to argue that the apparel industry is in constant fluctuation as a result of the continued inflow and outflow of capitals in this sector. Moreover, the high turnover rate is as pertinent to the medium-sized enterprises as it is to the lowest and highest segments of the industry.

The chart below illustrates further details concerning apparel exporting manufacturers over the last decade. First of all, despite intensified global competition, Istanbul's apparel exporters seem to have successfully coped with recent challenges. Although the total number of exporting apparel manufacturers remained more or less stable, there is a constant reshuffling of enterprises in the export business. The average ratio of new exporters to firms withdrawing from ITKIB membership is 1.16 for the years between 2000 and 2009. Even if the peak in 2003 is momentarily ignored,
the average ratio drops to just 1.006. In other words, the exiting capitals were almost completely replaced by the entering capitals during this decade. The ratio of the new and withdrawing export manufacturers to the total number of export manufactures in a year between 2000 and 2009 is on average 48 percent. In other words, almost half of the capital in the industry's export is replaced by others each year.

**Chart 2.13 Apparel Exporters in Istanbul (2000–2009)**

Given that all exporting manufacturers are obliged to become a member of ITKIB, membership lists provide a concrete idea of the concentration of capital in Istanbul's apparel industry. The chart below substantiates the argument concerning the limits to growth in the previous section.

**Table 2.11 Apparel Exporting Manufacturers in Istanbul (2000–2009)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0–100.000$</td>
<td>2585</td>
<td>2845</td>
<td>2922</td>
<td>2941</td>
<td>3424</td>
<td>3566</td>
<td>3664</td>
<td>3466</td>
<td>3076</td>
<td>2975</td>
<td>3146.4</td>
<td>306.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100.000–500.000$</td>
<td>1080</td>
<td>1139</td>
<td>1132</td>
<td>1131</td>
<td>1363</td>
<td>1454</td>
<td>1422</td>
<td>1444</td>
<td>1411</td>
<td>1274</td>
<td>1285.0</td>
<td>133.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500.000–1.000.000$</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>470.8</td>
<td>59.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.000.000–10.000.000$</td>
<td>917</td>
<td>876</td>
<td>958</td>
<td>1042</td>
<td>1125</td>
<td>1131</td>
<td>1208</td>
<td>1174</td>
<td>1189</td>
<td>1047</td>
<td>1066.7</td>
<td>98.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.000.000–33.000.000$</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>162.6</td>
<td>49.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33.000.000–65.000.000$</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65.000.000–100.000.000$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 100.000.000$</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5012</td>
<td>5322</td>
<td>5557</td>
<td>5709</td>
<td>6605</td>
<td>6937</td>
<td>7053</td>
<td>6928</td>
<td>6474</td>
<td>5984</td>
<td>6158.1</td>
<td>583.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Courtesy of the Secretariat of ITKIB
First, more than fifty percent of exporting manufacturers export merchandise annually under a value of $100,000. Another twenty percent annually export merchandise valuing up to $500,000. These medium-sized sweatshops employing between thirty and one hundred workers account for seventy percent of the total population of exporting manufacturers. Second, another significant category of exporters falls in the threshold between $1,000,000 and $10,000,000. Most of these enterprises operate relatively large-scale facilities employing at least fifty workers and possibly working with subcontracting sweatshops. Lastly, supporting the “$35 million threshold” hypothesis, there is an insignificant number of manufacturers that could annually export merchandise worth more than $33 million. There are only very few enterprises exporting merchandise at a level above $65 million. Although the value of the annual apparel exports from Istanbul has soared to the level of around $12 billion as of 2010, small- and medium sized enterprises’ direct share in Istanbul’s apparel exports accounts for less than ten percent of this figure. Adding to the data in the previous section which established the presence of a high turnover rate for large enterprises, this data verifies the extremely high turnover rate for medium- and small-sized enterprises.

2.5 HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDS OF TARGET FACTORIES AND SWEATSHOPS

I find it necessary to present the histories of target factory and sweatshops here for two reasons. Firstly, stories of these enterprises substantiate the argument concerning the impact of competitive pressures on the labor practices adopted by different enterprises. Second, this section will be an introduction to the case study in this book.

A typical apparel enterprise begins its life as a small sweatshop. In most cases, such enterprises are started by workers who, possessing enough social capital to borrow some money for seven or eight sewing machines, take the risk to open a sweatshop, sometimes because they do not see any prospect in their future. Sometimes the reason is much simpler: they are tired of working. They usually cut a deal with one of the jobbers working for a factory. The jobber is promised his commission from the worker/would-be sweatshop owner. If our worker can find a couple of friends or convince his cousins to work at his sweatshop, he is in the game. The immediate goal is to grow the production capacity as fast as possible in order to take orders from exporting firms. Exporting firms generally pay higher rates than domestic firms, while they also expect an output of higher quality. If they manage to satisfy the jobber in terms of punctual delivery and production quality, the sweatshop begins to employ more workers. Thus our sweatshop owner takes his first steps towards his dream of exporting his products directly to the foreign markets himself one day.

Naturally, in most cases, this dream does not come true. Every single day, a worker opens a new sweatshop. Every single day, a sweatshop owner, who was a worker last year, becomes a worker once again. Is this the end of his dream? Absolutely not. To be back in the ranks of the working class is only an interlude; an interim period between dreams. Once he pays his debt, or if he can trick his debtors in one way or another, he is back in the game. Mr. Survivor was one of those worker/sweatshop owners.

When I was introduced to Mr. Survivor by one of my co-workers from a sweatshop where I had conducted research, he was just about to open his own sweatshop in a couple of weeks. I had recently completed my observations in another sweatshop, and I was already in search for a small
family enterprise in order to extend my observations on sweatshop labor. He was interested in the project, especially when I told him about my intention to work at his sweatshop as an ordinary worker. He could certainly use somebody, at least for a couple of weeks, he said, even though he knew that I would be there primarily for research purposes.

He had moved with his family to Istanbul in 1996 from Diyarbakır, a Southeast Anatolian province populated mostly by Kurdish citizens. His village had been evacuated by the military, because their fellow villagers were believed to support the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) guerillas. Having moved to Istanbul at the age of seventeen, he had immediately begun working at a sweatshop. He had soon become the foreman at one of the many places he worked at. This experience had given him the self-confidence to open his own sweatshop. He had tried once in 2003 and once again in 2006. Having failed, each time, he had returned to work at the last sweatshop that had employed him before his business adventure. This was going to be his third attempt.

This time, he had found a partner: I.R.R., a hemşehri17 of Mr. Survivor. I.R.R.’s family had migrated to Istanbul in 1998. As in Mr. Survivor’s case, their village too had been evacuated by the military. Their initial choice was to move to the city of Diyarbakır. I.R.R. and his older brother, L.K.M., began to work at the wholesale fruit and vegetable market in Diyarbakır. Competition at the market was intense most of the time, sometimes to the point that they ended up in gun fights. Concerned for the lives of his sons, his father had sent them to Istanbul. Like Mr. Survivor and many other Kurdish migrants, they too began working at sweatshops.

I.R.R. bought the sewing machines. Mr. Survivor had the connections. They convinced their sisters and wives to work at their new place. They rented a 50-square meter shop on the ground floor of a residential building, bought second-hand sewing machines, and opened their atelier. I call this sweatshop “the Family Sweatshop” throughout this study.

A year later, after I had finished my project, I called Mr. Survivor to tell him that I was back in Istanbul, and he invited me to their new place. The new workplace was only two blocks away from the first one. It was obvious that they had done pretty well with their business. They had bought new sewing machines, moved to a larger place, and employed more workers. L.K.M., I.R.R., and Mr. Survivor were still working together.

As I sat in Mr. Survivor’s “office,” a corner with a “manager table” separated from the rest of the shop with a curtain, after asking for my permission to do so, he picked up the conversation he had been having with a teenager in his office prior to my arrival. He was eagerly trying to convince the teenager to working at his sweatshop. Clearly, the teenager did not share Mr. Survivor’s enthusiasm, because he knew that working at this sweatshop would be no different than working at any other. But he had to work. He asked reluctantly,

Are they gonna be working here? I don’t want them working here.

Mr. Survivor: No, no… Their time is up. They don’t really do much here anyways. I’m gonna kick ’em all out soon.

---

17. Hemşehri is someone who hails from the same town or province as oneself. The common provincial origin leads to close cultural and social ties among Hemşehris in Istanbul. See Erder 1996.
After the teenage worker had unwillingly agreed to start work at Mr. Survivor’s sweatshop next week and left, I asked Mr. Survivor who he was talking about. It turned out that this young worker did not want to work with Mr. Survivor’s relatives, since he knew that working with the family members of the boss at a sweatshop meant not only working for yourself, but also having to work harder to cover the low performance of the others. Mr. Survivor paused for a second and then said, with great seriousness,

We’ve grown enough; we can’t carry their burden any longer. We need ordinary workers, strangers. You can curse at them. You can’t yell at family.

How much will his enterprise grow? How big could it become in the future? Mr. Survivor made his own dream come true as in many successful examples in the apparel industry. His role models are the self-made men of this industry.

Originally from Siirt but raised in Istanbul, Mr. Independent was already a foreman at the age of just twenty-one. He opened his sweatshop in 1991, which was as small as Mr. Survivor’s. He had ten sewing machines to start with. He took orders from multiple sources, factories or larger sweatshops. As any sweatshop owner, he invested most of his revenue in more sewing machines and workers. In the next few years, his sweatshop proved to be a success and became, in the mid-1990s, a semi-factory with an annual budget of $1.5 million, employing a total of approximately 180 workers.

Everything was just fine until the 2000s, when the new government policy of revalued Turkish currency hit the industry. From then on, Mr. Independent would no longer be chased by busy jobbers eager to find a decent sweatshop for their factories. He would either have to downsize his business, which would simply mean another step toward bankruptcy, or take a bold step for further growth.

He began to work with a designer who had been in the business for the last three decades; being a veteran of the sector with a BA degree from the United States, Mr. Independent’s designer had worked for much larger firms and had important connections in the industry. The crisis of the sector, however, left her with no alternative but to work with Mr. Independent. By 2005, they began exporting directly to the European markets. Although this new strategy seemed to fuel the enterprise with a new synergy, it did not prevent the unavoidable downsizing. During the time that I worked at his assembly line, Mr. Independent’s atelier was employing around seventy workers. The annual budget had dropped to $700,000.

Mr. Independent’s sweatshop actually had the potential to be one of the big fish in the pond, yet he was too late in taking the necessary step towards direct exporting, which is always a risky decision. Maybe the money flowing into the business from the apparel-exporting firms was too sweet and came too easily. Maybe he was not lucky enough to make the necessary connections at the right time and to turn his business into an export company. No matter what the reason for the delay in his decision was, he was late. He had missed the boat. Since this sweatshop worked for multiple domestic and foreign customers and was not an integral element of a particular supply chain, I will call it “the Independent Sweatshop.”
Another role model of Mr. Survivor could be Mr. Follower. Like his partner, A.H.N., Mr. Follower had migrated from İğdir to Istanbul in the early 1980s. After having worked for a few years at different sweatshops, they, like Mr. Independent and Mr. Survivor, had borrowed a few thousand dollars from relatives. They had bought nine sewing machines in 1988 for a small shop of seventy square meters in Halkali, one of the neighborhoods in which I resided for the research. This place is now a neighborhood grocery shop. In 1990, they had fifteen machines. In 1993, they moved to a new larger place, 225 square meters in size, enough to operate twenty sewing machines. In 1995, they rented a much larger place, 500 square meters, in a nearby neighborhood, İkitelli, as the number of their sewing machines increased to forty.

This was a rate of growth much slower than Mr. Independent’s enterprise, yet it was also much steadier. Mr. Follower was the subsidiary of a very reliable customer, the factory subject to this project. Mr. Follower was a relative of the target factory owners. The factory was the center of an extensive subcontracting network until 2005. Although their development depended on this factory, this connection saved them from the intense competition in the industry and helped them gradually grow their business. However, the same dependency came with the prices of entrepreneurial lethargy. For A.H.N., “[they] could lose the revenue for one month in the subcontracting business, yet [they] could have lost everything in the export business.” Since this enterprise had worked primarily for the factory subject to this project, I will call it “the Follower Sweatshop.”

Although Mr. Independent and Mr. Follower make good examples for Mr. Survivor, his ultimate role model would probably be Mr. Self-Made Man. He initiated his business with five sewing machines in 1986 in Zeytinburnu, the center of the apparel sector from the 1960s to the 1980s. As a hardworking sweatshop owner, he earned a good reputation in Zeytinburnu and in 1988 met G.R.R., who was a college graduate fluent in German with some business connections in Germany. As Mr. Self-Made Man took the responsibility of production, G.R.R. established contacts in Germany. They turned their sweatshop into an export business and the scope of their production swiftly expanded.

In 1991, Mr. Self-Made Man moved production to Bağcılar, a neighborhood in the west part of Bağcılar. He began to employ some of his hemşehris, especially those in Halkalı, and encouraged others to have their sweatshops integrated into his own supply chain. Mr. Follower was one of those other forty hemşehris who gave up an “independent” growth strategy for the sake of the safety provided by Mr. Self-Made Man’s factory in Bağcılar. This symbiotic relationship contributed to the enlargement of the productive capacity with ever-growing orders from Germany.

As the number of workers employed at the factory rose to four hundred, the overall employment capacity of this supply chain grew to four thousand. The horizontal expansion was supplemented by further investment in textile production: in 1999, the firm opened a textile factory in Çorlu, a growing industrial town approximately 150 kilometers from Istanbul. Having established an integrated supply chain, the firm was now capable of processing cotton, weaving and dying fabric, sewing apparels, and then directly shipping the end products to retail chains in various European countries. Thanks to the position of this firm in the supply chain, I will call the firm “the Center Firm” and the factory “the Center Factory.”

Over the years, Mr. Self-Made Man established his connections in different European countries. As a primary school graduate from İğdir, a town in the far eastern part of Turkey, he assigned
his brothers to the administrative positions in the factory and took a bigger responsibility in the management of the supply chain and the marketing of the products. The firm became one of the top apparel producers of Turkey with an annual export capacity of more than sixty million dollars and made it onto the list of the Top 500 Industrial Establishments in Turkey several times.

The growth, though, has not been and could not have been endless: the same government policy of revaluated Turkish currency after 2001, which urged Mr. Independent to invest in direct exporting, put the Center Firm under tremendous pressure. The competition caused by East Asian corporations introduced new challenges in the European markets. The new strategy was a bold one: to downsize the productive capacity in Turkey and to move production to a low-wage country. After several initiatives in China and India, Mr. Self-Made Man decided to do something against common sense: he decided to invest in Ethiopia. The Chinese government had become too spoiled because of excessive investment by American corporations. India was still a country of excessive bureaucratic arbitrariness, which only their capitalists could deal with. Ethiopia, as a virgin base for industry, provided all of the incentives demanded. A factory was being built in Addis Ababa during this project, which was to employ approximately 10,000 workers, probably the single largest industrial establishment in the entire country. The factory in Addis Ababa was estimated to begin operating in April 2010.

The change in the growth strategy of the Center Firm certainly had significant consequences for the subsidiaries of the Center Factory. In 2005, the old and tight subcontracting system was left aside. This was a major blow to all of the subsidiaries of the Center Factory, including the sweatshop of A.H.N. and Mr. Follower. They were now on their own in the chaotic jungle of the apparel industry. Moreover, the productive capacity of the Center Factory was also gradually being reduced during the time which I worked there. Workers were being laid off on a “one by one” basis: the number of workers had been reduced from 500 to 400 in the previous three years. The Center Firm finally cracked its cocoon on its way to becoming a multinational corporation. However, this transformation was the outcome of a reluctant change in the mindsets of the firm owners. They found a way to break the vicious cycle for the enterprises in this sector. As an apparel enterprise becomes bigger, Turkey, Germany, and Europe become smaller. Thus, within the national economic context, the ultimate end of the growth of an apparel enterprise is simply the unavoidable downfall.

When Mr. Survivor prepared himself to fire his relatives with the hope of pursuing his dream, he did not do anything different from what Mr. Self-Made Man did to his subsidiaries and workers. Mr. Self-Made Man represents the embodiment of all the aspirations of Mr. Survivor. Can Mr. Survivor one day become Mr. Self-Made Man? As we will see in the following chapters of this book, Mr. Self-Made Man relied on his Azeri-Turkish hemşehris from Iğdır, as the core of the workforce at this factory. Perhaps Mr. Survivor will be able to build up his success by utilizing the labor of his fellow Kurdish hemşehris. Perhaps the currency policies will be different in the next decade and Mr. Survivor will find well-educated partners who have connections in European countries. Perhaps his enterprise will become as big as Mr. Self-Made Man’s. If Mr. Survivor can turn the disadvantages of his Kurdish identity into an asset, as Mr. Self-Made Man did with his Azeri identity, perhaps he will become the next Mr. Self-Made Man one day. No matter how unrealistic this sounds, this is the common dream of all sweatshop owners, regardless of their provincial, ethnic, and religious origin.
However, he will not become Mr. Self-Made Man in one single step. If he succeeds in reaching his dream, he will first become Mr. Follower and then Mr. Independent. These personalities reflect different labor practices, different relations in the industry, and different growth strategies. The gradual transformation of Mr. Survivor into Mr. Self-Made Man signifies one of the dynamics of multiple labor practices in an industry in which a uniform rate of profit holds.

2.6 HIGH POLITICS OF THE SECTOR: ANNUAL ITKIB ELECTIONS

For individual entrepreneurs, the short average longevity of apparel enterprises is certainly not a matter of numbers only. As they see many of their competitors go out of business and feel the pressure of domestic and international competition at an ever-increasing intensity, they react to this tension in most cases individually, and seldom collectively. I was lucky enough to observe one rare occasion of collective action by entrepreneurs owning small- and medium-sized establishments. It was during the last week of June 2008, ITKIB had its annual elections, when I attended the elections as an observer upon the invitation of Mr. Independent.

Mr. Independent supported one of the candidates running for the presidency of this agency, which is a semi-official organization recognized by the government as the representative of the apparel and textile exporters in Istanbul. Although I began to work at the Independent Sweatshop as an undercover agent, after I disclosed my identity to Mr. Independent, we developed a relationship on good terms. He later invited me to the meetings of the group running for positions in ITKIB. I attended three meetings and had the opportunity to get a better grasp of the small- and medium-sized firm owners’ perspective on the apparel and textile industry.

The first surprise on my part was Mr. Independent’s enthusiasm about the election process, event though he was not a candidate for any position. He was involved in the recruitment of the businesspeople to the ranks of their group, as he invited them to the meetings and asked for their support for his candidate in the upcoming election. Approximately one hundred employers attended these meetings, during which the projects and promises of his candidate, Abdi Köse, were a matter of huge debate.

Mr. Köse was a textile engineer with a PhD degree. He taught at Ege University for several years before starting his own business. As a successful businessman, he had a medium-sized factory. His business was suffering from the same problems as the businesses of the other industrialists who attended the meetings. He came up with an agenda to protect the small- and medium-sized enterprises in the industry and openly stood against the current agenda of ITKIB. He argued that ITKIB currently pursued policies that worked in the favor of the large-scale enterprises, while everybody knew that apparel and textile industries depended on the sacrifices of the small- and medium-sized enterprises.

Attendants of these meetings were very much concerned about the restructuring of the industry after the 2001 crisis. Most of them perceived the current problems as indications of the ultimate collapse of the industry. In the first meeting, a businesswoman, the owner of a well-known firm, succinctly expressed common concerns. Her firm was in the process of liquidation at the time of the election process:
Three years ago, if someone had told me I would be here at this meeting today, I would have told him to simply go around and ask people about my reputation. Now, I’ve lost just about everything. There are things we have to change.

Several policies of the current ITKIB administration were the target of severe criticism. For instance, ITKIB has been working on an international advertising project, Turquality, for Turkish textile products and clothing in different countries. This initiative was seen by the attendants of these meetings as a waste of resources benefiting only firms that could make direct exports to foreign markets anyhow. The government took its share of criticism as well. The common belief was that the government, instead of providing the sector with the necessary support, motivated the apparel and textile firms to make investment overseas. According to Mr. Köse, it was nothing but a pipe dream to expect all entrepreneurs in the apparel and textile sectors to shift their production places to other countries:

They tell us to invest in Egypt [UB: Egypt has been the stereotype for the low-income countries open to Turkish investors for a long time. This is probably why Mr. Köse mentions Egypt in particular]. This is simply a pipe dream. If Egypt were an option, then Europeans would go there. And they could invest in Egypt, if they wanted to, but they don’t. What Europeans want to do is use us as their proxy-players in low-income countries.

Most of the employers had never met before, but their rage was the common feeling in the audience, their uniting force. Most of them had been reluctant to attend such meetings, to be actively involved in the politics of ITKIB, or even to vote for a particular candidate. But desperate conditions called for desperate measures, and “politics” was the last resort.

Many of the attendants who asked Mr. Köse questions introduced themselves as businesspeople of their business district: “We are here as atelier owners from Laleli [UB: a district in the old city, which serves the Russian and Eastern European markets]. How are we going to save Laleli from this crisis?” Or sweatshop owners from Merter, another dying district of garment production, were furious about the declining importance of their district and pleaded with Mr. Köse, asking for useful suggestions. His advice would have at least given them some hope. Although concerns were diverse and discussions lacked focus, criticism of the larger firms in the industry and complaints about larger firms’ influence on national policy-making were shared by everyone who supported Mr. Köse’s candidacy. The reaction of one of Mr. Köse’s supporters was quite striking:

We are the ones who produce! We are the ones who suffer! We should be the ones to end this injustice!

Mr. Köse responded to these reactions and questions with precise suggestions of policy and promises. First, the pressure to move production to other low-income countries would not be feasible for the majority of enterprises in the sector. Thus, this orientation favored large-scale producers and cast aside small- and medium-sized enterprises. Second, ITKIB needed to establish an insurance system which they could apply to in cases in which their foreign customers had difficulties rendering payment. This “export” insurance had already been a part of the ITKIB structure for a long time; however, it had never been used. Third, Mr. Köse complained about the lack of
information regarding the structure of the sector and promised to conduct an extensive survey concerning its basic parameters:

There is no reliable statistical data about this sector. How many workers are employed? What is the size of capital stock? What is the current productive capacity? It is simply not known. I've been in this sector since 1993. Nobody has ever asked me about the scope of my annual output, the number of my employees, or my machinery inventory. How could you pursue an industrial strategy without knowing anything about the industry?

Fourth, ITKIB should quit high-budget advertisement initiatives such as Turquality, since such projects were mostly abused by firm owners who had administrative positions in ITKIB, on behalf of their own companies. The dominant discourse on the crisis of the apparel and textile sector preaches the need to create an authentic and distinctive image for Turkish textile products and clothing. The same discourse teaches the businesspeople that it is the only way to distinguish Turkish producers from their East Asian competitors and, eventually save the industry from its chronic crisis. Mr. Köse was highly critical of this discourse. He believed that for the small- and medium-scale producers, this was just as unfeasible as the strategy to encourage producers to shift their production to other countries.

Another complaint was that government incentives were given to the establishments in the less developed regions in Turkey, while it was impossible for the apparel producers to operate independently from each other in different corners of the country:

The subcontracting agents [UB: the representatives of factories and export firms that distribute orders to sweatshops] don’t even want to have to travel to the Anatolian [UB: Asian] side of Istanbul. They want all ateliers close together, in a single district. How can the government suggest that we open factories in the middle of Anatolia? Wages are not particularly lower in Anatolia either. Government subsidies should be given to the firms in the clustering zones for clothing and textile production, not to a sweatshop in the middle of nowhere!

One of the key promises was to convince the government to reinvestigate its agricultural subsidies, especially those for cotton. According to Mr. Köse, in 2007, cotton imports of $1.5 billion in value took an important cost-advantage away from the Turkish textile and apparel firms. If one tenth of this amount were given as subsidies to cotton producers in Turkey, the price of Turkish cotton would be low enough to give that competitive advantage back to producers. While Mr. Köse was talking about the need to get politically mobilized with regard to the government's agricultural policies, an enthusiastic sweatshop owner interrupted him:

If that’s what it takes, we’ll go out onto the streets! If that’s what it takes, we’ll sit in front of the Prime Minister’s office until the police attack us!

The bottom line of Mr. Köse’s position was as follows:

We are not responsible for the current account deficit. We actually contributed to the amelioration of the trade deficit for more than two decades, but now, we are the ones to pay this debt back. Look, we don’t have to have our own brand. Everything is just fine, as long as we make money!
Participation in the election on the 24th of July was much higher than it had been in the previous few years. The ITKIB plaza was full of men and women in nice suits and dresses. The administrative staff from the candidates’ firms were escorting everybody from the parking lot to the plaza, giving each member of ITKIB their fliers and brochures, and briefly mentioning the projects of their respective candidates.

The president of ITKIB, Süleyman Orakçioğlu, promoted The Fashion Academy in his brochures and speech as his signature project. This semi-academic center was being built at the time of election in Halkalı, a neighborhood in Küçükçekmece bordering Bağcılar, with the European Union funds provided for ITKIB. The emphasis of his campaign was the need to turn the Turkish apparel into a brand in the world market. Nedim Özbek, as the second candidate, promised to support entrepreneurs working for the Russian market, because his group was supported by the exporters of the Eastern European countries (mostly sweatshop owners in Laleli). Hikmet Tanriverdi promised that “Istanbul [would] be the fashion and marketing center, while Anatolia [UB: practically all provinces other than Istanbul] [would] be the center of production” in his prospective term. Another promise he made was to increase the small- and medium-sized enterprises’ share in exports, which was approximately twenty percent of the total at the time. His agenda was the closest to Mr. Köse’s
in this regard, though he avoided framing the current problems as a tension between large- and small-scale enterprises in the industry.

As candidates gave their speeches in the meeting hall, voters who were unable to find seats in the hall were watching the speeches on the closed-circuit broadcasting. I began talking with a random person, who seemed disinterested in the speeches. He was looking around in apparent boredom. He had been operating a sweatshop in Bağcılar since 2000. This was his second time at ITKIB elections. When I asked him whom he would vote for, he was initially somewhat reluctant, since I probably gave him the impression that I would try to make propaganda for a candidate. As I revealed my identity, he was slightly relieved:

You know, this is politics. My vote is Hikmet Tanriverdi’s. At the end of the day, he’s my hemşehri.

A businessman watching the speeches by the candidates for ITKIB presidency at the ITKIB Election, 2008.

Photo: author.

Hikmet Tanriverdi was from Malatya, an Eastern Anatolian province. Mr. Independent was quite concerned about the solidarity among industrialists hailing from Malatya. And he was right to be anxious: Mr. Tanriverdi won the elections with 1,269 votes. The former president, Süleyman Orakçıoğlu, got 631 votes. Mr. Köse got 124 votes, less than the number of people who had attended his meetings. The electoral success of Mr. Tanriverdi derived from the support of his hemşehris as much as his balanced rhetoric that promised to provide protection for the small-scale apparel producers and avoided antagonizing large-scale business. In other words, the solidarity of the supply chains based on identity-affiliations won over “the solidarity of class politics.”


2.7 COMPETITION AND THE PROLIFERATION OF LABOR PRACTICES IN THE APPAREL INDUSTRY

This chapter investigates the circumstances under which a competitive industry provides sufficient room for multiple labor practices. The spectrum for industry-wide wages and currency policy determined the global competitiveness of the sector. In the case of Istanbul, urban sprawl shaped the conditions of domestic competition. These factors limit the tendency to monopolization. In correspondence to the absence of monopolization in this sector, competition takes place in a market marked by the constant entry of numerous new enterprises and exit of failing ones.

The initial purpose of this chapter was to understand the industrial structure in question. Both small- and large-sized establishments are affected by different forms of fluctuations. For small-sized establishments, geographical shifts in population pose a major challenge. For large establishments, growth brings about a constant struggle to receive orders of sufficient magnitude. Recent trends for the largest enterprises support the argument that a threshold of approximately $65 million in exports is the long-term challenge for these establishments. Most of these enterprises are simply unable to keep up productive capacity for a long period of time. While large-scale establishments of the industry tend to shrink following a short period of growth, other large-scale establishments soon replace them, so that the overall numbers remain relatively stable. Significant turnover in the ITKIB membership lists supports this proposition. Every year, thousands of enterprises withdraw membership. These firms probably either experience a severe downsizing or simply go into bankruptcy. However, a similar number of enterprises replace them every year. The dynamic structure of the industry thus remains intact thanks to these frequent entries and exits.

The second purpose of this chapter was to provide an outline of the growth-related characteristics of target enterprises. This outline also provided the description of the organizational transformation of an ideal-typical enterprise in the apparel industry in Turkey. Most of the large-scale apparel enterprises are initially sweatshops. Most of these sweatshops go out of business in their “earlier stages of growth.” In their “evolution,” such successful enterprises usually start as “family sweatshops,” gradually eliminate the family members in production\(^\text{18}\), and eventually become integrated factories. These “successful” establishments, however, do not usually keep their position in the market for more than a decade, unless they extend their operations overseas, as in the example of the Center Firm. This perspective is useful for understanding how a competitive market generates multiple labor practices. In the absence of such volatility of capitals in this sector, a uniform profit rate would urge individual enterprises to adopt one particular labor practice determined by the conditions of global competition. The multiplicity despite the competitive pressures can be understood within a framework that investigates the transformation of individual enterprises along urban transformation. Urban sprawl is a major reason behind the continued competitive nature of Istanbul’s apparel industry.

However, this approach is not sufficient to help us understand the relationship between cooperation among capitals within supply chains and the multiplicity in labor practices. In other words, the analysis of population movements and enterprise volatility helps us understand the characteristics of competition and to reveal the possibility for variety in labor practices despite or thanks to the competition. However, it does not explain the organizational characteristics of this

---

\(^{18}\) The factors that contribute to the eventual replacement of workers who are relatives with those workers who are strangers will be discussed in the fourth chapter, in which the labor process of the Family Sweatshop will be analyzed.
variety. Thus, the next chapter will investigate how these interactions contribute to the proliferation of the labor practices in this industry.

The theoretical challenge now is to understand the reasons behind the absence of organizational uniformity in this sector, even though extensive supply chains can be expected to bring about organizational uniformity among individual enterprises. The first section provides information on the geographical distribution of apparel facilities in Bağcılar. Given that most of these facilities operate in the informal part of the economy, it is a challenge to understand the spatial dynamics of industrial relations as much as it was to document the volatility of capitals in the last chapter. The data in this first section will demonstrate that there is a visible “division of space” among large and small facilities in Bağcılar. This segmentation not only marks the organizational differences between factory system and non-factory forms of labor, but also strongly illustrates the structural links among different labor practices. The same section also provides further information about the working population in Bağcılar. I provide this information in this section because sweatshops and home-based work networks are located in residential areas. Thus, some knowledge of the population makes it easier for the reader to thoroughly contextualize the investigated relations among different enterprises in the sector.

The next section will provide further information about the target factory and sweatshops in terms of their relations with other agents in their supply chain. This part of the book will implicitly criticize the global commodity chains approach because of its failure to synthesize work-related relations with the internal structure of supply chains. Thus, this section not only illustrates the organizational differences between the two observed forms of subcontracting, but also documents the impact of these differences on their labor practices.

The observed forms of subcontracting verify the empirical relevance of different theories surveyed in the first chapter. The first form is a vertical supply chain organized by the Center Factory. The second form is based on arms’ length relations. The question is how both forms could survive, even though both produce the same commodity and compete in the same market. The answer to this question is hidden in the way that the connection between the characteristics of the supply chains and their labor process is established. Relations between workers and employers take place in different sites of production alongside different organizational dynamics. These differences render particular connections in the market possible and others impossible. Accordingly, even though relations between small and large capitals can be investigated with an analysis of the organizational characteristics of subcontracting, those characteristics do not solely derive from those relations. This will take our investigation to the next step, which is a look into the direct confrontation of labor and capital within the labor process. I will deal with this question in the last and longest part of this book.

PART II: DEPARTMENTAL HOMOGENIZATION AND THE POSSIBILITY FOR THE COEXISTENCE OF MULTIPLE INDUSTRIAL PRACTICES

3.1 CIRCUITS OF CAPITAL AND HARMONIZATION OF THE LABOR PROCESSES

In part one, I provided an overview of the implications of profit rate equilibration for the labor practices in a particular industry. If an industry operates in a competitive market, a particular form of labor control usually provides higher productivity rates than its alternatives. Thus, individual enterprises in that industry face the pressure of adopting that particular form of labor control rather than others. However, this is not the case in the context of the apparel industry in Istanbul. The rapid urbanization, characteristics of the working population, and the differentials in wages across the domestic and global industry result in a high turnover rate of the enterprises in this industry. This in turn accounts for the relationship between the multiplicity of the labor practices in the apparel industry and the competitive nature of its markets.

Another possible cause of the uniformity in labor practices in a particular industry is the intensification of the organizational coordination among different enterprises through complex supply chains and the standardization of technology. In this chapter, I will summarize the theoretical approaches to the relationship between the characteristics of capital accumulation and the conditions of organizational coordination. This connection has been the subject of several debates among radical political economists and social thinkers.

The underlying argument for these approaches is that technological standardization and the content of the division of labor among industrial work organizations in an industry derive from the contextual characteristics of the connections among different circuits of capital. The implicit tendency of the continued accumulation is the harmonization of different circuits of capital. Thus, even though these approaches do not share a common argument concerning the content of technology, they deal with the question of why certain characteristics of industrial organizations resemble or differ from each other. We can categorize two relevant positions in this regard.

The first group of theories argues that capital accumulation generates a strong tendency to increased similarity in industrial work organizations, since the continued capital accumulation rests on the presence of harmony between the circuits of money, productive, and commodity capital. In the absence of such harmony, profit cannot be at the same pace as the accumulation rate. The harmony between different circuits of capital necessitates uniformity in labor practices operating in the same industry and in the same Department of Production.

Theories emphasizing this tendency of capital accumulation present the diversification of the labor practices as the outcome of institutional differences between nation-states. Since national markets of different countries have been established under historically different circumstances and nation-states protect those markets with particular regulations on foreign trade and capital transfers, different labor practices coexist in different nation-states, even though uniformity within nation-states characterize the labor practices of those national industries. Accordingly,
these theories attempt to prove the possibility of accumulation within closed economic units. The implicit assumption is that, once the barriers on trade and capital transfers among nation-states are eliminated, the intrinsic tendencies of capital accumulation to harmonize different circuits of capital should yield globally identical industrial labor practices.

The second group of theories argues that the realization of this tendency necessarily brings about the lack of proportionality (or disproportionality) of output levels between industries producing means of production (Department of Production I) and industries producing means of consumption (Department of Production II). Thus, capital accumulation suffers from the constant potential of such disproportionality crises.

These theories discard the possibility of accumulation within closed economic systems, since the inherent instability of the accumulation process necessitates its geographical expansion. This expansion of accumulation in scope and space amounts to the adoption of labor practices in regions previously outside the geographical boundaries of the capitalist world economy. In some cases, these recently adopted labor practices transform the previously dominant labor practices, as they might provide comparative advantages in terms of labor control.

Another reason for the multiplicity of labor practices suggested by these theories is that the disproportionality between Departments of Production constantly eliminates the possibility of harmony among different circuits of capital. As the implicit tendency to the emergence of unitary labor practices contributes to the establishment of harmonization of circuits of capital, industries of Department I enjoy faster productivity increases than the industries of Department II does. This, in return, generates crises of accumulation, which can be overcome through such social processes as devalorization of money capital through financial crises, devalorization of commodity capital via political crises (e.g. wars) and institutionalized overconsumption (e.g. Keynesian policies), and devalorization of productive capital with the promotion of a new technological paradigm (e.g. Kaizen or Taylorism). Each of these possibilities amounts to a complete rescrambling of the methods of labor control. The multiplicity of labor practices is the outcome of such irregularities that take place on a regular basis.

In the next section, I will summarize these perspectives along these lines; yet first, I would like to provide a more detailed presentation of the problem of disproportionality for the reader who might be unfamiliar with this debate of Marxist political economic theory.

### 3.1.1 Disproportionality and the Systemic Need for the Adoption of Multiple Labor Practices

The polemic between Rosa Luxemburg (2003) and Nicolai Bukharin (1966 and 1972) about the impact of inter-industrial relations on the characteristics of capital accumulation shaped the theoretical framework of Marxist political economy concerning the relationship between accumulation and the global diversity of labor practices in the last century. Rosa Luxemburg’s argument rests on her critique of the argumentation in the second volume of Capital. According to Luxemburg, Marx presumed a closed economy with a constant level of exploitation in his model. The relevant interactions assuring the reproduction of the production relations (and,
hence, accumulation) take place between the agents of two Departments of Production. The continued accumulation depends on the sustainable relations between Departments of Production. Luxemburg criticizes this model on the basis that accumulation under the conditions of extended reproduction cannot take place in a closed economy thanks to the disproportional development of surplus values in the respective departments:

...Marx has been tackling the problem from a wrong approach. No intelligent purpose can be served by asking for the source of the money needed to realize the surplus value. The question is rather where the demand can arise—to find an effective demand for the surplus value...On the basis of simple reproduction, the matter is easy enough: since all surplus value is consumed by the capitalists... (U)nder conditions of accumulation, i.e. of capitalization of part of the surplus value, it cannot, ex hypothesi, be the capitalists themselves who buy the entire surplus value, that they cannot possibly realize it... The accumulation of capital has been caught in a vicious circle. At any rate, the second volume of Capital offers no way out (Luxemburg 2003: 139–40)

For Luxemburg, the model itself gives rise to a dilemma, rather than a solution. When the relevant factors are taken into consideration, the riddle becomes more significant:

(T)he diagram completely disregards the increasing productivity of labor (Luxemburg 2003: 315)...The adjustments we have tried out on Marx’s diagram are merely meant to illustrate that technical progress, as he himself admits, must be accompanied by a relative growth of constant as against variable capital. Hence the necessity for a continuous revision of the ratio in which capitalized surplus value should be allotted to c and v respectively. In Marx’s diagram, however, the capitalists are in no position to make these allocations at will, since the material form of their surplus predetermines the forms of capitalization. Since, according to Marx’s assumptions, all expansion of production proceeds exclusively by means of its own, capitalistically produced means of production and subsistence,—since there are here no other places and forms of production and equally no other consumers than the two departments with their capitalists and workers,—and since, on the other hand, the smooth working of the accumulative process depends on that circulation should wholly absorb the aggregate product of both departments, the technological shape of enlarged reproduction is in consequence strictly prescribed by the material form of the surplus product. In other words: according to Marx’s diagram, the technical organization of expanded production can and must be such as to make use of the aggregate surplus value produced in Departments I and II (Luxemburg 2003: 319).

This critique assigns Luxemburg’s theory a capacity of prediction which is beyond the perspective of her contemporaries:

The final and absolute rule of capital over the world—the precondition on which Marx bases his analysis—entails the a priori exclusion of the process of imperialism...The problem posed and left unanswered in the second volume of Capital...is insoluble. Accumulation is simply impossible under these conditions. This apparently rigid theoretical contradiction has only to be translated into historical dialectics, in that it conforms to the spirit of the entire Marxist teaching and way of thinking, and the contradiction in Marx’s model becomes the living mirror of the global career of capitalism, of its fortune and fall.
Accumulation is impossible in an exclusively capitalist environment... The development of capitalism has been possible only through constant expansion into new domains of production and new countries...

The general tendency and final result of this process is the exclusive world rule of capitalist production. Once this is reached, Marx’s model becomes valid: accumulation, i.e. further expansion of capital, becomes impossible. Capitalism comes to a dead end (Luxemburg 1972: 145-46).

The most significant implication of this argument is that multiplicity of labor practices is the outcome of the geographical expansion of expanded reproduction: the regions embedded in the accumulation process are by definition described in terms of the ultimate homogenization of the individual labors. Laborers become the variable capital. However, the variety in global capitalist relations goes beyond this scope. Those regions which are partially embedded in capitalist relations or linked to the world market through international trade, fall back on a variety of labor practices, since the dynamics of competition are retarded and trade relations are regulated primarily through inter-state relations. In such geographies, non-capitalist forms of labor characterize industrial work. And depending on this variety, multiple forms characterize the production of total social capital.

Another variant of this argument was advanced later by Immanuel Wallerstein. Wallerstein’s analysis of the forms of labor control is a representative reflection of the Luxemburgian position: it is impossible for wage-labor to be the only form of industrial labor, since that would signify the terminal crisis of capitalist world system (Wallerstein 1974: 127). The emergence of what he calls multiple “forms of labor control”20 is a product of the global hierarchy, which makes the transfer of surplus between regions possible. This very transfer is the solution to the constant disequilibrium in the core regions of the capitalist world system that Luxemburg identifies (Wallerstein 1974: 87).

The emergence of multiple forms of labor control is the outcome of the gradual incorporation of new regions into the capitalist world economy. As the geopolitical stratification is structured in the modern state system, particular forms of labor control begin to pertain to particular regions and determine the capacities of the domestic ruling classes (Quijano and Wallerstein 1992). Thus, multiple forms of labor promise a solution to the persistent problem of “disproportionality,” inasmuch as the latter characterizes one of the structural features of the capitalist world economy. Once this multiplicity is replaced with the domination of wage-labor as the only form of labor, the terminal crisis begins for the entire system (Wallerstein 1991 and 2003).

Wallerstein, as Andre Gunder Frank (1978), frames the question as to why the multiplicity of forms of (industrial) labor appears as a systemic characteristic of the capitalist world economy. Wallerstein refers to a “systemic” need for different forms of labor to emerge in different regions of the capitalist world economy. While, as we saw in the previous chapter, Arghiri Emmanuel implies that the equilibration of wages and the consequent homogenization of labor practices appear as possibilities thanks to regional political struggles, Wallerstein does not see any merit in this argument: gains on the part of labor groups in a peripheral region of the world economy might signal that region’s new position in the semi-periphery. However, if the capitalist world-economy is to function in the long run, there should be a periphery and, hence, the success of a region means

20. Wallerstein seems no longer to use ‘the forms of labor control’ as a functional concept in his recent writings (Martin 1994: 157).
the failure of another one. The problem of any regional labor movement is in the geographical scope of such movements. Structuring themselves mostly in the nation-states, these movements have no other option but to take over state power. Thus, even when they are successful in their struggle, they reproduce the old global hierarchy among different labor groups suffering from different forms of labor control (Wallerstein 1986).

In other words, capital accumulation with geographical expansion and probably sector-based diversification (Wallerstein apparently sees the latter as the derivation of the former) incorporates not only new regions but also new forms of (industrial) labor. The incorporation of new regions contributes to the “invention” of new forms of (industrial) labor. This is not a haphazard outcome of unequal development of productive forces between newly incorporated regions and core regions, but the result of the systemic need to diversify the forms of (industrial) labor in order to solve the internal inconsistencies of the development of productive forces between industries of Department I and II.

To recapitulate, there is a well-established position in social theory arguing that the absence of industrial complementariness in terms of the productive scope of different sectors has been a major force in the geographical expansion of markets. This geographical expansion in turn led to the incorporation of new regions into the world economy; this then resulted in either adoption of the “pre-incorporation” labor practices or invention of new forms of labor control that helped to assign said regions their status in the global stratification of center, semi-periphery, and periphery. This argumentation helps us to analyze the historical dynamics behind the multiplicity of labor practices.

### 3.1.2 Auto-Centric Accumulation and the Institutional Basis for Multiple Labor Practices

One of the earliest counterarguments to the thesis of “disproportionality” was Nikolai Bukharin’s theory of imperialism and world economy. Bukharin argues that extended reproduction can take place in a closed economy: Luxemburg ignores the capacity of the state to create money in order to establish momentary equilibrations between Departments of Production. The generation of money capital provides the absorption power for the Department II (Bukharin 1972). If the world economy geographically expands to new regions, this is not because of the reflection of an abstract disproportionality between Production Departments. The disproportionality can transform the production relations in multiple ways. The actual reason for the geographical expansion is rather the competition within national economies, which urge individual capitals to conduct overseas operations in order to have a competitive edge in their home markets (Bukharin 1966).

Entire countries appear today as ‘towns’ namely, the industrial countries, whereas entire agrarian territories appear to be ‘country’…World division of labor and international exchange presuppose the existence of a world market and world prices…We define world economy as a system of production relations and of exchange relations on a world scale (Bukharin 1966: 21, 23, and 25)
Crises happen at the level of world economy (Bukharin 1966: 53) and “one must not overestimate the significance of international organizations. Their specific weight compared with the immensity of the economic life of world capitalism is by no means as great as would appear at the first glance” (Bukharin 1966: 60), because the international agreements that could remain stable are those based on a natural monopoly (Bukharin 1966: 61):

The process of the internationalization of economic life sharpens, to a high degree, the conflict of interests among the various ‘national’ groups of the bourgeoisie. Indeed, the growth of international commodity exchange is by no means connected with the growth of ‘solidarity’ between the exchanging groups. On the contrary, it can be accompanied by the growth of the most desperate competition by a life and death struggle. The same is true of the export of capital (Bukharin 1966: 61).

There is only one case, in which…solidarity of interests is created. This is the case of growing ‘participation’ and financing, i.e., when, due to the common ownership of securities, the class of capitalists of various countries possesses collective property in one and the same object (Bukharin 1966: 62).

However, within nation-states,

vertical concentration and centralization of production, in contradistinction to the horizontal centralization which is going on within one branch of production, signifies, on the one hand, a diminution of the social division of labor, since it combines in one enterprise the labor that was previously divided among several enterprises; on the other hand, it stimulates the division of labor inside of the new production unit. The entire process, taken on a social scale, tends to turn the entire “national” economy into a single combined enterprise with an organization connection between all the branches of production. The same process is going on with great rapidity in another way: banking capital penetrates industry, and capital turns into finance capital (Bukharin 1966: 70).

When these two relationships merge, world capitalism or the world system of production emerges as “a few consolidated, organized economic bodies (‘the great civilized powers’) on the one hand, and a periphery of underdeveloped countries with a semi-agrarian or agrarian system on the other” (Bukharin 1966: 74):

There is nothing behind the discussion about the creation of a middle European tariff alliance but the wish to create a vast economic territory as a monopoly system allowing more successful competition on the external market. In reality this is a product of the interests and the ideology of finance capitalism which, penetrating into all the pores of world economy, creates at the same time an unusually strong tendency towards excluding the national organisms, towards economic autarchy as a means of strengthening the monopoly situation of the respective capitalist groups. Thus, together with the internationalization of economy and the internationalization of capital, there is going on a process of ‘national’ intertwining of capital, a process of ‘nationalizing’ capital, fraught with the greatest consequences (Bukharin 1966: 80).

This reading of capital accumulation demonstrates the social forces behind the protection of national economic borders. Variation in industrial labor practices is particularly related with “horizontal centralization.” However, unlike Luxemburg, Bukharin chooses to define these forces as
dynamics primarily from within the nation-state. Accordingly, the “incorporation” of non-capitalist social formations into the capitalist production relations is neither inevitable nor necessary: as with the town-country distinction, differences between industrial and agricultural societies too can be kept intact only if particular conditions regarding the relations among capitals hold in individual nation-states. Within the context of nation-states, the vertical integration binds different labor practices through concentration as unitary capitals. Thus, Bukharin provided the first building block for the perspective theorizing the possibility of concentration of capital without centralization.

The inter-industrial coordination has also been investigated as a matter of “regulation.” For instance, Michel Aglietta deals with the question of the historical reality concerning the significant role of regulation in expanded reproduction, rather than the historical possibility of accumulation within closed economies. Michel Aglietta’s Theory of Capitalist Regulation\footnote{For a meta-theoretical critique of Aglietta’s ‘Althusserian Marxism’, see Gartman 1983.} investigates the transformations in the wage relation and the conditions of existence of the wage-earning class in two historical periods of accumulation: extensive and intensive accumulation. The emphasis on the wage relation is inherently associated with Aglietta’s de-emphasis on the concentration of capital. He rejects “the idea that the concentration of capital is the most fundamental process in the history of twentieth century capitalism”: it is rather a radical change in the conditions of reproduction of capital in general (Aglietta 1979: 20–21).

As concentration of capital provokes an implosion of the forms of competition, coexisting price systems represent different modes of transformation of value: monetary system makes these price systems compatible, but this adaptation through the manipulation of monetary system takes place at the political level (Aglietta 1979: 21). Thus, the political struggles among capitals and between capital and labor characterize the conditions of concentration. This analysis takes the nation-states as its spatial unit of analysis, yet it also distinguishes itself from the position of Baran and Sweezy’s monopoly capitalism thesis (1966):

\[\text{[I]n the logic of the doctrine of state monopoly capitalism…analysis…is based on the fundamental processes of concentration of capital, but it reduces this to the question of whether profit rates are standardized or differentiated, without being able to tell us what the forces are that determine the level of the general rate of profit. The leitmotif of the argument is that by valorizing public capital at a reduced rate of profit or by financing capitalist production in the most concentrated sectors at low cost, the state contributes to raising the rate of profit for the monopolies (Aglietta 1979: 28).}\]

This devalorization is, however, not sufficient to hinder the disharmony between Departments of Production (Aglietta 1979: 57). The historical barrier, “which is always latent, can only be raised if capitalist production revolutionizes the conditions of existence of the wage-earning class” (Aglietta 1979: 60). In other words, unlike Maurice Dobb, Aglietta argues that laws of exchange are not sufficient to understand the characteristics of a dynamic system transforming the conditions of existence of the wage earning class. The institutional arrangements which link the accumulation process to the reproduction of the relations of production should therefore be conceptualized. Thus, Aglietta introduces the regime of accumulation as “a form of social transformation that increases relative surplus value under the stable constraints of the most general norms that define
absolute surplus value” (Aglietta 1979: 68). The conditions of existence of the wage-earning class are transformed according to the characteristics of the regime of accumulation.

In a particular regime of accumulation, structural forms evolve with the material transformation of the mode of production. Laws of reproduction of social norms in relation with these structural forms give rise to the transformations in the homogeneous field of value (Aglietta 1979: 189). The analysis of centralization and competition of capitals should be conducted at the level of these structural forms. With the crisis of intensive accumulation in the form of the crisis of Fordism, centralization produced new structural forms; giant corporations, financial groups, and subcontracting networks:

The centralization of capital regroups under a single power of disposal and control cycles of valorization that may remain distinct from one another from the standpoint of the production and realization of commodities. Such a centralized power of disposal can only be established by the creation of new structural forms. These are…the giant corporation and the financial group…But the centralized organization of capital also extends to the network of sub-contracting, in which firms that are legally autonomous and are not controlled by financial holdings still do not form autonomous capitals from the standpoint of the valorization cycle. These capitals make segments of valorization function in an integrated series. Their dependence is set by technico-economic norms over which they have no influence. Their clients are imposed on them. They do not produce commodities properly speaking, but rather intermediate products within a broader production process creating complex commodities. The quantities produced and the prices…are similarly imposed on them. The latter are not market prices by simply transfer prices (Aglietta 1979: 220-21).

In this particular context, relations between these new structural forms necessitate the redefinition of the concentration of capital (Aglietta 1979: 215):

If only the labor process is taken into account, then emphasis will fall on the increase in size of factories at certain times and in certain industries. But the transformation of the labor processes themselves experience a dual movement of segmentation and integration. At a different moment in the development of the productive forces, the same individual capital may be able to increase the scale of its valorization relative to others while organizing its labor process in a series of dispersed units, with the result that the size of its factories becomes smaller in relation to those of its competitors. Has concentration then increased or decreased? In the same way, when attention is drawn to another phase of the circulation process, emphasis often falls on the shares of the market controlled by different firms. Once again, it is highly dangerous to draw conclusions from this one aspect. It assumes that markets and therefore commodities can be divided up in terms of use-values. Now the valorization of an individual capital in no way implies anything about the use-values which support value proper. It may happen that the conditions of production and exchange develop in a way that favors a rapid diversification of use-values. In this case, it might well be possible to establish a decline in the indices of concentration as calculated by taking the market shares for each type of use-value in isolation, even though the total number of firms in the market as a whole dropped and the volume of turnover and number of workers controlled by each of these has greatly increased. Has there not then been an increase in the power of autonomous centers to dispose of social labor? (Aglietta 1979: 216)
For Aglietta, there has been an undeniable increase in the power of centers to dispose of social labor. However, our existing notions of centralization and concentration need to be reshaped:

[Valorization of capital in its most general sense is the expansion of homogeneous value. This is why it is the monetary form of value that gives the flow over which there is a power of disposal...It is the predominance of this monetary form that enables one and the same individual capital to direct several production processes and to sell commodities on several markets, while appearing as a single center of production. Now the redeployment of the money destined to be employed as capital is effected by financial agencies. Can we infer from this that these agencies are the true centers of power and that the concentration of capital can be identified with the financial connections established between these agencies and legally autonomous firms? (Aglietta 1979: 216-17)

In order to answer these questions, Aglietta redefines Marx's distinction between simple concentration and centralization:

While simple concentration is a quantitative fact of uneven accumulation in the field of value, and preserves the autonomy of separate capitals, centralization is a qualitative change that refashions the autonomy of capitals and establishes new relationships of competition...It establishes new relations of competition, because the destruction of one section of industrial capital reduces the total mass of capital involved in production and gives all capitals new possibilities of valorization...[Under the regime of extensive accumulation], [t]he establishment of new relations of competition between centralized capitals is the mediation that organizes [continuous] devalorizations, and enables a continuous transformation of the conditions of production by reducing the deleterious consequences of brutal eliminations of capital (emphasis added) (Aglietta 1979: 220-21).

Under these constantly changing circumstances of production, accumulation of money capital is more rapid than that of the value of the material elements of productive capital (Aglietta 1979: 227). Finance capital is defined as “the mediation by which coalitions of capitalists exercise proprietary control over the structural forms necessary for the continuing cycles of valorization of productive capital, thanks to the centralized money capital at their disposal” (Aglietta 1979: 253):

In the course of development of the capitalist mode of production, the centralization of capital alters the form of ownership at the same time as its effects far-reaching changes in the way that the processes of valorization is organized and controlled. The key phenomenon here is financial centralization, which leads to the formation of a new mode of association between capitalists, finance capital, as defined above. Finance capital is the ultimate mode of capital centralization. It makes possible a centralization freed from the obstacles posed by the heterogeneity of the material conditions of production (Aglietta 1979: 266).

Intensive accumulation, thus, “forced the centralization of capital to change its nature; it took the new direction of a diversification of production.” This diversification obstructs coordination between Departments of Production: the principle behind centralization on a functional basis was vertical hierarchical dependence. The new centralization, on the other hand, rests on the principle of information. This enables “constraint by directive” to be replaced by “the direct constraint of production” (Aglietta 1979: 255-57):
This structure corresponds to the new mode of organization of labor that we have termed Neo-Fordism. It generalizes the division of labor into semi-autonomous groups at the level of the sum total of managerial practices. This generalization constitutes participatory management controlled by a common objective (Aglietta 1979: 258).

Once finance capital becomes the ultimate mode of capitalist centralization, the relationship between expansion of ownership and direct control over labor process ceases to hold. Aglietta calls the emerging organizational principle “new centralization”: subcontracting which implies the multiplication of forms of industrial labor emerges as a structural form. As monopolistic competition progressively signifies the permanent coexistence of different prices systems and replaces full competition (Aglietta 1979: 299), conditions of the labor process are no longer strictly determined by the level of simple concentration of capital. New conditions for centralization lead to the diversification of production and yield new forms of industrial labor thanks to “the obstacles posed by the heterogeneity of the material conditions of production”.

Aglietta’s arguments concerning the transformation of the labor process are by no means authentic: job rotation and job enrichment are regarded as “simply the ultimate extensions of the principles of Fordism and Taylorism” (Aglietta 1979: 128). The new argument here is, however, that concentration does not necessitate the geographical centralization and process-based homogenization of the labor process:

A far more advanced centralization of production becomes compatible with a geographical decentralization of the operative units (manufacture and assembly) (Aglietta 1979: 127).

Unlike Aglietta, who investigated specifically the historical conditions of the development of capitalist production relations in the United States, Samir Amin analyzes the possibility of regulation among industrial sectors at the global scale. The defining characteristics of “the extraverted accumulation” is the significance of the internal market of luxury products and the related “development” path that results in the industrialization as the “last” step, unlike the economies, which experienced “autocentric accumulation” (Amin 1976: 193). Because two different models of accumulation are theorized in this model, Amin argues that two different systems of exchange coexist with two different historical paths of the changes in the organic composition (Amin 1974: 41). The reason why Amin resorts to such a dual model is his belief in the primacy of internal relations to external connections:

22. For recent dynamics regarding the globalization of financial markets, which concretize the idea behind “new centralization,” see Buch 2004. For “the politics” of new financial environment, see Soedeberg 2004. For an investigation of the underlying advantages and disadvantages of choosing vertical financial ownership relative to vertical contracts, see Mahoney 1992. Mahoney suggests that in the absence of agency and transaction costs, vertical financial ownership and vertical contracting are equivalent governance structures for achieving corporate objectives. However, given a world of positive agency and transaction costs, the key theoretical question becomes predicting when market mechanisms are sufficient, when intermediate forms of vertical contracting become necessary, and when vertical financial ownership becomes the preferred governance structure. Though it aims to provide a synthesis of agency and transaction cost perspectives, the argument successfully concretizes the idea of “new centralization.”

23. However, Aglietta mentions the question of subcontracting only once in the entire text (259–66). See, for an overview of the characteristics of industrial subcontracting in the new regime of accumulation, Feenstra 1998. For the factors that motivate individual enterprises to subcontract in the apparel industry, see Balakrishnan 2002 and Sayeed and Balakrishnan 2004. For the overall restructuring of the global textile sector as a specific case, see Loo 2002.
The essential relations of the system cannot be grasped without taking account of these relations. Moreover, the external relations of the advanced regions, taken as a whole, with the periphery of the world system are quantitatively marginal in comparison with the flows that take place within the center; besides...these relations are a matter of primitive accumulation and not of expanded reproduction (Amin 1976: 75).

Autocentric accumulation along with monopolization brings about multiple rates of profit. At the national level, state planning determines the prices (Amin 1976: 68 and 69). The analysis of the link between Departments of Production is still central for the investigation of the characteristics of capital accumulation and autocentric capitalist development (Amin 1976: 73). However, due to the monopolistic market structure, the analysis of prices does not successfully illustrate the relations between Departments of Production (Amin 1976: 66).

Amin rejects Luxemburg's critique of Marx's reproduction schemes, because a growth in the organic composition of capital is compensated by the changes in the rate of surplus: he attributes a "dynamic role" to money capital. As long as a sufficient amount of money is inserted into the economy, Luxemburgian crisis can be hindered. Amin calls this form of reproduction "dynamic equilibrium" (Amin 1976: 87):

The monetary system thus fulfills a delicate task, taking care to keep entrepreneurs' expectations within 'reasonable' limits and calculating the probabilities of dynamic equilibrium. It plays the role of a planner watching over the maintenance of dynamic sectoral equilibria. This is why the capitalist system devised, at its very start, the centralization of credit (Amin 1976: 88).

In fact, Amin's spatial units of analysis are monetary zones: proportionality and disproportionality are the problems pertaining to the monetary zones. Influences coming from outside the monetary zone are not to be analyzed via the schemes of reproduction. Because monopolization made the recovery of the gold standard impossible at the time of his contributions (Amin 1976: 91), Amin argued that the space of expanded reproduction basically overlapped with the state territories that were able to establish autonomous monetary zones. This is one of the most successful attempts at defining the role of the nation-state in industrial relations. National governments through their control over the supply of money, at least after the abolishment of convertibility, define the geographical scope of expanded production. Characteristics of industrial labor practices are shaped within this framework as a result of the bifurcation between regions of extraverted and auto-centric accumulation.

The variety in labor practices is rooted in two dynamics. First, different monetary zones are at multiple stages of industrialization. These zones prioritize different labor practices. Thus, two monetary zones of extraverted accumulation that are at different phases of industrialization might adopt different labor practices. Second, zones of autocentric accumulation are relatively independent from the exogenous effects of global circulation of capital. Thus, they can develop their “authentic” forms of industrial labor given the relative insignificance of global competition vis-à-vis the domestic monopolization.

24. His demonstration of the solution is almost identical with Bukharin's, though he does not refer to Bukharin's work.
3.1.3 The Possibility of Concentration without Centralization: Departments of Production and Circuits of Capital

After this review of the relatively early positions regarding the impact of the relationship between circuits of capital upon industrial labor practices, we can now move on to more recent perspectives. Many argued that the last quarter of the twentieth century witnessed a qualitative transformation of the capitalist relations of production. The progressive internationalization of the industrial supply chains, the gradual elimination of barriers over global trade, and recent developments in production techniques and labor control made the question of the possibility of “autocentric accumulation” to some extent redundant. However, recent significance of global industrial relations certainly did not eliminate the question of disproportionality. This question rather took a new form with the changes in the organizational principles of industrial relations and the transformation of the circuit of productive capital with the circuit of money capital.

For instance, Scott Lash and John Urry (1987) argue that the “effective de-concentration of capital,” rather than a new centralization, accounts for a major transformation in industrial relations. This particular relationship between the configurations of the distribution of capital and emerging labor practices gave rise to “disorganized capitalism.” “Disorganized capitalism” signifies a set of widespread changes such as an expanding service class; increasing independence of large monopolies from control and regulation by individual nation-states; and spread of capitalism into most Third World countries. Accordingly, the average plant size decreases, industrial cities shrink, and industrial activities are subcontracted more and more either to the “world-market factories” in the Third World or to the “rural” sites in the First World (Lash and Urry 1987: 6):

The growth of a world market combined with the increasing scale of industrial, banking and commercial enterprises means that national markets have become less regulated by nationally based corporations. From the point of view of national markets there has been an effective de-concentration of capital. This tendency has been complemented by the nearly universal decline of cartels. Such deconcentration has been aided by the general decline of tariffs and the encouragement by states, particularly the USA, to increase the scale of external activity of large corporations. In many countries there is a growing separation of banks from industry (Lash and Urry 1987: 5).

Lash and Urry see the settlement of “organized capitalism as the result of two phases of one single Kondratieff cycle starting with the 1890s: the 1890s witnessed the organization at the top, while, in the inter-war period, the bottom was organized” (Lash and Urry 1987: 8). Disorganization takes the form of “a spatial scattering.” In terms of industrial relations, the widespread growth of global corporations does not go hand in hand with the concentration of capital:

Although companies have developed with turnovers in excess of the national income of individual nation-states, there has not been a marked increase in the degree of concentration in the world economy, as a whole...The development of the large corporation had been a response not only to the growth of mass-production technology,

but also to the efforts to orchestrate and regulate a given national economy. With the...disorganized capitalism, these...‘global corporations’ (1) cannot control levels of mass demand for their products within the central western economies; (2) will be able to orchestrate levels of demand in individual Third World economies, but this will provide only a small fraction of the mass market...; and (3) because of reduced world concentration levels and increased import penetration of each given national economy, will experience heightened competition in all markets (Lash and Urry 1987: 196–97).

New conditions in terms of financial capital enabled the ultimate advance of banks as capital-groups:

This freedom accorded to bank capital led to a separate circuit of money-capital rather than an integrated circuit of the ‘finance capital’ of organized capitalism...There are not separate and rival empires all competing with each other within a given national economy...This is because just as banks have moved into a variety of ‘non-banking’ activities, so too have industrial concerns come to operate in part as banks, borrowing and lending and participating in the growth of the new forms of financial intermediation. This is in turn a more specific example of the general tendency for the distinctiveness of an enterprise’s products to have considerably declined...The effect...has been to shift the balance of profit away from ‘industrial’ to ‘commercial and financial’ sectors...[W]hat has happened now is that both ‘industry’ and ‘finance’ have been internationalized but with separate and uncoordinated circuits (Lash and Urry 1987: 206–08).

Transformation of the political scene contributed to the changes in industrial and financial dynamics: increasing electoral volatility weakened working class parties; new social movements became prominent; small cells and social groupings began to characterize more and more the working class communities; and the welfare state at least changed its shape (Lash and Urry 1987: 213–29). The spatial scattering is defined as “reflexive accumulation” in Economies of Signs and Space (1994):

[It is increasingly a capital accumulation today that the labor force becomes increasingly self-monitoring as well as develops an even greater reflexivity with respect to the rules and resources of the workplace. Hence we address in some depth a developing process of reflexive accumulation in economic life (Lash and Urry 1994: 5).

The mere investigation of industrial relations is unable to bring about a sufficient analysis of such new orientations. In this sense, concepts of flexible specialization, flexible accumulation and post-Fordism fail to account for the entirety of these new dynamics in the contemporary economy. The flexibility analysis is one-sidedly “productionist” in that the role of consumption in the contemporary socio-economic processes has not been successfully theorized (Lash and Urry 1994: 60–61).

In addition to changes in the financial sector, new organizational aspects characterize the “globalized localization.” Although hierarchies do still exist, they are not all powerful in disorganized capitalism. Labor-management relations changed significantly with the disorganization of industrial relations. The “risk society” following Beck’s analysis (1992) characterizes the exaggeration of modernism, rather than its refusal. Thus, Giddens’s “self-reflexivity” (1991) accounts for the mode of current rationality: “the new political culture also entails an attempted democratization of reflexivity” (Lash and Urry 1994: 20–51).
The novelty of Lash and Urry's perspective lies in the way that they put the commonly accepted causality between concentration and centralization of capital “on its head”: rather than concentration of capital, de-concentration of capital has caused the emergence of relatively new industrial labor practices. Rather than the transformation of the vertical industrial organizations by highly concentrated capital groups into horizontal industrial organizations, horizontal industrial organizations have been reversing the general tendency to the concentration of capital. Thus, relations between industries were reshaped in the age of disorganized capitalism in a particular manner so that different circuits of capital function in synchrony, if not in harmony. Self-reflexive forms of industrial labor appear as the outcome of this new relationship between money, commodity, and productive capital. The mere focus on the industrial relations is simply not enough to understand the scope of social change.

Other contributions also emphasized the transformation of industrial relations within the last four decades through the analysis of the relationship among different circuits of capital. For instance, Bennett Harrison, who published his Lean and Mean the same year as Lash and Urry’s Economies of Signs and Space, uses a new phrase antithetical to Lash and Urry’s position in his analysis of the new production organizations, “concentration without centralization”: craft-type industries, small firms in industrial districts, large firm-led industrial districts, and strategic alliances.

Harrison focuses on the organizational diversity within industries, rather than the patterns of industrial organization pertaining to different nation-states. Although the role of small firms in contemporary industrial relations was widely celebrated by the scholarship of the late 1970s and the early 1980s, Harrison reaffirmed the long-standing dual-labor market theory. For Harrison, multinational corporations used the network-based production systems in order to compensate their high-wage labor force. As these corporations remain to be the agents responsible for the concentration of capital, they were actively involved in the decentralization of capital by establishing extensive supply chains centered around their production facilities. Unlike Lash and Urry, Harrison is skeptical about the scope of change in the characteristics of capitalist relations of production. Although industrial relations go through a qualitative transformation, the content of change by no means amounts to a reversal of the core principle of capital accumulation: concentration takes place along with accumulation. In this regard, Harrison reaffirms some of the key arguments of Aglietta.

Actually, Harrison’s work is also a response to the by-now almost canonical work by Charles Sabel and Michael Piore (1984), The Second Industrial Divide. Piore and Sabel theorize the choice of technology as the main factor shaping the labor process. In other words, they investigate the recent global changes in industrial relations from the perspective of the circuit of productive capital, rather than the circuit of money capital. Relations among individual capitals, especially during the accumulation crises, appear as a fight over the prospective dominant technology. The motivation is to suggest a solution for the double crisis of the 1970s: the crisis of regulation and the crisis regarding the choice of the technology itself. Industrial divides of the nineteenth century and the contemporary period characterize the history of industrial capitalism.

Two paths appeared as a systemic solution for the crisis in the 1970s: the continuation of mass-production technology and the revival of craft methods of production. The former requires the dramatic extension of relations between the developed and the developing world with the implementation of global Keynesian policies, while the latter is more feasible, since, unlike 1929, when the model for technology was obvious (the mass production implemented in the United States), the 1973 crisis yielded a Knightian uncertainty about institutional arrangements. The absence of a consensus over technological choices urges us to analyze both why mass-production prevailed over the craft method and why the United States took the lead in developing a particular variant of the mass production system in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century (Piore and Sabel 1984: 5–14).

Municipalism, familialism, and paternalism emerged as historical variants creating suitable conditions for the craft system. These options were gradually eliminated in the twentieth century, though some countries such as Italy or Germany preserved certain characteristics of the craft system. The United States appears as the extreme example in terms of extensity and intensity of mass production. It had been “the role model” for development plans for other countries throughout the twentieth century, especially after the Great Depression of 1929 (Piore and Sabel 1984: 29–41).

Mass production can be “profitable only with markets that … large enough to absorb an enormous output of a single, standardized commodity and stable enough to keep the resources involved in the production of that commodity continuously” (Piore and Sabel 1984: 49). Thus, modern corporation, as a solution for the need for microeconomic regulation, acted to create those markets (Piore and Sabel 1984: 50). In this regard, Piore and Sabel differ from both Alfred Chandler's historical narrative (1977), which describes the emergence of modern corporation more or less as the inevitable consequence of the emergence of national markets, and Oliver Williamson’s theory (1975), which regards the modern firm as the outcome of the current conjuncture of markets: the technological paradigm determines the prevalent form of microeconomic regulation, but not the other way around.

In the continuous-process industries, the conflict between productive capacities of an efficient-sized plant operated with the principles of mass production and the fluctuations of demand yielded the modern corporation. In the newer mechanical industries, the structural need to create their markets had a huge impact on their specific organizational form. Thus, Chandler’s emphasis on the integration of mass marketing and mass production is only a partial account of the factors behind the emergence of the modern corporation:

This form of integration seems, in fact, to be only one instance of a broader class of institutional reforms—all rooted in the high fixed cost of mass-production technology—that cleared the way for the corporation. (Piore and Sabel 1984: 55–63)

27. “Knigthian uncertainty” implies the moments when actors cannot even know their interests; see Fligstein 2001.

28. See, for historical context for these forms of control in the US, Scranton 1984 and Scranton 1989.

29. In order for the price system, rather than the modern corporation, to be the dominant form of microeconomic regulation, resources should be general-purpose, workers should not be “proletarianized,” and firms should be small. In other words, only in such an environment of low centralization and low concentration will firms make their decisions to “buy or make,” primarily according to the transaction costs determined by the prices regulation. This was the case in the American economy in the early nineteenth-century (Piore and Sabel 1984: 50–51, 75).
In other words, shop floor dynamics create certain preconditions for the institutional evolution of the economic environment and the establishment of horizontal links between and within industries. It was not infrastructure that provided multiunit enterprises with structural advantages, but rather those organizations that actually created that infrastructure. It was not market conditions determined by the “revolutions” in communications that produced the corporation utilizing the mass production, but rather mass production that created the corporation and, hence, those “revolutions.”

However, technology is not the outcome of linear scientific progress. Short periods of technological diversification during crises are followed by longer periods of uniformity (Piore and Sabel 1984: 39). During crises, capital-labor relations are as central as the relations among capitals, while periods of technological uniformity signify the contextualization of labor-management tensions in certain organizational dynamics. Thus, Piore and Sabel distinguish between political struggles of technological diversification and uniformity.

Diversity in mass production among nation-states reveals the fact that “there was at least one place where their paths did not converge: workers running equipment that was the same throughout the four [investigated] countries were organized in different ways” (Piore and Sabel 1984: 164). That is, the broader political context also creates differences in the mass production. However, once the institutional framework for utilization of labor is settled, it shapes the organizational concerns and mindset of the management. Piore and Sabel contextualize “the control imperative” as a technical requirement of mass production, the conditions of which are historically determined as a result of the competition between different techno-paradigms:

The unstable labor relations were...the product of corporate policy. But this policy's chief motive was not, as is commonly thought, to create an open market for the determination of wages and working conditions. Rather, the corporation attacked labor organizations in order to maintain tight control over their own internal operations...The corporations' labor strategy was an extension of the basic principles of mass production. The decomposition of production into discrete operations made sense only if the separate operations could be reintegrated into a whole- a process that placed a huge premium on managerial coordination. Hence, anything that threatened the authority necessary for this coordination was suspect; from this point of view, American corporations were no more resistant to union organizations than they were to outside financial control. (Piore and Sabel 1984: 63–64)

If craft production had been chosen as the dominant technological paradigm, then the management might have rather welcomed the contribution of workers in the decision-making. Unionization in the United States was, thus, primarily a consensus between workers’ universal demand “to gain control over their workplace” (Piore and Sabel 1984: 111) and capitalist management’s need to establish coordination (Piore and Sabel 1984: 79). Thus, the question of control is reduced to a technical requirement pertinent to mass production. The institutional settlement is reflected on the legal and legislative context and the level of homogenization of tastes (Piore and Sabel 1984: 120, 190). Piore and Sabel deny a necessary association between control and accumulation and disagree with the Labor Process Theory, which will be dealt with in the final chapter.
Craft production actually coexisted in a limited sense alongside mass production, as a result of the reluctance of monopolistic corporations, which utilize mass production techniques, to take over the market completely (Piore and Sabel 1984: 56–57). Social unrest in the industrialized world, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, external shocks such as the Oil Crisis and the Russian Wheat Deal, and the debt crisis (Piore and Sabel 1984: 166–83) all gave rise to a shift to greater flexibility and enhanced the importance of the extant craft practices. Rather than leading to a regression to simple techniques, it resulted in the pursuit of technological sophistication. Examples from various industries producing different commodities demonstrate the extent of this “revolution” (Piore and Sabel 1984: 207–20).

Given the difficulty of establishing multinational Keynesianism, flexible specialization is suggested as the most feasible pathway for the new institutional framework. Because of the presence of complement machines, price coordination can act as the medium of microeconomic regulation. Under these circumstances, the price-regulated economy envisaged in neoclassical economic theory can be put to practice. Innovation is central to this form of regulation. In other words, either Aglietta’s regulation or intense innovation causes the required devalorization in the Department of Production I and establishes some proportionality between Departments of Production. Regional conglomerations, federated enterprises, “solar” firms, and workshop factories in particular serve to fulfill this function. Coordination is assured through the emergence of new forms of industrial districts and the presence of complement machines (Piore and Sabel 1984: 258–68).

For Piore and Sabel, since the mass-production plant requires extensive coordination, the control imperative becomes stronger, while, in the case of craft production, it is weakened. The generation of surplus value requires that particular labors be performed in different sites, where productive forces are gathered together and become social labor: value is the expression of these relations among different labors (Aglietta 1979: 38). In a similar vein, Piore and Sabel argue that:

> Where resources are very highly specialized, price coordination is impossible. A piece of modern machinery dedicated to the production of a single part cannot be turned to another use, no matter how low the price of that part falls, or how high the price of other goods rises. (Piore and Sabel 1984: 50)

Corporations thus prevail where the price coordination cannot coordinate the economic environment. In an economy of complement goods coordinated by prices, value can be established through market exchanges, since products of different labors can be “exchanged” on the market. Homogenization of different labors appears as the low level of specialization of resources. This low specialization assures the price coordination and makes homogenization visible in the realm of commodities. In the absence of price coordination, only an integrated labor process compares among different labors. In this case, capital must organize labors through vertical structures:

---

30. For the implications of the changes in production techniques corresponding to the scheduling of working time, which implies the replacement of standard working time with “flextime,” see Avery and Zavel 2001.
31. For the role of cities, regions, and districts in innovation, see Castells and Hall 1994.
32. If we follow Michael Burawoy’s argument (1985), this vein of thinking ignores the need for simultaneously obscuring and securing the surplus value. Craft production as a mode of control (i.e., skilled workers and restricted access to the skills) contradicts the requirement of obscuring the surplus value and has a limited use, inasmuch as mass production is limited with its own rigidities.
homogenization is established through the direct relations between different labors thanks to their integration in the same labor process. In short, in both cases, a “homogenization imperative” holds, yet different relations are established between productive capital (specialized or generic resources) and money capital (price coordination or monopolistic coordination).

This implies the practical limits of craft system as a techno-paradigm in terms of its capacity to establish coordination among industrial practices: skill differentiation yields resource specialization, which in return would limit the price coordination itself. Thus, if the pace of innovation among and within industries is not synchronized, skill differentiation might necessitate institutional or organizational coordination. Low level of centralization is not necessarily compatible with high level of skill differentiation. Highly differentiated skills make it difficult for independent enterprises to cooperate through market exchanges.

To summarize, an economy of highly differentiated labors in terms of skills requires tight organizational coordination among different labor processes. As the global commodity chains approach illustrates (Gereffi, Korzeniewicz, and Korzeniewicz 1994; Korzeniewicz and Martin 1994), geographically-dispersed and highly integrated networks can establish this coordination. However, in any case, there should be a “link” connecting different labors. Although Piore and Sabel emphasize the role of industrial districts, they do not contemplate on the historical conditions under which such districts could have replaced the corporation as the organizational center for industrial production. Furthermore, as Aglietta argues, tight coordination required by the heterogeneity in skills can be achieved through hierarchical firms as well. Thus, there is no necessary relationship between craft production and flexible specialization. In fact, characteristics of industrial coordination are shaped by the availability of forms of industrial labor. There cannot be an infinite number of forms of industrial labor, since, in such a case, commodities cannot be exchanged regularly due to the absence of value. Thus, there are structural limits to flexibility. Hence, Piore and Sabel emphasize the rising significance of complementary machine tools. As mentioned above, the ingenious point in this argument is its success in explaining the recent transformation of the global industrial relations as a result of the changing characteristics of the circuit of productive capital, unlike many others, who prioritize the circuit of money capital.

Manuel Castells’s theory of network society (1996) takes the analysis by Piore and Sabel to the next level by arguing that the new organizational forms herald the advent of informational capitalism (p. 13). This signifies a variable geometry implying an interdependent world (Castells 1996: 145). Its characteristic relationship is the one between “the self” and “the net” (Castells 1996: 27). This relationship has become prominent with flexible production and the crisis of large corporations: interfirm networking, corporate strategic alliances, and horizontal corporations yield the vertical disintegration along “networks of firms” (Castells 1996: 154–64). Despite the variety

33. Marx speculates on “the exchange without value” between independently subsisting communities, when he discusses the emergence of trade in human history (Marx 1991: 183).
34. This is by no means a new idea. For earlier versions of the same argument, see Bell 1973, Salvaggio 1989, and Dordick and Wang 1993.
35. See, for shifting demographic parameters affecting the skill distribution and the vertical disintegration, Karoly and Panis 2004.
36. Debates on the role of networks in the labor market, innovation, and capital movements yield interconnected literatures. The significance of low-density networks compared to high-density networks in social and economic life was analytically investigated by Mark Granovetter (1983) in the 1980s. For a debate on the notion “mobilization networks” as “the processes that go to make up
in the organizational transformation,

networks are the fundamental stuff of which new organizations are and will be made...
Under the conditions of fast technological change, networks, not firms, have become
the actual operating unit...[T]he network enterprise makes material the culture of the
informational/global economy: it transforms signals into commodities by processing

Thus, Castells is critical of Alfred Chandler and others who have framed the recent changes as
the interaction of the multinational form with their national roots:

Empirical analyses of the structure and practice of large corporations with a global
scope appear to show that [these] visions are outdated and should be replaced by the
emergence of international networks of firms, and of subunits of firms, as the basic
organizational form of the informational/global economy (Castells 1996: 191).

Multinational enterprises bypass the so-called “transnationals” and are evolved into
international networks (Castells 1996: 192), since markets and inputs are “globalized” and dramatic
technological change increases the pace of devalorization: “[I]n such a context, cooperation is not
only a way of sharing costs and resources, but also an insurance policy against a bad technological
decision” (Castells 1996: 193). This rapid change in the scale, scope, and characteristics of constant
capital yields an economic environment in which coordination is assured through networks, rather
than vertical firms or government intervention. However, this structural shift does not lead to the
replacement of markets with hierarchies, as Oliver Williamson (1975) argued:

Whilst market size was supposed to induce the formation of the vertical, multi-unit
corporation, the globalization of competition dissolves the large corporation in a web
of multidirectional networks, that become the actual operating unit. The increase of
transaction costs, because of added technological complexity, does not result in
the internalization of transactions within the corporation but in the externalization
of transactions and sharing costs of throughout the network, obviously increasing
uncertainty, but also making possible the spreading of uncertainty...[C]orporations have
transformed themselves into a web of multiple networks embedded in a multiplicity
of institutional environments...The market’s hand that institutional economists tried
to make visible has returned to invisibility. But this time, its structural logic is not only
governed by supply and demand but also influenced by hidden strategies and untold

labor force structures” and a debate on conditions characterizing the “habitus” of workers and employers using those networks,
see deGaudemar 1987. For more comprehensive models, see articles in Schettkat eds. 1996 and Fuaker 2005. For the impact of the
networks in the financial sector on the price volatility; see Baker 1981 and Sassen 2005. For the role of networks in innovation and
dissemination of information, see Valente 1995; Coombs, Albert, Savotti, and Walsh eds 1996; and Stoneman 2002. For the role of
networks of labor for information dissemination, see Fornahl, Zellner and Audretsch (eds.) 2005. For the role of networks of labor in
industrial innovation due to the contagion and diffusion effects, which they cause, see Guille and Brooks 1987.

37. See, for the effect of the diversification of the economies of scale of dominant goods and assets and for the structural scale of
national state on the logic of collective action, Cerny 1995. As other pieces subject to this paper, Castells’s work does not provide an
extensive debate on the international trading system (except for his discussion on the role of nation-state) and implicitly argues that
there has been a gradual decrease in tariffs. See, for the structure of WTO and agreements constituting the WTO system, Landau
2005. See, for the impact of different exchange rate regimes on the mobility of capital, Akyuz 2002.
Transaction cost economics presents the alternative of hierarchies as discrete interactions among actors on the market. This assigns the market a specific mode of behavior and many institutionalists such as Mingone (1991) or Granovetter (1985) have already presented their criticism of this view. Castells theorizes markets as the medium of an alternative mode of behavior, networking:

"For the first time in history, the basic unit of economic organization is not a subject, be it individual (such as the entrepreneur, or the entrepreneurial family) or collective (such as the capitalist class, the corporation, the state)...[T]he unit is the network, made up of a variety of subjects and organizations, relentlessly modified as networks adapt to supportive environments and market structures (Castells 1996: 198).

The post-industrial society signifies the global interdependence of the labor force, rather than a global labor force. Since the basic source of value-added in informational work process is innovation, actors in the work process are differentiated in terms of their contributions to the networks of innovation. They can be networkers, networked, or switched-off workers. Thus, being a decider, participant, or an executant is an outcome of these positions (Castells 1996: 239–44). This segmentation yields a structural divide between generic and programmable labor. In other words, the deskilling thesis of Braverman (1998), which I will deal with in the last part, pertains only to a particular segment of the labor force (Castells 2000: 372). Similarly, “capitalists” are also diversified: holders of property rights are structurally separated from the managerial class, even if the former are individual entrepreneurs or family owners. The actual capitalists are, however, neither of them:

"Global financial markets, and their networks of management, are the actual collective capitalist, the mother of all accumulations. To say so is not to say that financial capital dominates industrial capital, an old dichotomy that simply does not fit the new economic reality. Indeed, the past quarter of a century, firms around the world have, by and large, self-financed the majority of their investments with the proceeds of their trade. Banks do not control manufacturing firms, nor do they control themselves. Firms of all kinds...use global financial networks as the depositories of their earnings and as their potential source of higher profits...Global financial networks are the nerve center of informational capitalism. Their movements determine the value of stocks, bonds, and currencies, bringing doom or bonanza to savers...But these movements do not follow a market logic. The market is twisted, manipulated, and transformed, by a combination of computer-enacted strategic maneuvers, crowd psychology from multi-cultural sources, and unexpected turbulences, caused by greater and greater degrees of complexity in the interaction between capital flows on a global scale. While cutting-edge economists are trying to model this market behavior on the basis of game theory, their heroic efforts to find rational expectation patterns are immediately downloaded in the computers of financial wizards to obtain new competitive advantage from this knowledge by innovating on already known patterns of investment (Castells 2000: 374–75).

38. See, for debates on mobility of labor, Emmanuel 1972 and Bhagwati 1983. For the trends in international migration in the presence of unemployment and economies of scale, and for an argument rejecting the assumption of linearly homogeneous production technology as a result of migration, see Basu 2004. For case studies on the impact of geographical mobility of labor on shop floor dynamics, see Lee 1998 and Ngai 2005.
In short, Castells argues for the possibility of an economic environment characterized by low concentration (through the dispersal of financial capital) and high centralization of capital (through the coordination of networks). He redefines the notion of centralization and concentration of capital as a result of his emphasis on the network-based production organizations. The dense production networks signify a higher level of centralization of capital, rather than de-centralization, as Lash & Urry argue. These recent contributions attempt to theorize the content of contemporary industrial relations with the analysis of the conditions of concentration and centralization of capital.

It is possible to broaden one’s perspective concerning these contributions in terms of the role of organizational changes, the relationship among different capital groups, and the institutional forms of regulation, through a reading of David Harvey’s Limits to Capital (1982). Harvey specifically theorizes the role of temporal differences in circulations of fixed and circulating capitals. He also discusses the contemporary relationship between different circuits of capital in an analysis of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall with an authentic reading of Capital. For Harvey, Capital establishes three objectives: the first volume uncovers “the origin of profit in a production process,” while the second volume “focuses upon the circulation of capital.” The third volume intends “to synthesize the findings of the first two volumes and to build a model” around the theme of the falling rate of profit and its countervailing tendencies (Harvey 1982: 156–57). Although Harvey provides an extensive discussion on the factors behind the falling rates of profit, his major contribution, I believe, lies in his success in demonstrating the relationship between interactions among different circuits of capital and the consequent changes in industrial labor practices.

The last volume of Capital, Harvey believes, is heavily influenced by the polemical issues of its time and fails to arrive at a synthesis (Harvey 1982: 180). Thus, the theorization of the falling tendency of the rate of profit could have been “a viable synthetic model of the contradictions of capitalism,” if Marx had not failed “to integrate even the limited though deeply suggestive findings on turnover time into this argument.” The capitalist relations of production generate the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, since “individual capitalists...make technological adjustments which drive the economy as a whole away from a ‘sound,’ ‘normal’ development of the process of capitalist production” (Harvey 1982: 188). Thus, capitalist relations of production must necessarily adhere to certain technological and organizational characteristics if they are to achieve balanced equilibrium growth:

[H]ow on earth can the processes of technological and organizational change...ever achieve the viable technology to permit balanced accumulation and the reproduction of class relations in perpetuity?... The necessary technological and organizational mix could only ever be struck temporarily by accident and...the behavior of individual capitalists tends perpetually to de-stabilize the economic system. This is, I believe, the correct interpretation to be put upon what Marx depicts as the fundamental contradiction between the productive forces and the social relations under capitalism (Harvey 1982: 189).

This instability is associated with the circulation of fixed capital: distribution of fixed capital affects the differentials in industrial turnover times and establishes or (most of the time) distorts the proportionality between Departments of Production. For Harvey, “the more capital circulates in fixed form, the more the system of production and consumption is locked into specific activities geared to the realization of fixed capital” (Harvey 1982: 220):
[Capitalists]…create a distinctive and rather peculiar mode of circulation of capital which in due course ‘hardens’ into a ‘separate mode of existence of capital’…Specific temporal relationships are introduced into models of accumulation, which are initially specified without reference to any particular time scale…The accumulation process has not to be seen as operating within a time-space framework defined according to the distinctive logic of capitalism…I shall refer to the totality of processes whereby capital circulates through fixed capital formation and use as the secondary circuit of capital…The circulation process of fixed capital does not establish an absolute time scale against which accumulation can be measured…The separation of fixed from circulating capital imparts a cyclical rhythm…to the interchanges between Department 1 and 2…Crisis formation takes on a particular temporal rhythm defined, in the first instance, by the relative circulation times at various components of fixed capital in relation to surplus value production. The diversity of potential circulating times is considerable, however (Harvey 1982: 235–36).

The circulation of fixed capital is primarily linked to the relations between Departments of Production, rather than labor-capital relations. The proportion of fixed capital in circulation in relation to the circulating capital determines the characteristics of “specific activities geared to the realization of fixed capital” and characteristics of industrial relations. Complementarity between different forms of capital is a central dynamic accounting for the content of industrial practices. The analysis of fixed capital reveals the conditions of the “liquidity” of the productive capital between two Departments of Production and the terms of its “convertibility” to the circulating capital. A higher organic composition of capital implies more frequent crises as a result of the imbalance between fixed and circulating capital39 and signifies a structural trap:

From the standpoint of the production of surplus value, fixed capital appears as ‘the most adequate form of capital’…On the other hand, fixed capital is ‘value imprisoned within a specific use value’, associated with specific forms of commodity production under specific technological conditions. It must command future labor as a counter-value if its value is to be realized. For this reason fixed capital confines the trajectory of future capitalist development …precisely because it is ‘condemned to an existence within the confines of a specific use value’ (Harvey 1982: 237).

The harmonized circulation of different forms of capital requires the spatial integration of labor processes, which takes the form of unequal exchange between different trading systems. This spatial integration is achieved through the circulation of capital over space: “the relation between the mobility of variable capital and that of the laborers themselves introduces another dimension into class struggle” (Harvey 1982: 376). Since “the laws that govern the movement of variable capital are embedded within those that regulate the mobility and accumulation of capital in general,” “devaluation, arising for whatever reason, is always particular to a place, is always location specific” (Harvey 1982: 381, 378). That is, a positive correlation emerges between the magnitude of turnover times and the severity of geographical and temporal inertia (Harvey 1982: 394):

39. This structural source of crisis is theorized by the neo-classical position as “trilemma” as a result of difficulties to establish the fixed exchange rate, open capital markets, and autonomous monetary policy. See Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor-1, 2004 and Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor-2, 2004. On the role of the capital controls in the maturing of crisis, see Forbes 2004. See, for the reactions of multinational corporations in response to restrictions on the mobility of capital, Desai 2004.
The more mobile the laborer, the more easily capital can adopt new labor processes and take advantage of superior locations. The free geographical mobility of labor power appears a necessary condition for the accumulation of capital...Free individual mobility of the laborer is an important attribute to be promoted. But capitalists also need to keep labor reserves in place, keep labor markets segmented as a means of social control and support adequate social reproduction processes for labor power of certain qualities (Harvey 1982: 380–84).

The structural problem is that “capitalism increasingly relies upon fixed capital...to revolutionize the value productivity of labor, only to find that its fixity (the specific geographical distribution) becomes the barrier to be overcome” (Harvey 1982: 394). This is because

[The temporal requirements of circulation of capital limit the time available for spatial movement within each state. The unity of production and realization of values keep the geographical movement of capital within strictly circumscribed bounds (Harvey 1982: 406).

These temporal and spatial constraints on turnover times ensure regional differentiations (Harvey 1982: 431):

The tensions between fixity and motion in the circulation of capital, between concentration and dispersal, between local commitment and global concerns, put immense strains upon the organizational capacities of capitalism...The result has been the creation of nested hierarchical structures of organization which can link the local and particular with the achievement of abstract labor on the world stage...A hierarchy of moneys of different qualities is necessary for accumulation to proceed. Only in this way can the local need for medium of circulation be related to the universal equivalent as a measure of value...Other hierarchical forms of organization abound and exhibit similar tensions within themselves. Multinational firms, for example, have a global perspective but have to integrate with local circumstances in a variety of places. They may rely heavily on patterns of local subcontracting and may therefore participate to limited degree, in support of a local territorial alliance...And within the hierarchy of the multinational firm, what makes sense at one level does not necessarily make sense at another...While the nation state occupies a key position in this hierarchy, supra-national organizations reflect the need for global co-ordinations, and regional, city, and neighborhood governmental arrangements links universal with purely local concerns (Harvey 1982: 422–24).

These hierarchies are in constant flux thanks to the absence of coordination between primary and secondary circulations of capital, and result in regional crises. “Spatial fixes,” thus are not “the instant magic” for these contradictions (Harvey 1982: 431). Harvey’s The Condition of Post-Modernity (1990) defines three possible relations between circulating and fixed capital. Temporal displacement switches between different forms of capital in order to increase the turnover time or to accumulate money capital for its prospective conversion to productive capital. Spatial displacement absorbs excess capital and labor through geographical expansion. Time-space displacements generates fictitious capital (for the sake of temporal displacement) to be squandered in labor-intensive economies (for the sake of spatial displacement) (Harvey 1990: 184).
This last dynamic leads to the diversification and coexistence of alternative labor systems. In his *The Condition of Postmodernity*, Harvey argues:

[It] seems as if alternative labor systems can exist side by side within the same space in such a way as to enable capitalist entrepreneurs to choose at will between them… Eclecticism in labor practices seem almost as marked in these times as the eclecticism of postmodern philosophies and tastes. (Harvey 1990: 187)

This multiplicity is “a rather traditional response to crisis”: though Piore and Sabel (1984) observe “a reconstitution of labor relations and of production systems,” and Pollert (1988) perceives recent developments as an ideological assault to break the power of organized labor, Harvey argues that unsustainable time-space displacements do not offer long-term solutions. Since the crisis of 1973, not the concentration of power in financial institutions, but the explosion in new financial instruments and markets has been coupled with sophisticated systems of financial coordination on a global scale: “[I]t is through this financial system that much of the geographical and temporal flexibility of capital accumulation has been achieved.” Thus, consumer, corporate, and governmental debts are all interwoven and serve to fuel the tendency to crisis. These observations confirm Aglietta’s arguments (Harvey 1990: 189–95).

### 3.1.4 Mobility and Cooperation among Capitals in Istanbul’s Apparel Industry

The second volume of *Capital* theorizes the necessity for establishing harmony between the circuits of productive capital and the circuits of commodity and money capital. The turnover rate of the circuit of productive capital depends on the turnover rates of the latter circuits. The global economic environment in the twentieth century until the 1970s signified a low turnover rate for both money and commodity capital. Accordingly, the turnover rate of the circuit of productive capital was low, resulting in specialization of resources and high verticality in industrial organizations. In this period, productive capital was mostly industry-specific. Individual industries had their authentic labor processes, while labor practices within individual industries became increasingly homogenized. Thus, it is no wonder that debates of political economy until the 1970s focused on the question of the possibility of expanded reproduction in closed economies.

For the current period, however, contrasting perspectives provide equally convincing arguments about the impact that the circulation of different forms of capital in different circuits has upon industrial relations. One of the relevant questions for this industry-specific analysis has to do with the modes of the use of productive capital. If the argument of Piore and Sabel has empirical relevance, then we should see two patterns in the apparel industry. First, the diversification in terms of the labor practices within the industry should be strong. Second, this diversification should be the basis of complementary industrial relations among different labor practices. One way to investigate the characteristics of the diversification among labor practices is to look at the spatial division of labor.

---

40. For the boom in the magnitude of swaps since 1984, see market surveys in http://www.isda.org/.
between factory system and sweatshop labor in Bağcilar, the setting of the research project, and thus that is what I chose to do.

The question at hand is the content of the relationship between individual capitals of different sizes. While Harrison argues for the “concentration without centralization,” which gives theoretical priority to the upper echelons of supply chains, Castells and Lash & Urry’s argument “centralization without concentration,” emphasizes the autonomy for smaller capitals. These two arguments imply two different forms of supply chains. The first form suggested by Aglietta and Harrison postulates close links between larger and smaller capitals beyond arm’s length relations. Piore & Sabel, Lash & Urry, and Castells, however, argue that industrial relations among different enterprises take a form of lesser institutionalization either through micro-scale cooperation in industrial districts or through production networks loosely connecting the enterprises on the basis of individual operations.

In order to examine the relevance of these arguments, I will illustrate the characteristics of the subcontracting relations for the Follower and Independent Sweatshop. Relations of these sweatshops with their customers provide evidence for both arguments. On the one hand, the Follower Sweatshop took the path suggested by the theories of “centralization without concentration”: its connections with the Central Factory had, until recently, been so close that it operated almost as an extended unit of the factory. On the other hand, the Independent Sweatshop had limited organizational links with its customers. However, in overall terms, I observed a gradual convergence over time in the transformation of organizational links of these two sweatshops with their customers. As the Follower Sweatshop no longer enjoys a close relationship with the Center Factory thanks to the changes in the growth strategy of the Center Firm, customers of the Independent Sweatshop have progressively intensified their control over its organizational arrangements. This convergence within the relations among different enterprises, however, does not take the form of a vertical organizational structure. In general, these observations support the argument that different labor practices, which are at least potentially substitutive for each other, can coexist with each other, when their connections have a complementary character. Now, let us first focus on the spatial distribution of the industrial activities in Bağcilar and examine the characteristics of its population and its industries. This section is intended to provide an overview of the industrial connections among small and large work organization in the apparel industry.

### 3.2 DIVISION OF LABOR AND SPACE IN BAĞCILAR

#### 3.2.1 Bağcilar: A Representative Industrial District in Istanbul

Supply chains connect workers as much as enterprises. Characteristics of the working population determine the viability of different forms of subcontracting in a particular industry. Thus, let us first have an overview of some basic demographic characteristics of the working population in the research setting, Bağcilar, Istanbul. The data in this introductory section will be evaluated in the final chapter. The overview in this section will help contextualize the information concerning the occupational characteristics of the resident population which will be tackled in the next section. The focus in this section will be the origin and timing of migration to Bağcilar, and its population size.
Bağcılar measures 22 square kilometers and lies in the European part of Istanbul. It is neighbored by four districts: Küçükçekmece, Esenler, Güngören, and Bahçelievler. Its western border with Küçükçekmece is a connection highway linking the two major highways of Istanbul, E5 and E6. Its northern border with the military zone in Esenler is marked by the E6 highway. There are no easily identifiable historical or geographical landmarks between eastern and southern borders of this district. Actually, these borders are mostly for legislative purposes. The urban space is filled with adjacent apartment buildings, which have on average four floors (Bağcılar Household Survey 2006).
The population of Bağcılar was 719,267 in 2007. Bağcılar is the most populous district in Istanbul with a high density of 32,693 people per square kilometer. The population was 203,175 in 1985 and has increased by 3.5 times within the last twenty years.

Table 3.1 Population of Bağcılar

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population of Bağcılar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>203,175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>291,457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>487,896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>558,435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>719,267</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DIE (State Statistics Institute), www.tuik.gov.tr

This major inflow of population to Bağcılar points to a short average duration of residence for the district’s inhabitants. Approximately 40 percent of Bağcılar’s residents have been living in this district for less than ten years. Approximately 75 percent of the population migrated to Bağcılar less than twenty years ago.
Bağcılar's residents are mostly first-generation migrants to this district. The average age in Bağcılar is 27.4. Thirty-four percent of the population was born in Bağcılar. Twenty-two percent of the population, approximately 156,000 residents, is under 12 years of age. Given that forty percent of the current population has been living in Bağcılar for less than ten years, even though these children can be regarded as migrants, the first enormous population inflow also generated its own human geography with this generation. Another identifiable group is the residents who have been living in this district for more than two decades. This segment of the population accounts for twenty-five percent of Bağcılar’s households. The second-generation households constitute a minority in Bağcılar.
The average household size for this relatively young population is 4.2 persons. In fact, most of the residents in Bağcılar live in nuclear families. Forty-nine percent of respondents to the Municipality Survey decided to live in Bağcılar in order to be close to their relatives, whereas fifty-four percent of the families decided to live in Bağcılar due to the proximity of their neighborhood to their workplace. In other words, most of the residents in Bağcılar migrated here in order to alleviate the burden of commuting to their workplaces and to enjoy family ties.

This emphasis on family ties as a reason to reside in Bağcılar raises questions about community and family relations. The provincial origin of migration plays an important role in the making of communities (Erder 1996). Turkey is composed of seven geographical regions: Marmara, Aegean (Ege), Mediterranean (Akdeniz), Central Anatolia (İç Anadolu), Southeast Anatolia (Güneydoğu Anadolu), Black Sea (Karadeniz), and Eastern Anatolia (Doğu Anadolu). Households from each region were affected by different push factors in their decision to migrate to Bağcılar.

Map 3.2 Geographical Regions of Turkey


Istanbul is in the Marmara region, the most prosperous part of the country. Almost all cities in this region receive domestic migration. Unsurprisingly, only 2.5 percent of Bağcılar’s population was born in other provinces of the Marmara Region. The Aegean region and the Mediterranean region similarly provide relatively ample opportunities for employment thanks to tourism and valuable cash crops. Furthermore, the Aegean region has Izmir, which is the third biggest city of the country. It is a major destination point for Aegean migrants. The Central Anatolian region has important industrial centers such as Kayseri. Ankara, as the capital city of Turkey and the second biggest city, is also located in Central Anatolia. These cities absorb a significant portion of the Central Anatolian migrants.

Three regions of Turkey are the migration origins for a significant number of the residents in Bağcılar: Eastern Anatolia, Southeast Anatolia, and the Black Sea Region. Eastern Anatolia covers
most of the eastern part of Turkey, a mountainous area with low agricultural productivity, long and cold winters, and low population density. Southeast Anatolia has fertile land, while irrigation has been a problem despite the massive Southeast Anatolian Project, which is composed of various dams and irrigation systems. Furthermore, the majority of the population in this region is Kurdish. The language barrier has a negative impact on formal education. Hacienda-like landownership in this region also manifests itself in a semi-feudal agricultural production system. Last but not least, the civil strife between Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) and the state has also brought about significant political and economic instability in the region (Ergil 2009). The Black Sea region suffers from scarcity of land, despite the opportunity to grow valuable cash crops such as hazelnuts. The Western Black Sea is a major source of migration to Bağcılar.

The map below illustrates the places of birth of Bağcılar’s residents. People born in the Western Black Sea and Middle Eastern Anatolia constitute the largest groups in terms of migration origin. In general, the Black Sea region as a whole accounts for 24.7 percent, while migrants who were born in Southeast Anatolia constitute 8.2 percent of Bağcılar’s population. Eastern Anatolian migrants, on the other hand, account for 17.5 percent. Together, people born in these three regions constitute 50.2 percent of Bağcılar’s population.

**Map 3.3 Places of Birth of the Residents of Bağcılar**

![Map of Turkey showing places of birth of Bağcılar's residents](image)

*Source: Bağcılar Municipality Survey, Courtesy of Municipality of Bağcılar, 2006*

Turkish citizens can register the birth certificate of their children in any particular province they choose. Although the newborns can be registered in the location of birth, many families in big Turkish cities choose to register their children in their hometowns in order to make certain official procedures such as marriage, military service, voting, and taxation easier. This also helps to maintain their children’s cultural affiliation with their hometowns. The migration origin of Bağcılar’s residents who were born in Istanbul can be tracked to some extent via analysis of these identification records.
Out of 34.1 percent of Bağcılar’s residents born in Istanbul, only 7.4 percent have their birth certificates registered in Istanbul. In other words, parents chose to register the birth certificates for their children in their home provinces. The Black Sea Region appears to be the migration origin for more than one third of the population in Bağcılar. It is followed by Eastern Anatolia with twenty-five percent. Southeast Anatolia and the eastern part of Central Anatolia each account for approximately ten percent of Bağcılar’s population. These four regions constitute more than eighty percent of the district population. Thirty-six percent of Bağcılar’s residents are made up of entire families who migrated from the Eastern regions of Turkey. A surprisingly similar figure, thirty-seven percent of Bağcılar’s population migrated from the Black Sea region. In other words, the Black Sea and Eastern-Southeast Anatolian migrants comprise the majority of Bağcılar’s population.

To recapitulate, first, Bağcılar has a young population. Most of the households are first-generation migrants. Families who migrated to Bağcılar in earlier periods constitute approximately one quarter of the population. Second, at least ninety-three percent of residents regard themselves as migrants according to their birth certificates. Third, in terms of migration origin, two regional groups dominate the population: migrants from the Eastern regions of Turkey and Black Sea migrants account for 73.4 percent of the total population. Each of these groups constitutes a similar portion of the resident population. Now let us look at the occupational characteristics of the resident population in Bağcılar. This is by and large a working class district, while a significant portion of the population are multiple homeowners. This gives us some clues as to the economic stratification in working class districts of Istanbul.
3.2.2 Occupational Characteristics of the Population in Bağcılar

The largest migration wave to Bağcılar took place in the 1990s and added 400,000 new people to Bağcılar, tripling the population of the district. This huge influx of people supplied the labor for the emerging industry in this district. Thus, unsurprisingly, the most important source of income is wage income.

The four most important sources of income in Bağcılar are wages, pensions, commercial activity, and housing rent. These activities account for 92.5 percent of total income, as demonstrated in the below chart. The most striking figure here is the ratio of housing rent as an income source for Bağcılar’s population: the primary source of income for 5.3 percent of the households is the rent from their apartments, probably in Bağcılar.

**Chart 3.3 The Primary Source of Income for the Households**

Housewives constitute 25.6 percent of the population, followed by workers who account for 22.6 percent. In addition to their non-remunerated domestic labor, housewives are also potential home-based workers. Thus, they constitute an independent occupational category. If children and students are not taken into consideration, all other remaining categories of work account for 17.2 percent.

Source: Bağcılar Household Survey 2006
Wage-earners constitute eighty-seven percent of Bağcilar's active workforce. The total share of employers and self-employed is eleven percent. If housewives, students, children, and retired people are omitted from the calculation, workers constitute fifty-seven percent of the workforce. In fact, Bağcilar is a working class district. Given the stagnation of the wages discussed above, the working class in Turkey earns less than the GNP per capita-level. This trend applies to the workers in Bağcilar as well. Given the significant percentage of workers in Bağcilar's population, the average household earning in Bağcilar is lower than the Turkish national average.

In comparison to the average national household income per month, which was 1,214 TL in 2006, Bağcilar’s average is only 914 TL. Seventy-one percent of the households earn less than 1,000 TL. In other words, more than seventy percent of the population in Bağcilar is either poor or working poor.
One of the primary reasons for widespread poverty in Bağcılar is limited contribution to the labor force, unemployment placing more than four percent of the population outside the labor force, in addition to the percentage of children in the population. Eleven percent of households have no employed members at all. In sixty percent of the households, there is only one working member of the family.

**Chart 3.6 The Number of Individuals Working in the Household**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Individuals</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>60.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 or more</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bağcılar Household Survey 2006

The low income level is not the sole reason for poverty. The other primary but less visible reason is the duress of paying rent.

**Chart 3.7 Homeownership in Bağcılar**

- Renter % 39.0
- Residing at a Relative’s Apartment, Paying no Rent % 12.8
- Other % 0.3
- Apartment Owner % 47.9

(n=152,122)

Source: Bağcılar Household Survey 2006

Thirty-nine percent of low-income households in Bağcılar pay an average of 309.65 TL in rent. The declared monthly income of fifty percent of the district population is below 750 TL. Even for households earning approximately 1,000 TL, this means one third of their monthly income. However, there is a significant group of multiple homeowners in this district as well. Fourteen percent of the population owns more than one apartment. Moreover, as mentioned above, the primary income of 5.3 percent of the population is rent. In other words, rent transfer among the residents of Bağcılar, an expense for renters and an income for homeowners, contributes to the poverty of the working population.

The provided survey data does not enable us to draw conclusions as to the possible correlation between timing of migration and home ownership. However, my observations in Bağcılar support the intuition that residents who migrated to Bağcılar relatively earlier (i.e. twenty years ago or earlier) constitute the property-owning segment of the population. Thanks to the phenomenal population growth in the last two decades, the latecomers generated a high demand for housing.
This led to an increase in tenement rents. Rising rents put the late migrants in a rent-trap difficult to escape.

Bağcılar is a working class district, which received migrants from different regions of the country through successive waves of migration. A significant portion of this population is employed at numerous small- and medium-sized apparel facilities and by home-based work networks. The high population density is one of the main factors that render this district a zone of industrial clustering for the apparel sector. Although the spatial distribution of sweatshops and home-based work organizations looks chaotic, the east-west binary in Bağcılar between large- and small-scale facilities characterizes the structure of industrial coordination in this district.

3.2.3 Division of Space in the Supply Chains of Bağcılar’s Apparel Industry

Bağcılar is not only the most populous district of Istanbul, but also one of the biggest industrial sites in Istanbul. One of the most striking characteristics of the industrial production in Bağcılar is its geographical distribution: the majority of factories are located in three neighborhoods in the western part of the district; Bağlar, Evren, and Mahmutbey. These neighborhoods border the connection road which links E5 to E6, which means that merchandise produced here can be transported to their destinations with relative ease.

The western border of Bağcılar is the connection highway linking E5 to E6, marked by the yellow line on the map below. The red areas illustrate the blocks for the large-scale industrial establishments. Almost all large-scale establishments in Bağcılar are adjacent to the connection highway. These factories produce a variety of products such as recycled steel, metal products, appliances, machinery, plastics, paper, pipes, chemicals, glass, automobile parts, and different construction materials.
Map 3.5 Large-Scale Industrial Establishments in Bağcılar

Red areas demonstrate the blocks occupied by the factories.

Source: Courtesy of the Department of Geographical Information Systems, Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality

The district and metropolitan municipalities issue licenses for the industrial establishments in Istanbul. The metropolitan municipality takes the responsibility for issuing licenses for the largest industrial establishments, such as power plants generating energy of more than twenty megawatts, steel mills processing more than fifty tons of steel- and iron-products annually, concrete factories producing at least five tons of concrete an hour, and textile factories using engine power of more than 500 HP\textsuperscript{42}. In 2008, fifty-two enterprises were registered by the Metropolitan Municipality in Bağcılar as such large-scale industrial establishments.

\textsuperscript{42} İşyeri Açma ve Çalışma Ruhsatlarına ilişkin Yönetmelik (The Code of Registration for the Businesses), Bakanlar Kurulu Kararının Tanı (Cabinet Decision Dated): 14/7/2005  No : 2005/9207
Table 3.2 Number of Large-Scale Industrial Establishments in the Neighborhoods of Bağcılar

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhoods</th>
<th>Number of the Large-Scale Industrial Establishments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bağlar</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evren</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Güneşli</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahmütbey</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yüzyıl</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazım Karabekir</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merkez</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yenimahalle</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>52</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Courtesy of the Department of Machinery and License, Bağcılar Municipality, 2008

The western neighborhoods of Bağcılar, which are adjacent to the highway connecting E5 and E6, are Mahmütbey, Evren, Güneşli, Bağlar and Hürriyet. Forty-three of the aforementioned establishments are located in Bağlar, Evren, and Güneşli. The establishments in Kazım Karabekir and Yüzyıl neighborhood are large parking lots especially for trucks. In addition to apparel and textile production, large-scale industrial establishments in this area process paper, plastics, aluminum, steel, and chemicals, manufacture cables, plastic and metal tools, and paper products, and weave various kinds of fabric. The district municipality issues licenses for medium- and small-sized industrial establishments and inspects workplaces to see if they meet the requirements of the license conditions.

Chart 3.8 Number of Registered Medium-Sized Industrial Establishments in Bağcılar

Source: Courtesy of the Department of Machinery and License, Bağcılar Municipality, 2008
Although all industrial establishments are required to receive their operation license from the municipality, most of them do not meet the requirements of health and fire hazards. Such establishments do not apply for the license and attempt to delay the related procedures for as long as possible. The establishments with license are usually medium-scale industrial establishments. Sixty-one percent of these establishments are located in the west neighborhoods of Bağcılar neighboring the connection highway. Most of these medium-sized industrial establishments are factories employing hundreds of workers. The Center Factory is one such medium-sized industrial facility.

The second striking characteristic is that the labor-intensive and small-scale industrial workplaces are mostly located in the eastern neighborhoods of Bağcılar. There is an implicit geographical division of labor among different industrial activities: labor-intensive industrial activities in Bağcılar are mostly small-scale. They lack sufficient resources to run an extensive shuttle system for the commuting of their workers. Nor can they compensate their workers for commuting. In order to utilize the poorly paid local workforce of Bağcılar, these workshops are located in residential areas. The eastern neighborhoods of Bağcılar, with enormous population densities, possess this much sought characteristic.

**Map 3.6 Apparel Facilities in Bağcılar**

Source: Courtesy of the Department of Geographical Information Systems, Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality
This map illustrates the count of apparel facilities by the Metropolitan Municipality in 2008. The count is not a complete survey and only roughly demonstrates the clustering of garment workplaces. However, it still provides a representative visual image of the clustering of the apparel workplaces. Workplaces are indicated in different colors according to their function: processing leather (red dots), outwear and underwear (blue dots), ready-made clothing (green dots), and flat knitting (yellow dots). As elaborated below, seventy-one percent of all industrial activities in the residential areas have to do with various sorts of apparel production. Apparel sweatshops are generally clustered in the eastern part of the district.

Given the intensity of the informal industrial activities in the residential areas, our knowledge about the content and the size of such activities is limited. The Bağcılar Household Survey, however, provides realistic data concerning the number and the geographical distribution of the small-scale industrial establishments in the residential areas of Bağcılar. The interviewers counted the industrial establishments in residential buildings for the survey.

There is approximately one industrial facility in every six residential buildings in Bağcılar. For approximately every ten buildings, there is an apparel- or textile-producing facility. In correspondence to these figures, for every 88 residents of Bağcılar, there is one industrial facility, and for every 144 residents, there is one textile or apparel facility in the residential areas of Bağcılar. These figures would verify my visual observations in this area where almost every street has at least one clothing sweatshop. The industrial dynamics are at the core of everyday life. The supposed distinction between private and public is moot.

Table 3.3 Distribution of Apparel Facilities in Residential Areas of Bağcılar

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of the Population</th>
<th>Number of Residential Buildings</th>
<th>Number of Industrial Establishments in Residential Buildings</th>
<th>Number of Clothing and Textile Facilities in Residential Buildings</th>
<th>Population / Number of Residential Buildings</th>
<th>Population / Number of Industrial Establishments in Residential Buildings</th>
<th>Population / Number of Clothing and Textile Facilities in Residential Buildings</th>
<th>Number of Industrial Establishments / Number of Buildings</th>
<th>Number of Clothing and Textile Facilities / Number of Buildings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>644,098</td>
<td>40,227</td>
<td>9,794</td>
<td>6,977</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>88.1</td>
<td>154.5</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bağcılar Municipality Survey, Courtesy of Municipality of Bağcılar, 2006

The ratio of the number of industrial facilities located in residential buildings to the number of the residential buildings provides a rough sense of the spatial binary between large-scale and small-scale industrial facilities.
The map above illustrates the ratio of industrial facilities in residential buildings to the residential buildings in the neighborhoods of Bağcılar. Evren, Güneşli, Bağlar, and Hürriyet neighborhoods are adjacent to the highway connecting E5 and E6 highways and have a lower ratio than the district’s average. However, the ratios in most of the eastern neighborhoods of the district are above average. The ratio of these small-scale industrial establishments to the total number of buildings in a neighborhood demonstrates the density of the light industries in the residential areas. The mean of these ratios in different neighborhoods is 0.116 with a standard deviation of 0.018. The western part of Bağcılar is well below the average in that regard, while the eastern part is in general above the average, with the exceptions of Kazım Karabekir and Sancaktepe neighborhoods.

The research project focused on apparel production, a labor-intensive industry. Bağcılar has 40,227 residential buildings. Workplaces in non-residential areas such as factories were not included in this survey. Thus, all of the counted workplaces are small- and medium-scale industrial establishments in residential areas and mostly within residential buildings.
### Table 3.2 Non-Residential Use of Space in Residential Buildings and Plots in Bağcılar

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>50569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Classified</td>
<td>61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Facilities</td>
<td>172</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial</td>
<td>32352</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>114</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>9794</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Centers</td>
<td>133</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreational Facilities</td>
<td>440</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Agencies</td>
<td>1610</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport Facilities</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5841</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bağcılar Municipality Survey, Courtesy of Municipality of Bağcılar, 2006

There are 6,977 textile and garment producing facilities in the residential areas of Bağcılar. This figure accounts for seventy one percent of all small- and medium-scale industrial facilities in Bağcılar. In other words, textile- and apparel-producing facilities dominate the industrial scene of Bağcılar. They also account for the geographical separation between the small- and large-scale industrial establishments in the eastern and western neighborhoods.
Most of the small-scale industrial establishments pursue informal employment practices. This is one of the primary difficulties in measuring the size of the workforce in various branches of the apparel industry. As discussed above, estimates on the number of workers employed in the textile and apparel industry in Turkey vary between two million and three and a half million. The data at hand, unfortunately, does not provide a clear idea about the textile and apparel workers in Bağcılar.

According to the Municipality Household Survey, approximately 148,000 workers reside in Bağcılar, yet it is not possible to know which sectors they are employed in and whether they work in Bağcılar. An estimate about the total number of employment by apparel sweatshops could be based on the last national census for the industrial establishments by TUIK in 2002, according to which the average number of employees per local unit of apparel production is nine. Based on this figure, the textile and apparel sweatshops in Bağcılar should be employing approximately sixty thousand workers. However, this census probably failed to catch a great portion of the informal workers. According to my observations, sweatshops usually employ at least fifteen workers, since this figure

---

is the minimum for a semi-functional assembly line. Most of the apparel sweatshops have a functioning assembly line. If we take fifteen as the average number of employees per sweatshop, this very conservative estimate will yield a figure of 105,000 workers employed in the 6,977 apparel facilities in the residential buildings of Bağcılar. If the average figure is estimated more realistically as thirty workers per sweatshop, then the total number increased to 200,000 workers.

In other words, not only are the majority of workers in Bağcılar employed in garment producing workplaces, but garment production is the most important single source of employment in the area, larger than all other industrial and non-industrial sectors combined. This labor force is shared by the factories, sweatshops, and home-based work networks, while the estimates here do not include the factory workers and homeworkers.

This particular geographical division of labor among different forms of labor in the apparel industry reflects particular connections among industrial establishments that sustain the complementarity between these forms. In other words, although different labor practices of the apparel industry produce similar products (different kinds of apparels), extensive subcontracting relations tie them to each other in various ways and establish a unitary industrial complex, which successfully exploits different social categories of workers in quite distinct cultural contexts.

Thus, it is no wonder that the Center Factory is located in the least populous neighborhood of Bağcılar, Bağlar. This neighborhood provides a convenient location for the factory in terms of the proximity to its subsidiary sweatshops in the Halkali neighborhood of Küçükçekmece and eastern neighborhoods of Bağcılar. The residential neighborhoods of Bağcılar function as the “hinterland” of the factory, providing its workforce.

### 3.3 FORMS OF SUBCONTRACTING

#### 3.3.1 Integral-Independent and Short-Term Subcontracting

This urban context unsurprisingly facilitates different forms of subcontracting. The spatial binary of industrial activities within the district contributes to the making of the duality among enterprises in terms of the scope of production. During the fieldwork, I had the opportunity to observe two forms of subcontracting. The first form is established as a hierarchical relationship between factories and sweatshops. The second form organizes individual enterprises of different sizes via relatively discrete market exchanges without a central hub.

In order to document the characteristics of the first form, I will provide a brief history of the Follower Sweatshop. Two partners owning the Follower Sweatshop have been in the apparel industry since 1988. They have moved the workplace five times since then. The original location was a particular quarter of the Halkali neighborhood in Küçükçekmece, bordering Bağcılar. I resided in this neighborhood during the period I conducted my observation at the factory. This first sweatshop was approximately seventy square meters. It was a grocery store at the time of my research project. They initially had only nine sewing machines, which they bought with some money borrowed from

---

44. This is a very conservative estimate. A fully functional assembly line requires at least thirty workers.
their hemşehris and relatives. Both partners were from Iğdır, an Eastern Anatolian province, and one of them was related to the owner of the Center Factory.

In 1990, the number of sewing machines increased from nine to fifteen. The sweatshop moved to a larger place on the main street of the same neighborhood in 1991. Founded only one year before the Follower Sweatshop, the Center Firm was meanwhile experiencing much faster growth thanks to its aggressive export strategy. This success could not have been possible without the contribution of the second partner of the Center Firm, G.R.R., who had business connections in Germany. This imbalance between the growth rates of the Center Firm and the Follower Sweatshop eventually subordinated the Follower Sweatshop to the Center Firm: Follower Sweatshop underwent a steady and healthy growth, which was apparent from the gradual growth of the firm’s machinery portfolio. However, thanks to the phenomenal success of the Center Firm, the Follower Sweatshop became a part of the lower echelon of the supply chain. The Follower Sweatshop benefited from and contributed to the growth of Center Firm.

The relationship between the Center Firm and its subsidiaries was called the “integral-independent system” (iç bağımsız sistem). In Turkey, relations between subsidiaries and their customers usually signify a distanced connection based on the piece-rate. In the integral-independent system, however, payment was made upfront in order to cover the expenses of the sweatshop, including wages, energy costs, and overheads. By the completion of the order, the cost of production and the revenue from the Center Firm would have been calculated and, if the output by the sweatshop did not cover the payment, the sweatshop would be indebted to the Center Firm. This debt would be sustained and the subsidiary sweatshop would continue to take orders from the Center Firm.

This unconventional form of subcontracting was the outcome of the conscious growth strategy of the Center Firm. It had two major elements. First, the supply chain should have internalized all capital-intensive departments. Accordingly, the Center Firm opened a large-scale textile factory in Çorlu and gradually internalized almost all capital-intensive units for apparel production in its Center Factory. The second part of the strategy was to have close relations with the labor-intensive production units in order to eliminate the contingencies for the planning department. Sweatshops took on the legal and managerial task of employing a large (and informal) workforce, taking this burden off the shoulders of the Center Factory. Accordingly, the Center Firm could still keep its immediate access to a large number of workers instantaneously via this supply chain. The downside of the strategy was that the productivity of the sweatshops in this tight supply chain could be lower than the industry’s average due to the absence of competitive pressure.

The ability to process high volumes of orders quickly was one of the characteristics of this supply chain which provided the precious cutting edge for the firm in this sector. Accordingly, the Center Firm worked on individual orders of multi-million pieces for the largest retail chains in Europe in the past. As the manager of the department of total quality management, E.R.R., commented:
UB: But why did you internalize almost all capital-intensive departments within your factory? Why did you develop such a tight relationship with your subsidiary sweatshops?

E.R.R.: We don’t have a distant relationship with our subsidiaries. Others do, but our customers see the difference. While our competitors have to go out looking for a sweatshop for garter or tagging, we’ve got our own department within our factory ready, so we can start working on the order immediately. So while our competitors are out trying to make a deal with a cutting sweatshop, we’ve already begun sewing the clothes. Nobody can be faster than us.

In short, economies of speed rather than economies of scale were the primary motivation for the high verticality. The close relationship of the Center Firm with its subsidiaries substantially contributed to its growth. Most of these subsidiary sweatshops belonged to either the same kin or hemşehris. The Center Firm’s trust in its subsidiaries, a valuable asset in the garment industry, allowed it to make courageous moves in the direction of expansion. The Center Firm employed approximately three hundred workers at its factory during the project. However, until recently their website declared a workforce of four thousand, a number arrived at by including the workers employed by its close subsidiaries. As a result of this close relationship with the Center Firm marked by continued large-scale and long-term orders, the Follower Sweatshop increased its production capacity at a steady and substantial rate.

In 1993, the Follower Sweatshop moved to a much larger space of 225 square meters with approximately twenty sewing machines. As the orders from the Center Firm continued to supply a regular flow of money, the production place in 1995 was again moved to a larger space of five hundred square meters in another neighborhood of Halkali. By 1995, the Follower Sweatshop had forty sewing machines and employed more than fifty workers. Close relations with the Center Firm, which was growing uninterruptedly from 1988 until 1995, encouraged the Follower Sweatshop to take out big loans for new investments in sewing machines and enlargement of the production place. However, the financial crisis in 1995 caused a temporary cut in the orders from the Center Firm. The Follower Sweatshop lost 125,000 German Mark; approximately $62,000.

After the Center Firm recovered from the crisis, the Follower Sweatshop continued to grow. In 1998, Mr. Follower and his partner A.H.N. bought some land in Halkali and began to construct a building for their current workplace. This three-story building was approximately one thousand square meters. The number of sewing machines increased to fifty. This building cost approximately one million Turkish Lira (ca. $830,000). The third story was vacant by the time of the project, as the positive trend of growth came to an end with the abolition of the integral-independent subcontracting system by the Central Firm in 2005. Their expectations to grow uninterruptedly failed. This miscalculation cost them this unused extra story in their building.

### 3.3.2 A New Sub-Contracting Relationship and a Semi-Functional Assembly Line

The integral-independent system allowed the Center Factory to externalize the production-related risks (in a limited manner), while the management still kept significant power to intervene
in the labor process of the sweatshops in terms of planning and employment, especially in the case of technical crises.

Certainly, the subcontracting relationship is almost always motivated by the mother firm’s tendency to externalize its risks related to the labor process. The relevant question is which particular risks are externalized. For instance, in the absence of trust between the mother firm and its subcontractors, piece-rated payment motivates the sweatshop owners to keep the quality low and the output high. Thus, maintaining a long-term relationship with the subcontractors is expected to increase the quality of the returns.

However, a long-term relationship with the subcontractors on the basis of guaranteed payments also reduces the capacity of the mother company to punish its subcontractors. Furthermore, technical crises in the labor process are not completely externalized for the company. Consequently, direct intervention in the labor process of the sweatshops becomes necessary in the case of technical emergencies. So long as such emergencies occurred sporadically, the Center Firm incurred only negligible costs associated with the monitoring of its subcontractors’ labor process. However, according to the managers of the Center Factory, most of the permanent subsidiary sweatshops abused this relationship and failed to maintain productivity levels as planned. Their debt to the Center Firm accumulated over the years.

Some of them even resorted to deception by giving false figures for production costs, such as the number of workers employed at their facility. The Center Firm had approximately thirty direct subsidiaries and closely monitored their financial activities by providing them with accounting services themselves. Thus, such acts of corruption inevitably came to light. Finally, the Center Firm gave up the integral-independent system, which had gradually become a burden.

Table 3.5 Characteristics of the Observed Forms of Subcontracting in Bağcılar

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Two Alternative Forms of Vertical Integration in the Apparel Industry</th>
<th>Mode of Payment</th>
<th>Level of Integration</th>
<th>Advantages for the Mother Firm</th>
<th>Disadvantages for the Mother Firm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Short-Term Subcontracting</td>
<td>Payment on Bargained Piece-Rate</td>
<td>Direct and Drastic Intervention in the Case of Miscommunication and Emergencies</td>
<td>Almost Complete Externalization of Problems related with the Labor Process</td>
<td>Limited Opportunity for Intervention only in Emergencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal-Independent Subcontracting</td>
<td>Upfront Payment Based on the Pre-Determined Rates and the Production Costs</td>
<td>Constant Counseling and Training with the Provision of Managerial Services such as Accounting</td>
<td>Establishment of a Set of Incentives for the Sub-Contractor to Keep the Quality High</td>
<td>Subcontractors Having the Opportunity to Abuse the Relationship by Fallacious Record-Keeping. Short-Term Pressure on the Subcontractors is Low.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Owners of the Follower Sweatshop had not cheated the Center Firm and performed more successfully than other subsidiaries in the supply chain. Thus, they were still working with this firm during the project. However, the Center Firm was no longer their primary customer, since the Center Firm had been systematically decreasing its production capacity in Turkey over the years as a result of its plan to transfer its major production facilities to Addis Ababa in Ethiopia. Despite
this new relationship with the Center Firm, the Follower Sweatshop continued to pursue similar organizational arrangements and employment policies from 2005 on. Thus, a closer analysis of the conditions of production at the Follower Sweatshop provides the opportunity to see the similarities and differences between small- and large-scale places of production in the apparel industry.

The shift from internal-independent subcontracting to short-term subcontracting resulted in a great amount of uncertainty. Owners of the Follower Sweatshop were constantly looking for new customers, since they did not hold a significant amount of liquid capital for emergencies. The daily operational cost of the sweatshop was approximately 3,000 Turkish Lira (ca. 2,000 USD). Planning was done on a weekly basis. In other words, sweatshop owners did not know for sure whether or not they would be receiving orders even just two weeks ahead of time.

The declining size of the orders was another source of uncertainty. Multiple orders from different customers were taken in order to bypass this difficulty. In order to document this problem, for one week during my observations I kept a record of orders. At the beginning of the week, Monday, an order of three thousand black sweatshirts was being sewed. The piece-rate was 1.2 Turkish Lira. Tuesday afternoon, that order was completed and a new order of four hundred deep blue sport shirts was on the assembly line. The sewing cost for each was 2 Turkish Liras. On Wednesday, a new order of eight hundred polar shirts started to be sewn. This was a difficult design with a piece-rate of 2.5 Turkish Liras and could not be finished until early Friday.

Meanwhile, on Thursday a second order was taken to the assembly line simultaneously with other orders: one thousand eight hundred sweatshirts for which the Follower Sweatshop would receive 2 Turkish Liras a piece. It is a regular practice in apparel sweatshops to work Saturdays until 1:00pm. However, this time, due to pressure from the customer firm, the Saturday shift was extended until 5:00pm that week. The tension was extremely high, since there were significant problems in some of the stitches on the neck of the garment. Also, some overlock machine operators were slower than expected leading to at least three bottlenecks on the assembly line. These bottlenecks increased the waiting time for other operators in line. In total, five thousand pieces were completed by the end of the week.

Table 3.6 Basic Outline of the Orders of the Follower Sweatshop for a Selected Week

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orders and Piece-Rates for a Week</th>
<th>Monday</th>
<th>Tuesday</th>
<th>Wednesday</th>
<th>Thursday</th>
<th>Friday</th>
<th>Saturday</th>
<th>Total Production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3,000 sweatshirts. Piece rate: 1.2 TL (A continuing order from the previous week)</td>
<td>400 sport shirts. Piece rate: 2 TL</td>
<td>800 polar shirts. Piece rate: 2.5 TL</td>
<td>1,800 sweatshirts. Piece rate: 2 TL (This order was completed with 800 polar shirts)</td>
<td>800 polar shirts were completed. Production of 1,800 sweatshirts continued.</td>
<td>By 5 pm, the order of 1,800 sweatshirts was delivered.</td>
<td>5,000 pieces were produced.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Income</td>
<td>3,600 TL</td>
<td>800 TL</td>
<td>2,000 TL</td>
<td>3,600 TL</td>
<td></td>
<td>10,000 TL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Follower Sweatshop employed approximately fifty workers at its sewing section, one fourth of the sewing department at the Center Factory. The size of the orders of the Center Factory ranged between 50,000 and 250,000 and were at times as high as one million pieces. Thus, the
sewing department at the Center Factory, except for the emergency finish-ups from the subsidiary sweatshop, was set to produce a particular design at least for one week, usually for one month. However, the Follower Sweatshop not only worked with short deadlines and very small orders, but it also had to work on multiple orders simultaneously.

These difficulties certainly caused significant tension among workers and between workers and foremen at the Follower Sweatshop. In that week, during which I kept a record of the orders and the labor process as an outside observer, workers had verbal disputes several times, one of which almost turned into a fight. Workers were subjected to very harsh criticism and were yelled at by foremen on several occasions. The hemşehris of the foremen were the ones who tended to talk back to the foremen and to have disputes with each other. Unrelated workers were much more docile and inclined to accept the pressure as it was. In other words, workers who were relatives and/or of the same migration origin were by no means more amenable to the pressure of the labor process. I will elaborate on the dynamics of the employment of workers having identity-affiliations with their employers in the fourth chapter.

In contrast to the Follower Sweatshop, the Independent Sweatshop never had a long-term customer. Thus, what was new for the managers, workers, and foremen of the Follower Sweatshop was routine at the Independent Sweatshop. The Independent Sweatshop’s relations with its customers in regard to the production process therefore provide useful insights concerning the piece-rate subcontracting system.

3.3.3 Hierarchical Relations in the Horizontal Supply Chains

As in the Follower Sweatshop, the owner of the Independent Sweatshop, Mr. Independent, was obliged to run his workplace on short-term planning. While I was at this sweatshop, there were always new customers and their representatives making sure that their order was processed properly. The state of affairs was in “a constant crisis.”

An interesting observation on my part was to see the representatives of the customers spend a significant amount of time at the sweatshop when their order was being processed. These “subcontractor-agents” (fason takipçisi) represent the customers at the sweatshop. They monitor and, if necessary, intervene in the labor process. They are paid by the customers of the sweatshops in order to assure the quality of the order and timing of the delivery. Their intervention inevitably slows down the production, frustrates workers and the foremen, and adds new complexities to the labor process.

In this context, foremen usually experience triple the pressure from the demands by workers, employers, and subcontractor-agents. Foremen must constantly negotiate with each of these parties. Their capacity to shape the organization in a flexible way is, thus, seriously compromised. The subcontractor-agents had not been expected to directly monitor production in the past. Their primary responsibility was to find the sweatshop accepting the lowest piece-rate, to distribute the material, and to deliver the finished garments to the export firm or the factory. Quality control in the 1990s was the most important means of monitoring the performance of the sweatshop. In the case of large orders, the quality of some randomly chosen garments were checked and, if
defects were found, the sweatshop was either given a severe fine or in some cases denied payment completely.

This kind of control over the sweatshops was gradually replaced with direct monitoring by the subcontracting agents. The agents now allocate their time to the different sweatshops they work with. Thus, they can spend just a couple of hours a day or sometimes the entire day at a particular sweatshop. The amount of time an agent spends dealing with sweatshops depends on the number and the performance of the sweatshops. I would like to share a striking example about the dysfunctional aspects of the assembly line at the Independent Sweatshop due to the clash of interests among different actors, which will help illustrate these multiple effects on the labor process.

I was hired by the Independent Sweatshop as a “sweeper” (ortacı). Sweepers are attendants who work with different sewing machine operators. Their basic function on the assembly line is to assure an uninterrupted flow of the pieces among machine operators and work units and to ease the job of the operators by folding the pieces in such a way that the operator can quickly grab them from the pile. Furthermore, sweepers also perform the interim quality control, finding defects and returning pieces back to the operator responsible for the mistake. Accordingly, operators cannot simply sew faster with a high rate of defects and put the blame of the defective items on other workers in their work unit. This position is ideal for inexperienced (young) workers. Although their responsibilities in the assembly line are well defined, most of the sweatshops usually use them as interim ironers (ara ütücü) as well. Interim ironers prepare the collars for shirts and t-shirts, press the synthetic buckrams on the pieces with the heat of the iron, and unfold small and elastic pieces with the steam in order to save sewing machine operators time.

At this sweatshop, unsurprisingly, I worked at the interim-ironing line as well. The largest order during the participant observation here, a party of 30,000 t-shirts, began to be sewn in my second week. The design was difficult and the fabric too thin to be processed by the machine operators. One of the most problematic parts of the entire process was sewing a heavy stitch on the bottom part of the collar. In order to prevent the sewing machine from damaging the fabric, a synthetic piece needed to be stuck onto that particular part of the fabric. The synthetic material used was “buckram” (tela).

Pieces of buckram measuring approximately four square centimeters in size needed to be stuck with the heat of the iron on the appropriate spot at the back of the fabric, and then secured in place with a stitch extending down from the collar. The technical problem was to locate this spot, since there was no reference cut-point showing the middle point of the fabric. In the absence of such a cut-point, the foreman drew a model on the ironing table for the ironers to use as a model sheet for the fabric. Various problems emerged right after we began to stick the buckrams onto the fabric: the fabric was too light and elastic. Thus, the sign sheet drawn on the ironing table did not successfully provide the correct reference points to locate the spot. The drawing on the ironing table began to stain the fabric because of the steam of the iron, which would later earn me (and my teenage coworkers) a scolding from the foreman. In short, mistakes were inescapable and the quality of the job was certainly poor, though this was probably supposed to be one of the simplest tasks in the assembly line. My two co-workers, who were suffering from serious concentration problems due to their young age, and I had a rather difficult time resolving the problem. They were constantly motivating me and each other to work faster. In the middle of this struggle, the
subcontracting agents, a man and a woman, arrived at the sweatshop to monitor the process. Their presence actually contributed to the chaos on the shop floor. Fixing the buckrams was the very first process in the assembly line. Thus, we, the interim ironers, caught the agents’ immediate attention. After standing by us for a couple of minutes, they began to talk amongst themselves about the problem.

The subcontracting agents were opposed to the idea of using a drawing for the reference point on the ironing table: there was the risk—as experience had already shown us—that the drawing could stain the fabric. The foreman had not been aware of this, until the agents mentioned the possibility. However, my co-workers and I knew very well that we had already sent many of the pieces stained with the red ink. We did not let the foreman know, since it would have resulted in us being berated further. In addition to this, many of the buckrams were incorrectly fixed, and this misdirected the operator responsible for sewing the collar. However, the structural failure in this operation would remain unnoticed for another two hours.

Why did the foreman decide to use a reference drawing on the table to find the middle of the piece? The alternative was to make one of the ironers find the correct spot on the fabric and punch a tiny hole in it to mark it. Then, the second ironer could have easily fixed the buckram with the iron. In other words, the foreman could have decided to decrease the average productivity of the interim ironers with fewer defects. However, the foreman was not sure if cutting a hole in the fabric would have caused trouble for the subcontracting agents. The subcontracting agents might not have tolerated such a small hole even at the edge of the fabric. Thus, he had chosen the presumably less risky method of finding the middle of the fabric, by using a reference scale on the ironing board. The less risky method in theory, that is!

After a short but heated dispute, the foreman conceded his failure in an apologetic manner, for which he would take out his frustration on us after the agents left, and pushed for his alternative method, which was to pierce small holes in the fabric. He tried to convince the subcontracting agents that this was the only alternative. The subcontracting agents were, however, as unsure as the foreman. The woman agent, who was the superior of the male agent, asked for a minute, came to our corner of the shop, and made a phone call. Luckily, I was able to overhear her conversation. She asked for her superior’s approval, who would call her back after he or she received the approval of the actual customer, a retail chain in Germany. In a couple of minutes, she got a call back from her superior, this time at another corner of the sweatshop. We had received approval from Germany. Once the subcontracting agents approved the alternative method of cutting a marking point on the fabric, we immediately shifted to this new procedure.

However, at this point, the incorrectly fixed buckrams we had already sent on, having failed to find the right spots on the pieces, were being returned by the sewing machine operators. We needed to fix them all and at the same time keep up with the pace of the assembly line. After a while, we speeded up and began to fall into rhythm with the assembly line (and the boys and I were feeling great). However, then the agents realized that one buckram was not enough to hold the stitch. The machine sewing the collar had damaged many pieces, even when the buckrams were properly fixed to the fabric. At this point, a new decision was made and we began to put two buckrams on top of each other. This meant that the interim ironers would process the same piece for the third time.
This example illustrates the conditions of low productivity at the sweatshop. First of all, the interim ironing section, which was composed of four low-quality irons, was understaffed. Thus, I was assigned to this task, although I had clearly told the foreman several times that I had not ironed anything in my entire life (unsurprisingly, I became the source of embarrassment in my team). Second, thanks to the lack of coordination between different work units (again a consequence of insufficient number of workers, this case sweepers), we sent on many defective pieces which went unnoticed by the next unit for a long period of time. Third, the actual and potential intervention of the subcontracting agents had a significant effect on the foreman’s decisions concerning the technical details of this task. The foreman was not sure of the best way to find the right spot on the fabric, since he was more concerned with the subcontracting agents’ reaction to his decision. Furthermore, the agents’ initial intervention cost us a significant amount of time, as we had to undertake repairs and readjustments. Their delayed intervention concerning the necessary number of buckrams meanwhile was yet another source of failure.

To recapitulate, the understaffed personnel, the problematic relations with customers, and constant changes in the organization of production thanks to the small size of orders, resulted in low productivity in this sweatshop. The limited “economies of scale” were only part of the problem, since the lack of communication between subcontracting agents and foremen made it impossible for the existing workforce and the sewing machines to be used to their fullest potential. My overall assessment about such problems (as a sweeper) is that the employment of only a couple of extra sweepers could have resolved many difficulties deriving from the miscommunication between work units. The employment of a few more workers would not have made a significant change in the scale of production. However, the minimalist perspective of the employers seemed not to apply to sewing machine operators but instead aimed to reduce the number of all other personnel helping those operators. This view of management was closely associated with the erratic nature of the orders: to employ as few workers as possible was a measure to lower immediate costs, even though this strategy resulted in significant disruptions in the work process.

**3.3.4 Failed Attempts to Structure the Clustering in Bağcılar’s Industrial Basin**

I was aware of the physical concentration of apparel sweatshops in the residential areas of Istanbul before this project. Thus, why the government or the municipality failed to provide space for a large industrial park for apparel producers and traders was a source of curiosity for me. Hypothetically speaking, enterprises such as the Center Firm could have chosen to motivate its close subsidiaries to relocate to such industrial parks in order to reduce transaction costs. Accordingly, big players of the sector could have been expected to support the construction of industrial parks specifically for the apparel and textile sectors.

During the project, I realized that there were actually two such industrial parks adjacent to the border between Bağcılar and Esenler: Giyimkent (Clothing City) and Tekstilkent (Textile City). These industrial parks were initiated as one single project as an industrial cooperative in 1985. The aim was to provide space primarily for garment and fabric merchants. Most of the merchants had been operating in Eminönü, the old city, for decades, and they were suffering from
serious problems due to the old and dysfunctional infrastructure of this district.

As a result of some disputes concerning the planning and the architecture, the initial project was split into two industrial parks. Both projects were intended to be a mass showroom for companies in the textile and apparel sectors. However, later, small-sized production facilities were included in the projects as well. Tekstilkent houses 5,000 shops in large multi-story buildings, while Giyimkent has 2,300 shops. The construction of the parks took more than fifteen years. Most of the financers and prospective shop owners meanwhile found themselves in a downfall with the rest of the industry from the 1990s on. Some of them simply withdrew from membership. Others sold their rights for low prices. However, more important than either of these factors, both merchants and industrialists later became sour about the idea of relocating their production facility to these industrial parks. The distance from the working class neighborhoods and the old centers of trade could have disconnected them from the networks among sweatshop owners. Most of them simply did not want to take this risk.

By the time the projects were completed in 2000, they were already a major failure. Ninety percent of the parks’ 5,300 shops were vacant during the project. The managers of these cooperatives, whom I interviewed, were among the most experienced merchants and industrialists in the sector. They had apparently lived through the history of the textile and apparel industries since the 1960s and personally experienced the transformation of the industry from the early years of the ISI period. Thus, they were quite confident in the appropriateness of these projects in the 1980s: what the textile and apparel industries needed was properly planned industrial districts with sufficient infrastructure and easy access to the highways. My impression from these interviews was that they remained convinced that these projects could have fulfilled their intended functions, if the financial crises of the 1990s had not hit the sector. Thus, they were doing their best to promote their cooperative with an emphasis on the advantages of agglomeration in such sites that provided all of the physical amenities well above the standards of the industry. As one of the managers of Tekstilkent put it:
When we began to work on this project in the 1980s, we were not aware of the concept of “clustering.” In fact, we created the physical infrastructure of clustering in the textile sector with this project, though we did not know that what we were doing was called “clustering” by [social] scientists.

Providing ample space for producers and traders in a decent environment, these industrial parks are only five kilometers away from the central neighborhoods of Bağcılar. These projects were on paper and in reality nearly perfect in terms of their infrastructural conditions. However, what was not taken into account was the import of networking among enterprises and relations between workers and their employers. Interactions among these agents were and are in constant change as a result of urban transformation, migration waves, and the transformation of the networks in the sector. As O.S.M., one of the founders of Giyimkent and a veteran of the textile sector, commented:

We are truly astute and successful as individuals, but, when it comes to the sector in its entirety, this is certainly not the case.

The search for cheaper labor and the chaotic nature of the subcontracting relations turned Bağcılar and its neighboring districts into the center of the apparel industry no matter how much sweatshops and factories suffered from chaotic industrial relations. These connections enable sweatshops and home-based work networks to reach workers and the factories to reach the sweatshops and the home-based work networks. The pictures above were taken on a regular weekday. Streets and shops in these industrial parks were simply vacant.

Picture 3.3 Giyimkent

Giyimkent, 2008 (The picture on the left: vacant shops in Giyimkent; The picture on the right: the mosque [mescit] in Giyimkent with its modernist architecture) Photo: Author
3.4 SPACE OF THE SUPPLY CHAINS

Bağcılar’s apparel industry is based on the local division of labor among different forms of industrial labor. Industrial facilities in Bağcılar are located in different parts of this district according to their production capacity. The entire district acts as a single workplace with two major departments: relatively capital-intensive establishments are in the west, while labor-intensive establishments are in the east.

Specialized sewing machines are frequently swapped between sweatshops. Factories with particular specialized machinery use their excess capacity from time to time in order to produce for other factories in the same sector. In short, the active circuit of productive capital creates a tendency for different labor practices to adopt similar organizational principles. However, individual labor practices still keep their organizational independence and hold their places in this district. The question then is, how come cooperation among enterprises does not lead to uniformity in labor practices?

In order to answer this question, this chapter provides research data concerning the division of labor within supply chains. Supply chains turn different labor practices into an integrated production system within an individual industry. Thus, the analysis of the characteristics of supply chains provides information on the organizational interaction among different labor practices.

The Center Factory had, until recently, used a special form of subcontracting system that went well beyond arm’s length relations. Thus, it was certainly not surprising to see similarities in the organization of work in this factory and its subsidiary sweatshops. The close relationship with the subsidiaries certainly brought about more control over the sweatshops. After integral independent subcontracting was abolished in 2005, the Follower Sweatshop suffered from the dynamics of a chaotic marketplace. Being under lesser control by new customers came with the price of insecurity.

The experience of the Independent Sweatshop in terms of the relationship with its customers was quite the opposite: subcontracting agents gradually increased their control over the labor process. Although this sweatshop had never been a permanent part of a particular supply chain, its foremen and owners had to submit to the their customers’ representatives’ increasingly frequent interventions in their own work.

Thus, regardless of the characteristics of the sweatshops, it seems that vertical command relations between customers (factories and export companies) and their subsidiaries have been becoming more important in the Turkish apparel industry. This transformation in the relationship between different workplaces points to a higher level of integration among different labor practices and a rising similarity in production techniques between different workplaces of the same labor practice. For example, the way I fixed the buckrams onto a piece of fabric was decided by a white-collar employee of a retail chain in Germany.

In other words, I believe transformation of the subcontracting relations into a higher level of verticality plays a significant role in the homogenization of the labor processes within individual forms of industrial labor. However, labor practices in most cases complement each other. Cases whereby labor practices substitute each other are relatively rare. Characteristics of the geographical configuration of the industrial activities in Bağcılar and the evolution of the relations among different actors within the supply chains both verify and contribute to the tendency of homogenization of the labor processes for individual labor practices. Thus, while the autonomy of each labor practice is kept intact, organizational characteristics of enterprises within individual
labor practices become increasingly similar. In other words, my observations support the arguments by contrasting literatures on the current characteristics of industrial relations: both vertical and horizontal integration exist in Istanbul’s apparel industry. However, the caveat here is that this happens only to the extent that different labor practices can fulfill distinct roles in supply chains of contrasting organizational structures.

This “relative autonomy” of individual labor practices also means that integration within supply chains has a limited impact on the labor process of the subsidiaries. The longevity of the relationship between customers and subsidiaries, in this regard, determines the extent of similarities of organizational matters between different forms of labor. The Independent Sweatshop was working with different customers, some retail chains, and factories. Thus, even though this workplace had to adapt to their customers’ organizational priorities and subcontracting agents could have extensively intervened in the technical aspects of production even if it were a one-time operation, the Independent Sweatshop in general had to keep its authentic organizational structure.

This was because this organizational structure was primarily intended to establish a functional labor process. The labor-management relations had a higher priority in the organizational matters than the temporary relations with customers. The impact of the customers on the labor process was strong, but it had its own limits. Moreover, in the case of the Follower Sweatshop, even though its long-term relationship with the Center Factory generated significant similarities in organizational dynamics of the labor process, parallelisms in their employment practices were equally important.

Thus, this chapter illustrates the potentials and limits of the analysis of supply chains to understanding the organizational characteristics of different labor practices. Investigation of the positions of different agents in supply chains tells us much about the dynamics rendering their respective organizational arrangements increasingly uniform. However, it does not tell us much about why enterprises at different echelons of supply chains still can and do keep distinct organizational arrangements. As a reminder for the reader, the Center Factory, Independent Sweatshop, and the Follower Sweatshop produce similar use-values but with different organizational arrangements.

In fact, the analysis of the division of labor within supply chains (or, for that matter, global or local commodity chains) provides limited information about these differences. In order to go beyond this, we need to pursue an extensive investigation of the labor processes for each of these labor practices. Thus, the next chapter will deal with the question of labor-management relations in the apparel industry.

Most of the small- and medium-sized sweatshops and home-based work networks work for multiple customers. Thus, the immediate impact of the customers on these work organizations is limited. Relations between workers and their employers have an impact on organizational choices as important as the internal division of labor of supply chains. The question now has to do with the content and the variety of these relations. How and why do workers who produce the same use-value, work in different work conditions, adapt to different organizational arrangements, and have different employment experiences?
PART III: HOMOGENIZATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL LABORS INTO ABSTRACT LABOR

In the first part, I investigated the impact of a competitive environment on the labor practices in the apparel industry. The question was about the conditions of the variety of labor practices despite the homogenizing effect of similar profit margins on the labor process of individual enterprises. The analysis of the changes in the positions of small- and large-scale establishments demonstrates a particular path of growth along the adoption of different labor practices. The data at hand supported the argument that industrial establishments follow this path until a particular threshold of growth, while most of them cannot sustain their leading position in the industry for a long period. In addition to this growth pattern, industrial establishments adopt different labor practices successively, ranging from family sweatshops to multi-sectional factories.

In the second part, the impact of the relationship among different circuits of capital on the labor practices was discussed. This particular relationship is assumed to create a tendency to the homogenization of individual labor practices, since “the convertibility imperative” among different forms of capital requires the presence of substitutive relations among different labor practices.

On the one hand, the geographical location of industrial activities and the ethnographic observations support the counter-argument that complementary relations characterize the apparel industry, rather than substitutive connections. Sweatshops and home-based work networks mostly work for the factories, while the labor process of the establishments in the lower echelons in the supply chains is subject to intense control and monitoring by the agents of the upper echelons. Thus, the variety in the labor processes signifies the presence of commodity chains composed of different labor practices, which are tightly connected to each other and take on different responsibilities. Accordingly, the apparel industry is characterized not by relative autonomy, but rather by interdependence among different labor practices.

On the other hand, the same internal control within the supply chains homogenizes the labor processes of the individual forms of industrial labor. In other words, although differences between the labor practices of the factory system, home-based work, and sweatshop labor are kept intact, organizational arrangements for each of these labor forms have been growing progressively similar as a result of the higher echelons’ tighter monitoring of the lower strata of supply chains.

In the last part of this piece, I will analyze the extent of standardization of the organizational dynamics of different labor practices in the apparel industry. Commodity production for the market requires commensurability among individual labors. This is achieved primarily through the formation of a labor process that deprives the individual labors of their individual characteristics. However, historically this tendency towards the homogenization of individual labors in the form of abstract labor has not been realized as one single form of industrial labor. The context of the relations in production should therefore be the subject of empirical analysis.

My intention here is not only to understand those contextual conditions resulting in the multiplicity of labor practices in Istanbul’s apparel industry, but also to develop a synthetic theory about the relationship between the multiplication of the forms of industrial labor and the social dynamics theorized especially in the first volume of Capital. Thus, the first part of the literature review will emphasize the theories that investigate the impact of the general conditions of capital
accumulation on the characteristics of the capitalist labor process. The focus will be on the Labor Process Theory and Segmented Labor Market Theory. The second part of the review will provide a selective reading of case studies focusing on the question of the proliferation of non-factory forms of industrial labor.

4.1 LITERATURE ON THE REDUCTION OF INDIVIDUAL LABORS INTO ABSTRACT LABOR

4.1.1 Theories of Homogenization and Segmentation of Labor

Within the context of labor-capital relations, two prominent perspectives deal with the question of the proliferation of industrial labor practices. The first approach is the Labor Process Theory (LPT). This perspective focuses on the organizational dynamics of the relationship between labor and capital in order to reveal the forces behind uniformity and proliferation of labor practices. The second approach is the Segmented Labor Market Theory (SLMT), which focuses on the impact of employment practices on industrial labor practices. Analytical differences between these perspectives regarding the endogenous and exogenous dynamics of the labor process help us to read recent case studies on different industrial labor practices critically.

The relationship between characteristics of the labor process and capital accumulation is a “core” dimension for different versions of the LPT (Stark 1980, Wood 1982, Thompson and Newsome 2004). Although many conventional organization theories prioritize different intra-organizational dynamics in order to account for the characteristics of the labor process (e.g. Rothman 1987, Erikson and Vallas 1990, Howard 1995, Watson 2003), the LPT strives to find out systemic tendencies in the modern labor process that derive from the conditions of monopoly capitalism. The monopoly capitalism thesis was developed by Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy (1966) and it is the paradigmatic backbone of the LPT. Harry Braverman (1998) as the leading “labor process theorist” was motivated to complement Baran and Sweezy’s argument about the structural characteristics of capitalist relations of production in the twentieth century with an analysis of the organizational dynamics pertinent to monopoly capitalism:

...Baran and Sweezy deal less with the movement of production than with the movements of its outcome, the product. But, as they point out, not only technological change but also a changing product bring about new and different processes of labor, a new occupational distribution of the employed population, and thus a changed working class (Braverman 1998: 176).

As one of the initial steps in the development of the monopoly capitalism thesis, Paul Baran leaves the surplus value as an operational concept aside and uses, instead, a new concept, “the surplus product,” which is the “part of surplus value that is being accumulated” (Baran 1968: 22). Arbitrary monopoly prices replace production prices, which are a modification of value (Sweezy 1970: 55). Non-exchange relations are increasingly important in the national economies increasingly dominated by monopolies (Sweezy 1970: 288). Since the law of value only holds among commodities as products of one and the same homogeneous and mobile labor force (Sweezy 1970:
289), it is technically impossible to use it for an analysis of monopoly capitalism. Thus, the focus is on the surplus-product rather than the surplus value.

This legitimizes the emphasis on the labor process and the relative disregard for market relations. The monopoly capitalism thesis provides a set of assumptions concerning the institutional setting for the organizational dynamics within the labor process. One of those assumptions is the replacement of market competition by monopolistic competition. With competition among enterprises no longer a major drive for organizational change, labor-management relations become the key dynamic behind the organizational structure of the modern industry.

Although some see this perspective as a clear divergence from the labor theory of value (Rowlinson and Hassard 1994, Carter 1995), this argument should be treated justly. Baran and Sweezy argue that the conditions of production in the age of monopolies hinder the labor theory of value from realizing itself in the first place, since exchange relations between capitals do not take place in competitive markets. Thus, relations between industrial workers and capitalist management, rather than relations among individual capitals in the market, characterize the conditions of accumulation. Following these presumptions of the monopoly capitalism thesis, Braverman's motivation is to analyze the surplus of labor, rather than the surplus of value (Braverman 1998: 177). Two themes in Braverman's piece are in this regard central to the current debate.

First, the separation of conception from execution in the process production through job fragmentation and, hence, deskilling is the key to the capitalist labor process. The capitalist buys the labor “infinite in potential, but in its realization…limited by the subjective state of the workers” (Braverman 1998: 39). The second major theme is control\textsuperscript{45}: the management systems act not only as a specific organization of work, but also as a mechanism that creates the “monopoly over knowledge to control each step of the labor process and its mode of execution” (Braverman 1998: 82).

As the consequences of monopoly capitalism, these two processes shape the labor process in the current historical context. Braverman describes the historical rise of monopoly capitalism as a result of the institutionalization of capital in the form of the modern corporation. In other words, that the increasing concentration and centralization of capital emerged hand in hand with this institutional form constitutes a central argument in Braverman’s perspective of political economy:

The institutionalization of capital and the vesting of control in a specialized stratum of the capitalist class correspond chronologically to an immense growth in the scale of management operations. Not only is the size of enterprises growing at a great pace—to the point where a few enterprises begin to dominate the productive activity of each major industry—but at the same time the functions undertaken by management are broadened very rapidly (Braverman 1998: 181).

The hierarchy among individual capitals coordinates the industrial relations. With the growth of scale of managerial operations, the labor control took a new form different from the manufacture period of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. This quantitative transformation

\textsuperscript{45} For a conceptually inspiring debate on the role of control in the capitalist labor process, which is presented by mainstream economics as the outcome of “search for efficiency,” see Marglin 1975 and Marglin 1991. For the elaboration of a similar argument with an historical insight, see Thompson 1967 and Samuel 1977.
in scope led to the qualitative transformation of the question of control into the strategy of
deskilling. In other words, concentration of the capital has historically had a positive correlation
with the centralization of capital. Thus, the “deskilling imperative” for control in vertical industrial
organizations is also a prerequisite for further concentration of capital. Accordingly, characteristics
of the contemporary markets reflect the deskilling process in industrial organizations.

Though the LPT is by no means a unified perspective (Kitay 1997), the monopoly capitalism
thesis appears as the common ground for the related contributions. Thus, both critical and uncritical
followers of Braverman seem to accept the premises of Baran and Sweezy’s perspective. For
instance, in his Manufacturing Consent (1979), Michael Burawoy argues that the overall strategy
of management is to transform its intrinsic tension with the workers into a tension among workers
through the formation of internal labor markets and the creation of an ideological terrain turning
the labor process into a game for workers. Thus, Burawoy criticizes Braverman’s emphasis on the
separation of execution from conception and direct control over the activities of workers (Burawoy
1979: 104–108 and p. 171–177). However, despite his efforts to convince his audience of the
continued significance of the shop floor tensions between workers and management, Burawoy
uses Braverman’s central argument about the relations among individual capitals in the age of
monopoly capitalism:

Concentration and centralization have obvious implications for the organization of
work. If competitive, supply and product markets are subject to control; it then becomes
essential to control the labor market as well. To control some markets and not others
would be a self-defeating process... Just as the internal market, the internal state, and the
global state were involved in the taming of the market, so all three were also involved in
containing the struggles that threatened to overthrow competitive capitalism (Burawoy

This is simply a repetition of Braverman’s argument: capital is being centralized as a result of
its concentration. In order for the capital to concentrate, it is necessary to beat the workers on the
shop floor. Thus, capitalists have to centralize their capital in their struggle against workers. The
authentic point in Burawoy’s piece is the emphasis on “the relative autonomy of the labor process.”
In other words, the relationship between concentration imperative and centralization imperative is
not as simple as it seems: the consent of workers emerges as an organizational requirement thanks
to the same institutional arrangements deriving from the concentration of capital.

Braverman’s neglect of workers’ subjectivity and the organizational irrationalities of
the capitalist management has been subject to many criticisms. Workers are not passive recipients of

for Warde’s article; Berberoglu 1993. These pieces take shop floor resistance as the central tension for the transformation of capital
accumulation. Hence, their de-emphasis on the overall transformation of conditions of circulation of capital and markets.
47. For the development of the concept of “internal labor markets,” see Doeringer and Piore 1971. See Stark 1986 for the application
of the concept in non-capitalist industrial relations. See Althauser 1989 for alternative conceptions of the term.
48. The same concern to understand the conditions determining “the motivation level” practically accounts for an important
segment of industrial sociology. For some recent evaluations of management strategies to “setup teamwork,” see Carr 2004 and
Charron and Stewart 2004. For the impact of communicative strategies and strategies of “leadership” on the labor process, see
49. For other critical case studies challenging the centrality of this dynamic, see Besser 1996 and Delbridge 1998.
the management’s orders. Nor is the management always a perfectly rational decision-maker. However, I believe, as in Burawoy’s piece, that the later contributions to the LPT did not profoundly theorize the link between the transformation of monopoly capitalism and the organizational changes in the capitalist labor process.

Attempts to account for the diversity in industrial labor practices within the framework of the LPT fail to demonstrate the connection between this diversity and the characteristics of capital accumulation. Instead, they suggest new and eclectic categories of labor process on the basis of the historical analyses of the characteristics of the shop floor struggles. The underlying argument in these attempts is that capital uses the segmentation of labor in the labor process as a strategy in the shop floor struggle.

For instance, Andrew Friedman (1977) attempts to theorize the strategy of individual capitals to divide the working class in the context of monopoly capitalism: “responsible autonomy” is a form of control pertinent to the central workers, firms, and productive activities. What Braverman suggests as the characteristic labor process of capitalism is, for Friedman, “direct control.” This form of control applies to the peripheral workers, firms, and productive activities. These strategies articulate different organizational restrictions for the management, while the implementation of one of these two forms creates its path-dependency for the industrial establishment. This path-dependency accounts for the persistence of different labor practices.

In contrast to Friedman’s framework suggesting a sector-based differentiation in regard to the control imperative, Richard Edwards (1979) establishes a historical link between control and resistance. “Simple control,” as the characteristic of small workplaces, gives way to “technical control,” especially in those industries which use the assembly line as the center of organizational arrangements. “Bureaucratic control” appears as the final form of industrial development, utilizes the career ladders of internal labor markets, and pertains to large monopolistic corporations. Though this theory is problematic in its presentation of management strategies as a historically linear process (Penn 1982), it at least questions the assumption that monopoly capitalism is a monolithic economic environment. The worker resistance urges capitalists to develop more sophisticated methods of control. Similarly, uneven development of capitalist relations of production yields a bifurcation in industrial relations and assigns different control imperatives to the primary sectors (bureaucratic control in the independent primary sectors and technical control in the subordinate primary sectors) and the secondary sectors (simple control).

It is increasingly difficult to distinguish between the LPT and the conventional organization theory, since the analysis of capital accumulation now has a lesser role in LPT (Carter 1995 and Jaros 2005). Thus, the theory loses its original premise suggested by the Braverman and Brighton Labor Process Group (1977). It is still possible to see some intellectually valuable attempts to insert different social dynamics which had not been hitherto conceptualized, such as the impact of local labor markets (Warde 1992), law (Steinberg 2003), “enskilling” (Penn and Scattergood 1985), or “contextual upskilling” due to competition (Attewell 1992). However, failure to reconsider assumptions about the conditions of accumulation reduced the LPT to the same level of theoretical abstractness as other organization theories, such as organizational ecology, agency theory, and

---

50. See Wood 1982, Alvesson 1987, Sturdy 1992, Kraft 1999, and Haydu 2001 for attempts to introduce the actual shop floor relations into the LPT.
transaction cost economics.\footnote{See, for organizational ecology, Hannan and Freeman 1977, Carroll 1984, Rothman 1987, Carroll and Hannan 1995, and Gorawara-Bhat 2000. See, for agency theory, Clegg 1981, Eccless 1985, Eisenhardt 1989, Mahoney 1992, Ouchi 1986, Powell 1990, Shavell 1979, Shavell 1979, Ulrich and Barney 1984. See, for transaction cost economics, Lazerson 1988, Williamson 1975, Anderson 1985, Mahoney 1992. The agency theory and transaction cost economics are two major responses to the multiplication of industrial labor practices from a neoclassical economic perspective. See, for criticisms, Robins 1987, Perrow 1986, Blyth 2002. My criticism to these two perspectives is that the abstraction of markets used by both perspectives could be relevant only in an economy of low centralization and concentration of capital. In other words, transaction costs could be a leading factor for entrepreneurs only in an economy of petty producers. Similarly, the connection between workers and employers can take the agent-principle relationship only if the employee is not proletarianized. These conditions certainly have no empirical relevance in the contemporary world economy.} The problem is not the explanatory power or historical relevance of the monopoly capitalism thesis, as Rowlinson and Hassard (1994) discuss. The core difficulty is not the “rigidity” of the class analysis of Marxist theory (Carter 1995) either.

I believe that the major problem of the LPT is its failure to analyze the conditions of transformation of the productive powers of labor into labor power. It is possible to call this process the “homogenization of individual labors into abstract labor” or, following Harvey (1982), “the reduction process.” Indeed, for Paul Thompson,\footnote{The last significant attempt to “rescue” the LPT was Paul Thompson’s “core theory” (1989). He suggests four core elements: the function of labor and the centrality of production; constant renewal and change in the forces of production and skills of labor due to discipline of profit rate and competitive accumulation of capital; control imperative due to the indeterminacy of labor; and the “structured antagonism” between capital and labor (Thompson 1989: 243–244). Thompson derives these elements from other works on labor process and argues that these elements are common in the major theoretical contributions. Besides the methodological deficiency of suggesting arbitrarily chosen elements as the “core” of LPT (Jaros 2005), since he separates the labor process theory from Marxist schema, the initial premise about the relationship between accumulation and labor process drops and the approach is reduced to one of many organization theories. Thus, chances for adapting it to the new conditions of accumulation are also lost.} a common point pertinent to the major works of LPT is their attempt to conceptualize the conditions of transformation of labor power into labor (Thompson 1989: 242). According to Braverman:

The complexities of the class structure of pre-monopoly capitalism arose from the fact that so large a proportion of the working population, being neither employed by capital nor itself employing labor to any significant extent, fell outside the capital-labor polarity. The complexity of the class structure of modern monopoly capitalism arises from the very opposite consideration: namely, that almost all of the population has been transformed into employees of capital (1998: 279).

This will read in Friedman as follows:

The mode of production (essentially the wage-labor relation under competitive conditions) defines the formal alienation of labor power and the formal possibility of exploitation. It is within the labor process that alienation from the product of workers’ labor is extended to alienation from the organization of work activity and therefore workers’ labor time itself (1977: 5).

And Burawoy:

The definitive problem of the capitalist labor process is therefore the translation of labor power into labor (1985: 21).
However, the terms of this “translation” are determined well before the actual moment of the labor process: individual labors are funneled into different forms of industrial labor before their commodity (i.e. labor power) is transformed into the actual effort. Thus, the way that the labor power is transformed into labor cannot be accounted for without analysis of the conditions of the individual labors before the labor process.

In fact, various versions of the LPT are mostly negligent when it comes to the conditions of the segmentation of labor prior to the labor process, probably because of the belief in the transforming power of the labor process. In other words, labor power as a salable commodity is regarded as an entity already ready for its own exploitation in the labor process. Its transformation into the actual effort, i.e. “labor,” takes place within the labor process. This sharp distinction between the moment of actual labor process and several other social processes preceding the labor process provides a theoretical clarity, while also hindering the observer from distinguishing between different social dynamics that transform the productive capacity of labor into labor power. According to the Labor Process Theorists, the labor process by and large takes the place of those social dynamics responsible for this transformation.

This belief has substantive empirical relevance, as long as conditions of capital accumulation resemble the ideal-typical representation of monopoly capitalism. Thus, the crisis of the LPT does not lie in its performance to decipher the empirically observable principles for capitalist labor process. It rather derives from its failure to go beyond a simplistic theory of monopoly capitalism (and I do not know any other version of monopoly capitalism more comprehensive than Baran and Sweezy’s account) and accordingly to include the social dynamics exogenous to the labor process.

Especially in the context of this project, the tendency towards the homogenization of individual labors cannot be understood with such a model of accumulation. The monopoly capitalism thesis is capable of demonstrating the tendency toward the homogenization of individual labors. However, this approach is incapable of articulating the conditions of segmentation of the labor force prior to the labor process. Thus, although I implicitly accept the presence of a general tendency towards deskillling in this piece, I have two caveats. First, the “deskilling imperative” is not necessarily the outcome of monopoly capitalism. Thus, the presence of this tendency does not prove the relevance of the monopoly capitalism thesis. Second, industrial dynamics leading to the deskillling of the workers are shaped within a broader context of the homogenization of individual labors into abstract labor. Conditions of the labor process that transform labor power into actual labor follow this social process.

Despite such generic problems, the LPT provides a coherent analysis of the effects on the labor process through the investigation of the social dynamics within it. Tendencies towards the homogenization of different labor practices are regarded as the outcome of organizational evolution because of the intrinsic struggle between capital and labor on the shop floor. However, as the multiplicity in industrial labor practices have not faded away, the focus solely on the shop floor dynamics suffers from severe limitations. The focus on heterogeneity of industrial labor practices thus urges us to look at dynamics beyond the scope of organizational characteristics of the capitalist labor process.
The literature on segmented labor market theory (SLMT), in this regard, provides an alternative venue. It is difficult to miss the implicit and explicit references of later works of LPT to the duality in labor markets in order to bypass the factory-centrism of this perspective, as we saw earlier. However, SLMT is not only a distinct perspective, but also antithetical to the LPT because of its emphasis on employment-related dynamics, rather than shop floor dynamics.

The idea that labor markets have never been homogeneous in terms of racial and ethnic relations is by no means new. For instance, Kerr’s The Balkanization of Labor Markets (1954) as an early attempt theorizes the segmentation of labor market in distinct categories. Whenever different ethnic or racial groups compete for the same jobs and there is an actual difference in their labor costs, this division encourages the employers to use the labor force in two (or more) different categories along different employment practices. This particular perspective seeks to explain the continued wage disparities among different racial and ethnic groups in a particular sector. In the 1970s, a variety of approaches investigated the same phenomenon such as The Split Labor Market theory (Bonacich 1972, Wilson 1978, Boswell 1986).

Doeringer and Piore's piece on Internal Labor Markets (1971) and Berger and Piore's later piece (1980) are the most influential early studies on this issue. Their perspective relies on the notion of imperfections in labor markets. The uncertainty on the part of capital and labor due to these imperfections historically generated particular labor market institutions, which are partially responsible for the duality in the labor markets of advanced economies. Moreover, product markets can have stable or volatile demand patterns. These patterns generate respectively mass-production in the core of the economy and flexible production in the periphery of a particular economy.

The interesting conclusion is more about this core segment of the economy. Since employers are provided relatively secure employment in this segment, they need to be motivated with further rewards in their occupational career. This historically resulted in the establishment of internal labor markets. The notion of internal labor markets seems not only to explain much about the occupational dynamics in large enterprises operating in the formal/core segment of the economy, but also to somewhat help us see the differentiation of organizational practices within the institutional body of an individual enterprise.

Gordon, Reich, and Edwards make a neo-institutionalist contribution to this perspective and I will specifically deal with their Segmented Work, Divided Workers (1982) in this part of the chapter, in order to illustrate the explanatory power of the SLMT for a debate on the proliferation of industrial labor practices. Unlike Doeringer, Piore, and Berger's perspectives, Gordon et al. provide a historical approach to contextualize the making of the dual labor markets by the struggle between organized labor and capital. This piece investigates the relationship between institutional changes in labor-management relations and the transformation of the labor process in the context of the United States. In fact, the emphasis is on the role of labor resistance in the transformation of the labor process and its institutional framework. The operational motivation is to account for the dynamics behind labor segmentation (Gordon et al 1982: 32). Three dynamics are central to their

---

53. For a review of different versions of “labor market segmentation” theory, see Fine 1998. See Osterman’s article (1975) for empirical support for dual labor market theory. For a contribution to the debate with the argument that the “dualism thesis” is applicable in countries of different income levels, see Berger and Piore 1980.
Three relevant periods distinguish among the modes of labor control in the United States: initial proletarianization (1820s–1890s), homogenization (1870s–1940s), and segmentation (1920s–1970s). At the beginning of each period (or A-Phases), capitalists experimented with new methods of labor management. Later, institutional innovation supported the emerging mode of labor control. Stagnation, crisis, and workers’ struggle undermined the institutional framework and the B-phase of the existing swing eventually gave rise to a new swing of economic activity (Gordon et al. 1982: 10). Gordon et al. convincingly illustrates the relationship between segmentation/homogenization of the workforce and the organizational characteristics of labor process in the context of the United States.

The crisis of the 1870s and the 1890s gave rise to the mechanization of the production process with the introduction of interchangeable parts to the labor process. The struggle for the establishment of mechanization characterized the emergence of a national labor market and the spread of labor unrest. Assembly line production began to be used widely. Sizes of the plants grew much larger. Moreover, plants were moved to “industrial satellite suburbs,” despite efficiency losses as a result of underdeveloped transportation facilities. Architects were ordered to design plants fragmenting the workspace. Along with these technical responses, racial and ethnic differences regrouped (or re-homogenized) workers with wage incentives according to the criteria of the management (Gordon et al. 1982: 113–43). In other words, capitalists homogenized the labor, while they also developed aggressive counterstrategies to prevent the workers from using their collective power. However, these measures did not stop the spread of labor unrest between the 1890s and 1900s. The labor unrest in turn contributed to the institutionalization of labor unions along with the factory system characterized by the assembly lines.

The relatively calm environment of the 1920s, in terms of external stability and labor-management relations, allowed for an intensive internal reorganization of corporate structure. The need for planning in the recruitment strategies brought about internal labor markets, especially after the Great Depression of 1929, because of the profitability crisis. After the Second World War, homogenization of the labor process was replaced with segmentation under two categories. Following Edwards’s argument (1979), segmentation of the labor process between primary and secondary sectors was argued to couple with the segmentation of independent and subordinate jobs within the primary sector. The average size of plants shrank, heterogeneity in skills grew, and the racial distribution of workers became more even in different departments. Workers lost most of the rights they had secured in the First World War environment. Segmentation was consolidated in the post-World War environment as a result of Cold War conservatism and global domination of US corporations (Gordon et al. 1982: 153–86).

Segmentation was also possible thanks to the survival of the peripheral firms because of the reluctance of large corporations to enter low-profit, easy-to-enter segments of the markets. Center firms avoided the actual acquisition of firms in such (segments of) markets. Such small

---

54. See, for a literature review of “social structures of accumulation” theory, Lippit 2006. See, for a meta-theoretical critique, Mavroudeas (1999), who argues that social structures of accumulation theory is a “middle-range methodology” and, hence, it cannot theorize the target phenomena. For a detailed debate on the relationship between “long waves” and the control process, see Clegg 1981.
firms played an active role in the industrial restructuring. In addition to this market segmentation, secondary labor markets and labor processes emerged within the core firms as well. In this context, “subcontracting emerged as a viable option to utilize the high-risk operations pertaining to the primary markets” (Gordon et al 1982: 201). According to Gordon et al., segmentation, however, ceased to characterize production relations in the 1980s:

The gradual erosion of the postwar labor truce has already begun to undercut the stability and effectiveness of the structured production relations in the subordinate primary segment and … this erosion constitutes a principal source of the well-known slowdown in productivity growth in the US economy…[T]he declining effectiveness of the postwar system of bureaucratic control has contributed significantly to the slowdown in the growth of labor productivity in the US economy (Gordon et al 1982: 219–20).

The new period, they argue, signifies “a reshuffling of the boundaries of the different labor segments and changes in their internal structures” (Gordon et al 1982: 226). In other words, the binary between segmentation and homogenization has lost its historical relevance. It is rather multiplicity that characterizes industrial labor practices, as bureaucratic control is no longer a viable method on the shop floor. Once the monopoly capitalism thesis is left aside, institutional changes in the relationship between capital and labor become the center of the analysis. Thus, different categories of labor practices can be conceptualized on the basis of empirical analysis and observations.55

In the case of the United States, more recent pieces point to declining union membership, contingent work arrangements, and migration of foreign workers in the last three decades (Hudson 2007). In the international context, the cost differentials between different categories of labor are by and large the outcome of variations in regional and national economies that result from uneven capitalist development (Boswell et al. 2006). Despite the empirical value of these contributions, like LPT, SLMT lost most of its theoretical authenticity to provide clear-cut answers concerning the question of the proliferation of industrial labor practices. As Ben Fine comments, “the theory has remained ‘middle-range’…SLM theory has been in a chronic state of crisis, not simply as a judgment in retrospect from an external vantage point, but from within the paradigm itself from the outset” (1998: 132). The historical role of the SLMT, however, lies somewhere beyond its own analytical scope. In its implicit criticisms of the LPT, SLMT theoretically justified the role of different identity affiliations in the making of different labor practices. Moreover, it also helped later case studies to develop a non-factory-centric approach to industrial labor practices.

It is not difficult to see the analytical difference between LPT and SLMT. The former argues that the tension between labor and capital on the shop floor generates intrinsic tendencies towards particular employment practices. The latter approach contextualizes the shop floor tension within the history of the strategies of employment by capital. In more vulgar terms, LPT looks at the organizational dynamics between labor and capital, while SLMT investigates the employment-related dynamics between capital and labor, which are argued to contextualize these dynamics. This analytical difference is especially helpful in evaluating the position of most of the recent

55. In a later piece, Gordon (1988) argued that instability rather than a new accumulation cycle characterizes the current state of world economy.
4.1.2 Proliferation of Industrial Labor Practices in Recent Case Studies

Case studies on industrial production within the last three decades reflect the diversity in organizational characteristics of different labor practices. Thus, different themes and concerns pertain to the studies of factory system, home-based work, and sweatshop labor.

Analyses of the recent transformation of the factory system mostly focus on the changes in the shop floor relations. The automobile industry has unsurprisingly been the major sector for recent case studies on the factory system, given the intensified global competition. From the early 1980s on, the organizational changes in motor vehicle plants have been receiving scholarly attention (e.g. Sekaly 1981, Grunwald and Flamm 1985, Casson et al. 1986, Jurgens et al. 1989). Although these early studies point to the increasing importance of the multinational subcontracting relations (and, hence, indirectly the segmentation of workforce in different nation-states), the focus is mostly on the new technologies that render such vertical supply chains viable. Especially, Womack et al.’s study (1990) The Machine that Changed the World is one of the most influential pieces that argues for the advent of a new era in industrial relations thanks to the innovations by Japanese car manufacturers. As an organizational mixture of craft and mass production, lean production proves to be far superior to the old-style conveyor belt-based manufacturing. Moreover, this new production technique is not pertinent to Japanese work culture only, but rather is adaptable to other countries and different industrial sectors. This argument is certainly not only for the academic audience. Numerous studies follow these contributions that aim to provide policy suggestions for the U.S. automobile industry.\(^{56}\)

Critical studies respond to the arguments about the merits of lean production. These case studies (e.g. Fucini and Fucini 1990, Garrahan and Stewart 1992, Milkman 1997, and Rinehart et al. 1997) illustrate the shop floor tensions under the lean production system. The core antagonism theorized by the LPT is still at the heart of the relations between labor and management. Moreover, one of Milkman’s earlier case studies, Japan’s California Factories (1991), illustrates that even most of the Japanese companies use labor control strategies in their plants in the United States that primarily aim to break the power of unions. In other words, Japanese manufacturers in the United States do not act much differently from their American counterparts, when it comes to labor-management relations. Case studies in the edited volume by Kochan et al. (1997) similarly illustrate how different the actual implementation of lean production could be in different nation-states. For instance, Mitsuo Ishida argues that new production techniques in Japan, the birthplace of lean production, bears strong resemblances to classical Taylorism, while Arnaldo Camuffo and Giuseppe Volpato describe the production organization at Fiat’s car factory in Italy as Mediterranean lean production.

---

Despite the unsurprising disagreements concerning normative and technical consequences of these changes in the factory system, probably one point of consensus is the diversity of relations in production at the plant level. Comparative studies investigating multiple plants such as Green and Yanarella eds. (1996), Delbridge (1998), and Greene (2001) also document the variety of responses by workers to the implementation of post-Taylorist production techniques at their plants.

The advent of post-Taylorist production techniques pertinent to the factory system has a particular significance for our investigation for the following reasons. First, such changes usually described as lean production imply greater room for plant-specific arrangements, even if this potential is in most cases not realized. Thus, if scientific management proper is regarded as a set of directives by the upper echelons of the management, it is difficult to judge the effectiveness or even the relevance of scientific management at the new factory system. Factory managements by principle accept to share some of its authority with workers with the expectation of higher productivity. Thus, the analytical investigation of the principles of scientific management could reflect much less of the actual shop floor relations at a contemporary factory than the relations at an ideal-typical factory based on Taylorist principles. My participant observation at a garment factory in Istanbul will substantiate this assertion. It is rather a mixture of formal management techniques and informal relations with workers which keeps “the [virtual] conveyor belt” in the target garment factory moving.

Second, these studies also reveal the significance of extensive supply chains imperative for the operation of factories. Accordingly, the internal structure of plants cannot be successfully investigated without a comprehensive analysis of the relations of the target factory with its subsidiaries. As we will see in the successive chapters, relations of the factory investigated in this project with its subsidiaries had a significant impact on its internal structure.

Third, even though shop floor tension might go through a qualitative change, the basic antagonism between workers and management remains intact. In other words, the management urges workers to produce more surplus value and workers resist this pressure. Thus, even though most of the LPT’s propositions concerning the content of the labor process should be reinvestigated and since an even greater number of them are not directly applicable to the apparel industry, two major principles of the capitalist labor process still categorically pertains to any factory. First, factory management tends to separate conception from execution as much as the technical nature of production allows. Second, control of the labor process belongs to the management, rather than the workers.

As the reader will notice, all case studies cited above investigate the organizational arrangement of factories in high-income countries. Although some of them, such as Milkman’s study (1997) or Greene’s study (2001), refer to racial and gender dynamics, the central theme of recent studies on the factory system in high-income countries is the transformation of Taylorist production techniques into lean production. However, studies on the factories and especially sweatshops in low- and medium-income countries approach the technical aspect of production as a secondary concern, while the making of subjectivities along gender, race, and ethnicity plays a key role in these studies.

to the impact of family relations on the aspirations of young women workers in Hong Kong and
the Guandong region of China. Women workers decide on how long they will work following
the approval of their families. In Taiwan, small-scale workshops (or “satellite factories”) operate
in the semi-rural parts of the country. Women’s participation in the workforce is a part of their
domestic duty as daughters and wives (Hsiung 1996). Miriam Ching Yoon Louie (2001) documents
the impact of the increase in participation by Chinese, Mexican, and Korean immigrant women in
investigates the factors behind the tendency of Chinese American sweatshop owners in New
York City to employ Chinese migrants and illustrates the legal and linguistic vulnerability of these
workers vis-à-vis sweatshop owners.

These studies ask for a reexamination of our well-established perceptions of shop floor relations
and employment practices pertinent to the factory system. For instance, Susan Tiano’s study (1994)
emphasizes the impact of high turnover by women workers on the organizational dynamics in
Maquiladoras. Shouldering both the domestic and economic burden of their households, Mexican
women workers change their jobs frequently and take some time off during the year. The
outcome is what Tiano calls “maquila-grade” labor shortage. Leslie Salzinger (2003) points to
the diversity in the methods of labor control in Maquiladoras in Mexico: different factory regimes
organize women’s (and men’s) labor along the lines of the location-specific definition of femininity.
Differences in the perception of femininity derive from the content of the shop floor struggles.

One of the implicit arguments in these studies affirming the empirical relevance of the SLMT is
that discriminatory employment practices at factories and sweatshops in low- and medium-income
countries substitute for the technical organization of work in order to establish the hegemony
of the management over the labor process. For instance, two interesting case studies by Wilson
(1991) and Cravey (1998) vividly document how the transformation of the old model state-led
industrialization to the Maquiladora system came along with feminization of the workforce and
how this substantive change in employment practices affected the shop floor dynamics. Strategies
to employ the hitherto unused segments of the workforce prove to be a tool to contain the labor
resistance as effective as the lean production system.

Certainly, the most “visible” connection between identity affiliations and new labor practices is
embedded in the most “invisible” form of industrial labor: home-based work (HBW). The return of
this labor practice in the last quarter of the twentieth century has generated a growing literature.
One of the distinctive features of contemporary home-based work is the extensive employment
of female labor (Mehrota and Biggeri 2002). Early studies render women’s work visible, as they
document the role of HBW in global industrial relations (Mies 1982, Allen and Wolkowitz 1987,
Lordoğlu 1990, Çinar 1994). One focus point of many such studies is homeworker women’s
subordinate and inferior positions both in the labor market and in the household (Mies 1982,
Beneria and Roldan 1987, Allen and Wolkowitz 1987, White 1994, Boris and Prugl eds 1996,
Hsiung 1996). Other studies focus on the impact of HBW on gender roles and relations within the
household. These studies document the contradictory effects of HBW on women with a focus on the division of labor in the household, decision making, and women's status in the family. While some argue that the HBW deteriorates the position of women in the family (Kümbetoğlu 1996, Prugl 1999, Hattatoğlu 2001), others claim that HBW at least improves income inequality in the context of India and the Middle East (Banerjee 1991, World Bank 1991, Moghadam 1998). Such differences in opinion reflect the regional variety in gender dynamics as much as the theoretical perspectives of these scholars.

All in all, there is a consensus that the labor process of HBW is shaped in a complex matrix between supply chains, characteristics of the domestic space, and family relations. Some, in this context, studied the use of internal space in the houses of homeworkers and observed a significant variety: in Guadalajara, Mexico, Faranak Miraftab finds that homeworker men have a higher tendency to have a separate workplace within the home than women (1996). Furthermore, in her research in Tijuana, Mexico, Silvia Lopez-Estrada observes a similar differentiation among homeworker women (2000): relatively better-off women tend to have a separate workplace within the home, whereas this is not the case for poorer woman homeworkers (Lopez-Estrada 2003). A nine-state research study in the United States by Heck et al. concludes that a separate workspace is the preferred location for the primary work sites of homeworkers (1995). These studies take the home as the site of labor process and demonstrate the convoluted forms of control exercised over women not only by their employers but also by their family members.

Other studies emphasize the variety in the characteristics of the distribution channels: in Hong Kong, posters and flyers are used for recruitment because homeworkers are mostly concentrated in high-rise public housing estates (Lui 1994). In Beneria and Roldan's study on Mexico (1987), seventy percent of homeworkers gain access to HBW through direct personal contact. In Upstate New York, because of the low population density, some of the distributors give advertisements to the local newspapers (Dangler 1994). In Hsiung's study, “[to] discover' homeworkers in the local neighborhood” is a major challenge for the satellite factories/sweatshops (1996: 71). Mehrrota and Biggeri’s extensive study of HBW in five countries (2002) also reveals the variety in patterns of recruitment: in India, individual workers take the initiative in the HBW link. In Pakistan, homeworkers rely heavily upon their jobbers. In Indonesia, legal contracts with one particular subcontractor are common. In Thailand, workers and subcontractors are usually neighbors and relations are based on mutual trust. In the Philippines, this trust-based relationship emerges in the form of patronage thanks to the significance of kinship ties in the formation of the HBW link.

The diversity in the mediation between jobbers and homeworkers reveals the significance of location-specific characteristics of patriarchy in the organizational characteristics of the labor process for HBW. Internal characteristics of the distribution channels and the binary between domestic and public spaces determine the organizational dynamics of HBW. They are contextualized within the sphere of gender relations. Thus, gender relations in household dynamics are integral to the nature of work. In other words, the segmentation of labor on the gender of the workers determines the organizational characteristics of work. Moreover, these studies also demonstrate that location- and sector-specific characteristics of HBW amount to more than a simple strategy of segmentation by employers. An important contribution of these studies about factory systems/regimes in low- and medium-countries, sweatshop labor, and HBW to this piece is their success in illustrating the impact of the complex matrix of subjectivities on the respective labor processes. This aspect is certainly
missing in most of the case studies on the factory system in high-income countries. However, there are three generic and unavoidable problems in most of the studies in the low- and medium income countries.

First, even though the making of gender and race/ethnicity in the work environment/organization is the primary focus, the making of these identity affiliations outside the sphere of work is usually inserted into the narrative as an exogenous dynamic. Identity affiliations are usually regarded as a relatively stable set of categories rather than active relations in a state of constant change. Second, organizational dynamics of the labor process are given secondary importance in most of these case studies. The technical nature of production is usually not profoundly documented. Even though the central element could be the manipulation of identity affiliations in the factories, sweatshops, and HBW networks of low- and medium-income countries, the mutual relationship between social and technical relations in production is not given sufficient attention. Third and most importantly, most of these case studies fail to go beyond the particularistic observations on work-related dynamics and to provide a comprehensive contribution concerning the reasons behind the emergence of labor practices that are significantly different from the ones pertinent to the factory system(s) of high-income countries. Even though the failure to resolve the first two problems can be easily justified with the excuse of the limitations of the empirical scope of these studies, the last problem requires greater attention, and the current piece aims to suggest an alternative approach to bypass, if not to resolve, this difficulty.

The generic response to the problem of particularism of case studies on industrial labor practices is to categorize institutional differences in regard to the labor practices in different countries. For instance, Frederic Deyo, in his Beneath the Miracle (1989), strives to distinguish between the organizational characteristics of labor practices in East Asian countries. This piece reveals the relevant characteristics for the East Asian labor systems. Four parameters distinguish among different labor systems and characterize the “location” for those “labor systems” (Deyo 1989: 157): skill-enhancement, allocation of labor, utilization of labor, product/profit from labor, and means of production. These parameters concretize the conditions of homogenization of individual labors into abstract labor, as they give rise to the differentials in the mobility among individual labors. Deyo aptly conceptualizes these differentials as labor property (Deyo 1989: 154). Since this framework broadly defines property rights, the futile debate on the systemic significance of wage-labor system as a method of labor control can be regarded as a secondary concern:

Full proletarianization, exclusive reliance on wage sanctions in the expropriation of labor property, is a useful ideal-type rather than a description of a historical reality. More typically, nonmarket processes, both coercive and legitimate, have both supplemented and supplanted wage-dependency (Deyo 1989: 155).

Another example is Steven McKay's Satanic Mills or Silicon Islands (2006). This book:

[challenges] the myths that high-tech production is generic and that globalization is simply a homogenizing force. First, I argue that technological change, new competitive demands, and contradictions within production are pushing high-tech firms to use a wide range of diverse organizational strategies, which I label flexible accumulation. Second,…the restructuring of work has broadened the scope of labor control, extending
it outside the factory and making the specificities and uniqueness of place more, not less, important. Third, firms intervene in the local labor market in order to constitute and reproduce the social and gendered relations of flexible accumulation (McKay 2006: 4).

In this regard, the strategic localization of production and the creation of worker consent are linked with each other through the political construction of the local labor market (McKay 2006: 4–5). Despotic, panoptic, peripheral human resources, and collectively negotiated work regimes appear to characterize different labor processes, which pertain to product, technological intensity, marketing strategy, nationality, flexibility strategy, work organization, recruitment strategy, production worker profile, and labor relations (McKay 2006: 22–24). These variables are inductively chosen in McKay's piece. Thus, they do not establish a coherent set of parameters applicable in different contexts, though this is to some extent legitimate given the empirical scope of the work. As in Deyo's work, these variables are used to depict the dynamics of the local labor market.

Michael Burawoy's The Politics of Production (1985) also attempts to complement his contributions in 1979 and 1983 with an analysis of the variety in shop floor practices in a cross-country investigation. Braverman's analysis of control fails to analyze the characteristics of the labor processes in different nation-states. Burawoy defines three modes of control conceptualized as factory regimes: despotic, hegemonic, and hegemonic despotic. Despotic and hegemonic modes of control are respectively similar to Friedman's direct control and Edwards's simple control (Littler 1990). The hegemonic control conceptualizes his observations in Manufacturing Consent and appears as the amalgamation of Edwards's bureaucratic control and Friedman's responsible autonomy. Market despotism, as a historically rare form, pertains to early capitalism. Hegemonic regimes replaced it with the advent of monopoly capitalism (Burawoy 1985: 123–25).

The “global” dimension of Burawoy's analysis is embedded in this theory with a reference to the variation among the factory regimes in different nation-states. For Burawoy, previous versions of the LPT cannot account for the diversity in the labor processes either historically or geographically. He distinguishes the labor process conceived as a particular organization of tasks from the political apparatuses of production conceived as its mode of regulation. Braverman ignores the political apparatuses of production, while Edwards and Friedman collapse them into the labor process (Burawoy 1985: 123–28).

The content of state intervention, as the key dynamic, is the outcome of capitalism's uneven development and variation in class struggle shaping “the substratum of relations of production” visible in mass movements such as the strike waves (Burawoy 1985: 137–39). Accordingly, different factory regimes coexist together in the world economy. In semi-peripheral countries, the manufacturing industry historically did not establish hegemonic regimes, but relied on a combination of economic and extra-economic means of coercion. In core countries, different experiences in class struggle gave rise to distinct forms of hegemonic factory regimes (Burawoy 1985: 148–49):

[However,] irrespective of state interventions there are signs that in all advanced capitalist societies hegemonic regimes are developing a despotic face. Responses may reflect the different relations between production apparatuses and state apparatuses, but the underlying dynamics, the changing international division of labor and capital mobility, are leading toward a third period: hegemonic despotism (Burawoy 1985: 152).
It is unfortunately unclear whether what Burawoy means by hegemonic despotism is a new form of labor process, a new factory regime, or a new form of capitalism (Littler 1990). Hegemonic despotism seems to demonstrate the impact of the recent conditions of accumulation on the labor process. In this regard, Manufacturing Consent and Politics of Production do not theoretically complement each other. Nor do they make consistent arguments. The former prioritizes the relative autonomy of the labor process, while the latter tries to theorize the extra-workplace effects in order to account for the differences among factory regimes. Moreover, although Burawoy does not attribute any universalistic tendencies about labor processes to the earlier periods of capital accumulation in the nineteenth century, the presence of such a tendency is implicitly presumed for the contemporary period of accumulation. It is by no means clear why such a global tendency to hegemonic despotism came into existence, if conditions of class struggle are determined on the national level.59

Thus, it is ironic that most of the recent case studies on contemporary labor practices take different variants of the global commodity chains approach as their theoretical ground. The question is to understand the particularities of the local in the age of the global. This relatively unchallenged domination of globalization rhetoric is reflected in the titles of books and articles. It is a challenge to find a case study of contemporary industrial practices with a title that does not include the buzzword “global.” Although the intention is to focus on the impact of local dynamics on industrial labor relations, the absence of a coherent framework linking these dynamics with wider relations of capital accumulation necessitates the reaffirmation of globalization rhetoric. Accordingly, the unquestioned recognition of the impact of global connections on the labor process prevents many of these recent case studies from fulfilling their basic promise: to understand the impact of local dynamics on the making of the subjectivities in the labor process and on the making of the labor process. To coin different categories of “factory regimes,” “labor systems,” or “work regimes” in an attempt to circumvent this difficulty also provides a partial solution, since such a “categorical” strategy fails to theorize the local dynamics that bring about similar relations in distinct national and urban contexts.

In fact, there seem to be two alternative positions to explain why similar organizational arrangements pertain to a particular labor practice in different contexts. The first one is to assign those similarities to the homogenizing effect of global supply chains and/or corporations and to assume that the upper echelons of these chains/corporations make the final decision of what labor practice is to be used under which circumstances. This position acknowledges the organizational initiative of the transnational capital. Global commodity chains either deskill/homogenize the labor in the labor process or segment it by manipulating local divisions within the workforce.

The second strategy is to investigate the relations among capitals, between capital and labor, and among labors as interdependent layers constitutive of local industrial dynamics of a particular urban context. In fact, these relations at the local level should be taken as the building blocks of global connections, not vice-versa.

59. While his references to the global city argument give some hints about the globalization of industrial relations (Burawoy 1985: 149), Burawoy does not strip his theory of the nation-state context.
In this regard, the global city or world city literature provides a particular venue to connect the question of proliferation of industrial labor practices to the question of urban transformation. This perspective criticizes the hitherto dominant approach that investigates the urban hierarchies within the nation-state context (Beaverstock et al. 2000, Knox and Taylor 1995, Sassen 2001, Taylor 1997, Taylor 2004). As particular cities became global financial centers, characteristics of economic activities in these cities lost some of their relationship with the rest of their nation-state (Cohen 1981). Initially conceptualized as world cities (Friedmann 1986), these global cities fulfill distinct roles within a transnational network of cities.

The advent of this global urban structure historically corresponded to the downfall of industrial cities of the Fordist era. For example, Chicago lost its central position in the U.S. economy vis-à-vis Los Angeles (Sassen 1988). Migration to the global cities is more diverse in terms of migration origin, nationality, and ethnicity. This heterogeneity in the workforce is reflected in employment practices. Employment of white collar workers for advanced producer services is coupled with informal and semi-formal employment of blue collar service migrant workers (Sassen 2001).

Recent contributions suggest two generic criticisms. First of all, the first wave of the global cities approach overemphasized advanced producer services and neglected the role of other industrial sectors in the formation of a global network of cities (Coe et al. 2010). After all, “all Global Commodity Chains “run” through world cities, and all cities are integrated into commodity chains” (Brown et. al 2010: 27). Thus, to associate the cities part of this global network only with advanced producer services reduces the explanatory power of this perspective. Second, industrial production of the cities within this global city network is largely neglected in the early writings within this literature thanks to the overemphasis on the global cities of the Global North. As Robinson comments in her Ordinary Cities:

Clusters, whether specialized in one sector or multi-sector clusters of diverse firms, are often thought of as geographically concentrated, perhaps in a small part of the city...or have consolidated over many years in a particular neighborhood...They usually only bring into view small segments of the city. For writers considering the continuing significance of place for economic activities in global and world cities, the city as a whole does not seem very relevant. It is as if the location of these activities within the city rather than the neighborhood were not important: the rest of the city, its political dynamics and its range of economic activities, is left out of the equation (Robinson 2006: 118)

In fact, even though the global city/world city perspective helps to justify the prospective analyses about the role of the city in the proliferation of industrial labor practices at the global level, the emphasis is on the relations among cities within a global network, rather than the local dynamics that assign similar characteristics to the cities in this network. Thus, why a network of cities should bring about the current geographical configuration of industrial relations around the world is rather in the dark.

More interestingly, the focus on advanced services and finance generates questions about the notion of urban space. Even though migration of foreign labor to the global cities is a central theme in this literature, the global city looks an awfully lot like the old industrial city with its concentric rings, but now with one ring missing: the factory zone. The impact of the mobility of industrial
capital and labor within the city on economic activities is, thus, generically ignored. This limits the overall explanatory power of the current version of the global cities perspective in spite of the above-cited recent attempts. However, the analysis of urban transformation of individual cities can help us to develop a theoretical interface between case studies of industrial labor practices and the analyses of regional and global production networks.

The literature on urban sprawl is, in this regard, helpful for understanding the recent urban development in contemporary cities with a manufacturing basis. For instance, Edward Soja et al.’s earlier article (1983) regards the urban restructuring of Los Angeles as the most recent phase of the overall transformation of the city from Industrial Capitalist, to Monopoly Capitalist, to the State-Managed Capitalist Metropolis. The erosion of the State-Managed Capitalist Metropolis was historically associated with the rise of post-modern Los Angeles. In the 1980s, for the first time in the last two centuries, small towns and non-metropolitan areas began to grow faster in population than metropolitan areas. Thus, the proliferation of work practices should be contextualized within this dynamic context of urban sprawl. Deindustrialization is rather a selective process: parts of this city resemble Detroit in terms of industrial decline, while “a deep and prolonged process of labor disciplining, plant closures, and capital flight has created the basis for a renewed expansion based on high technology industries and services” (Soja et al. 1983: 218).

Michael Dear (2002) takes Edward Soja’s perspective to the next level and argues that Robert Park and Ernest Burgess’s notion of urbanization (1925/1967) should be left aside in favor of a new theory of urbanism. Dear is critical of concentric ring theory in particular and Chicago School of Urbanism in general, since, Dear argues, this perspective regards the city as a unified whole. It employs an individual-centered understanding of the urban condition and uses a linear evolutionist paradigm from tradition to modernity, from primitive to advanced, and from community to society. However, as the emerging literature especially focusing on Los Angeles contributes to a new understanding of urbanism that focuses on the particularities of the urban space:

Los Angeles, like all cities, is unique, but in one way, it may typify the world city of the future: there are only minorities. No single ethnic group, nor way of life, nor industrial sector dominates the scene. Pluralism has gone further here than in other city in the world and for this reason it may well characterize the global megapolis of the future (Jencks 1993, cited by Dear 2002).

Even though I would not consider replacing Chicago or Paris with Los Angeles as the epitome of the future city, it significantly contributes to our understanding of urban space, and the emphasis on the heterogeneity in urban space is certainly appealing for any investigation on the multiplicity of industrial labor practices.


61. See Hoyt 1939 for transport axis model, Harris and Ullman 1945 for multiple nuclei model, and Isard (1956) for his hybrid model. These models either challenge the empirical validity Park and Burgess’s theory or update it with the developments in the postwar context. Dear’s criticism of Park and Burgess is thus not limited to the concentric ring theory, but rather aimed at the impact of the Chicago School on urban studies in the United States.
Urban sprawl as a primary factor behind this heterogeneity, at first sight, looks like a concept pertinent to cities in high-income countries which have complex highway systems and high car ownership rates. However, this focus on cities in high-income countries can be somewhat misleading. Successive chapters will give some tentative information on the impact that the geographical expansion of Istanbul has had upon manufacturing activities. In the case of metropolises of medium- and low-income countries such as Mexico City (Ward 1990), Istanbul (Tekeli 1994), and Tehran (Bayat 1997), urban development brings about a qualitative transformation of economic relations similar to that valid for Los Angeles. It is, however, much more vibrant and much more subtle, since the relocation of industrial activities in most cases take place in the informal segment of the economy. Operations of the agents responsible for the industrial transformation, i.e. local capitals, are mostly invisible. Moreover, the primary architectural form of this transformation of space is not suburban housing, but shantytowns/favelas/bidonvilles/gecekondus. Once again, the change happens in front of us, yet the question is framed within the same linear evolutionist paradigm of Park and Burgess, this time an evolution from low-income cities to high-income urban centers. In fact, since it is a fundamental challenge to document these changes, I will spend ample space providing information on the urban development and transformation of Istanbul. Such information serves not only to contextualize the current shape of manufacturing but also to demonstrate the independent impact of urban transformation on industrial labor practices.

All in all, the geographical and social change undergone by urban space is an integral element of this analysis of the proliferation process for the following reasons. First, particular characteristics of urban transformation in different contexts shape the nature of global industrial relations. To begin the investigation of the organizational characteristics of industrial labor practices with the acknowledgement of the presence of a global network of cities or global commodity chains, is like beginning the construction of a building from the rooftop. Such a perspective reveals practically nothing but our lack of knowledge of the dynamics in the individual urban contexts. Second, although recent case studies on different industrial labor practices successfully document the organizational characteristics of the respective practice, analysis of the relationship between these practices remains limited, at best, to the investigation of the analyzed supply chain. Thus, it is necessary to contextualize the structural dynamics that reproduce the relations among different labor practices in its urban context. Third, the analysis of the role of gender and race/ethnicity in the making of the labor process requires investigation into the relations among these identity affiliations outside the labor process; i.e. in their homes, neighborhoods, and districts.

### 4.1.3 Three Layers for the Investigation of the Reduction Process in Istanbul’s Apparel Industry

Following this literature review, the last and longest part of this book will focus on the differences among the labor practices of three forms of industrial labor in the apparel industry in terms of the workers’ modes of engagement with each different form of labor. This chapter will tackle the question of how different forms of industrial labor in the apparel industry operate in an industrial basin less than forty square kilometers in size.
The literature review provided three questions for analysis. The first one is the organizational dynamics of the reduction process within the labor process. The propositions suggested by LPT and SLMT will be investigated in the context of Istanbul’s apparel industry. Thus, the first section will provide the research data about those organizational dynamics pertinent to the factory system, sweatshop labor, and home-based work in the research setting.

Limitations of a shop floor-centric analysis are obvious, especially when the focus is the multiplicity of labor practices. Thus, the second question is the interaction between urban space and those organizational dynamics. The second section in this part will thus provide data about the social dynamics of the urban setting with a focus on identity affiliations.

This analysis will provide the context for the last section, which will pursue a discussion on what workers think about work, time, and their community. This section is intended to enrich our understanding of the mode of engagement of workers in the labor process of different labor practices in the target sector.

Three sections of this part will present the data and observations by following the guidance of the following questions:

1) What are the organizational characteristics of “the control imperative” in the labor processes for the target factory, the target sweatshops, and the target home-based work network? This analysis will suggest the characteristics of labor procurement for each labor practice as a central dynamic of their labor processes.

2) How do the social dynamics exogenous to the labor process affect the labor practices in the apparel industry? In response to this question, I will analyze the human geography of the two target neighborhoods in Bağcilar and Küçükçekmece. The focus will be on the demographic and residential characteristics of the population in the target neighborhoods. The analysis in this chapter will raise the question of the mindsets of individual workers in different communities in regard to their long-term decisions, strategies about daily problems, and their occupational tendencies.

3) What are the characteristics of the engagements of the workers with different forms of industrial labor in the apparel industry? In this section, I will present some of the discussions I had with my co-worker friends in regard to their perception of the labor process, their relations with their community, and their reactions to the problems of their everyday life. This section will provide some preliminary ideas regarding the perception of time by my co-workers and myself.

This multidimensional analysis is intended to reflect the dynamics both from within and without the labor processes of the three target forms of industrial labor. This exercise will address the question of the transformation of individual labors into abstract labor and the transformation of labor power into labor in unison. This integrated analysis will provide particular conclusions concerning the social dynamics endogenous and exogenous to the labor process, which contribute to the making of multiple labor practices in a labor-intensive industry.
QUESTION I: ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REDUCTION PROCESS

4.2 OBSERVATIONS ON THE FACTORY SYSTEM

4.2.1 The Factory: An Integrated Labor Process in a Disorganized Industry

The Center Factory employs approximately three hundred workers in different sections responsible for cutting, stripe print, embroidery, knitting ribbon, tagging, ironing, packaging, and sewing. I conducted my observations in each of these departments. I informed my co-workers of the content of the project gradually, while I was working with them.

It was a real challenge for me to adapt to the work conditions. A regular workday was between 8:30 am and 7:00 pm and was extended until 11:00 pm with overtime. The length of the workday limited the social connections among workers outside the workplace, who lived in different districts and neighborhoods. The Center Firm used a quite extensive shuttle service for commuting in order to utilize a larger labor pool and (indirectly) in order to cut the social links between the workers in Bağcılar and neighboring districts.

I worked as a sweeper in the sewing section of the factory with approximately one hundred eighty other workers. At the beginning of the participant observation, the sewing section began to work on a new order; a white blouse of 170,000 pieces. With the average production capacity of six thousand pieces a day, the assembly line completed this order within a month. I worked with almost all work units on the assembly line and made observations about each individual process. A questionnaire was handed out to the workers and one hundred and sixty one of them were returned. The returned questionnaires provided data concerning migration history, occupational experience, and urban connections of the workers in this section.

Ironing, packaging, and quality control were conducted in another section employing approximately one hundred workers. In this section, I packed the finished garments which had passed QC and I distributed newly arrived cloth to the workers, after first examining and then ironing it. The same questionnaire was distributed in this section and seventy of them were returned. Other sections of the factory conducted more capital-intensive processes and employed approximately thirty workers: cutting, stripe print, embroidery, knitting ribbon, and tagging. In the cutting house, I helped to lay the sheets of fabric on the cutting table for the robots which cut the fabric exactly in the desired pattern. Stripe print machines were as elaborate as the cutting robots and required the workers to feed the printing devices with finished garments or fabric. Furthermore, pieces coming out of the print machines needed to be put in the dryers quickly. I took part in these processes. Ribbon knitting, tagging, and embroidery machines all needed to be fed the material they were to process. I helped the operators with such tasks. Workers in these sections were also given questionnaires. Twenty-one questionnaires were returned.

The Center Firm controlled an integrated supply chain for apparel production: the firm owns a factory in another city neighboring Istanbul, Çorlu, responsible for the production of fiber, thread,
and fabric. The apparels were sewed at the factory and the sweatshops. The finished clothes were shipped to the buyer firms in European countries. In other words, this firm had a variety of productive facilities and was capable of controlling all processes related to apparel production: cotton, synthetic fibers, and accessories were the major inputs of the supply chain.

The Center Factory had two major functions in this integrated supply chain. First, its sewing section was by far the largest section in the entire supply chain. It employed almost two thirds of the workers in its factory. It was also the only section that operated independently from the operations in other sweatshops in the supply chain. It had its autonomy and took responsibility to finish a significant portion of each individual order. As the manager of this section said, “It [was] the admiral ship of the fleet.” This means that the rhythm of the supply chain depended on the performance of the sewing section at the Center Factory. Thus, the character, work discipline, and work culture of the workers in this department were to some extent different from the workers in other sections.

Second, other sections of the Center Factory complemented the integrated sweatshops and home-based work networks. For instance, the firm distributed to the subsidiary sweatshops the fabric for the order at hand: the fabric came from their factory in Çorlu and was cut at their cutting house in the factory before being distributed to the sweatshops. Similarly, sweatshops were mostly responsible for sewing-related activities, while the completed garments were returned to the factory for quality control, final ironing, and packaging. The packaged items ready for the final shipment were sent to the final customers from the Center Factory. In other words, this factory was not only a place of production, but also a hub for a variety of production-related activities: it distributed or collected various inputs to be processed at different workplaces. The quality control department could check as many orders as five in one single day. As a sweeper, I was running the assembly line of the sewing section of this factory. As a part of the assembly line, the entire work organization at the sewing section of the factory looked to me like a “conveyor belt of flesh.”

4.2.2 The Labor Process in the Sewing Section: Running a Conveyor Belt of Flesh

4.2.2.1 Sweepers and the Conveyor Belt of Flesh

The sewing sections of the apparel factories and sweatshops use assembly lines. Sewing machines are located as work units in order to process different parts of the fabric. Consecutive processes are usually conducted by the consecutive work units on the assembly line. Thus, different pieces of fabric enter the core assembly line to be processed by successive multiple work units and then exit the line as completed apparels. The core assembly line is also fed by peripheral assembly lines, which prepare particular parts of the apparel such as collars, arms, and tags for the core assembly line. The buckrams are fixed onto the fabric with steam irons. Some collars need to be supported with synthetic pieces of fabric, which are sewn on with overlock machines. The shoulder pads or the neck of the clothes usually come to the shop as separate parts. The sleeves of some designs have multiple stitch points. They need to be sewn in these peripheral assembly lines separate from the core assembly line. In short, three or four workers work together within their
“mini-assembly line.” The finished parts later enter the core assembly line to be sewn onto the main body of the piece. In addition to the assembly line for sewing, some workers clean the excessive threads on the pieces or on the finished garments. Another group of workers checks for any defects on the pieces before they enter the assembly line, and on the finished garments before they are sent to the quality control-ironing-packaging department.

In the assembly line, different kinds of sewing machines are used for different processes. In addition to the regular sewing machines, the second most common type is the overlock machines. The regular sewing machines are mostly for shorter and more delicate stitches that have more endurance than overlock stitches. The overlock machines are usually for longer stitches and used to put the main parts of the garment together. In other words, overlock machines are used to make three-dimensional pieces such as the arms and the main body by stitching pieces of fabric together. There are different kinds of overlock machines. The most common ones are the sergers. Sergers not only sew two pieces together, but also cut around the edges of the sewn fabric as the cloth is fed through. Thus, sewing machine operators have to pay less attention to the borders of the individual pieces of fabric. As the cloth arrives to be sewn after overlocking, the serger has already cut around the cloth, leaving nice and even ends on the fabric which can then be sewn without a second operation of having to cut and clean the edges.

On my first day at the factory, I was surprised to discover that the workers and managers called this organized production process a “production belt” (üretim banti), or simply “the belt,” instead of “assembly line” (imalat hatti). Of course there was no conveyor belt in the assembly line, yet, with just a little imagination, one could see it moving along. Workers called the foremen “the belt leaders” (bant şefi). The initial establishment of the organized production process is called “to set up the belt.” The function of the imaginary “conveyor belt” is fulfilled by the workers. Pieces of fabric and unfinished clothes are moved from one unit to the next by workers, whose job is specifically to assure the uninterrupted flow of the assembly line. I call these workers sweepers (ortacı).

The youngest and most inexperienced workers usually start their career in the apparel industry as sweepers. They conduct three major tasks. Garments are made of different kinds of fabric which is a “soft” material. In order for the pieces to be processed at a faster pace, they need to be folded and, after being processed, refolded for the next work unit. This is the first task set for the sweepers. The second is to play “the role of a conveyor belt”: they carry the pieces from one station to the next. They also link the peripheral lines to the core assembly line. Hypothetically speaking, the sewing machine operators can run the core assembly line by handing the individual pieces to the next operator. However, this would result in slower throughput and a higher rate of defects. Thus, without sweepers, it would be much more difficult to connect the peripheral lines which prepare the pieces for the machine operators, and the core assembly line.

The third function of the sweepers is to ensure coordination: a particular order has dozens of different sizes and colors, if not hundreds. For instance, the first order which arrived when I had

---

62. See Nichols and Sugur (2004) for a detailed and comparative study of the organizational characteristics of the workers’ demography of seven plants in Eastern Marmara Region. The target factories were textile, appliance, and car manufacturers and their labor process was highly capital-intensive in comparison to the organization of work in the apparel industry. The well-documented problems in the assembly line in these facilities bear striking similarities to the ones that I observed at this factory.
first begun my observations was a white blouse. Although all of the cloths was the same color, there were different shades of white in different parties. It was difficult for the machine operators to notice these slight differences in color. Thus, sweepers made sure the pieces in a party had not been mismatched. If machine operators got two parties mixed up, they would sew pieces from different parties together, resulting in the production of defective garments with mixed sizes and colors, which then had to be sent back for repair. Sweepers played a significant role in ensuring this coordination and thus making sure that “the belt” operated smoothly.

These tasks of the sweepers are particularly important in the monitoring of sewing machine operators. As we shall see later, whenever machine operators fail to keep up, they tend to slow down the assembly line. Workers in different work units compete with each other and try to slow down the pace of other units. To fall behind the pace of the line means having pieces of cloth piled up on your table. Moreover, workers verbally attack each other, if they believe their co-workers are slowing them down. Thus, what Michael Burawoy (1979) calls “make out” is a common practice of the assembly line. Although sweepers are at the bottom of the labor hierarchy, they are the most important element of control as they monitor sewing machine operators in the assembly line.

Sweepers set the pace of work for the machine operators as they constantly move “the belt.” Sewing amounts to a semi-mechanical organization. Sewing machines can be regarded as complex tools and the operators have the primary role in the production process. In other words, they are not the “appendage” of the machinery. Nineteen percent of workers in the sewing section where I worked were sweepers. Typically there is one sweeper for every three or four machine operators. In fact, given that one sweeper controls and “helps” three sewing-machine operators, this can be regarded as quite an “expensive” but nevertheless effective form of monitoring.

**4.2.2.2 The Division of Labor on the Assembly Line**

Although the operation of sewing machines requires skilled labor, operators can work in various work units in order to perform different tasks in the assembly line. There are three categories of sewing machine operators in the sewing section of a conventional apparel sweatshop or factory.

**Chart 4.1 Positions on the Assembly Line at the Sewing Section of the Center Factory**
The largest two categories of machine operators at an apparel factory or sweatshop are overlock machine-serger operators and sewing machine operators. The third category of workers operates specialized machines such as merrow and button-hole machines. These workers do not operate other machines. The division of responsibilities is strict. Overlock machine operators are hardly ever given the order to operate the classical sewing machines and vice versa. However, whenever things come to a bottleneck on the assembly line, workers in these groups can be given different tasks. It usually takes approximately one week to set the assembly line for a sewing workplace employing more than fifty workers. As long as orders are big enough, operators usually remain in their original positions and foremen rarely switch workers between different work units.

In my first week, the sewing section began to process a new order of 170,000 pieces. In the first two weeks, the productivity was significantly low with many bottlenecks on the assembly line, since three foremen, each of who controlled three lines of approximately forty sewing machines, were struggling to find the optimal distribution of the operators on different work units. While some work units were waiting for the preceding units to send them the processed pieces, other work units were dealing with ever-growing piles of pieces. As the foremen struggled to set the assembly line, they occasionally consulted the department manager, O.Y.Y., who intervened to discuss possible measures in the prevention of bottlenecks. Finally, the assembly line began to function effectively with a decreasing number of switches of workers between work units.

The assembly line thus has both in-built rigidities and flexibilities. The flexibilities derive from the capacity of the operators to perform a variety of tasks. Thus, the configuration of the work units in the assembly line and the number of operators for each work unit can be determined according to the design of the order. Moreover, the configuration of the assembly line can be reshaped any time if and when, as in the example, the foremen fail to find the optimal distribution of operators for the defined tasks which results in bottlenecks on the line. To produce a garment amounts to a number of individual processes ranging from thirty to sixty. When the high number of the individual machine operators is also taken into account, the organizational challenge for the foremen becomes obvious, especially because the process time for an ordinary order is hardly ever longer than a few months.

In short, in the apparel industry, setting the assembly line is as much of a challenge as running the assembly line. The assembly line is made of workers, not machinery. The processes can be positioned on the assembly line in multiple ways. In other words, the same number of workers for the same design can be organized in different configurations. Thus, especially in the case of large sewing sections, it is difficult to be sure if the optimality in terms of the configuration of the work units is ever reached. A smoothly running assembly line is by no means necessarily the optimal one. These organizational challenges are coupled with the rigidities that specifically pertain to the social conditions of production in the apparel industry.

4.2.2.3 Gendered Division of Labor: Brick and Concrete Walls

The division of labor in the assembly line reflects gender-based segmentation. The classical sewing machines are used for complex sewing processes, while the simpler and faster overlock machines are used to sew large pieces of fabric to each other, such as the front and back sides of
the clothes. In this industry, all overlock machine operators are women; there are no exceptions. At the Center Factory, while forty percent of the classical sewing machine operators in the sewing section were women and sixty percent were men, male workers accounted for thirty three percent of workers in the sewing section. Sewing machine operators were paid wages approximately fifteen percent higher than overlock machine operators. In other words, the more favored positions were unsurprisingly assigned mostly to men. Upon my question about this disparity, the manager of the sewing section, O.Y.Y., replied:

I don’t know why, but woman workers are more apt to operate overlock machines. They are much faster than men. Maybe that’s why woman workers eventually came to dominate this position. I have a saying for this: overlock machines produce brick walls, while sewing machines [UB: regular sewing machines] build concrete walls.63

This metaphor of brick walls and concrete walls describes the different stitches sewn by classical sewing and overlock machines. Overlock machines make weak stitches at a fast pace, while classical sewing machines sew with sturdier stitches at a slower pace. Male workers and foremen shared similar opinions on the “nature” of women that enabled them to concentrate much more successfully on simpler tasks and to work much faster, especially in more repetitive tasks. In general, tasks done with overlock machines are actually more repetitive than the tasks conducted by regular sewing machines.

The gender-based division of labor pertained to other tasks in the sewing section as well. For instance, all of the interim quality controllers, trimmers, and most sweepers were women. All of the workers at the cutting house and all of the foremen in the sewing section were men, except for one forewoman, who was responsible for the thread cleaning department. In general, the capital-intensiveness or technological complexity of the process has been associated with the unsurprising distinction between men and women. The cutting house used the newest technology, while the interim quality control did not require the use of any kind of machinery.

4.2.2.4 Ethnic and Regional Diversity and Forms of Socialization

Another important characteristic of the assembly line in the sewing section was that the workers shared the same hometown with the factory owner. Twenty-nine percent of the workers were born in Iğdır, which is a province of Turkey in the Eastern Anatolian region that has borders with Iran, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. This province has a significant Azeri-originated population (a Turkic ethnic group constituting the majority of the population in Azerbaijan), like the company-owner family. These workers had particularly informal privileges. They were apparently not the first ones to be laid off. There was also some income difference between these workers and others.

Some workers complained to me about the inequalities at the workplace. They believed that they worked harder than the workers from Iğdır, while workers from Iğdır were paid higher salaries. My observation was that these differences could rise to as much as ten percent of a worker’s salary.

63. Lynch (2007) shares similar observations about the perceptions regarding gendered roles in the organization of work in the context of Sri Lanka’s apparel industry.
The second group in terms of migration origin was from the Black Sea region. Workers from the Black Sea region constituted thirty-seven percent of the workforce in the sewing section. Sixty-six percent of the employees were either from Iğdır (a very small town with a population of ca. 180,000) or from the Black Sea region (the area covering almost all the Black Sea coast of Turkey with a population of ca. 8.4 million).

All other regions were underrepresented, including the Kurds, the largest ethnic minority in Turkey. Four percent of the workers were born in Southeast Anatolia, which has provinces with a majority of Kurdish population. The portion of workers from Eastern Anatolian, which also has a significant Kurdish population, accounted for five percent of the total number of workers. In other words, even if all the workers from these two largely Kurdish regions working at the factory had indeed been Kurdish, though this was certainly not the case, then we could say that Kurds made up nine percent of the workforce at the factory, whereas, according to the Başçılars Municipality Survey, approximately thirteen percent of Başçilar’s residents speak Kurdish.

Workers from Iğdır usually had their lunch together, while other workers did not have a strong province- or ethnicity-based preference or predisposition in their decisions to socialize with their coworkers. Kurdish workers did not tend to sit together. Nor did other workers abstain from sitting with them.

On the other hand, the same invisibility of ethnic identity also amounted to the tacit agreement that ethnicity-related political issues be left aside in common conversations. As mentioned above, Iğdır-originated workers had a significant share in the labor force of the factory. Kurdish and Azeri residents have a great share in Iğdır’s population. Some of the middle-aged Azeri workers grew up in Iğdır and spent their childhood and youth with their Kurdish hemşehris. Some of them were familiar with the Kurdish language and could speak some Kurdish. They also had significant familiarity with Kurdish culture, even though most of these middle-aged Iğdır-originated workers were sympathizers of the ultra-nationalist Turkish ideology. However, young workers from Iğdır
did not share the same affinity. For instance, in my third week, a foreman, who was also an Azeri-originated worker from Iğdır, played a record of Kurdish folkloric songs. He apparently liked the music. Some of the middle-aged workers from Iğdır mouthed the songs, until some younger workers (again from Iğdır) began to complain that they could not understand the lyrics (an implicit reaction to being subjected to the Kurdish language in their work environment). The foreman later turned the CD player off.

However, when workers were asked of their opinion about ethnic politics, they did not hesitate to talk about such issues in a relatively civil manner. For instance, I worked at the work unit of B.I., a Kurdish worker from Kars (in Eastern Anatolia), and R.H.M., a Turkish worker from Giresun (in the Black Sea region), for almost one week. Thus, as I became familiar with the process of the work unit, I had the opportunity to have occasional conversations with them on different subjects. One time, I asked B.I. and R.H.M. which party they voted for. They expressed their opinions in a fairly civil manner. The worker from the Black Sea region was an ultra-Turkish nationalist, while in the last election he voted for the religious conservative party, which was in power as of the research. In his opinion, “left is too left and right is too right” in Turkey, while the religious conservative party provided a relatively balanced political position. B.I. voted for the same party as well with the expectation that this party would recognize the cultural and political rights of the Kurdish citizens. Both workers were a great fan of Ahmet Kaya, a leftist Kurdish singer, but neither of them were very fond of the lyrics of this singer’s songs which chastised religious values.

As mentioned above, workers originating from the Black Sea Region accounted for the largest regional group in the factory. However, despite their share in the workforce, they did not act as a united cultural group. They were regarded by the administration as an identifiable social category, while they did not see themselves as a tight community. While workers from Iğdır had close ties with each other, unlike them, workers from the same hometown of the Black Sea region did not have special relationships based on their origin of migration. Thus, not only were workers from Iğdır favored to some extent, but also their presence was the most visible on the shop floor. Lunch breaks in particular provided a precious opportunity for me to socialize with my coworkers. My daily routine was to have my lunch at a table shared by five workers from the Black Sea and Central Anatolia Regions. After lunch, when I wasn’t hanging out with my closer friends, I would spend my time with other workers from Iğdır and the Black Sea region. Some of these workers migrated to Istanbul as a result of the collapse of prices for their produce. Some of them still had hazelnut orchards, which generated a supplemental income to their salaries.

4.2.2.5 Timing of Migration

Sewing machine operators take a certain pride in their trade. They see their skills as more important and treat other workers, such as sweepers and overlock machine operators, as their subordinates. Thus, since the workers did not know I was a researcher when I first began my observations at the Center Factory, some of my friends promised me that they would eventually teach me how to operate the sewing machine. However, they were also aware of the declining status of the machine operators in the industry, which is reflected in the narrowing gap between the wages of machine operators and other unskilled workers such as sweepers. Most workers were too young to remember the “good old days.”
Eighty-one percent of the workers were thirty years old or younger. The export-led growth strategy was initiated in Turkey with the 1980 coup. The core of this growth policy has been traditionally based on the textile and apparel industry. Thus, this sector has been employing a significant portion of the urban labor force for the last three decades. However, workers of the past generation were underrepresented at the Center Factory, as in other workplaces and organizations subject to the research. The question of the whereabouts of the previous generations urges us to look at the timing of the migration of workers. These young workers came from families which had migrated relatively recently to Istanbul.

Thirty-two percent of the workers’ families have been in Istanbul for less than ten years. Seventy-four percent of the workers’ families have been in Istanbul less than two decades. Only eighteen percent of the respondents were born in Istanbul and most of them were first generation workers. In sixty-eight percent of the workers’ households, the decision to migrate was made by their parents. Workers were also asked what the occupation of the head of the household was back in their hometowns. In the sewing section of the factory, seventy-two percent of the household heads of workers were farmers who owned some land, while the remaining twenty-eight percent were farmers who did not have their own land. In other words, few workers had parents who worked in the apparel sector or in any industrial sector: the factory recruited young migrants from relatively recent migrant families, who did not have former experience or “collective memory” in the apparel sector.
Although the households of these young workers were mostly rural-to-urban migrant families, they were also experienced and skilled workers. Over eighty-one percent of the respondents had worked somewhere else before they started to work at this factory. However, their parents had not gone through a similar work experience. Thus, the gradual degradation of the status of the sewing machine operators was a matter of history for most of them, rather than a life-time experience.

4.2.2.6 Tensions on the Assembly Line

These multilayered tensions certainly had a strong impact on the way workers perceived their work conditions and their coworkers. These tensions were left aside to some extent, once “the belt began to move.” The long-term problems, concerns, and fears were forgotten, especially when the speed of the assembly line was high. The line was a source of stress on its own, and it needed to be that way in order for the employer to make money. Workers in general accepted the tense work environment as the nature of their work. As they believed that their job depended on the success of the enterprise, their overall tendency was to do the best they could. Capitalist work ethics had moral superiority over the class ideology workers adopted against their employer. However, this does not mean that workers did not attempt to cheat the foremen, their coworkers, and the assembly line. They did their best to push the responsibility of failure away from themselves as much as possible, especially when they failed to keep up with the speed of their coworkers.

In his famous ethnography Manufacturing Consent (1979), Michael Burawoy shares his observations about workers who hid pieces from others in order to surpass their expected production quotas and to prevent other workers from reaching those quotas. The workers who
were most successful at this “game” of what Burawoy called “make-out,” were also the most respected on the shop floor. I observed two explicit cases of make-out on the assembly line in the sewing section of the Center Factory.

In the first incident, the previous work unit was responsible for two sheets of fabric, the front and back of the blouse, which were currently being sewn. The pairing of the sheets, however, was poorly done. Thus, the woman operators in my unit had a difficult time picking up two sheets of fabric in one motion. They were losing a significant amount of time due to the poor performance of the previous work unit. Consequently, the next work unit was waiting for them and the foreman threatened the operators in my group to work an extra fifteen minutes during lunch break as punishment. Workers asked me to pair up the already-paired sheets coming from the previous work unit for a second time in order to reduce the inflow to their unit. Workers of the previous unit stopped me from doing that by arguing that it would not help other workers.

Once this strategy was obstructed by the previous work unit, they started pressuring me to fold the pieces slowly for the next work unit. Accordingly, the next work unit would receive a smaller number of pieces and slow down. Within half an hour, the sweeper of the next work unit began complaining that I was not folding the pieces properly. Operators of my unit silently approved of my speed. Eventually, the other sweeper began to take the unfolded pieces from my table and fold them herself. Thus, this strategy did not work either.

These tricks were usually measures for desperate times. Before this group fell back on make-out tactics, they first tried to establish an alternative division of labor within their work unit. One of the overlock machine operators was sewing the right side of the fabric and the other one was fixing the left side, while conventionally both processes are done by the same worker. However, as my later observations verified, these attempts were almost always but futile tactics that eventually put extra burden on the work unit, as the latter wasted valuable time organizing these “tricks.”

Part of the problem for this work unit was actually the make-out by the previous unit that was responsible for pairing the front and back sheets of fabric for the blouse. They were intentionally delivering huge piles of fabric, rather than smaller parties. The uncertainty in the delivery time and the lack of visual data for machine operators about the amount of pieces to be delivered to their unit created the illusion for them that they were doing just fine, as the previous work unit was not able to catch up with them. This “optical illusion” slowed them down to a great extent since they were not stressed.

The illusion surely ended in disarray, once the new gigantic pile was delivered by myself to the operators’ tables. Thus, before resorting to the make-out strategy, the operators first wanted to use me to discover the pace at which the previous work unit was working at. Whenever I asked the women workers to send smaller parties, they raised their voice and said that they would “let me know when the new party [was] ready.” Thus, the problem was by no means about the low performance of workers in my work unit only. Each work unit was ready to damage the performance of the preceding and successive work units as much as possible in order to keep its head above water.

Just as different work units could get hostile with each other, individual workers too occasionally turned against one another, especially when the foremen was taking a record of their
individual performances. In such cases, I observed a second form of make-out, which more closely resembles Burawoy’s observations. Many times, I saw women workers in particular attempt to hide the finished pieces under the pile of unfinished pieces or simply put them on their laps in order to stop the sweeper from taking them to the next operator. Once again, the motivation was to slow down the pace of the next worker by delivering a smaller number of pieces for a while and then, to load her/him with a heap of them. In such cases, hostility emerged within the work units. Such tensions usually resulted in a competitive relationship among workers within the work unit, while it also led to significant uniformity among the performances of the individual workers.

I had the opportunity to keep a record sheet for three overlock machine operators for approximately three and a half hours. As the chart below demonstrates, the output per collection dropped to some extent at the end of the recording period. Another outcome of the competition is the gradual convergence of the average productivity of the machine operators. The tension within the assembly line and more specifically within the work unit “homogenized” the productivities of these workers.

Chart 4.5 The Performance of Three Overlock Machine Operators in the Sewing Section of the Center Factory

These tensions in the assembly line were thus certainly functional in the overall production process. Hostilities among individual workers within work units and between work units were unsurprisingly a force that motivated the workers to work faster. However, we should still keep in mind the difficulty of setting up such a “functional” assembly line that is able to turn its internal dysfunctions into pressure on the workers. In other words, “to set the belt” was as much of a challenge as to run the assembly line. I will suggest the characteristics of this process as one of the two major factors that distinguish the factory system in the apparel industry from sweatshop labor.

If the barriers to the mobility of workers in between different positions are regarded as rigidities, then it is difficult to deny that those rigidities characterized this assembly line at the Center Factory. Except for the operation of the classical sewing machines, almost all positions were assigned to a particular gender. Moreover, the nepotism in favor of the Iğdır-migrants accounted for another source of tension, which probably had a negative impact on the performance of the workers. In
order to understand this form of rigidity, we need to look at the social dynamics outside the factory in terms of employment practices. I will elaborate on this in the coming chapters. I will suggest that the differences in employment practices are the second factor that distinguishes the factory system from other forms of industrial labor in the apparel industry.

In the next section, I would like to illustrate some of the major organizational dynamics in other sections of the factory by contextualizing their role in the entire supply chain organized by the Center Firm.

4.2.3 An Intersectional Analysis of the Labor Force

4.2.3.1 The Quality Control-Ironing-Packaging Section

The sewing section was the largest production unit in the Center Factory in terms of employment. Other sections took on different responsibilities both within the factory and the supply chain. I worked for two weeks in the Quality Control-Ironing-Packaging section (henceforth, the QCIP section), which was the second largest section in the factory and employed approximately one hundred workers. This department conducted three consecutive tasks, as its name implies: the finished garments first went through quality control. Then, they were ironed. Finally, they were packaged and put in boxes for shipment. However, since ironing helped the controllers check the defects faster, the sequence of the tasks began at the ironing section. Thus, although each of these processes had distinct characteristics (for instance, packaging requires a high pace of production, while quality control is associated with mental concentration), they took place in the same section.

The most striking characteristic of this department was the labor-intensiveness of the activities. Quality control was done by women workers, who laid the clothes out on a table and then checked them for defects. Packaging was also done by hand. The packaging section was predominantly populated by women workers. Without exception, all ironers were men. These tasks required significant skills and dexterity. Representatives of the customer firms paid as much attention to the packaging and ironing quality as they did to the quality of the final product.

In the sewing section, clothes were clumsily transmitted between work units, while the ironed clothes needed to be delivered carefully to the packaging unit, since the major function of ironing was to give the clothes an appealing look in their package. The delicacy of these tasks led to a smaller number of sweepers in this section given the significance of the transfers among the sections. Thus, foremen fulfilled most of the functions of the sweepers. The primary role of the foremen in this section was to monitor, rather than to coordinate the assembly line, and to train the workers, as was the case in the sewing section too. The lesser function of foremen in the tasks conducted at the QCIP section had to do with the repetitiveness of the processes. Although each of these three tasks required high skills, they did not require frequent shifts in the work organization. In the sewing section, the configuration of sewing machines and the distribution of workers for a particular task were constantly changing because of the changes in the models. Accordingly, sewing machine and overlock/serger operators worked in different work units. Thus, the primary responsibility of the foremen at the sewing section was to “install” the assembly line and to make the appropriate changes in the line in order to establish harmony among different work units.
However, in the QCIP section, there was a strict division among quality controllers, ironers, and packagers thanks to the distinct characteristics of each of these positions.

The foreman’s role as monitor was especially important in the ironing department, since the most intense competition in the factory took place among ironers. The reason for the antagonism among ironers derived from the simple fact that there was no division of labor within this department. All ironers worked individually and they had to meet a particular number of pieces at the end of the day. The same condition pertained to the quality controllers as well. However, the relative importance of quality control was much higher, since the customer representatives could penalize the firm on objective conditions, if they detected a defect on a stitch or a stain on the fabric, while they were more tolerant when it came to problems with ironing. Thus, the pressure on the quality controllers when it came to speed was somewhat milder, whereas ironers were pushed to increase their output as much as possible.

Under these circumstances, ironers sometimes resorted to cheating. Foremen almost always recorded the number of pieces per ironer. There were twenty-eight ironers in this section during the participant observation. Two foremen delivered the pieces from the quality control department to the ironing department. As the foremen passed by the ironers, the ironed pieces were collected in large carts. In moments of slight confusion between delivery and collection, carts waited by the ironers’ tables. I witnessed some ironers simply taking pieces from the cart and putting them on their own ironing table. Accordingly, the ironed pieces were to be counted once again. Other ironers did not report these activities to the foremen not because of their solidarity with the cheating workers, but, because they would have done the same, if they had had the same opportunity.

Four ironers were taking the same shuttle bus with me. I knew one of them, K.R.R., relatively better, since we got on the shuttle at the same stop. Another ironer, A.M.T., began to take this shuttle bus in my second month at the factory. Especially after a workday, workers were mostly silent, because everybody was simply too tired to chat. K.R.R. was generally a quiet man, except on days when the football team he supported, Fenerbahçe, had an important game. However, the presence of this new passenger had notably changed the social environment on the shuttle bus.
man in his early fifties, he constantly complained about the unrealistic expectations of the foremen in the ironing department in terms of the performance of the ironers:

A.M.T.: When I got this job, they told me to iron five hundred pieces a day. Now, they demand a thousand. I do four hundred. They want two pieces a minute. I can only do one per minute. At other places, they do a piece in three or four minutes. The foreman at the other line even okayed the defective pieces, because the job has got to be done... They fired the third guy this week. [UB: To K.R.R.] You know that guy, right? Me and him have been friends for five years. He does a good job, but he does four hundred pieces a day. Others, I mean, some, do a thousand a day, but what good is that? They just do a sloppy job. But they'd never fire those guys.

K.R.R. [in a frustrated tone]: You mean me, but look, everybody cheats here, there's no exception, alright? [UB: K.R.R. implies that all ironers took pieces from the delivery cart in order to have them counted for themselves. K.R.R. got angry, since A.M.T. implicitly accused him of cheating the foremen. Until K.R.R. gave this reaction, I had no idea that A.M.T.'s complaints carried such an implication.]

A.M.T.: OK, OK! I didn’t mean to say anything bad. All I’m saying is I never steal or cheat. I just do my job.

K.R.R.: Come on!

A.M.T.: Alright, at least I didn’t cheat today. I don’t want to. It’s just not right.

It was interesting to see K.R.R., who was a calm person, so agitated. When I began to work for the ironers as a sweeper, the foreman gave me the task of recording the number of pieces done by each individual ironer. K.R.R. made gestures, asking me to “do him a favor.” And I simply did. A.M.T., however, lost his job before I began to work in the ironing department, just one week after the argument between him and K.R.R. in the shuttle bus.

Unlike ironers, who were located along a line of individual ironing tables, packagers gathered around long, wide tables. Packagers conducted four processes: folding the ironed clothes, putting them in a package, sealing the package, putting the packaged clothes in the boxes. Each consecutive task was less delicate than the previous one. I was given the task of sealing the packages. The collective nature of the task required collaboration and reduced a great deal of tension among workers. Women workers were responsible for the first, most delicate two tasks, while men took care of boxing the folded and packaged apparels. My task was given to both men and women.

Thanks to the spatial organization of this section, workers worked face-to-face. Accordingly, workers who had gained sufficient dexterity constantly talked with each other while they were working. Single women mostly talked about their prospective marriage, their dowry, and their summer plans, while married women complained about their husbands and the burden of house chores. Sharing the same space with women, male workers listened to these conversations yet pretended not to hear their woman coworkers at all, since the subjects were not “manly” enough. Men’s favorite subject was daily politics, yet subjects were usually opened up carefully and never intended to be controversial. A common subject in these conversations about politics was the corruption of politicians. It was at one point almost a tiring experience for me to listen to these conversations for the entire workday. There were many repetitions: the same subject was referred
to many times even in a single day. Workers would pretend not to hear each other especially in regard to “gender-specific” subjects, while they simply could not visually ignore each other. Thus, they spoke with each other to overcome the unavoidable eye contact with their coworkers. Daydreaming, the most important mental activity of the sewing machine operators, was not “allowed” in this section.

Silences were frequently filled by sighs, most accompanied with words such as “God help us” or “Praise God.” One of my coworkers, A.L., let out quite interesting exclamations in moments of extreme boredom such as: “I think I am very happy right now,” “What else would you want in life when you’re doing what we’re doing right now?” These were mostly outbursts of psychological relief to alleviate the boredom of the task.

In contrast to this excessively sociable work environment, quality controllers were, as the ironers, isolated from each other. All of the controllers were women. A tension similar to that pertaining to the ironers was present in this section as well, while the pace of work was relatively slower. Thus, the delivery and collection of the pieces did not give quality controllers the chance to cheat, like the ironers. Moreover, to claim the pieces of another controller was risky, since any missed defects could cost one her job. The nature of the task required enormous mental concentration. Accordingly, workers in this department were always silent.

4.2.3.2 The Hub

The QCIP section was the last stop for the apparels before being shipped to various countries. Thus, the pace of the QCIP section depended on the pace of the sewing sections of the factory and the subsidiary sweatshops. Although most of the sweatshops employing more than fifty workers had independent QCIP sections, most of the subsidiary sweatshops working for the Center Factory only ran a sewing section. They relied on the QCIP section of the Center Factory. This was the decision of the company management, who did not want to risk dispatching defected garments produced by their subsidiaries. The QCIP section of the factory was therefore not only a workplace, but also the central hub for the entire supply chain.

Problems of coordination within the supply chain necessarily influenced the labor process in this section. During my observations in this section, the foremen often announced overtime around noon, while this decision was changed later in the day as the sewing section failed to finish the estimated number of pieces. Similarly, we had overtime for three days within my two weeks at the QCIP section, since this section was overloaded with the delayed deliveries arriving from subsidiary sweatshops. Although I was assigned to the packaging department, I was frequently asked along with other packagers to help the porters carry the sacks of clothes arriving from the sweatshops, to categorize them according to their color and size, and then to distribute them to the quality controllers. Multiple orders were processed at the same time. Low-quality t-shirts from a distant sweatshop, high-quality bathrobes from the sewing section of the factory, different types of blouses from the sweatshop in the same neighborhood as the factory—all of these different orders landed in this section, where they became the responsibility of the QCIP workers.
The contrast between the sewing section and the QCIP section in terms of their position in the supply chain is particularly interesting: the sewing section was, as the manager of the sewing section had said, “the admiral ship of the fleet.” This department of the factory enjoyed significant autonomy within the supply chain. Its only major supplier of inputs was the fabric factory in Çorlu, while contingencies between the Center Factory and its fabric factory were limited. During the participant observation, I observed only two disruptions in this connection, which caused only very brief delays on the shop floor.

Another possible problem that could cause slowdowns in the sewing section of the Center Factory were delays in the cutting house, which was on the same floor as the sewing section. Since the cutting house used two robots to cut the large sheets of fabric into the desired patterns, the possibility of any significant error was virtually eliminated. Thus, the sewing section had complete autonomy in terms of planning and production schedule.

The QCIP section was, in contrast, completely dependent on the other rings of the supply chain. It was not only the final step in the entire production process, but also the meeting place for a great variety of products. This section was the most labor-intensive production unit in the entire chain, given that the most complicated tool used in this section was the steam iron. This autonomy of the sewing section and the centrality of the QCIP section distinguished the entire workplace from the sweatshops in the supply chain and turned it into a “factory.”

4.2.3.3 Capital-Intensive Departments

Where do the capital-intensive departments of the factory stand in this picture? First, what made this workplace a factory was not only the size of its workforce, but also the presence of multiple sections for apparel production. The cutting house, the stripe print section, the embroidery section, the tagging section, and the garter section constituted the capital-intensive departments of the factory. Except for the cutting house, which was essential for the operation of the sewing section, all of the other capital-intensive departments were included in the factory, as the factory expanded its scope of production. The internalization of these sections was a business strategy of the Center Firm, which sought to gain total control over each phase of the garment production.

The garter and tagging sections produced accessories for the sewing section. In other words, rather than processing the finished garments, they produced inputs for the garments. Thus, in the case of proper planning, since the productivity of these sections was higher than the sewing section, they had their autonomy in terms of scheduling their operations. When they had spare time, these sections produced for other workplaces inside and outside the supply chain as well.

However, the strip-printing department sometimes processed finished garments and needed to work in harmony with the sewing section. Strip-printing was in the past a matter of craftsmanship. The hand-made silk screens filtered the dye through the prepared pattern on the garment and inserted the figures onto individual pieces. The company bought two robots in 1999. These machines printed the patterns onto the cloth much faster than workers, while they still used the same screens. The role of the master was still to prepare the screens for the robots by finding the right mixture of colors in his office filled with hundreds of bottles of dye. By experimenting with
different configurations, he needed to find the perfect match with the original design. His position and trade thus remained unchallenged by the new machinery. However, other workers became “the appendage of the machinery.” Workers fed the robots with the finished clothes or pieces of fabric, rather than manually dying the garments using individual screens. The least skilled workers of all capital-intensive departments thus began to be employed for this process; sometimes even porters were used to operate the strip-printing machines. Unsurprisingly, significant bottlenecks emerged in this section while I was working there. Whenever the printing was done on the pieces of fabric, rather than the finished clothes, there was no crisis. However, when a particular design had strip-printing on the pieces processed by the sewing section, the department had to race with the sewing section.

Similarly, the embroidery department regularly worked on finished garments. This department used computerized embroidery machines. The role of the workers was to install the embroidery software onto the computer and to check the operation of the machines. However, the order of the tasks still gave priority to the sewing section. Thus, no matter how capital-intensive this department was, it struggled with the contingencies and the operational problems in the sewing section. On the one hand, overtime was often necessary in this department, as the sewing section frequently missed its deadlines. On the other hand, machines sometimes waited idle until the parties began to flow in from the sewing section.

The cutting house had the liveliest social relations amongst the capital-intensive departments. The primary responsibility of eight workers in this section was to lay down hundreds of fabric sheets on a long table. At the end of the table, a robot cutting the thick pile of the fabric with a special knife first emitted pressurized air through the tiny holes on the table. The pressure created an air cushion under the pile of fabric and made it possible for workers to move the entire pile of hundreds of sheets of fabric to the cutting area on the table. Then, the robot did the rest, grabbing the pile and faultlessly cutting it into the desired shapes.

Although there were two supplementary machines which lay the sheets onto the table much faster than the workers, they still could not catch up with the cutting robots. Thus, workers needed to complement these supplementary machines. Moreover, in some cases, the fabric was too thin or had some defects that required the workers’ direct involvement.

As we laid hundreds of sheets of fabric on the table, we worked face-to-face, as in the packaging department of the QCIP section. As in the latter case, the spatial organization of work here too made eye contact inevitable. Accordingly, workers were engaged in an “eternal conversation,” just like their coworkers in the packaging section. However, the most important difference was that workers in this section were all men, which meant that there were no limits to the conversation topics. As this section’s primary responsibility was to cut the fabric properly, the pressure for fast output was relatively low, and the work environment was relaxed in comparison to other departments in the factory. I enjoyed this part of my work experience at the Center Factory the most. However, the cutting house at the Center Factory was one of the rare places where the hierarchy of pay and authority among workers could be explicitly questioned. One of the reasons for this tension was certainly the degraded position of the scissor master (makastar) as a result of the introduction of the new machinery, while the relatively relaxed labor process also enabled workers to think and express their concerns about the stratification in the work organization.
In other words, although all of these sections were located under one roof, the content of the processes and the position of the processes in the general sequence of the tasks contributed to the making of different personalities in the factory. An ordinary ironer is a silent man, who would not speak with you, unless he is spoken to. An ordinary worker at the cutting section is a talkative man, whose company anybody would enjoy (of course, for a limited time).

In fact, the relationship among different departments of the factory was not directly associated with the level of capital-intensiveness of the processes. The temporal order of the processes assigned different “privileges” to different departments in terms of the capacity for long-term planning. As in the case of the embroidery department, even if the labor process was ultimately mechanized, contingencies of the labor-intensive nature of the sewing section were directly reflected on the section’s work patterns and organization most of the time. The order of successive processes had a significant impact on the organizational characteristics in every section of the factory and certainly on the social relations among workers.

To recapitulate, the factory in the supply chain was not only a production facility, but also a coordination hub for all involved production places. As mentioned in the previous chapters, according to estimates of the firm managers, the total number of workers employed in this supply chain was approximately four thousand, whereas approximately only three hundred of them were employed within the factory. The departments in the factory played different roles in the supply chain. Some of the capital-intensive departments, such as garter and tagging sections, supplied the entire supply chain. The thread and fabric factory in Çorlu also produced primarily for the supply chain.

The cutting house served the factory’s sewing section. The embroidery and strip-print departments worked on the finished products. The sewing section not only operated independently from other rings of the chain, but also complemented the complex web of the subsidiary sweatshops. The Quality Control-Ironing-Packaging (QCIP) section, in the last step, aimed to harmonize the pace of production of the different units, before the garments were shipped off to the customers.
4.2.3.4 The Inter-Departmental Analysis of the Workforce: Gender and Migration

The presence of multiple departments in the factory did not necessarily signify unilinear production activity within the factory. Their presence under one roof was the outcome of the Center Firm’s general strategy of internalizing different processes within the supply chain. This strategy gradually emerged as a response to the problems in the supply of some of the key inputs from outside the supply chain. For instance, embroidery is always a source of organizational problems for the apparel sweatshops and factories. Embroidery sweatshops charge their customers on the basis of the number of stitches on the demanded pattern. A new deal has to be cut for every new order. During bargaining with the embroidery ateliers, apparel-producing workplaces lose precious time that could have been spent in the sewing section. Thus, although not cost-effective in the final analysis, the Center Firm nevertheless decided to establish its own embroidery department. Another motivation was certainly to reduce the long-term costs associated with capital-intensive processes. The garter and tagging department had two complex machineries weaving the synthetic fibers to produce garters and tags. The older one cost 80,000 Liras and the new one was bought for 200,000 Liras. A tag to go on the neck of a t-shirt could be produced for approximately twenty-five kuruş (one quarter of a Lira), while its market price was one Lira. In a couple of years, the machinery paid for itself. The strong financial backing of the Center Firm made such an investment possible.

As the internalization of different departments in the factory was due to different motivations concerning costs and speed, each of the departments had a distinct role in the supply chain. The QCIP section was not only a production unit, but also the core hub of the entire supply chain. Each
capital-intensive department had different relations with the sewing section of the Center Factory and the subsidiary sweatshops. The differential timing of contributions of the inputs by each of these sections in the production process assigned a different level of organizational autonomy for their respective labor process. The sewing section of the factory was certainly the most “independent” section, since the coordination of production in the supply chain was built upon the expectations of this section’s productivity.

The planning department of the Center Firm, which was also located in the Center Factory, made the arrangements concerning the multiple contributions of different workplaces within the supply chain. My conversations with the staff of this department revealed that the organizational mindset was to take each of the different sections of the factory as independent units in the supply chain. Accordingly, for instance, the garter and tagging section was the equivalent of one of the sweatshops in the supply chain. The physical unity of different sections within the factory did not assign them organizational unity. Thus, the unit of analysis for the interactions among these departments should cover the entire supply chain, rather than just the factory.

### 4.2.3.4.1 The Relationship between Gender and Positions in the Labor Process

As briefly discussed above, differences in the work organizations of these sections due to their position in the supply chain generated different worker typologies with different gender relations and migration backgrounds. The QCIP section had a ratio of women workers similar to that of the sewing section, whereas the capital-intensive departments employed male workers without exception. In the sewing section, both male and female workers were assigned to machines requiring skills, while overlock/serger machine operators were without exception women. Interim ironers in the sewing section were (young) male workers. Similarly, the trimming, interim quality control, and sweeping were done exclusively by women. At the QCIP section, ironers were male workers. A few packagers were men and all of the quality controllers were women. Quality control required high skills and the pay level for experienced quality controllers was usually either as high as that of ironers or occasionally even higher.

### Chart 4.8 Gender Distribution in the Departments of the Target Factory
This particular gender distribution bears the following conclusions:

1. Women are deterred from capital-intensive processes and tasks in general.
2. Men are assigned to either relatively less repetitive tasks or tasks requiring physical strength. For instance, there are no male overlock/serger operators, not only in this factory, but anywhere in the entire industry. This verifies the relationship between gender and repetitiveness in the distribution of tasks. That all (interim and final) ironers are men verifies the conclusion concerning the relationship between gender and physical strength.
3. However, it is difficult to establish a direct relationship between skills and gender: quality controllers, some of the finest sewing machine operators, and the fastest packagers are all women. A more profound relationship between gender and the nature of the tasks can be established with the notion of dexterity: tasks requiring dexterity are assigned to women workers. Highly repetitive tasks usually require high dexterity.

4.2.3.4.2 Timing and Origin of Migration

The timing of migration also has an impact on the allocation of workers to different departments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960–1980 (ISI)</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980–2001 (ELG1)</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001–2008 (ELG2)</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean: 1990.4; Standard Deviation: 9.57
Mean: 1987; Standard Deviation: 10.1
Mean: 1989; Standard Deviation: 9.9
Mean: 1993; Standard Deviation: 8

The QCIP section conducted the least capital-intensive activities. The average migration period for the workers and their families in this department is the latest among all sections of the factory. Unsurprisingly, capital-intensive departments have the earliest average for the timing of migration. This gives us an important clue about the segmentation of the labor process prior to the labor process. Workers from the early migrant households attained the skills required in the sewing section and the capital-intensive departments, while the QCIP section was populated by workers who lacked those skills. Workers in the capital-intensive departments, the QCIP section, and the sewing section were on average born in 1976, 1977, and 1981 respectively. In my conversations with the ironers, who were on average born in 1974, they expressed a desire to work in the sewing section, since the physical effort required in the sewing section was obviously less than that required in the ironing department. Thus, it is possible to argue that ironers were entrapped in their
trades. The timing of migration, which provided different opportunities for workers in the apparel industry, might be a reason for this inequity. The distribution of migration origin of the workers is another distinctive feature of the workforce employed at the Center Factory.

**Chart 4.9 Location of Birth by Geographical Region**

![Location of Birth by Geographical Regions N: 243](chart)

The sewing section was the only department in the Center Factory that operated by means of an “assembly line proper.” Given the labor-intensive nature of the tasks and the size of the workforce employed in this section, it is not surprising that workers born in Iğdır constituted a higher proportion of workers here than in any other section. The QCIP section similarly included labor-intensive tasks without a complex assembly line. Thus, workers from Iğdır constituted a smaller, yet significant percentage of the workforce in this section. The portion of workers from Iğdır in the capital-intensive departments was, however, almost negligible in relation to the other departments of the Center Factory. Although the conditions of work at these departments were the easiest in terms of physical activity due to the use of machinery, monitoring workers was certainly much less necessary. This particular distribution of workers in terms of migration origin further supports the role of Iğdır-originated workers in the labor process. If the employment strategy of the firm owners had been based on the nepotistic desire to benefit their hemşehris only, there would have been a higher percentage of workers from Iğdır in the capital-intensive departments, as these provided more favorable work conditions. Since this was not the case, it seems that there was a direct relationship between concerns about controlling the workforce and the employment of hemşehris at strategic points in the labor process, which ensured the desired level of monitoring.

This argument is further supported by the general shift in recruitment practices as a result of the short shutdown by workers in 2003. The reason for the tension was the wage increases that did not meet the expectations of most of the workers. The Center Factory was not unionized. Thus, experienced workers initiated a wildcat strike, while the factory management did not accept bargaining with the workers. Sixty workers were laid off after this incident in three or four smaller groups, the first of which was laid off on the very day of the shutdown. Although some
workers from Iğdır were involved in this protest as well, most of their hemşehris supported the management. The incident enhanced the tendency of the management to include workers from Iğdır in the workforce. A couple of workers and one of the managers mentioned “the shutdown” in different conversations. The incident apparently put its mark on the collective memory of the workers and the management.

For instance, in a conversation with S.N.D., a middle-aged worker from Iğdır at the quality control-ironing-packaging department, he mentioned being a union member at one of his earlier jobs. When I asked him if there was currently a union at the factory, he said that it would have been impossible. He explained why:

At first, everybody pretends to support you, but then they quit supporting you, when the boss puts pressure on them...However, although my boss is my hemşehri, I would not let him take advantage of me.

In another conversation with a worker from Giresun, K.R.R., I asked him if they could slow down the assembly line in the case of general discontent over wages or work conditions. He asked me if I had “ever heard of small stones in a bag of lentil.” He implied that those workers committed to taking such an action would be spotted immediately among the others. Another worker from Iğdır, G.B.B., had begun to work at the factory right before “the shutdown.” The firm bought the current building for the factory in 2003, which was in the same block as the old factory. The old building began to be used by the management offices, after the new factory began its operations. He, as most of the new workers, was working at the new building, while the shutdown took place in the old building. Thus, he was not well informed about the incident, which he called “the rebellion.” However, he knew that all of the workers involved in the shutdown were fired afterwards. His opinion about his job was generally positive:

We are paid on time. They never fail to pay our fringe benefits. Furthermore, they let us pray during work hours. I don’t think there is any point in rebelling.

In short, concerns about the monitoring of workers shaped, at least partially, the recruitment strategies of the management. As a sweeper, I learned that I was part of the conveyor belt of the assembly line. There was nothing “technical” which moved the assembly line according to the plans of the management. There was nothing that urged the workers in an assembly line to work at a particular pace. To the contrary, if they could, they would collectively slow down the assembly line and there would be no way to “measure” the average productivity of a worker, as the reference point of productivity would be the performance of other workers. Thus, this “conveyor belt of flesh” which I was a part of, was and is what makes the labor process of the apparel industry function more or less than the desired or expected productivity. Since “the stuff” of the assembly line is the laborers, rather than machinery, it is characterized by all sorts of tensions deriving from the complexities of social relationships on the shop floor.
4.3 OBSERVATIONS ON SWEATSHOP LABOR

4.3.1 The Follower Sweatshop: The Subcontracting Relationship and Employment Practices

Before I began my fieldwork, I was planning to investigate the work organization of one subsidiary sweatshop of the factory. However, as I gained a better understanding of the sector during participant observation at the factory, I realized that I needed to extend my observations to different sweatshops, which were not part of a particular supply chain, since most of the sweatshops work for multiple customers, subcontracting agents, and factories. In this part, I will provide a comparative analysis of the work organizations of the Independent Sweatshop, the Follower Sweatshop, and the Family Sweatshop. After completing my observations at the Center Factory, I pursued my observations first at the Independent Sweatshop, then at the Follower Sweatshop, and lastly at the Family Sweatshop.

My initial plan was to continue with the research at a subsidiary sweatshop of the Center Factory. Thus, I requested help from the managers of the Center Factory to establish the initial contact with the owners of their subsidiary sweatshops. Despite the sincere support of the factory management in this regard, none of the sweatshop owners agreed to my request. Although I could have probably worked at one of these sweatshops as an undercover agent, my intention was to focus on the impact of subcontracting relations on the work organizations of said sweatshops. Thus, I needed to closely collaborate with the sweatshop owners during the participant observation.

The reluctance of the sweatshop owners was not only a major obstacle for my research plan, but also a source of curiosity on my part. Before the fieldwork, I knew that it would be a challenge to persuade the managers of any factory to grant me permission to do fieldwork at their factory. Thus, I conducted pilot research in the summer of 2007 with the help of the Bağcılar Municipality, to which I am grateful. Thanks to the factory management’s enthusiastic support for this project and their promise to further help me receive permission to conduct research at one of their subsidiary sweatshops, I was confident that I would not have any significant problems getting permission from one of their close subsidiaries to continue my observations at their facility. Thus, the negative attitude of the owners of the subsidiary sweatshop was a truly bad surprise for me.

However, I should have expected this disaster. After the Center Firm abolished the integral independent subcontracting system in 2005, it continued to work with its old sweatshops on the piece-rate system. Moreover, as a result of its strategy to shift its production to Ethiopia, the firm was gradually reducing its output in Turkey. Consequently, the sweatshop owners found themselves in a difficult position. They were used to working closely with the Center Factory and they felt abandoned as a result of the abolition of the integral independent system, since they no longer had a privileged position in the market. As one of the partners of the Follower Sweatshop said, this was “the transition from communism to capitalism.” Thus, along with their understandable (but ungrounded) suspicions about my possible “hidden” intentions to document their informal employment practices for the authorities, they developed a reactionary attitude towards the requests of the managers at the Center Factory. If they would no longer be a permanent part of the supply chain, why should they comply with such an unconventional demand of the factory managers anyway?
In my attempts, the manager of the sewing section and another time the manager responsible for the subcontracting relations kindly accompanied me in my visits to some of their sweatshops. The sweatshop owners, who were also friends of these managers, found a precious opportunity to complain to them about their financial problems, their difficulties finding reliable customers, and the decreasing volumes of the orders they were receiving. Thus, my request for their permission to conduct observations at their sweatshop seemed like a bad joke to them. Whenever the representatives of the Center Factory and I entered their facility, their initial hope was that this could be a chance to save another month with a large order from the Center Factory. The last thing they needed was an outsider observing their business conditions during these trying times.

As a result of this failure, I was obliged to jump to the third phase of the participant observation, which was about the organizational characteristics of a medium-sized sweatshop working for multiple customers. As an undercover agent, I began to work at the Independent Sweatshop and this tremendous experience significantly contributed to the development of the ideas in this work. However, I certainly did not give up my original plan on working at a subsidiary sweatshop of the Center Factory, no matter how distant the factory’s relationship with its subsidiaries had become. Thus, while I was working at the Independent Sweatshop, I was still looking for a gateway to one of the subsidiary sweatshops.

When I retrospectively think about my experiences during the fieldwork, I think I was simply very lucky. As some of my co-workers from Iğdır at the Center Factory became my close friends, they did their best to use their personal connections to reach people in their neighborhood. Since most of the sweatshop owners working for the Center Factory were also from Iğdır, my friends had familial and provincial ties with some of those sweatshop owners. When one of my friends, E.N.N., invited me to the circumcision ceremony of the son of a sweatshop owner, I met Mr. Follower. As the owner of one of the few sweatshops which could stand on its feet even after the end of the integral independent subcontracting system, he did not take my request as a chance to get revenge on the Center Firm by refusing me. After I explained to him that he need not be concerned about the possible publicity of the informal labor practices at his sweatshop, he kindly granted me permission. In short, this phase of the fieldwork should have been the easiest part of the research in terms of the permission for entry to the workplace, while it surprisingly turned out to be the most challenging one. Despite the attempts of the factory management to help me in this regard, I unexpectedly resolved this problem with the help of my fellow workers at the Center Factory.

I worked at the Follower Sweatshop for one month. In the first two weeks, I was once again a sweeper, but this time, the workers knew my identity from the very beginning of the participant observation, since I wanted both to be able to be in the labor process and to make my observations without being confused by the pace of the assembly line. In the second half of my observations at this sweatshop, I stopped working on the assembly line and began to make direct observations. I have already shared some of these observations concerning organizational problems due to the small size of orders in the previous chapter.

In order to document the relevance of these problems, for two days I measured the durations at which different parties of an order were processed in the assembly line. The order at hand was a sweatshirt. Eight hundred pieces were sewn in two days. In order to see the average time spent to sew a garment, I put marks on every party of approximately fifty pieces that would enter the
assembly line approximately every hour. After the garments were completed in the assembly line, I recorded the total time spent for the first and last marked piece in the party in order to see the different durations of time within a single party.

Table 4.2 Record for Consecutive Parties in a Single Day at the Follower Sweatshop

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Duration to Process the First Piece in the Party (in Minutes)</th>
<th>Duration to Process the Last Piece in the Party (in Minutes)</th>
<th>Difference between Durations to Process the First and Last Pieces in the Party (in Minutes)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Thursday</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:20pm</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:00pm</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:50pm</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:20pm</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:00pm</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:45pm</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:30pm</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:35pm</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:00pm</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:40pm</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:00pm</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:40pm</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Friday</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:10am</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:10am</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The average duration to complete a piece dropped from 540 minutes to 490 minutes after the first five hours. Moreover, after the first three parties, the differences in average time between the first and last piece of the individual parties dropped to approximately 50 minutes.
Although the average duration to process a piece decreased to a great extent, the differences in average time between the first and last piece of the individual parties still had a significant variation.

Differences in duration between the first and last pieces of individual parties decreased after the third party. However, the variation was still significant. The standard deviation for the differences in duration to complete the first and last piece in a party after 4:20 pm was 33 minutes with a mean of 50 minutes.
On the one hand, the concordant harmony increased the pace of output, insofar as workers became familiar with their roles in the assembly line. Accordingly, the average duration to complete a party decreased. On the other hand, workers did not develop a similar pace with each other, even after they began to gain the required dexterity. Thus, the differences in duration to complete pieces in a party still had a significant variation. In other words, although the assembly line became faster, its overall pace was still erratic and by no means standardized.

The first finding, that is, the decrease in the average duration for the completion of a piece, reveals the first major organizational challenge for the foremen and owners of the Follower Sweatshop. Under ideal circumstances, this assembly line employing approximately fifty workers should have completed one thousand pieces of a simple design per day. However, this figure could have been reached only in the case of sufficiently large orders that would have allowed the assembly line to reach its optimal productivity. Small orders with a short deadline caused a drop in productivity.

The lack of harmony in the working pace of workers is the second finding of this exercise. It reveals the level of the assembly line’s organizational success in terms of the discipline of workers in a labor-intensive industry. The contextual interpretation of the same finding points to the deficiency of the management to establish strict control over the performance of individual workers. The majority of the workers at the sweatshop were either family members or hemşehris. The foremen personally knew these hemşehris. At an apparel sweatshop, it is not unusual for foremen to yell at or even curse at workers from time to time. However, since foremen at this sweatshop were brothers, they had verbal disputes among each other. Related workers and workers from İğdir occasionally responded to the foremen as well. The discipline generated by the structure of the assembly line was seriously compromised by the inability of the foremen to establish authority over the workers.

It is possible to substantiate these visual observations concerning the relationship between foremen and workers by means of investigation of the differences among the performances of individual workers. To this end, I recorded the individual work pace of five workers for one hour in a single day by keeping the time to complete an individual piece in order to see the variation in their individual performance.

Table 4.3 Basic Formula for the Coefficient of Variation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coefficient of Variation of the Motions of a Worker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Standard Deviation of the Distribution for the Duration of the Completion of an Individual Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average of the Distribution for the Duration of the Completion of an Individual Process</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The chart above illustrates the definition of the coefficient variation for the distribution of the duration spent by a worker to complete a standard task in a given time period. This indicator roughly provides the extent of the standardization of the physical activities of a worker in time. A bigger ratio means significant variation in the pace of the worker’s motions. A smaller ratio implies a high level of standardization of the motions of the worker and hence, possibly a high level of mental concentration of the worker on the given task. For the sake of simplification, I excluded the periods of waiting for the material from other workers or any other unrelated interruption such as
the use of the restroom. Although it is not a perfect and comprehensive method to measure the level of standardization of the labor process in the apparel industry, examining the variation of the motions of individual workers can still be regarded as a simple and heuristic reference point for a comparison between the performances of different workers. The chart below demonstrates the coefficients of variation for these workers.

### Table 4.4 Coefficient of Variation for Selected Workers at the Follower Sweatshop

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Mean (in seconds)</th>
<th>Standard Deviation (in seconds)</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Coefficient of Variation (Standard Deviation/Mean)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stitch on Both Sides on the Neck-Hemşehri of the Foremen (Sewing Machine)</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stitch on the Back (Sewing Machine)</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>7.24</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stitch on the Back-Hemşehri of Foremen (Sewing Machine)</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewing of a 3 cm-long Strip on the Side of the Body (Overlock Machine)</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewing of the Arms on the Body (Overlock Machine)</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The highest coefficients belong to the hemşehris of the foremen. I was able to observe the performances of two workers who worked on the same process. The task was to put a stitch on the back part of the cloth (“Stitch on the Back” in the chart above). The coefficient of variation for the worker who was the foremen’s hemşehri was twenty-eight percent higher than the unrelated worker. The reader will notice that the mean for both distributions is almost the same. This signifies the difference in mental concentration between these two workers. The performance of the hemşehri-worker had its ups and downs. Whenever he had a chance, he talked to the next machine operator in line and then came back to work at a very high pace in order to keep up with the operators behind and in front of him. The unrelated worker focused on his job, did not talk with his coworkers unless it was necessary, and worked at a more regular speed. The worker with the highest coefficient of variation was completely unfocused. Thus, he had no regular pattern of work at all.

In other words, regardless of the actual pace/productivity, the related/hemşehri-workers were mentally more aware of the social dynamics on the shop floor. They observed and reacted to those dynamics more often than the unrelated workers, since they could afford to be mentally unattached from the labor process. Unrelated workers did not have this luxury. Thus, their only choice was to focus on their job and to mentally isolate themselves from their work environment.

Another interesting inference, which is peripherally related to the current subject, is about the performance of the overlock machine operators. As the previous section illustrated, overlock machine operators in the apparel industry are all women and their “natural” capacity to focus on simple tasks is regarded as the justification for this gender-based allocation of this position primarily to women. Overlock machine operators unsurprisingly performed with a low coefficient of variation. In other words, they reproduced the self-fulfilling prophecy about the woman overlock machine operators as “builders of brick walls.”

The Follower Sweatshop was struggling to survive after the end of its exclusive relationship with the Central Factory. However, since the owners could not change their recruitment practices, they continued to employ their hemşehris. They made a significant investment in their current building and they chose the Iğdır Quarter of Halkalı neighborhood as the location for their building. Since neither the sweatshop owners nor their siblings working at the sweatshop resided in this neighborhood, this choice reflects their intention to recruit their hemşehris as their workforce. As the owners of the Follower Sweatshop expected to preserve their close relationship with the Center Firm in the future, their major recruitment-related concern was to have a reliable workforce in the long-run, rather than to hire workers for lower wages with the consequence of a higher worker turnover.

I witnessed the job talks between the head foreman and job-seeking, unrelated workers a couple of times. My overall impression was that unrelated workers had serious concerns about the social domination of the owner's hemşehris in the sweatshop, since they were afraid of being isolated in the work environment. Thus, the owners' decision was based not only on their concern to keep their hemşehris on payroll, but also by the difficulty they would have replacing them with unrelated workers. This difficulty partially kept the old recruitment practices intact, although their exclusive relationship with the Center Firm had come to an end.

In other words, the strategy to employ workers of the same identity-affiliation as the sweatshop owners was a useful strategy, when the Follower Sweatshop had a special relationship with the Center Factory, since the regular flow of orders kept productivity concerns at a minimum level. In the old system, the primary employment-related aim of the sweatshop owners was to have reliable workers who would not quit their job for other sweatshops for minor increases in their wages.

In fact, as long as the Follower Sweatshop had a reliable connection with the Center Factory, sweatshop owners wanted to keep employing their hemşehris, who knew that they would not be fired as a result of low productivity. In return, they would offer their loyalty to the sweatshop in the case of occasional gaps between industry-wide wages and their actual wage. With the end of the integral independent subcontracting system, this implicit “square deal” was over in the eyes of the sweatshop owners. However, sweatshop owners could not simply give up the long-standing employment and work practices, as they were entrapped in the social environment which they had created. Unrelated workers were simply reluctant to work at this sweatshop.

The Independent Sweatshop suffered from similar problems in terms of the small sizes of orders. Regarding their relationships with their workers, however, the sweatshop owners adopted an “easy entry-easy exit” policy of recruitment, which brought about different organizational challenges.
4.3.2 The Independent Sweatshop

4.3.2.1 Multiple Orders on a Limited Assembly Line

Like many others, the Independent Sweatshop had short-term relations with its customers and processed small orders. Planning was not based on long-run calculations. The terms of contracts were sometimes set just before the actual start of production. Thus, there was systematic pressure for a disorganized labor process. During the participant observation, the sweatshop always processed multiple items on its assembly line. There were usually two and sometimes three different orders at the same time, while the smaller size of the workforce posed various organizational challenges that were much harsher than the those faced at the Follower Sweatshop.

During my observations, the size of orders ranged between three hundred and thirty thousand. The daily production capacity for a simple design was approximately one thousand pieces a day, while, with overtime (i.e. a workday between 8:30 am and 9:00 pm), the daily target was usually to complete 1,500 pieces. The sewing section of the factory employed approximately two hundred workers and was capable of sewing six thousand pieces of a simple design, such as an unornamented t-shirt, in a regular workday between 8:30 am and 7:00 pm. This sweatshop employed approximately sixty-five workers, a third of the sewing section of the factory. Thus, its daily production capacity could be hypothetically as high as two thousand pieces a day. However, the sweatshop could rarely reach a figure of 1,500 pieces a day even with overtime. The reason for the low productivity was not the limited economies of scale. As in the case of the Follower Sweatshop, the erratic nature of the orders led to significant organizational problems. A second related problem was the high turnover rate of workers.

In order to deal with low productivity, overtime had become a regular practice at this sweatshop on workdays, except for Mondays and Thursdays.\textsuperscript{64} Workers were often called to work between 8:30 am and 1:00 pm on Saturdays as well. Actually, there was no exception to this practice during the participant observation. Workers earned approximately 170 Turkish Liras (ca. $140) for fifty-four hours of overtime in the first month of the participant observation. Lower wages matched with longer work hours and a low level of productivity.

This practice of long work hours was also a consequence of problems faced in the recruitment of new workers. The sweatshop was constantly understaffed. There were approximately sixty sewing machines on the shop floor, though approximately thirty-five sewing machines were actively in use. Twenty-seven regular sewing machines, eighteen overlock, and five specialized machines such as merrow machines constituted the assembly line. Unsurprisingly, all of the overlock machine operators were women, whereas twenty-seven classical sewing machine operators were men. In total, only seven sweepers, including the interim-ironers and me, were helping the machine operators. The ratio of sweepers to machine operators was smaller than that both at the Center Factory and the Follower Sweatshop. The ratio at the Center Factory was one to three. The ratio at the Independent Sweatshop was less than one fifth, excluding ironers. This imbalance put a significant burden on the machine operators. This configuration of the workforce resulted in low productivity, which was also associated with the following two factors.

\textsuperscript{64} It was believed that overtime on Monday would decrease the productivity of workers and it was religiously forbidden to work on Thursday nights, since Friday is the Holy Day of the week. However, workers do work on Fridays as well.
First, volatile orders, as in the Follower Sweatshop, did not allow the foremen and the owners to establish a functional assembly line. For instance, machines were frequently switched between different positions in the assembly line. Operators moved much more often than the machines. The pieces were moving on the assembly line in a chaotic manner. Thus, all of the conventional elements of an assembly line (i.e. machines, people, and the material) were scrambled and re-scrambled all the time. The shop floor was in a state of constant spatial transformation.

These changes in the organization of work put tremendous pressure on the workers. Regardless of the individual performance of a worker, the throughput to his or her table could enormously increase anytime as a result of the foreman's decision to increase the number of workers in a work unit prior to his or her own work unit in the assembly line. This uncertainty contributed to the tension on the shop floor. During the participant observation in this sweatshop, I saw fainting men, crying women, and foremen who simply walked out. The stress due to this "anarchy" urged the workers to attempt to work at a pace higher than that of the assembly line.

Second, since the entire organization was generally understaffed, the assembly line suffered from frequent bottlenecks. Machine operators could not work in harmony with each other most of the time. They irrationally worked at a fast pace which led to a higher ratio of defective items. In the Center Factory, sweepers were responsible for establishing this coordination and they were also quite good at doing the first quality control of the garments right on spot where the process was happening. The Independent Sweatshop was deprived of this opportunity. Thus, the detection of defective pieces took much longer than it did in the Follower Sweatshop and the Center Factory, sometimes hours even.

In the second part of this study, I focus on the characteristics of the subcontracting relations in the apparel industry and emphasize the transformation of the Independent Sweatshop's relations with its customers. Although these relations had a temporary character, the customers gradually increased their direct control over the labor process of the sweatshop. Now, I would like to analyze the characteristics of the employment practices at this sweatshop, since the characteristics of the employment practices were closely associated with the failure of the sweatshop to grow its scope of production beyond its current production capacity.

4.3.2.2 The Workforce: Easy Entry, Easy Exit

The literature on apparel sweatshops frequently refers to the employment of workers having similar identity affiliations with the sweatshop owners based on religious, ethnic, and provincial connections or kinship (e.g. Benton 1990, Hsiung 1996, Ghavamshahidi 1996, Eraydın and Erendil 1999, Dedeoğlu 2008). This is certainly true for small-sized sweatshops, which are not able to employ a sufficient number of workers to establish an assembly line. Moreover, the Center Factory also relied on the provincial affiliations in its workforce, though the purpose was to segment the workforce in the sewing section, rather than to take advantage of the affiliated workers in terms of low wages.

During the participant observation, I was surprised to find that such connections simply did not exist between the employer and the workers at the Independent Sweatshop. It is possible to argue that the relative importance of the identity-affiliations in the recruitment practices has an inverse
relationship with the number of workers employed at a sweatshop. I would like to suggest three conditions that make it possible or necessary for the sweatshop owner to employ workers of a particular identity-affiliation such as family, provincial background, ethnicity, and religion.

First of all, if the size of the workforce is not sufficiently large to establish an assembly line, then the unpaid or semi-paid family members establish the backbone of the workforce. Most of the time, workers accept employment by their family members, since they expect to benefit in the long-run. It is a common practice for siblings to operate a small-sized sweatshop together and to allow the big brother to enjoy the short-term benefits, while he is expected to use the impending accumulation to buy some land for a “family building” or to enlarge the business, which would let each of these (most of the time male) siblings prosper in one way or another.

Second, if the sweatshop is the regular subsidiary of a big firm such as the Follower Sweatshop, a “special” relationship with the wider kin, the hemşehris, or a particular ethnic, religious, or provincial group is usually established to have a stable workforce in the long run. Although this relationship might decrease the overall productivity of the assembly line, the low turnover rate of workers in the workforce alleviates problems with labor recruitment. The last thing that a long-term customer would tolerate is the inability of its subsidiary sweatshop to keep its productivity level up due to a high turnover rate in its workforce.

Third, factories in the apparel industry are usually based on sound financial backing and have long-term relations with their customers. In the current state of industrial relations in Turkey, to have a job and social security is a privilege. However, the relative legal protection of formal employment relations makes it also possible for workers to pursue organized resistance on the shop floor and even to demand unionization. In order to eliminate such contingencies, the management of the Center Factory employed a favored group of workers with privileged conditions such as slightly higher wages. Accordingly, workers were segmented into different cultural groups. Thus, employment of the workers of a particular identity-affiliation is one of the possible methods of labor control at the factories in the apparel industry in Istanbul.

In other words, recruitment of workers of particular identity-affiliations does not pertain to the “family” sweatshops only. Small sweatshops, medium-sized ateliers, and large-scale factories employ workers from particular ethnic, religious, and provincial origins with different purposes and under different circumstances. However, employment of family members or hemşehris always comes with a price, such as higher wages, low productivity, significant difficulty in laying off those workers, and/or the deterrence of unrelated workers from working at such places because they feel uneasy about working with favored workers.

I argue that most of the medium-sized sweatshops in Istanbul’s apparel industry are unable to pay this price. Thus, although the stereotypical image of the sweatshop as a family enterprise represents a significant portion of the industrial establishments in the apparel sector, it is not the dominant form. When the observer sees an apparel sweatshop in the basement of a residential building, he or she should not assume that it is a family sweatshop, as this assumption is often proven wrong. Moreover, as we saw in the case of the Follower Sweatshop, even if the workplace employs tens of workers in an independent multi-story building, one cannot assume that the majority of its workforce is composed of unaffiliated workers. Thus, family sweatshops should be regarded as one of the multiple categories of small-sized industrial establishments in this sector.
The Independent Sweatshop was one of the ordinary medium-sized sweatshops that had no resources to afford employing favored groups of workers. It did not have close connections with a customer such as the Center Factory. It was not located in a neighborhood populated by a particular identity group. It was “too big” to exploit the family members and “too small” to afford the segmentation of its workforce. Thanks to my observations during this research project and interviews conducted with more than thirty sweatshop owners during the pilot project in 2007, I believe that sweatshops which employ more than fifteen workers account for a significant portion of the apparel industry in Istanbul. This is because the basic assembly line of the apparel industry requires the employment of more than fifteen workers. These sweatshops adopt recruitment practices similar to the ones at the Independent Sweatshop. In other words, even if a sweatshop begins its operation as a family venture, the growth of its productive scope also gradually changes the characteristics of its labor force. Thus, the Independent Sweatshop has particular characteristics representative of a significant portion of enterprises in the apparel industry in Istanbul.

In this segment of the industry, sweatshops do not rely on a particular identity group as their workforce. Accordingly, they suffer from a state of chronic crisis with regard to their recruitment practices. Workers can easily find jobs at these sweatshops, which means that they can easily quit as well. I had the chance to experience this dynamic of the labor market when I found a job at the Independent Sweatshop, after my request for permission for this project was refused by subsidiary sweatshops of the Center Factory.

I began to work at the Independent Sweatshop as an undercover agent and revealed my identity to my co-workers and the employers only later. This was a tremendous experience allowing me to see what it is like to “be employed by a sweatshop”: I was not asked a single question, not even my name! I was introduced to the foreman by a friend of mine, M.L., who was already working there, while he was not related to the foreman or the sweatshop owner. The only question, or rather comment, directed at me by the foreman was that the pay level might not be satisfactory. It was not until my second week at the sweatshop that the foremen asked my name. Certainly he would not remember it later: he called me “Rambo,” a mildly derogatory, but also somewhat warm nickname, which quite evidently had nothing to do with my physical appearance.

As in my case, many workers got their job here without any recommendation by another worker or an acquaintance. For instance, a middle-aged woman began to work the same day as me and quit the job without informing anybody three days later during the lunch break. It took half an hour for the foreman to realize that she was absent and a few hours for him to be sure that she had actually quit the job. I heard stories of workers, who started their job at a sweatshop around noon, worked for about an hour, had their lunch, and left: they worked for one hour just to have a meal that day.

In other words, the “easy entry-easy exit” model applies to many medium-sized sweatshops, the owners of which cannot afford to have “special” relations with their workers. This partially explains why some units were seriously understaffed at the sweatshop in question. Workers were not motivated to provide long-term loyalty to their employer. Approximately two thirds of the workers did not benefit from social security. Wages were not particularly below the standards of the sector, yet certainly $400 a month was not the greatest motivation for a worker to be loyal to his or her employer. Thus, in comparison to the Center Factory, in which the fringe benefits and the salaries were regularly paid, this sweatshop had a high circulation of workers.
At the beginning of my term here, there were four teenagers at the interim-ironing department. Two of them quit their jobs during my first month. As mentioned above, an overlock machine operator who began working at the same time I did, left a few days later. Two sewing machine operators quit their jobs the same month. The most interesting event, however, was how, due to the duress of the work, one of the foremen “ran off”.

The sweatshop was owned by two business partners. The partner who had a smaller share in the business was responsible for the management of the shop floor. The other partner took care of relations with customers. Two foremen were in charge of the assembly line. Since the partner in charge of the shop floor was relatively unsuccessful in organizational matters, the foremen bore most of the burden when it came to establishing the assembly line. As a result of the shortage of sweepers, the foremen were also actively involved in “running the belt.” Thus, in contrast to the Center Factory, foremen were under extreme physical and psychological pressure regarding organizational matters.

Furthermore, the partner dealing with the customers regularly came to the shop floor and intervened in organizational matters. Thus, the authority of foremen was significantly undermined vis-à-vis the workers. The pay level of foremen in the apparel industry was not very satisfactory, either: an ordinary sewing machine operator earns approximately 600 Turkish Liras (ca. $400) a month, while a foreman, despite the responsibility and the difficulty of his position, usually does not earn more than 1,200 Turkish Liras (ca. $800). If necessary, they work Sundays as well without overpay.

As a result of these work conditions, one of the foremen quit without informing his employers. One worker had seen him on the stairs after the tea break, just a few minutes before he had left. He shared his experience with us:

I was still downstairs after the tea break and I rushed up, because I was late. Then, I saw him [UB: the foreman] on the stairs staring down. I was somewhat nervous, because I thought he was staring at me and he would yell at me, because I was late. I did not say anything and began to run up the stairs. I passed by him. He was still staring down, his eyes were fixed somewhere, and he did not even realize that I was there.

The foreman left the sweatshop approximately thirty minutes after this strange event. He apparently could not endure the tension of the workplace. He probably had a brief mental breakdown. In fact, only within one month, approximately ten percent of the workers had quit their jobs at the Independent Sweatshop. Did new workers immediately replace the old workers? Most certainly not. The vacancies put extra pressure on the assembly line.

I revealed my researcher identity to the employers in the third week of the participant observation for two reasons. First, as an undercover ethnographer, I felt that my secret identity bore ethical problems in my relations with the workers and the management. Second, after I was convinced that this sweatshop was a representative one in the industry, I felt the necessity to have a frank relationship with the management so that I could analyze different dimensions of the business, which I could not have investigated as an ordinary sweeper on the assembly line.
Despite these concerns, as a result of my past experience with the sweatshop owners during the pilot research in 2007 and during this fieldwork, I knew that most sweatshop owners would have reacted negatively if they had discovered that there had been an “undercover agent” at their sweatshop for some time. Thus, I was prepared to be shown the door or even something worse, when I disclosed my identity to the sweatshop owners.

To my surprise, the sweatshop owners not only handled the initial shock in a fairly civil manner, they also expressed a kind of appreciation for my efforts. The first reason for their unexpectedly positive attitude was obviously their appreciation of my efforts to conduct research and my enthusiasm. In my second week, one of the foremen even suggested training me as his aide (thus earning me the bitter hostility of his current aide). Second, they knew that I had already seen their management practices from within. Thus, they had nothing to lose by letting me continue with my research. They were convinced that I was not a government official in search of legal deficiencies in their employment practices (the officials of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security would hardly make such an effort to “bust” the sweatshops). Third, as I mentioned in the first part, the bigger partner, Mr. Independent, was quite involved in the politics of the apparel industry as a sweatshop owner. He was interested in having his concerns heard by the public, and I hope that this study partially fulfills his desire.

In addition to these reasons for their positive reaction to my “secretive” methods, I felt that another very practical reason at that moment was the ongoing crisis due to the increasing number of vacancies on the assembly line. In other words, they partially needed my physical labor there as a worker as well as my observations as a researcher. For example, when I had completed my observations, they had not yet found an ironer to replace me or the ironers who had left in the previous month. The chronic nature of this problem gave rise to an interesting dynamic between workers and the management.

Foremen and sweatshop owners closely observed the relations among the workers. If they felt that the resignation of a worker would lead to a “chain reaction,” in other words, to the resignation of the friends of that worker as well, then they would be more tolerant towards the worker in question. For example, one of the machine operators occasionally harassed other workers by rudely banging on the table in order to alert the sweeper that he was waiting for a new pile of pieces. Some workers expressed their frustration to the foreman and the sweatshop owner. However, neither the foreman nor the owner would even warn the worker to cease behaving in such a manner, basically because the worker’s girlfriend and her sister worked at the sweatshop as well. Thus, if this particular worker had been laid off because of the distress he caused, the other two would have followed him and quit immediately. The management could not have taken such a risk of losing three machine operators at once. The next question then is why some workers continue working here while others quit without hesitation; there is no one single answer to this question.

65. Machine operators bang on the table when the sweeper is late to feed them pieces. This is a conventional response, which is not regarded as some kind of harassment, but rather a warning to the sweeper to pick up the pace. If the sweeper continues to work slowly, then the operator has the legitimate right to yell at him/her. However, the repetition of the banging, its volume, and some other details might easily create some discontent, especially among male sewing machine operators, who would perceive the excessive behavior in this regard as a challenge to their masculinity.
First of all, gender certainly does matter: girls and young women worked here because they were used to this sweatshop. They knew some other workers and their employers. Their families thought that their daughters were safe at this sweatshop and far from close contact with men. Furthermore, when a worker was employed for a long time such as more than five years, the convention was that he or she could demand that his or her fringe benefits be paid. Thus, the possibility of “joining the club of protected workers” was an incentive. Most teenagers begin to work at apparel sweatshops without a concrete plan regarding their careers as apparel workers. As they gain the social status of an “old-timer” in the work environment and eventually realize the importance of social security, they demand that their employer begin paying their fringe benefits. The employer delays such demands for as long as possible (sometimes a couple of years).

Second, some others are already experienced workers. They come to the sweatshop on the condition that their fringe benefits be paid. Since most such workers are middle-aged (and mostly male) factory workers, their talent is not questionable. Employers give them the priority for fringe benefits. They legitimize their choice by referring to the fact that these workers have a family to take care of.

Third, some workers are recent rural-to-urban migrants and do not have close relations with their kin members. They are isolated in their neighborhood and do not have much choice but to stick with their current job. Workers from the Western Black Sea Region, who migrated to Istanbul recently because of the collapse of agricultural prices, and Kurdish workers from Eastern Anatolia who fled the civil strife in Eastern Turkey, constitute the majority of workers belonging to this category. At this sweatshop I met one Kurdish worker from Eastern Anatolia and two workers from the Western Black Sea Region who had migrated to Istanbul under such unfavorable circumstances. They could not establish close relations with their hemşehris in their neighborhood. Nor did they have relatives in Istanbul, who could help them develop personal networks in the job market.

Fourth, old workers have rather low expectations in the job market. There were ten trimmers and interim quality controllers in the assembly line. All of them were women in their fifties and over. Their salaries were low and their social security benefits were not paid at all. However, they were reluctant to look for a job at another sweatshop, since they knew that this was the best that they could get in this sector.

Fifth, foreign migrant workers without proper work permits also have an incentive to keep their job regardless of the work conditions. Most such workers whom I met were from the Nakhchivan Region of Azerbaijan. Their visas expire within one year and they needed to go to their country to renew their passports and visas. This is usually too costly for them to afford. I also heard of Turkish-speaking Armenians working especially in the apparel sweatshops located in the ISI districts of Istanbul, though I did not meet any of them in person. They do not have proper visas, since the border between Armenia and Turkey was officially closed at the time of the research. At this sweatshop, there was one old worker from Nakhchivan, a highly skilled winch operator in his home country.

---

66. Employers are obligated to pay the fringe benefits of workers in Turkey. This payment covers the pension fund and the health insurance of the worker. The amount depends on the official salary. The cost of fringe benefits for a minimum wage worker was approximately 250 Turkish Liras in 2008. Although sweatshops simply cannot afford to pay the fringe benefits of all their workers, this does not mean that they do not pay fringe benefits at all. Most of the workers whose fringe benefits are paid are either relatives of the sweatshop owner or old-timers of the workplace. Thus, this privilege is indirectly used by employers to motivate their skilled and/or loyal workers to remain at their workplace.
Except for those belonging to these groups, any worker might quit at any time, if there was a better position at another sweatshop or if the social conditions of work became too difficult to endure. As the foremen and the sweatshop owners were aware of these dynamics, their relations with the workers were informal. Everybody knew that the employers could not easily fire anybody simply on the basis of work performance. A foreman might punish a worker for failing to keep up with the assembly line by verbally abusing him/her; to fire a worker, however, would be the last resort for the employer.

For instance, M.M., an Alevi worker from Tunceli/Dersim, an Eastern Anatolian town the majority of the population of which is Zaza, had an interesting and long relationship with the Independent Sweatshop. He had worked at this sweatshop for four years, until one and a half years ago. He had had a dispute with the foreman, who was still employed during the participant observation: M.M. was to be the groomsman at a wedding and two weeks before the ceremony, he requested half day off on the day of the wedding. The foreman approved the request at first but then attempted to urge him to stay for overtime on the night of the wedding ceremony. After this dispute, he quit his job at the Independent Sweatshop.

Afterwards, he worked at two sweatshops, until recently coming back to the Independent Sweatshop. He became the foreman at his first workplace, yet the salaries were not regularly paid. The sweatshop owner owed him 1,500 Turkish Liras ($1,000) in payment, which M.M. was unable to recover for several months, and so he quit his job there. He then began to work at another sweatshop with a friendly environment. However, although he was promised that his social security benefits would be paid, the sweatshop owner failed to do so. The sweatshop owner also urged him to work overtime, although M.M. had a personal deal with him that he would not stay for overtime. As M.M. objected to the pressure, he once again had a dispute with the sweatshop owner. When he quit his job at this sweatshop, he said to the sweatshop owner, “I don’t need you, but you need me!” It was his third resignation in one and a half years. Then, he came back to the Independent Sweatshop. He talked with the sweatshop owner here about his past problems with the foreman. The sweatshop owner said, “These are ordinary problems in this sector. You should learn how to forget about your past disputes with the people here.” He began to work at the Independent Sweatshop one month before the participant observation. The foreman was apparently warned by the sweatshop owner not to be too harsh on M.M.

If workers had the opportunity to quit and if the employers knew that they could not exercise authority on the workers by threatening to fire them, then what was the actual source of pressure on the shop floor that urged the workers to work as fast as they could? The control of the workers was established with the help of the assembly line. Workers who fell behind the pace of the line would face the pressure of other workers, who refused to be taken advantage of by their coworkers. It was interesting for me to see the disciplinary power exerted by workers on other workers. Workers wanted to appear as industrious as possible, since the prestige associated with a superb work performance was an important element of the higher status in the social environment of the sweatshop.

---

67. Alevism is a religious belief system with adherents in the Anatolia, the Balkans, and the Eastern Mediterranean Region. It is widely regarded as an unorthodox sect of Islam, while some Alevis regard their belief as an independent religion. Zazas are the second largest ethnic group after Kurds in Turkey and many Zazas regard themselves as Kurdish. See the articles in White and Jongerden eds. 2003.
Thus, relations among the workers were tense. For instance, one of the young, healthy-looking male workers lost consciousness in my third week at this sweatshop. Meanwhile, I was serving a group of overlock machine operators, three young women. The worker who fainted was working on the next line, which was located behind me. Thus, I did not see the actual moment when the worker fainted, since I was concentrating on my work. I caught a glimpse of the foremen and two sweepers carrying what appeared to be a big object, like a sack, to the door and, when the overlock machine operators began to laugh, I turned around to see this rather shocking event. One of the girls commented, while she was laughing with obvious sarcasm regarding the weakness of the fainting worker:

Even men can’t endure this. How do they expect us to work like this!

That worker was a silent person who had begun to work at the sweatshop right after me. He was trying to make friends, as I was. However, after this incident, he completely isolated himself from the rest of the worker community. He began to have his lunch alone and spend his time at tea breaks by himself. His masculinity was seriously damaged in this wild social environment.

If there is anything worse than “despotic” labor control, as Burawoy coined the term, it is simply this kind of “anarchic” labor control. As laborers were already culturally segmented well before they began to work at this sweatshop, relations among the workers of different identity-affiliations were at best distant, if not hostile. Workers of different identity-affiliations did not hang out with each other at lunch and tea breaks except for teenage sweepers, whose inferior status in the sweatshop made them close friends.

I usually sat with my friend who helped me find this job, and his friends: M.L. was an Alevi and Zaza. At our lunch table, we had M.M. and an Alevi Turkish woman worker. Kurdish Sunni workers had their own social circle mostly on the basis of their provincial migration origin. Turkish workers were also friends with people of their provincial or regional migration origin. As a result of the “liberal” recruitment practices by the management, which I call the “easy entry-easy exit” model, Kurdish and Zaza workers were employed at a fair proportion representative of their share in Bağcılar’s population. Thus, as other workers, they were able to establish their friendship circles along religious and ethnic lines.

**Chart 4.12 Location of Birth of Workers at the Independent Sweatshop**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographical Location of Birth</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black Sea</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Anatolia</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Anatolia</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Anatolia</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marmara</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A striking example of the cultural segmentation at the workplace was the reluctance of Sunni workers to attend the engagement ceremony of a woman employee in the accounting department. She had been working at the sweatshop for a long time and most of the workers knew her in person, since she was responsible for calculating their salaries and other benefits. She was a Turkish Alevi from Tokat, a Central Black Sea province. As a gesture, the sweatshop owner had assigned a minivan, which was used as a shuttle for the workers, to transport those attending the engagement ceremony. The ceremony took place in a state park and the weather was nice. It was a Saturday afternoon and this could be a pleasant opportunity for the workers, most of whom basically lived in the middle of a concrete jungle, to spend some time in a different environment. There were twenty workers in the van. Seven of them were men. Except for one of them, who came to the ceremony in order to spend some time with his girlfriend, all of the male workers were Alevi.

However, women workers were from different ethnic and religious groups. Alevi, Kurdish, Zaza, and Turkish girls did not miss this precious opportunity to enjoy the nice weather and to be at the engagement ceremony of their friend. The host families were very hospitable, and girls wearing headscarves danced in the same dance circle with men. This would have probably been regarded as inappropriate by their families. In other words, segmentation according to identity-affiliation was certainly much stronger for men, while relationships among women could more easily go beyond identity-affiliations.

It is difficult to describe this social affinity as a form of gender solidarity. Although women workers were closer to each other than men in such social occasions, the competition among them was as tense as it was for men. Masculinity, on the one hand, acted as a shield for men, which saved them to some extent from performance-related deficiencies. They were men first and workers second. Women, on the other hand, had an already inferior gender position. Thus, they were eager to compete with their female coworkers in order to establish their social position on the shop floor. Unlike the women workers at the Center Factory, the overlock operators at the Independent Sweatshop, whom I assisted as a sweeper, never attempted to collectively “make out.” Rather than acting together as a work unit, they would try to slow down the pace of the workers within their own work unit.

A common tactic, which was used at the Center Factory as well, was to hide the sewn pieces on their laps and thus prevent the sweeper from passing those pieces on to the next operator. Another more hostile move was to toss the pieces on their table unfolded in order to slow down the sweeper and to reduce the flow of the pieces to the next operator. Because of the shortage of sweepers, the sweeper could not keep up pace folding the pieces properly and passing them on to the next operator. As the sweeper would slow down, the operator who had disrupted the sweeper’s and hence the next operator’s speed, would gain some time to catch up with the rest of the assembly line. I observed severe verbal disputes among women workers whenever they used such tactics. I got my share of the workers’ bitter reactions from those affected by my inability to pass on the pieces at the desired pace. (Luckily, I was not the only sweeper suffering from this tension.)

The demographic heterogeneity coupled with the tense relations among workers should have been ameliorated by the management. A strange reflection of such attempts on the part of the management was the choice of music. The radio or CD-player was always on at the apparel sweatshops. As Yörük (2006) points out in his master thesis, the genre of music at the sweatshops is
a significant source of political tension. It is so important that workers sometimes even quit their job, if their favorite genre or artist is constantly ignored by the foremen. For instance, particular singers such as Ahmet Kaya or Ozan Arif are a constant source of tension among workers. As I mentioned in the chapter about the labor process in the Center Factory, Ahmet Kaya is a leftist Kurdish singer widely recognized as a supporter of the Kurdish political movement. Turkish-nationalist non-Kurds strongly protested him. Ozan Arif is, however, an explicit supporter of ultra-Turkish nationalism and sings songs praising nationalist sentiments. How are these contrasting demands reflecting the ethnic and political tensions among workers compromised on the shop floor?

In the case of this sweatshop, the employers described themselves as “nationalists” and went to the mosque every Friday. Mr. Independent had recently quit drinking alcohol. Certainly, although they were not religious fundamentalists, this still is a necessary political/ideological position in today’s Turkey. In order to survive in the apparel sector, the safest political position is to have at least a conservative look. It would cause minimum damage while providing maximum protection. However, Ozan Arif’s records were never played, while Ahmet Kaya and Kurdish songs were on “the daily menu.”

Although the manifest political position of the sweatshop owners seems to contradict the choice of music at the sweatshop, this should be regarded as the employers’ message to the (left-oriented) Kurdish, Zaza, and/or Alevi workers. Nationalist and/or fundamentalist workers already had political affinity with their employer. Thus, the management had neither the motivation nor the power to further favor those workers with a choice of music that would have irritated the workers of ethnic and religious minorities. Accordingly, a choice of genre that would help left-leaning workers develop some sympathy towards their employer was a “cheap” way to keep those workers working at this sweatshop with relatively low risks.

Thus, it is possible to conclude that the workforce at the Independent Sweatshop represented the social heterogeneity of Bağcılar. The segmentation of the workforce along ethnic, provincial, and religious lines was not the outcome of a conscious strategy by the management, which could not afford to pursue the related recruitment practices by favoring particular workers vis-à-vis the rest of its workforce. The segmentation at the workplace was rather a reflection of the tensions outside the workplace. The “easy entry-easy exit” model allowed all identity groups to be represented at this sweatshop at proportions close to the share of their respective groups in Bağcılar’s resident population. Workers were not provided with strong incentives to disregard their identity-affiliations on the shop floor.

Accordingly, the unstable and haphazard recruitment patterns yielded heterogeneity in the workforce. The unpredictable shortage of workers at key positions generated two outcomes with regard to productivity at this workplace. First, such shortages were a chronic problem that this sweatshop could not resolve by its own limited means. If this problem had been resolved in the past, the owners of this sweatshop could have grown their productive capacity, as the Center Firm did. Second, this heterogeneity furthermore generated tense relations among workers. Although the consequent chaotic work environment was by no means the outcome of an intentional strategy of the foremen or the sweatshop owners and it had a negative impact on the productivity of the assembly line, this web of relations led to the fragmentation of the resistance on the shop floor, where the same relations also partially acted as a disciplinary mechanism.
In my last week at the Independent Sweatshop, the foremen informed the workers that payments would be delayed. This surely was a cause of frustration for most of the workers. At the second tea break at 7:00 pm, workers began to discuss what they were going to do about this problem. My friend who helped me find this job, M.L., suggested that workers should slow down the assembly line. Some of the workers had never heard of such a thing and questioned how it could ever be possible for all of the workers to take such a collective action. In a moment of despair, workers somewhat unwillingly agreed to this plan. After tea break, as sewing machine operators slowed down the pace of the assembly line, the foreman realized the collective resistance and began to yell at the workers:

Foreman: Whether you’re paid or not, you must not let it stop you from working. You must work.

[Silence]

Foreman: What do you think is going to happen if you don’t work? Will Mr. Independent be in a better position to pay your money?

[Silence of approximately thirty seconds. Most workers did not have a clue how to respond to the foreman. Then, a middle-aged, experienced worker, H.A.B., who was from Edirne, a province in the Marmara region, finally ended the silence.]

H.A.B: Well, how can you expect us to work if we don’t get paid?

Foreman: Look, don’t argue with me, OK? You have to work. It’s as simple as that.

H.A.B: We have our own plans which we make according to payday. How am I gonna pay my debt back on time, if I’m not paid on time?

Foreman: Listen to me carefully. I…don’t…give…a shit.

None of the workers supported this worker, who would later express his frustration at how his coworkers “chickened out.” The lack of solidarity thanks to the segmentation along provincial, religious, and ethnic lines was, I think, the major reason why workers were not willing to endanger their individual positions by supporting this worker. He did not have any hemşehris at this workplace. The workers originally from the Black Sea Region, the Kurdish workers, and the Alevi workers, none of them had close relations with this worker beyond their common work experience. By attacking an experienced worker, the foreman established his authority over the rest of the workers. Workers returned to their usual pace of work. This protest and the conversation between the foreman and this worker lasted approximately fifteen minutes.

4.3.3 The Family Sweatshop

4.3.3.1 Modern Industry without Modern Division of Labor: Organizations for Small Numbers

Thanks to my friends in Bağcılar, I met two prospective sweatshop owners, Mr. Survivor and I.R.R., who were planning to open their business one week from the day we met. Since participant
observation at a sweatshop employing a small number of workers would significantly contribute to the project, I requested their approval to conduct observations at their sweatshop. In addition to the reference of my friends in the neighborhood, the fact that they would need my personal contribution as a worker provided extra incentive for them to allow me to observe at their new establishment. Thus, they accepted my request and I begun to work with them in their first week.

The sweatshop was a shop of approximately forty square meters on the ground level of a residential building. The sweatshop owners were paying 400 Turkish Lira rent (approximately $300). The place had no space for a kitchen. A space of approximately three square meters was assigned as “the office,” though nobody used it, since everybody worked at the workplace.

All of the eight workers were family members of the two partners. Thus, I call this workplace the family sweatshop. Partners and family members operated the sewing machines. One of the partners acted as the foreman. He organized and trained the family members/workers, since four of them were inexperienced workers. Certainly the close relationship among the family members bore the curious question of how the discipline would be established in this sweatshop. Thus, in this section, I will focus on two subjects in particular. First, the number of workers at this sweatshop was not sufficient to establish an operational assembly line. Thus, I will analyze the characteristics of the work organization. Second, the owners (and the workers) were Kurdish and I was particularly interested in the question of the influence of their ethnic identity on the organization of their business relations.

In the Center Factory, the Independent Sweatshop, and the Follower Sweatshop, the number of workers employed was sufficient to establish an assembly line. In other words, every individual task was assigned to a worker or to a work unit. Those units/individuals were usually seated in the order in which they would complete successive tasks. The processes that provided inputs for the core assembly line were conducted in peripheral lines. Since even a simple design requires a number of processes ranging between twenty and sixty, a functional assembly line has to employ at least fifteen workers. Thus, the Follower and Independent Sweatshops employed dozens of workers not only for the sake of a larger output, but also for the sake of organizing the work on a functional assembly line. I call this work arrangement “Smithian division of labor.”

However, in this case, eight workers did not suffice for setting up an operating chain of tasks to be taken on by different individuals or work units. This difficulty bears an interesting theoretical question perhaps stated in its clearest form by Stephen Marglin (1974): One of Marglin’s key arguments is that the assembly line was the historical reflection of the class struggle in the industrial work organization, rather than the outcome of capitalists’ search for an efficient work organization. The assembly line is a complex organization, since tasks should be defined as detailed as possible in order for them to be assigned to individual modules of the assembly line. Marglin also argues that an alternative organization, which assigns the entire workforce to individual tasks in a consecutive manner, could hypothetically perform as well as the classical assembly line.

At this sweatshop, the two partners had contrasting views concerning the organization of the labor process. Given that I had the chance of being present within the very first week that the sweatshop began operations, I could observe this ongoing rift between the partners on how to establish the work organization. The partnership was based on the distribution of responsibilities and inputs in the venture: one of them (and his relatives) bought the sewing machines, while the
other partner found the customers and took responsibility for managing the workplace. Both of them had previously worked in sweatshops as machine operators.

The partner acting as foreman divided the tasks as minutely as possible, so that each of the nine workers (including me) had a specific task to finish. The order was a toddler sweatshirt with a special necklace and an ornament fixed with a regular sewing machine. Although this was a simple design, to set a functional assembly line for this order required the simultaneous operation of at least fifteen workers. However, we were only nine. Moreover, there were significant differences in the performance of workers, since tasks were qualitatively different. As I mentioned above many times, overlock machine operators almost always have a higher pace of output than sewing machine operators. Unsurprisingly, pieces piled up in front of the sewing machine operators.

Such bottlenecks generated another unpredicted problem, that of the storage of piled up pieces: Because of the size of the workplace, it was difficult to store the unfinished pieces in orderly piles. Furthermore, children were with us all the time, since all of the workers were family member of the partners. Some of the children were really helpful, folding the pieces, counting them, and passing them on to the next operator. In other words, they took on the responsibility of the sweepers. However, some of them were too little or just pestered their mothers. Thus, the foreman-owner had to count every piece after every process time and again, in order to make sure that unprocessed pieces were not mixed with processed ones. In other words, the piled pieces disrupted the harmony among machine operators.

The other partner, for all of these reasons, was skeptical about the overall effectiveness of this strategy. He was well aware of the fact that the number of workers was not enough to establish an assembly line. Like his partner, he had occasionally worked at small sweatshops that employed less than twenty workers. He knew that especially complex designs required an extensive division of labor that would necessitate the employment of a larger workforce. In such cases, the common practice was to resort to what I call the “Marglinian division of labor”: The team is divided into two or three work units and takes the responsibility of a particular task one at a time. Then, the successive (group of) task(s) is/are performed.

The foreman’s insistence on the use of a conventional assembly line could have caused a delay in the very first order that they took. This would have been a disaster for this brand-new enterprise, as its customer could have given up working with them. In the first four days, tasks were distributed according to the foreman’s plan. We were behind schedule and needed to increase daily production by almost thirty percent. We needed to complete 1,700 toddler sweatshirts in one week. Thus, including Saturday, the daily output needed to be more than 280 pieces, while both partners realized very well in the fourth day of the week that, if they persisted on the current strategy, no more than 1,200 pieces would be produced by Saturday. Thus, we shifted to the alternative system: eight machine operators were divided first into two, then into three work units, as the first two tasks were completed. The work units concentrated on different tasks involving similar processes, rather than having the tasks carried out in the order that they would have been on an assembly line. In other words, similar tasks were performed by a work unit consecutively, although these processes would have been performed at different points on the assembly line.

The new strategy was a success: The deadline was met. After the relationship between processes and responsibilities took a new form, tasks were distributed to the work units on the
basis of the similarity of the processes, rather than according to the temporal order of tasks on a virtual assembly line. The efficiency of this method was the outcome of three factors.

First, the Smithian division of labor is based on a strategy to divide the assembly line into individual processes. As there was an insufficient number of workers to have work units, one worker was assigned one task, although the average time to complete one process varies on the basis of the difficulty of the task. At larger workplaces, most of the tasks are conducted by work units, rather than individuals. Accordingly, the variation in the average time of completion for different processes can be harmonized with the assignment of different numbers of workers for different processes. However, the “one worker-one task” model does not allow this flexibility. It is not difficult to see why the bottlenecks at this sweatshop were a natural outcome of the assembly line.

Thus, the intra-work unit pressure is usually a much stronger motivation for the worker to work faster than the competition among work units, as we saw in the section on the labor process at the Independent Sweatshop. In other words, when workers work in work units rather than conducting a particular process individually, they have to keep up not only with the rest of the assembly line, but also with the rest of their unit members. Since the characteristic of the task is the same for all unit members, the pressure usually takes the form of competition. For instance, young women workers at the Independent Sweatshop and the Center Factory often asked me, as their sweeper, to keep the “unofficial” output record of the workers in their work unit. This record was certainly not to be given to the foreman, but they wanted to use it to prove to their coworkers that they were better than their fellow unit members. However, a division of labor based on “one worker-one task” is not able to create this pressure on the workers. The only reference point of the worker is the pace of the entire assembly line, rather than the coworkers in her unit. Thus, there is always the chance of evading criticisms by arguing that her task was a more difficult one compared to the successive and preceding tasks. However, the Marglinian division of labor requires the workers to perform the same task. Thus, even in the absence of a sufficient number of workers to establish an assembly line, the intra-work unit pressure is still in effect.

Second, learning is the key for workers to swiftly acquire the necessary dexterity, regardless of the characteristics of the work organization. Especially in the Independent and Follower Sweatshops, the terms were short and the efficiency gains due to the simplification of the tasks did not play a significant role in the actual increase of productivity. As the manager of the sewing section at the Center Factory commented, “It takes time for the belt to settle down.” This problem negatively affected the order of work at this small sweatshop as well: the deadline was one week ahead. In fact, workers simply would not have had enough time to gain the necessary dexterity for the assigned task if the classical assembly line had been used. However, the Marglinian division of labor created an environment for social learning, rather than an increase in individual dexterity: Workers in a work unit could teach each other the tricks of a particular task. Furthermore, similar tasks temporally follow each other. Thus, the dexterity gained while performing a particular task becomes useful for the consecutive tasks as well.

This intra-work unit training could not have been possible in a Smithian division of labor based on the conventional assembly line, in which each worker would have been on his or her own. The learning process on a conventional assembly line depends on the presence of collaborative relations
among workers at the workplace. If competition, rather than cooperation, prevails as a result of the heterogeneity in identity affiliations and the disincentives for collaboration due to the negative attitude of management, workers do not have any motivation to teach each other the delicacies of the process at hand. In other words, the conventional assembly line does not necessarily generate strong incentives for collaboration and collective learning.

Third, as mentioned in the previous chapters, a smoothly operating assembly line in a labor-intensive work organization by no means guarantees the optimal allocation of workers and machines. Although this is a minor issue for a small group of workers, the Marglinian division of labor virtually eliminates the question of allocation of machines and workers in an optimal configuration.

Thus, Marglin’s theoretical point, which he elaborated with ample historical data, was well supported by my observations: the simple “division of tasks in time” (i.e. a Marglinian division of labor) can yield much better results than the “division of tasks in space” (i.e. a Smithian division of labor). This is especially true when a shortage of labor and a greater need for efficiency gains through collective learning and characterizes the nature of the production. Certainly, capitalist management bears an instinctive dislike of productive collaboration among workers. Thus, it seems that efficiency concerns are most of the time secondary to the motivation of the management to establish control over its workforce. In one of my conversations with the manager of the total quality department of the Center Firm, I shared these observations with him. He commented:

> In my years in this sector, I have seen many who attempted to develop alternative production techniques. None of them ever succeeded. They eventually ended up with the belt system.

### 4.3.3.2 Discipline and Its Consequences

In order to analyze the impact of this work organization on the individual performances of workers, I kept track of the performance of three machine operators at this sweatshop for one hour on a single day, as in the Follower Sweatshop. Since most of the workers at the Follower Sweatshop were either hemşehris or relatives of the sweatshop owners, the characteristics of the relations between the foreman and the workers were at some level similar.

By measuring how long it took one worker to process one individual piece over one hour, I had a sufficient amount of individual cases ranging between fifty-eight and one hundred and sixty nine at the Follower Sweatshop. I undertook the same procedure at the Family Sweatshop. Naturally, the average time for each process varied significantly depending on the complexity of the process. Thus, I divided the average of the distribution composed of the individual moves of the worker during the designated time by the standard deviation of the distribution.

The comparison of the performances of the workers at the Follower Sweatshop versus the performances of the workers at the Family Sweatshop yields interesting results. First, the coefficients for the workers at the Family Sweatshop are not significantly higher than the coefficients at the Follower Sweatshop. In other words, although the distractive factors such as the presence of children on the shop floor certainly had a negative impact on the workers’ concentration, family members remained more focused on their job.
### Table 4.5 Coefficient of Variation for Selected Workers at the Follower and Family Sweatshops

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family Sweatshop</th>
<th>Mean (in seconds)</th>
<th>Standard Deviation (in seconds)</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Coefficient of Variation (Standard Deviation/Mean)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stitch on Both Sides on the Neck (Sewing Machine)</td>
<td>42.17</td>
<td>9.93</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewing of the Collar (Overlock Machine)</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>8.57</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stitch on the Back (Sewing Machine)</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean: 0.256
Standard Deviation: 0.04

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Follower Sweatshop</th>
<th>Mean (in seconds)</th>
<th>Standard Deviation (in seconds)</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Coefficient of Variation (Standard Deviation/Mean)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stitch on Both Sides on the Neck-Hemşehri of the Foremen (Sewing Machine)</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stitch on the Back (Sewing Machine)</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>7.24</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stitch on the Back-Hemşehri of Foremen (Sewing Machine)</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewing of a 3 cm-long Strip on the Side of the Body (Overlock Machine)</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewing of the Arms on the Body (Overlock Machine)</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean: 0.23
Standard Deviation: 0.109

Second, my major concern in my choice of the operators to be observed was to document and compare the differences in the work performances of both sewing machine operators and overlock machine operators. Thus, although the chosen groups at these sweatshops surely do not constitute a random sample, we can take the average of the coefficient of variation for the workers' average performance at the Follower Sweatshop and the Independent Sweatshop for illustrative purposes, in which case we reach almost identical figures: .23 and .25 respectively.

Third, when the variation of these coefficients for the two groups is calculated, we reach another surprising conclusion: Workers at the Family Sweatshop perform at a level of concentration very close to that of the workers at the Follower Sweatshop. In other words, although common sense tells us that the assembly line at the Follower Sweatshop should harmonize motions more successfully than the work organization at the Independent Sweatshop, this was simply not the case.

These findings generate two interpretations about the labor process of labor-intensive industries: First, under particular circumstances, the Marglian division of labor is a strong alternative to the Smithian division of labor. This work organization provides a lesser amount of control over workers, but it also enables workers to learn collectively and it increases their motivation to collaborate with
each other. Second, the Smithian division of labor, at least in labor-intensive industries, does not necessarily provide a higher level of standardization of the motions of workers than the Marglianian division of labor does.

These observations both confirm and deny the arguments of the Labor Process theorists such as Harry Braverman (1998): It is certainly correct that the primary orientation of the Smithian division of labor has been about the establishment of control over labor by taking the initiative from it. Thus, the assembly line historically won over other possible ways of organizing industrial labor.

However, Braverman analytically associated the Smithian division of labor with what he called “deskilling,” i.e. the process of stripping the worker of their skills in favor of routinization of work and standardization of the motions of the workers. At least in this comparison between two sweatshops, we see that such standardization did not take place. Thus, I argue that the supposed role of the Smithian division of labor in the standardization of human motion is realized only under certain circumstances. It certainly does not hold universally and it does not apply strongly to the labor process in the apparel industry. In other words, as the Labor Process Theory was intended to reflect the dynamics of capital-intensive industries, their predictions about the organizational dynamics of industrial activities are questionable in labor-intensive industries.

The reason why the assembly line is the backbone of the dominant form of work organization in the apparel industry is that it is impossible to establish in workplaces employing unrelated workers, the intense connection between the worker and the labor process that was the case in the Family Sweatshop. Family members employed at this sweatshop knew that the sweatshop owners, who were the brothers, cousins, and sons of the workers, put all of their resources into this business. The first week needed to be a success. The first order needed to be delivered on time for the very survival of the sweatshop.

However, rewards from this investment are certainly limited and they are never allocated equally. Single female members of the family can get at most their dowry money as a return. The little brothers will be provided with money to get married and to pay for their apartments, only after the big brothers resolve their financial problems. Family means solidarity, but never equality. This was also the case at the Follower Sweatshop. Younger brothers had apartments, but not cars. They were dealing with workers as foremen, the most difficult organizational position. The oldest brothers took care of the management.

Moreover, the growth of the scope of the production eventually requires the employment of unrelated workers. Some of the (male) family members become foremen. Most of the woman relatives are sent back to their homes. Family members who challenge the authority of the father or the big brother are condemned by the family and look for other options in their occupational career. In short, as the unrelated workers outnumber the family members, the assembly line silently encroaches back into the veins of the organizational structure of the sweatshop. During this transition, some of the family members become a burden, since they either disrupt the harmony of the line or challenge the authority of the sweatshop owner. Some other (male) family members comply with the rules of the game. Their reward is to keep their job as foremen on the assembly line.
4.3.3.3 The Kurdish Identity in the Urban Setting: The Language of Community, Class, and Ethnic Politics

In the Center Factory and the Follower Sweatshop, the dominant provincial group in the workforce was the Azeri-originated Turkish workers, who had migrated from an Eastern Anatolian province, Iğdır, since the owners of the Center Firm and the Follower Sweatshop preferred to employ their hemşehris. Owners of the Independent Sweatshop could not afford to provide favorable compensation or other benefits for workers from a particular provincial, regional, ethnic, or religious group. Thus, the workforce at this sweatshop was relatively heterogeneous in terms of identity-affiliations. The common demographic trend for these three workplaces was the significant share of Black Sea region migrants in the workforce, while Eastern and Southeast Anatolian workers accounted for the second largest group. This regional distribution, as we will see later, corresponds to the distribution of the residents’ origin of migration in Bağcılar.

The partners of the Family Sweatshop were Kurdish migrants from Diyarbakır, a major Southeast Eastern Anatolian province with a Kurdish majority population. All of the workers were family members. The cultural and political environment of the Family Sweatshop had, thus, particular characteristics contrasting with the one of the Follower Sweatshop: The foreman in the Follower Sweatshop, the younger brother of one of the owners, had been an active member of MHP (Nationalist Movement Party; the strongest extreme Turkish nationalist political party in Turkey) until a few years earlier. Unsurprisingly, he had a strong bias against Kurds which shaped his recruitment practices:

I have no problem with Kurds. When you hire one of them, they are harmless. However, if you hire a bunch of them, then they give you a big headache.

The everyday practices at the Family Sweatshop, however, reflected the Kurdish identity of the sweatshop owners. Kurdish songs were played on the CD player all day long. Political jokes about the pressure of the government on Kurds were common. During the tea breaks, Kurdish politics was one of the major subjects of conversation amongst the men.

This political attitude most certainly had to do with the state’s reluctance to grant cultural and political rights to the Kurdish population in Turkey. Moreover, these families migrated to Istanbul as a result of the forced evacuation of their village by the military. The number of such evacuated villages and hamlets is estimated to be between 3,000 and 4,000. The total number of Kurdish migrants who have had to leave their villages without their consent is a matter of debate. Official sources base their figures on the number of applications received by a government project aiming to assist the migrants to return to their villages and hamlets. Thus according to government sources, the number of such migrants is around 350,000. A more realistic projection is provided by a recent survey by Hacettepe Nüfus Etütleri Enstitüsü (Hacettepe Population Studies Institute) in 2006. This study argues for an estimated number of between 950,000 and 1.2 million migrants who have migrated as a result of forced evacuations during the military struggle between the

---

Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Turkish state. All in all, Kurdish families who involuntarily migrated to Istanbul had a bitter memory of their migration experience. However, it should not be forgotten that the experience of Kurdish workers in the industrial life of Istanbul also has a significant impact on their ethnic identity.

It is an undeniable fact that Turkish factory managers and sweatshop owners discriminate against Kurdish workers in their employment preferences, whenever they can afford to employ workers of a more favorable provincial group. Sweatshop owners and factory managers justify their discriminatory employment strategy by complaining that Kurdish workers act in a collective manner in workplaces and resist the authority of the management, whenever they feel that they are facing ethnic discrimination or, in rarer cases, compensation-related injustices. The common ethnic identity of the Kurdish workers, who experience discrimination in various spheres of their lives, seems to motivate them to act together in cases of unjust treatment. This can be regarded as a particular form of class consciousness bolstered by ethnic identity.

However, my observations, especially at the Independent Sweatshop, bear another conclusion, that most of the workplaces in the apparel industry simply do not have this “capacity for discrimination.” Discriminatory practices are mostly exercised in those factories which already enjoy a strong financial base and easy access to a particular (non-Kurdish) identity group. Sweatshops linked with such factories are also able to perform similar recruitment practices. They can afford to discriminate against the Kurdish workers, whereas this tendency is not realized in many other cases thanks to the financial weakness of most of the sweatshops in this sector. They simply need workers and it does not matter whether they are Kurds or not.

Moreover, it should be emphasized that systemic discrimination is usually not based on a blunt distinction between Turkish and Kurdish workers, but rather on a selective employment strategy of Turkish workers from a particular provincial origin. Discriminatory employment practices consist of the employment of a favored provincial group as a significant portion of the total workforce. Thus, in general, Turkish workers not from that favored provincial group are discriminated against in a similar (but milder) way as the Kurdish workers. If management is unable to favor members of a particular provincial group by providing them with relatively higher wages and longer periods of employment, this inability generally overlaps with a failure to recruit a reliable work force. In this case, ethnicity-based discrimination cannot be said to be a systematic characteristic of employment practices.

From the anecdotal information gathered from interviews with the workers, I also tend to believe that Kurdish employers use similar discriminatory practices as well. However, in this case such “discrimination,” seems to favor Kurdish workers, and usually takes a twisted form of overexploitation of the workers by the employers through the manipulation of their ethnic sentiments. Thus, Kurdish workers suffer from these two contrasting forms of discrimination: First, they have a lesser chance of getting a job at the sweatshops and the factories owned by non-Kurdish employers, as long as those employers are able to rely on a particular (non-Kurdish) provincial migration group. Second, if they choose to work at a workplace owned by a Kurdish employer, then the employer generally uses the discriminatory labor market to his favor in order

to overexploit his workers. In short, the extent of the discrimination has a direct impact on the
decisions of the workers about their occupational strategies.

These patterns of employment in the apparel industry provided four options for the owners of
this small-scale sweatshop. First, they could attempt to find a steady job at a factory such as the
Center Factory by overcoming the discriminatory recruitment practices. If they found a privileged
position at such a Factory, they would not suffer significant inequities at the workplace in terms of
differences in wages and benefits, although they needed to disguised their ethnic identity at some
level. Since a significant portion of the recent Kurdish migrants involuntarily migrated to Istanbul as
a result of the forced evacuation of their villages by the military, some of them have a distinct ethnic
consciousness and, for understandable reasons, tend not to take this option even when given such
an opportunity. Second, they could accept the paternalistic protection of a Kurdish employer, who
would use this opportunity to overexploit them. Third, they could continue to work at a sweatshop
similar to the Independent Sweatshop. This occupational strategy would mean that they change
their job every two or three years. Last, they could try to get out of this vicious cycle by starting
their own business. And this was what these partners had done. To have their own business meant
not only emancipation from the immediate duress of being a wage-earner, but also freedom from
ethnic pressure.

Both of the partners, Mr. Survivor and I.R.R., were experienced workers and had performed
as foremen several times before. Mr. Survivor had opened two small sweatshops before, but
failed both times. He was an enthusiastic supporter of the PKK (Kurdish Workers Party) and a firm
follower of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK: “If Apo [Abdullah Öcalan] said that this white
wall was black, then I would see it as black.” He was curious about political matters. Whenever I
worked close to his machine, he asked me about my views regarding Kurdish and national politics.

Although the PKK is widely regarded as left-oriented, Mr. Survivor’s political position was also
supplemented by his strong Muslim beliefs. On Fridays, the holy day for Muslims, records about
holy incidents in the history of Islam, life stories of the historical figures of Islam, and rules of Islam
were played on the CD player, although younger sisters of the partners usually preferred Turkish
pop songs to these religious records. As they were not fluent in Kurdish, the Kurdish political music
was not their favorite genre either. All of the women at the sweatshop wore headscarves, as did the
majority of women workers at other the workplaces observed as part of this research.

Men working at the sweatshop meanwhile went to an underground mosque for Friday prayers.
In these mosques, the Imam preached in Kurdish, which was forbidden in Turkey at the time of the
research. The mosque, which the members of these families attended, was located on the ground
floor of a residential building with a size of approximately 300 square meters: It had all of the
necessary ceremonial facilities, such as public restrooms. Although it is forbidden by law to found
a mosque without permission of the Presidency of Religious Affairs, which assigns an Imam to
every mosque on its payroll, for this mosque, located in a populous neighborhood, it was in a way
difficult to escape the attention of the government officials. It was probably informally allowed by
government officials to function in order to absorb ethnic tensions. This mosque was the very space
in which Sunni Kurdish men felt themselves to be a part of a unique ethno-religious community.
Sharing the same ethnic identity, Sunni Kurdish men prayed together, though they had barely
anything in common in terms of political views or class.
In other words, the ethnicity-based community solidarity seemed to remain within the confines of this underground mosque. Mr. Survivor and I.R.R. initiated this business on the presumption that an acquaintance of Mr. Survivor would provide them with sufficiently large orders in order to keep their sweatshop running. Mr. Survivor had met this middleman when he worked as a foreman at a sweatshop a few years ago. He was not Kurdish and his affiliation with Mr. Survivor was based solely upon his expectation that he would earn his commission. In other words, in this case, the Kurdish identity was not the basis of an ethnic-based supply chain between such small-scale sweatshops and larger workplaces owned by Kurds.

Ethnicity-based political solidarity is not transformed into ethnicity-based solidarity in the form of close industrial connections among Kurdish sweatshop owners. The Kurdish factory owner, if there is one, would not try to elevate the position of his weak compatriot to a stronger position in the commodity chain. The Kurdish sweatshop owner would not collaborate with another Kurdish sweatshop owner based on ethnic affiliations. The commodity chains are too complex, dominated by the Turks, and embedded too deeply in a path of distrust.

Especially in the case of Kurdish workers, one reason for the relative insignificance of identity in their work-related connections is their self-perception about their position in the city. For Mr. Survivor and I.R.R., their home province was rather a distant memory than the symbolic reference point for a community-based network. As L.K.M., the older brother of I.R.R., commented:

I don’t understand people from Bitlis or Van [UB: Eastern Anatolian provinces with a majority Kurdish population]. They say “I’m still new here. I’ve only lived in Istanbul for two years.” They still don’t understand that they won’t go back [to their hometowns]. I don’t understand how they don’t get it. How will they ever get used to the idea that they’re here now and forever?

The provincial origin of migration is important in the identity of the Kurdish worker, although his/her relations with his/her hometown are relatively weak. One possible indicator of the connection people have with their migration origin is the extent of the use of land in their hometown. In Southeast Anatolian provinces, Kurds constitute the majority of the regions’ population. At the Center Factory, only twenty percent of the workers from this region had land which was cultivated at the time of the project. The respective ratios are twenty-five percent for the Independent Sweatshop and zero for the Follower Sweatshop. In other words, a significant majority of the workers from the provinces with a Kurdish majority or a significant Kurdish population either do not have any land or do not cultivate their land in their hometown.

In fact, the sense of Kurdish-ness of these workers was shaped by their strong emotional ties with their hometowns, which were not materially supported with strong economic connections, nor their social position in their neighborhood. Kurdish-ness is certainly not an attribute within an alternative supply chain based on an anti-Turkish ethnic consciousness. In this regard, the politicization of the ethnic identity of Kurdish workers is more firmly shaped within Turkish-dominated industrial relations than it is through ethnicity-based production networks.

In the absence of “economic” solidarity among the Kurdish ethnic group in industrial relations, it is connections based on the provincial origin of migration which determine the way Kurdish workers and worker/sweatshop owners identify themselves in the urban space, even though their
ties with their hometown are weak in terms of land ownership and cultivation. Provincial origin becomes the basis on which they shape their urban identity in community relations. Kurdish identity seems to remain within the confines of the politics of the Kurdish political party. Thus, it fails to provide the cultural ground to establish community networks for alternative supply chains or to organize workplace resistance.

This complex identity is the product of discrimination in the labor market and in urban culture, the difficult (and, in some cases, forced) migration experience, and proletarianization. To own a sweatshop is the dream of most (male) apparel workers. In the case of Kurdish workers, this dream becomes a collective project for all family members: They see the sweatshop not only as a means of (limited) liberation from proletarianization, but also as a venue where they can have autonomy from the inequitable labor market and establish hitherto absent community relations, if not with other Kurds, then with their hemşehris. Thus, Mr. Survivor and I.R.R.’s family members embraced the project.

Another reason why owners of such family sweatshops fail to establish ethnicity-based connections is the structural function of such sweatshops in the overall industrial scene of the apparel sector. As I argued in the second chapter, such sweatshops fulfill the short-term needs of larger workplaces. Thus, these sweatshops usually have a very short life span, because they are viable under two circumstances. First, if the capacity of the larger sweatshops is insufficient in times of high demand, the small-scale sweatshops have their day. Second, in periods of significant contraction in demand, larger sweatshops go out of business and small-scale sweatshops replace them with the prospect of extending themselves to the level of those larger sweatshops. Workers of any identity-affiliation dream of “running their own sweatshop one day.” Some of them take the risk and most of them fail. In the meantime, the sweatshops of the bold workers fulfill an important role in the wider industrial relations: They either complement larger workplaces or substitute them.

On the same street with this sweatshop, there were two more sweatshops of a similar size owned by Black Sea migrants. Most such sweatshops usually employ approximately fifteen workers or more, which signify the minimum number to establish a very basic assembly line relying on a mixture of the Smithian and Marglinian divisions of labor. When sweatshop owners go into bankruptcy, they usually end up in a significant amount of debt, begin to work at another sweatshop or factory, and work hard to pay their debt back. Then, if they are determined enough to pursue their dream, they try again, as Mr. Survivor and I.R.R. did several times.

I visited them in the summer of 2009. Mr. Survivor and I.R.R. had moved their sweatshop to a larger workplace in the same neighborhood. They had begun employing approximately twenty workers and working for customers who produced for foreign markets. Thus, they not only enjoyed relatively higher piece-rates, but also needed to meet higher quality standards. Accordingly, they began to hire unrelated workers. Their female family members were no longer working with them. They had been sent back home. Mr. Survivor did not insist on hiring Kurdish workers only, since he really had no choice. Thus, the “Kurdish culture” of the sweatshop was largely a thing of the past. The picture of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of Republic of Turkey, whom the radical Kurdish politics was critical of, was on the wall. When I gave Mr. Survivor a sarcastic smile and motioned at the picture with my eyes, he smiled back at me and said:

You know how things are. You gotta do what you gotta do.
4.4 OBSERVATIONS ON HOME-BASED WORK

4.4.1 Precarious Work: Distribution Networks and Labor Control

In the previous chapter, employment practices and characteristics of the relationship with customers were suggested to be the major parameters distinguishing between the factory system and sweatshop labor in the apparel industry. In addition to these labor practices, industrial home-based work is the third important labor form in Istanbul’s apparel industry. As in the previous chapters on sweatshop labor and the factory system, I would like to begin the organizational analysis of this form of labor by investigating the characteristics of its employment patterns.

I believe that the data and insights provided so far have strongly emphasized the link between the characteristics of employment and the labor process for the factory system and sweatshop labor. The high degree of formality in employment practices at the Center Factory was certainly a unique feature of this workplace distinguishing it from the other three workplaces. Workers’ social security benefits were paid without exception. Furthermore, pay days were hardly ever delayed. In compliance with the legal requirements, the factory employed a medical doctor. In contrast to the Center Factory, the target sweatshops failed to meet most of these criteria: While the Follower Sweatshop and the Independent Sweatshop did pay the fringe benefits of approximately one third of their workers, they failed to meet many other hygienic and social requirements. As for the Family Sweatshop, given the characteristics of the workers and the scope of production, expecting the fulfillment of any such requirements of a legal/formal employment relationship borders upon the absurd.

Compliance with the legal requirements in employment practices, however, does not result in a significant difference in the average employment duration of workers. For instance, workers at the Center Factory had on average 2.9 different jobs in their employment careers and worked an average of 3.13 years at their first jobs. In the Follower Sweatshop, workers held on average 3.05 jobs until their employment at this sweatshop, and worked on average 2.28 years in their first workplaces. For the Independent Sweatshop, the respective figures are 3.9 times for change of workplace and 4.1 years in the first workplace.

Moreover, the average duration of employment per worker both at the Center Factory and the Independent Sweatshop is two years. It is somewhat longer seven years, at the Follower Sweatshop, since at least eight workers were family members, who had been working at the sweatshop throughout the entire history of the enterprise. If one omits the highest figures in the survey data from calculation, which most possibly belong to those related workers, then the average duration of employment drops to four years. In other words, the average duration of employment for a worker at a particular workplace is quite short in the apparel industry (and even shorter at the Independent Sweatshop). However, regardless of these employment practices, time-wage was the only form of compensation at these workplaces. Although they are short-lived, contracts have no terms of expiration.

For industrial home-based work, however, this is not the case: home-based work is based on the piece-wage. The relationship between the employer (in this case, most of the time jobbers, rather than the firms directly) and the worker (homeworker) ends once the order is completed.
The domestic space, in most cases the home of the worker, is used as the primary place of production. Thus, it is called home-based work. This labor practice is conducted by women. The cultural limitations on the physical mobility of women by the patriarchal order characterize the organizational dynamics of this form of industrial labor. Two points are critical for any investigation of the organizational characteristics of home-based work.

First, distribution is the key means of control over the labor process. In other words, characteristics of the distribution assign a particular capacity for the employer/customer to shape the labor process. Since workers do not work under the direct surveillance of the employer, middlepersons have to establish extensive networks. These networks are responsible for distribution and the reduction of organizational uncertainties on the part of the employers/customers. Home-based work networks in Istanbul have a two-layered structure. The first layer establishes the immediate contact between homeworkers and production networks. The second layer connects these sub-networks in city-wide distribution channels.

Second, home-based work fulfills different functions in a supply chain. These functions assign the home-based work networks different levels of autonomy in terms of the organizational characteristics of its labor process. There are two generic functions of the home-based work networks in the apparel industry. First, home-based work organizations take responsibility for particularly labor-intensive processes in the apparel industry, such as trimming and packaging. In this case, home-based work complements the labor process of other forms of industrial labor. Second, home-based work organizations can also conduct particular tasks which are not easily adapted to the work organizations on the assembly line. Home-based work is used, in such cases, in order to utilize highly specialized and skilled labor in labor-intensive processes such as complementing garments with lacework and beadwork.

### 4.4.1.1 Characteristics of the HBW Distribution Networks in Istanbul

On the basis of the available practices of distribution and the productive function of home-based work (HBW) in the supply chains, particular strategies have evolved in order to establish control over industrial homeworkers. In the two previous fieldworks that we conducted in 2003 and 2006 and during this project, I observed a two-layered structure of distribution with great organizational variety.

Direct access to the homeworkers takes place in the first layer of the distribution channels. Since the piecework is distributed along with individual orders, the relationship between homeworkers and their employers takes the form of a discrete contact. Thus, a variety of organizational arrangements have emerged in order to establish this direct contact between homeworkers and their employers.

---

70. There is a growing literature on women’s participation to the labor force in Turkey. See Ansal 1997, Çağatay and Berik 1990, Çağatay and Berik 1994, Kümbetolu 1996, and Özär 1998 for the relationship between women’s employment and the post-ISI growth policies.

71. The project in 2003 investigated urban poverty in Istanbul. My observations during the fieldwork focused on the poverty-related aspects of this form of labor. See Bulgur and Keyder 2003 for the research report. In 2006, Esra Sanoğlu and I conducted research on the variation of the organizational characteristics of home-based work, focusing on the characteristics of the urban demography and patriarchy in three districts of Istanbul, including Bağcılar. See Balaban and Sanoğlu 2008 for the research report.
First, small-sized sweatshops, which employ a number of workers barely sufficient to establish an assembly line, use the homeworkers as their “satellite” workforce. In this case, the piecework is distributed to the homeworkers in the neighborhood of the sweatshop. Homeworkers trim the excessive threads on clothes, package them, and sometimes become actively involved in the sewing process with their sewing machines at home. Sweatshops rely on these homeworkers, especially in the case of unexpected large orders. Since the piece-wage paid to homeworkers is much lower than the wages paid to the sweatshop workers, it is an economical way to complement the work organization inside the sweatshop. However, sweatshop owners cannot predict the number of homeworkers available for a particular order. This uncertainty limits the use of pieceworkers as a regular practice. The relationship between homeworkers and sweatshops is neighborhood-based and does not account for larger production networks.

Second, homeworkers who live on the same street operate in gangs that establish “street networks.” A resident of the street (almost always, a woman) organizes her neighbors and connects them with multiple customers including sweatshops, jobbers working for large-scale enterprises, and local distribution spots. Jobbers have motor vehicles and distribute the piecework with the help of these group leaders. The content of the job is usually a relatively routine task such as packaging and trimming.72

However, this distribution mechanism is not preferred when HBW is used for embroidery, lacework, and bead-work. The piecework for such operations is not bulky, yet the material is delicate. In addition to this problem, unreliable workers can damage the material or steal the garments. Since the piece wages are meager amounts, it is rational for a homeworker to steal a nice garment from time to time, if the leader of the street gang has no significant social control over her neighbors. In order to overcome these problems, jobbers tend to limit the piecework per street network and worker as much as possible. Although, thanks to the piece-wage system, an increase in the number of homeworkers does not mean a rise in total labor costs, the allocation of the piecework in several districts of the city increases transportation and storage costs. Furthermore, workers need to be trained, if the task requires skills. Street networks provide quick and expansive access to a city-wide pool of labor, yet they are not capable of performing complex tasks. In other words, this form of distribution is highly flexible, yet it is not suitable for operations requiring skill.

The third organizational form is based on home-based work-shops (HBW-shops) (Balaban 2007): These local distribution places look like tailor-shops, yet their primary responsibility is to distribute material to homeworkers, rather than to provide a production place for workers. HBW-shop owners train homeworkers and assure the quality of returns. Homeworkers know these places. Some of the homeworkers affiliate themselves with a particular HBW-shop on their street or in their neighborhood and take piecework exclusively from that HBW-shop. Some of them are, however, freelancers. They compare the piece-wages and the difficulty of piecework available at different HBW-shops. They work with the HBW-shop in their district which offers the highest piece-rates and easiest jobs.

Many (woman) homeworkers are already under the extreme pressure of the patriarchal family

72. See Lui 1994 for the organization of home-based work in Hong Kong, which is similar to this particular form of piecework distribution.
order. Their physical mobility is already limited, which is precisely why they are homeworkers. Accordingly, a significant portion of homeworkers work with a particular HBW-shop, generally the one closest to their apartment. They are usually phoned from the HBW-shop whenever an order is available. As their connection with that HBW-shop provides a relatively safe (but meager) income, they do not have the power to bargain with HBW-shop owners. In this section, I will provide data about this particular organizational form for two reasons. First, I believe it is the fastest growing organizational arrangement for HBW. Second, the Center Factory used this distribution method for its HBW-related operations.

The HBW-shops establish relatively tighter control over the workers than the street networks, since the HBW-shop owner is responsible for quality control, unlike most of the street network organizers. They are “business women,” rather than “just a neighbor on your street.” They have strict work ethics in terms of regular wage payments and the quality of returns, as their work discipline is their greatest asset in their business. They dislike freelancing homeworkers, yet it is difficult to keep a sufficiently large workforce of “loyal” homeworkers for larger orders.

The city-wide HBW-networks constitute the second layer of the distribution channels. Except for homeworkers directly working for small sweatshops or (in very rare cases) for factories, all homeworkers are connected to these networks via their street gangs or the HBW-shops. Such networks organize the street gangs (or networks) and the HBW-networks for large-scale operations and employ hundreds, sometimes thousands of homeworkers for a single operation. Relations of these city-wide networks with street networks and HBW-shops are in a constant process of transformation, changing along with the apparel industry itself.

For example, during the fieldwork we conducted in 2003, I saw relatively few HBW-shops in our research setting. Mobile jobbers, some of whom were former homeworkers, were working with street networks. HBW-shops were relatively new and exceptional cases. Those few HBW-shops, however, functioned as the major hubs connecting dozens of street networks. Owners of these HBW-shops held a dominant position in their relationship with mobile jobbers. Although mobile jobbers organized city-wide networks, their relationship with the street networks was always on contingent and tense terms. Meanwhile, HBW-shops could provide a large and reliable pool of labor for the jobbers. They were working directly with the factories as well. Accordingly, jobbers acted mostly as their subordinates. The HBW-shops were few, but they were big. As a generic principle, whoever controls the biggest number of homeworkers is “the boss” in the world of HBW.

To my surprise, in our research focusing on the HBW in 2006 and during my fieldwork in 2008, I realized that HBW-shops had spread without exception in all target working class districts in Istanbul. Some of them were the initiatives of skillful entrepreneurs, as was the case in 2003. However, a further surprise on my part is that today, the HBW-shops’ average scope of employment has been reduced in conjunction with the proliferation of such shops. Especially in the peripheral districts of Istanbul such as Kırcaö, organizers of street networks gradually became the agents of the mobile jobbers and opened their HBW-shops under the directives of mobile jobbers. In some cases, jobbers paid the rent for the HBW-shop while the shop owner more or less acted as their agent.

73. The research setting covered six districts of Istanbul. Burcu Yakut and I conducted detailed interviews in Bağcılar, Ümraniye, Eyüp, Eminönü, Bakırköy, and Esenyurt.
Rather than dealing with unreliable street networks and capricious HBW-shop owners, jobbers began to encourage the organizers of street networks to open their own HBW-shops. In this way, they could both reduce some of the risks associated with the unstructured social dynamics within the street networks and eliminate the autonomy of the HBW-shops.

Thus did street networks and HBW-shops come to merge in an interesting organizational fusion. As the number of HBW-shops increased, their organizational centrality in the city-wide networks diminished. Mobile jobbers, some of whom were former homeworkers, took the upper hand in this relationship and subordinated the HBW-shops to their distribution channels. In other words, organizational forms of distribution of HBW by no means remain stagnant. They rather go through a significant organizational transformation along with the changes in the supply chains and in the characteristics of the organization of work in the neighborhood. This organizational diversity is the outcome of the particularities of the history and physical topography of the urban district as much as the result of the struggles among actors in different layers of the production networks.

For instance, the recently emerging districts do not have as many sweatshops as the older ones. Thus, the density of potential homeworker per sweatshop is usually higher in these new districts. Many homeworkers in these regions of the city are obliged to work with mobile jobbers. For instance, Kiraç is a district at the edge of metropolitan Istanbul, which has been receiving the most recent migration waves. Primarily dominated by factories, this district has relatively few sweatshops, while factories provide significant employment for (male) workers. Women usually take piecework directly from mobile jobbers, since this new district still does not have as many HBW-shops as relatively older working class districts of Istanbul do.

**Picture 4.1 Homeworkers in Kiraç**

Homeworkers manually assembling the internal mechanism of light switches in Kiraç, Istanbul; 04.08.2007. In this particular case, the factory producing these switches produced the plastic and metal pieces of the switches in its mechanized assembly line. Homeworkers carry out the manual labor. Photo: Author
If a district has particular roots in old industrial relations, middle-aged women who grew up in working class families of the ISI period might have the necessary cultural capital to organize their neighbors into complex networks. For instance, during the project in 2003, we observed that woman organizers who grew up in Eyüp (an industrial district of the ISI period) were able to run extremely complex production networks covering more than five districts of Istanbul. Moreover, the ethnic, provincial, and religious heterogeneity in a neighborhood makes it easier or more difficult for women to collaborate with each other. Cooperation can easily be replaced by competition in the case of such heterogeneity. For instance, Eminönü was populated from the 1990s on by Kurdish households who had been expelled from their villages due to the civil strife in Southeast and Eastern Anatolia. As particular streets were primarily dominated by Kurdish households, women of the same ethnicity were able to establish well-organized street networks. All in all, the characteristics of a particular HBW organization cannot be analyzed without an accompanying investigation into the history of its district.74 Street networks need to use the streets as a semi-public space in order to organize the distribution of the piecework. In the case of Eminönü, the narrow streets of the district reduce car traffic and become an amenable public space for the distribution of work.

74. See Erman, Kalayçıoğlu, and Pittersberger-Tılıç 2002 for the adaptation of rural-to-urban migrant women to urban life and the labor market. See Fehim-Kennedy 1999 for the position of middle-class women and how they relate to urban space and their use of domestic space. See Hattatoğlu 2001 for a debate on the relationship between HBW and patriarchal dynamics.
An off-traffic street in Eminönü, the old city; 23.07.2007. Populated mostly by Kurdish migrants, this neighborhood has gradually become an inner-city ethnic ghetto since the late 1990s as a result of the forced village evacuations in Southeast and Eastern Anatolia. The common ethnic identity among women helped the neighbors to form a HBW gang working for the sweatshops in their neighborhood. The absence of car traffic on this street contributed to the relaxed social environment for women, who could work and chat on a sunny day in summer in front of their buildings. Photo: Author

This two-layered structure of the distribution channels also signifies the potential transformation of a HBW-organization from a street network or a HBW-shop to a city-wide network. While the organizer begins working with women on her street or in her neighborhood, she has the opportunity to enlarge the geographical scope of her operations if she succeeds in making contact with an ever-increasing number of women from different peripheral districts of the city. As a family sweatshop can pass through multiple stages to the level of an integrated factory, the owner of a small HBW-shop in a peripheral district also has the potential to become the organizer of a city-wide network. The intensity of the competition among street networks and HBW-shops for a sufficiently large pool of homeworkers urges the organizers to enlarge the scope of their organization. As in the
case of family sweatshops, many such HBW-shops go out of business and many street networks simply break down every day. This structural problem with regard to labor procurement pushes the organizers of HBW-networks to expand their organization to different districts of the city.

4.4.1.2 Characteristics of the Piecework and Organization of the Labor Process

In addition to the characteristics of the distribution channels of HBW, the second important parameter in the analysis of this form of industrial labor is the content of the tasks conducted by homeworkers. HBW is connected to the factory system and sweatshop labor in order to fulfill two major functions. First, industrial HBW can be part of a virtual assembly line. Certain labor-intensive processes could give rise to coordination problems in the assembly line as a result of the differentials in capital-intensiveness among different processes. Thus, the less capital-intensive processes might disrupt the harmony among more capital-intensive processes. Such tasks usually require the use of some basic tools such as screwdrivers or needles. The labor-intensive nature of the tasks make it possible for homeworkers to work at home. In other words, one of the basic motivations to resort to HBW is to spatially separate labor- and capital-intensive processes. In the technical sense, HBW is still an integral part of the labor process for the completion of a use-value. In fact, without the contribution of the homeworkers, the product would not have an operational value for its prospective user.

Second, special skills of homeworkers also contribute positively to the market value of the product with significant value-added for the finished product: Ornaments, artistic packaging, lacework, or embroidery embellish the finished products that come out of the assembly line. Depending on the scarcity of the skills involved, the value-added by HBW can be phenomenal in comparison to the would-be market value without the contribution of home-based work. A simple blouse, which would have a market price of approximately $10 without the contribution of homeworkers, can be sold for up to $40, if it has some nice beadwork. The unsurprising irony is that, although the largest contribution of labor to the market price of the commodity is the product of homeworkers, who are the most skilled laborers of their supply chain, it is these same homeworkers who constitute the lowest paid segment of the workforce in the apparel industry. This demonstrates the effectiveness of the distribution channels in terms of the reduction of wages. As homeworkers are disconnected from each other and other nodes in the supply chain, their bargaining power is limited to their capacity to play HBW networks and HBW-shops off one another.


To recapitulate, HBW, as a form of industrial labor, operates within extensive supply chains composed of factories, sweatshops, and export companies. Distribution networks not only establish these connections within the supply chains, but also shape the characteristics of the labor process by framing the relations between employers/jobbers and homeworkers. Because of the significance of the mutual relationship between supply chains and HBW distribution networks, I focused on one of the HBW-shops used by the Center Factory in my investigation of the characteristics of the HBW labor process. In other words, rather than presenting my random observations on the general characteristics of this labor form in Istanbul, I focused on a particular HBW-shop within the same supply chain as the Center Factory in order to achieve a comparative understanding of the work conditions within this supply chain.

The management of the Center Factory initially used HBW networks for two purposes: to trim the threads on the garments and to sew beadwork, lacework, or embroidery onto finished garments. The Center Factory had its trimming department, since this task could be conducted at the factory with specialized machinery, which cuts the excess thread and vacuums the trimmed thread in its container. Moreover, trimming is an interim process in the assembly line of the sewing section. Thus, although there were attempts to use HBW networks for this process, the factory management quit this strategy because of the time spent on the distribution of the garments to the homeworkers and the problems with the network organizers. Since trimming was not less capital-intensive than other processes at the sewing section, it did not cause significant bottlenecks on the assembly line either. Thus, during the fieldwork, the Center Factory utilized HBW primarily for the second purpose; to sew beadwork and embroidery onto the garments as special accessories.

The Center Factory had an independent accessories department. Most garments have various kinds of accessories. Some of these accessories are the basic parts of any ordinary garment, such as buttons or zippers. The basic responsibility of the department was to procure these accessories for the sewing section of the Center Factory and its subsidiary sweatshops. In addition to this function related with the logistics of the material, the accessories department was also responsible for the processing of beadwork and embroidery. However, factory or sweatshop workers were not expected to do hand-made embroidery or beadwork, since these tasks could not be conducted with sewing machines. Thus, whenever a design had such a special accessory, the accessory department worked with a HBW network.

The accessories department previously had deals with mobile jobbers controlling street networks, rather than HBW-shops. However, the outcome of this strategy was mostly discouraging. Due to limited control of the jobbers over their teams, some items were stolen or returned in defective condition. Moreover, since jobbers were constantly mobile, they could not be reached easily in cases of emergency. The accessories department also had a couple of severe disputes with the jobbers when, after having received the completed garments, jobbers asked for commissions higher than the rate they had originally agreed to and threatened the managers, saying that they would not deliver the completed garments unless they were paid the demanded rate. The accessories department therefore quit working with mobile jobbers or street networks as a matter of principle. Thus, in this supply chain, the HBW-shops functioned as the organizational hub for the distribution of piecework. The accessories department had a large portfolio of HBW-shop owners who controlled their own team of homeworkers.
4.4.2 The Perspective of the Jobber: Distanced Control over Homeworkers, Distanced Association with Customers

Upon the referral of the accessories department assistant manager at the Center Factory, I contacted the owner of one of the primary HBW-shops within the supply chain. The shop was in Gaziosmanpaşa, a district located in the same industrial basin, approximately eight kilometers from Bağcılars. The annual budget of this HBW-shop was approximately 100,000 TL (ca. $80,000). As mentioned in part one, the owner of the shop, Ms. Networker, had been running her HBW-shop in Gaziosmanpaşa since 2001, following the failure of her first attempt in Merter.

The number of homeworkers taking piecework from this HBW-shop was approximately fifty. I was kindly given the opportunity to review the records of two different orders from the books of the shop. The books were kept to record the number of pieces per worker and the pick-up times for the pieces. The record of the first order reveals that sixty-eight homeworkers processed the beads on the garments for 40 Turkish kuruş per piece (ca. .25 per piece). A worker on average took 27.9 pieces and earned 11.19 Turkish Liras (ca. $8). The completion of the order took six days. The total number of pieces was 6,000 and this HBW-shop took 1,872 pieces out of this order. The rest was distributed to three other HBW-shops in different districts. Ms. Networker did not prefer giving a large party of piecework to a particular homeworker at once. Workers came to the shop a few different times in order pick up the piecework in small parties. Smaller parties usually enable the shop owner to check the quality of the work as soon as it is delivered by the homeworker. On average, workers had come 2.05 times to the HBW-shop in order to pick up the piecework for this order.

The second order had 1,991 pieces. It was distributed with an average number of 36.86 pieces per worker. The order was completed in one week. Pieces came to the HBW-shop in multiple parties, as the sewing department of the factory completed them. Thus, the average number of pick-ups rose to 2.92. The piece-wage was 70 Turkish kuruş (ca. 0.45 USD): the average earning of a homeworker in seven days was 25.8 Turkish Lira (ca. $ 15). The large standard deviation in earnings points to the differences in work patterns by homeworkers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chart 4.13 Characteristics of Two Orders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample Order 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample Order 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this case, the relationship between the HBW-shop owner and homeworkers takes the form of what I call “distanced control”: The HBW-shop owner can control the workers’ workload. Ms. Networker knew the personal limits of individual workers and assigned different amounts of piecework to different homeworkers. Furthermore, as successive orders came in, she could also adjust the workload accordingly. For instance, she did not distribute piecework on Sundays.
in order to let the homeworkers have some rest, even though most of the homeworkers would want to work Sundays as well in order to earn some extra money. Similarly, she tried to convince the homeworkers not to overload themselves, since her past experience convinced her that homeworkers who exhausted themselves by taking on large parties of piecework to be completed in a short period of time, usually then felt overwhelmed and quit taking piecework altogether.

Another psychological pressure on workers has to do with the variation in piece-wages: piece-wages vary depending on the deal made with the customer firm. Some firms have close deadlines and thus accept higher piece-wages. Although there is a conventional rate, which is approximately two Turkish Liras per hour (ca. $ 1.2), meeting the deadline is generally a more pressing motivation for the firm than its instinct to overexploit the HBW-network. Furthermore, it is difficult to calculate the average production time per piece, since every new order means a new model: the gray area of time/wage proportion sometimes benefits the workers. In short, some orders generate more revenue than others, though they usually make only a fraction of the wages of even sweatshop workers. In our research in 2006 (Balaban and Saroğlu 2008), our seventy-five respondents working for HBW-shops in three different city quarters (Bağcılar, Avcılar, and Kırçağ) were asked their approximate monthly income.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Thresholds</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Mean (YTL)</th>
<th>Standard Deviation (YTL)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0–100 TL</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>89,411</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100–300 TL</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>173,97</td>
<td>43,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300–500 TL</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>87,62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>159,93</td>
<td>101,23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although this is not a statistically random sample, the distribution provides a rough sense of the wage differences between homeworkers and sweatshop/factory workers. Even if a homeworker
works ten hours a day for a 26-day month for Ms. Networker, her monthly earning would not exceed 430 Turkish Liras (approximately $300), a figure below the minimum wage. Furthermore, our general survey in one residential (Avcılar) and two industrial (Bağcılar and Kırca) districts of Istanbul supported the insight that the average monthly earnings of homeworkers ranged between 100 and 200 Turkish Liras.

Ultimately, it is in the best interest of the HBW-shop owner to get the highest piece-wage from her customers for two obvious reasons: first, since she gets roughly a percentage-based commission, higher piece-wages mean higher revenue for her. Second, higher piece-wages increase the motivation of homeworkers to work for her, given that other HBW-shops compete for the same pool of homeworkers. However, if an order pays significantly less than the previous order, the difference in piece-wages negatively affects the motivation of homeworkers. Attributing these differences to the greed of the HBW-shop owners, the homeworkers might choose to work with another HBW-shop owner or for a mobile jobber. Thus, a HBW organizer should keep the earnings at a steady level without significant differences in pay. As a result of this complex balance between the customers’ demands for lower piece-wages and the pressure from homeworkers for higher piece-wages, HBW-shop owners act as representatives of homeworkers as much as of their customers.

Along with the efforts of the HBW jobber to establish some “distanced control” over homeworkers, her relations with her customers, i.e. the firm representatives, mobile jobbers, and sweatshop owners, can be regarded as “distanced association”: Customers generate revenue, but they also cause risks for the HBW jobbers. For instance, Ms. Networker was offered a very large order a few months before my interviews with her. The customer would have paid her 34,000 Turkish Liras (ca. $29,000). 15,000 Turkish Liras (ca. $12,500) of this amount would have been paid to her homeworkers in piece-wages. 12,000 Turkish Liras would have been spent on the materials such as beads. With commission rates at around twenty percent, this order would have yielded an approximate revenue of 6,800 Turkish Liras (ca. $5,700). This was a large sum for a HBW organizer.

Ms. Networker was not bold enough to take this order, since the payment would have been made three months after the delivery. She did not have the financial power to wait for such a long period of time, since she had to make payments to her homeworkers by the time of delivery. Furthermore, if the customer had experienced any unexpected financial difficulties, she would have been put at the end of the waiting line for payments and probably exposed to monetary abuse. Written contracts are very exceptional rare in the world of HBW.

Given the reluctance of Ms. Networker, the firm gave the order to another HBW-shop owner in the same district. This organizer demanded an additional one Turkish Lira per piece for the same job. The firm had probably been turned down by some other HBW organizers as well and was now in the perilous position of not being able to meet deadline unless they reached a deal and resolved matters quickly. Regardless of the reason, the firm accepted Ms. Networker’s competitor’s demand for a higher piece-rate (and a higher commission for her competitor). Though she managed to deliver the order on time and received the promised amount, Ms. Networker believed that her competitor was probably able to cover her expenses only, including the piece-wages and the cost of the material, such as beads. In other words, she believed that the earned revenue probably did not generate the projected amount of profit.
This example helps to illustrate the characteristics of the “distanced association” between HBW-shop owners and their customers. Customers’ control over the HBW-shop owners is limited. The customer representatives act in a manner similar to the subcontracting agents working with the sweatshops, as they check the quality of the returns at HBW-shops. However, unlike the subcontracting agents for the sweatshops, jobbers cannot intervene in the actual labor process, since production is conducted at home, rather than at the HBW-shops. Due to their motivation to establish long-term relationships with the HBW-shop owners, and given that piece wages are already so meager, customer representatives are unable to put significant pressure on HBW-shop owners in terms of pricing and deadlines.

Therefore, most of the time HBW-shop owners do not act as submissive agents of their customers, but bargain for higher piece-wages. Ms. Networker complained that customer representatives sometimes tried to exploit “emotions.” Representatives usually explained in detail the financial difficulties their firm was facing. Sometimes, they would almost beg Ms. Networker for lower piece-rates (probably in order to increase their own commission). Orders to the apparel firms come with a tight deadline, which gives them little time to cut a favorable deal with the HBW-shop owners. Problems with HBW-shop owners can give rise to delays. Thus, HBW-shop owners, especially those with strong teams of homeworkers, are by no means in a weak position vis-à-vis their customer firms.

### 4.4.3 Characteristics of Work and Homeworkers

In this context, I conducted a questionnaire and some semi-structured interviews with homeworkers who took piecework from this HBW-shop. Together with the findings of our research project in 2007, the questionnaire and survey data helps to provide clues about the individual characteristics of homeworkers and their work habits.

First of all, all homeworkers working with this HBW-shop were women. Second, the distribution of the migration origin of homeworkers was similar to other investigated workplaces. The Black Sea and Eastern Anatolian migrants account for the majority of the workforce for both Ms. Networker’s HBW-shops and HBW-shops investigated in 2007. Third, the average year of birth for the workers at Ms. Networker’s HBW-shop was 1973 while for the other HBW-shops it was 1970. Female homeworkers were significantly older than female factory and sweatshop workers. Fourth, half of the interviewees, in both 2007 and 2008, had never had a job outside of their homes, while approximately forty percent of the homeworkers were former industrial workers. Thirty-nine percent of Ms. Networker’s workers were former apparel workers. Only seven percent of the respondents in both groups were taking piecework primarily because they could not find a job outside of their homes. More than eighty percent of the women were working as homeworkers either because they got married or because they had children. With very few exceptions, the reason why these women had become homeworkers was because they were not allowed to work outside their homes.

77. Unfortunately, we did not ask the respondents in 2007 to specify the industrial sector of their previous jobs. However, it would not be unrealistic to assume that most of them, like those working for Ms. Networker’s HBW-shop, had been apparel workers.
### Table 4.7 Basic Demographic Indicators Concerning Homeworkers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Married Homeworkers/All Homeworkers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N: 91</td>
<td>N: 28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average Duration Spent for Piecework</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N: 18</td>
<td>N: 28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.16</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date of Birth</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N: 86</td>
<td>N: 29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970.5</td>
<td>1973.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Origin of Migration</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N: 69</td>
<td>N: 27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Sea</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Anatolia</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Anatolia</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Anatolia</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Migrants (Bulgaria, Russia, and Germany)</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marmara</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reason to Take Piecework</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N: 84</td>
<td>N: 14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Childcare</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage/No Permission by Husband for his Spouse to Work at a Public Workplace</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Problems</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unable to Find another Job</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Former Occupation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N: 68</td>
<td>N: 28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never Had a Job, but only HBW</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory or Sweatshop Worker</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.42 (0.39: Apparel Workers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Occupations</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Thus, it is not surprising that more than ninety percent of the homeworkers were married. This rate was thirty-five percent at the Center Factory, fifty-nine percent at the Independent Sweatshop, and only twenty-six percent at the Follower Sweatshop. Fifty-three percent of the homeworkers were formerly employed outside of their homes. Thirty-nine percent of them were formerly apparel workers. In other words, homeworkers and factory/sweatshop workers are not independent categories in the labor pool. Women shift their positions in the labor market as a result of marriage, which costs them in the form of low wages and more precarious working conditions.

Similarities in the migration origin and timing of migration of homeworkers’ families and workers’ families in other investigated work organizations reveal the extent of this pattern. In other words, half of the homeworkers never had a job outside of their homes. The rest were expected to “return” to their homes after they got married, regardless of the differences in the timing and origin of migration. Most homeworkers quit their jobs after/because they got married. However, the average number of children homeworkers working for Ms. Networker’s HBW-shop had, was close to the averages at the Center Factory and the sweatshops: 1.9 for homeworkers, 1.45 for the Center Factory, 1.84 for the Independent Sweatshop, and two for the Follower Sweatshop. Thus, childcare-related concerns do not seem to account for this occupational transition from working at factories or sweatshops to becoming homeworkers.

In the interviews both in 2007 and 2008, women expressed their discontent about the piece wages and their work conditions. Some of them felt somewhat guilty for not being able to make a decent contribution to the family income. As the records in the books of Ms. Networker illustrates, the hours homeworkers spend working varies greatly. I asked the homeworkers who worked closely with Ms. Networker to fill out a time-use survey for two days. Ms. Networker herself filled out the surveys for three illiterate homeworkers before the interview. Ms. Networker, as many other experienced HBW-shop owners, intentionally dispersed the piecework per worker in small parties in order to reduce their workload. Thus, the average time spent for home-based work was 3.9 hours a day. Homeworkers spent approximately 5.3 hours on house chores, a figure which does not include time spent on childcare. The usual window of time during which piecework is done is between 11:00 am and 7:00 pm. Homeworkers tend to finish their house chores in the early morning and then begin working on their daily piecework.

**Chart 4.14 Total Hours Homeworkers Spend Working**

![Chart 4.14 Total Hours Homeworkers Spend Working](chart.png)
Since this data reflects the patterns of work for homeworkers working with one HBW-shop only, it is difficult to make generalizations on the average number of hours homeworkers spend working. For instance, in our research in 2007, we asked ninety-three homeworkers working for HBW-shops in three different districts the average amount of time they spent working in a day. Eighteen of them could give exact figures, which averaged out to 7.1 hours a day. This huge gap between the two groups might reflect the actual differences in the average amount of time spent on piecework daily, as Ms. Networker adopted a deliberate strategy to allocate to homeworkers as little piecework as possible in order to be in touch with a larger number of homeworkers and to reduce their average workload. Moreover, since this survey illustrates the work pattern for two days only, it certainly does not provide information on work patterns in the case of voluminous orders. All in all, it is possible to conclude that a homeworker works on average somewhere between four and seven hours a day.

The data is more compatible with the research findings in 2007 in terms of earnings. An average workday of four hours earns the homeworker approximately 200 Turkish Liras a month, if she can take piecework everyday. Since work is contingent upon the frequency of orders that the HBW-shop takes, homeworkers usually do not work at the same intensity everyday. Hence, the earnings of a homeworker on average range between 100 and 300 Turkish Liras a month.

Although a more detailed and systematic investigation is necessary in order to analyze the patterns regarding the earnings of homeworkers, the work patterns of the homeworkers working with this HBW-shop seem to be relatively representative. Work-related dynamics of homeworkers are certainly shaped by their responsibilities as housewives. Homeworkers begin to work only after they have finished their daily house chores, and they stop working once their husbands have come home. Both during the research in 2007 and during this project, some homeworkers mentioned tension between themselves and their husbands because of the time they dedicated to piecework. They have their own deadlines and see the piecework as their personal responsibility. However, their husbands usually ridicule their enthusiasm and in some cases strongly object to the very idea that their wives actually “work” at home. Thus, some of the homeworkers simply hide from their husbands the fact that they do piecework. Husbands probably do know, yet they choose to turn a blind eye to what their wives do when they are away at work. 100 Liras a month is a significant amount of money for a working-class family, though both homeworkers and their husbands prefer to deny it.

Low piece-wages do not mean easy work conditions. Beadwork in particular requires a significant amount of concentration. Beads are sewn onto garments in particular patterns. Homeworkers learn the designs at the HBW-shops. They are sometimes allowed to take a sample piece in order to replicate it properly, especially when the designs are complex. In other words, every new design is a new challenge. Homeworkers usually sew the beads and the laces on the garments in their living rooms. Only two of the homeworkers I interviewed during this project said that they sat at a table when they worked; the majority usually sat on the floor or on the couch. Because beadwork is such a delicate, intricate task, a common complaint of the homeworkers was that their eyes got sore after a few hours of work. Children needed to stay away from the garments and not tread all over them. Beads and laces could be quite expensive. Beads are measured by their weight and given to homeworkers in small plastic bags. Homeworkers do not have the luxury of using the beads as plentifully as they like. Deadlines, the control over the material to be processed,
and the training for the task thus standardize the labor process to some extent, even though the labor process is conducted at home.

**Picture 4.3 Homeworkers at HBW-shop**

![Homeworkers learning the delicacies of a design for the beadwork on a blouse at a HBW-shop in Bağcılar, 12.08.2007 Photo: Author](image)

One of the questions I posed in regard to the labor process of the HBW both in 2007 and during this fieldwork was the level and extent of cooperation among homeworkers with regard to the labor process or house chores. Especially in the summer, when one walks along the narrow streets of Bağcılar or its neighboring districts, groups of homeworkers sitting on the street doing piecework is a nearly inevitable sight. This image gives the outsider the impression that home-based work is mostly a collective effort on the part of neighbors and relatives.

This first impression can, to some extent, be misleading though. As mentioned above, tasks conducted by homeworkers take two extremely different forms. They are either simple and repetitive, such as trimming, or complex and detailed, such as beadwork. In both cases, chances of cooperation are limited, since simple and repetitive tasks cannot be further partitioned into simpler tasks through a division of labor. Complex and detailed tasks usually signify artistic work and should be conducted by an individual worker. Hence only seven out of twenty-eight respondents who took piecework from Ms. Networker’s HBW-shop cooperated with neighbors in their building or on their street. Four of them received the help of their daughters at home. In our project in 2007, thirty-four percent of homeworkers collaborated with their relatives or neighbors, while nine percent of homeworkers had some help from their children. Fifty-one percent of homeworkers worked alone. Only one respondent received some help from her husband.

Another related question is the degree of cooperation in doing house chores. Even if the paid work cannot be conducted collectively, women could, for instance, take turns cooking in order to alleviate the burden of house chores. However, none of these homeworkers even thought about cooperating with each on house chores, probably because they perceived the house chores as their personal responsibility.

To recapitulate, four ironies characterize the labor process of HBW. First, although homeworkers,
especially in the case of beadwork, lacework, and various kinds of ornaments, produce the highest value-added, they are the lowest paid workers in the apparel industry. Second, a significant portion of homeworkers consists of former sweatshop and factory workers in the apparel industry. Female workers exhibit a tendency to shift from the factory system and sweatshop labor to HBW. The third astonishing fact is that, although the work is conducted at home, there is still a substantial amount of control over homeworkers in terms of the characteristics of the labor process. The fourth interesting dimension is that, although homeworkers share the same buildings and streets, they are highly isolated in their work.

This isolation also explains their passivity towards the HBW-shop owners with regard to the piece-rates. However, although they are unable to collectively bargain with the HBW-shop owner, they can always choose to go to another jobber. This certainly puts a significant degree of pressure on the HBW organizers to keep the piece-wage above a particular standard. However, since homeworkers compete with each other to take a larger party of piecework, they are unable to collectively act vis-à-vis HBW-shop owners, street organizers, and mobile jobbers. Homeworkers are isolated workers constituting the most complex networks of the apparel industry. If they have any power to bargain vis-à-vis their employers, this derives from the aggregate outcome of their individual decisions to play HBW organizers off one another, rather than from their collective action.

In other words, industrial HBW should be analyzed primarily as an integral organizational element of the supply chains, rather than merely as an informal labor practice urging women to work for incredibly low wages. HBW in the apparel industry fulfils a particular organizational function. It is therefore possible, not just in theory but in practice too, to raise piece-rates to the level of average wages in the apparel industry, if homeworkers can manage to act collectively in their respective neighborhoods or districts. In fact, HBW was probably devised in the late 1990s by the opportunist predators of this sector to reach the most vulnerable segment of the (potentially) working population; it, then gradually took on new and authentic functions in the supply chains. Thus, political initiative on this front should focus on the formation of solidarity among homeworkers. HBW-networks distribute not only piecework but also information on the characteristics of the tasks and the piece-wages. These networks have been used so far by employers to prevent information flow among homeworkers. I believe it is possible to use the same networks as the very basis of solidarity among homeworkers by transforming them into a means of information dissemination.

4.4.4 Homeworkers and Daily Factory Workers: In Between the Mobility of Variable and Commodity Capital

The multiplicity of the labor practices in the apparel industry was one of the reasons why I picked this sector as the focus of this investigation. Factories, sweatshops, and HBW networks employ hundreds of thousands of workers in Bağcılar and its neighboring districts. The question of formality in employment relations is certainly important for a comparative investigation of these forms of industrial labor. However, as I pointed out earlier, the formal/informal binary is rather the outcome of a complex web of relations regarding the conditions of labor procurement, characteristics of the supply chains, and the technical nature of the labor process. In other words, it
is difficult to assume a natural tendency towards informal (or formal) employment practices in the apparel industry just because of the motivation on the part of capital to reduce the cost of labor power. The organizational transformation of the HBW from a mere means to reach vulnerable labor to an autonomous form of industrial labor, I believe, supports this argument.

The primary factors that generate the labor practices of HBW lie in the characteristics of the labor process in the factories and sweatshops and in the content of tasks that are not compatible with these two forms of industrial labor. The concerns related with the cost of labor power rather signify an outcome of these dynamics. As HBW became an autonomous form of industrial labor, it generated demand for itself. Accordingly, homeworkers began to conduct particular processes that had been hitherto organizationally impossible in the apparel industry. A cautious observer in a European country will already be aware that blouses with simple beadwork designs have become more popular than ever and that even the cheapest t-shirts are now marketed in the fanciest packaging.

In the earlier sections, I suggested two parameters that help to distinguish between factory system and sweatshop labor in the apparel industry: the predictability of orders and the predictability in the labor supply. In the case of HBW, these parameters are not relevant at all, since the labor process of HBW is not conducted within an institutional structure associated with a stable workplace. Even in the case of HBW-shops, their primary function is rather to provide a meeting place for capital and labor than to create a space for the real subordination of labor. The role of HBW-shops in terms of control is certainly limited to the circulation of the material to be processed, rather than the organizational arrangement of the labor process. As the organization of HBW takes an autonomous character, it claims new responsibilities in the supply chains independently of the organizational needs of factories and sweatshops. As mentioned above, the boom in the beadwork and lacework market in the apparel industry in Turkey can be regarded as an example revealing the increasing autonomy of HBW. Along with the structural changes in the apparel industry that motivated the enterprises to utilize low-paid labor with low productivity, the increasing organizational maturity of the HBW assigns itself a special place in the industrial scene of Istanbul.

Thus, in order for a labor practice to become an autonomous form of industrial labor, it should not only utilize particular forms of compensation, but it should have a distinct form of labor control as well. HBW-networks developed their distinct form of labor in the late 1990s and then introduced this new form of industrial labor into the Turkish apparel industry (along with other sectors).

With regard to our discussion concerning the autonomy of a particular labor practice, a very striking case is the employment of daily factory and sweatshop workers. The employment of daily workers in the apparel industry does not account for an autonomous form of industrial labor, as they are an integral part of the workforce at apparel factories and sweatshops. However, their employment conditions are significantly different from the workers on the payroll. As with homeworkers, daily factory and sweatshop workers are “invisible” in the records of the factory and sweatshop owners. However, unlike the homeworkers, daily workers work side-by-side with salaried workers.

Daily workers are needed in apparel factories and sweatshops on a regular basis. This practice seems to have become as widespread as HBW in the last decade. Men are hired for the ironing department and women are hired for quality control, packaging, and to a lesser degree, thread-
cleaning. Most of the middlepersons who bridge daily workers with the factories and sweatshops are former daily workers. Their ability to provide the desired number of workers at the moment of demand is their key asset in this business.

Since daily workers and homeworkers are the mirror images of each other in various respects, I would like to present my observations about the employment practices of the daily workers in this section in order to support my argument on the relationship between organizational characteristics of the apparel production and the extent of informality in this sector.

Daily workers earn approximately thirty percent more than a worker on payroll, while an average homeworker makes no more than thirty percent of a factory or sweatshop worker. Homeworkers work at home and leave their apartments in order to pick up their piecework or deliver it to their jobbers/sweatshops only. Many daily factory and sweatshop workers gather at special locations on a particular street. Daily workers go to work, homeworkers pick up the work.

However, despite all these stark contrasts, homeworkers and daily factory/sweatshop workers have something in common: Both groups constitute the most informal segment of the labor force in the apparel industry. There is no written contract or promise of employment even in the near future. Most of the time, these workers do not even know who their employer is: Piecework comes to the homeworker, but she does not know who the provider of the piecework is. Daily factory/sweatshop workers go to a different workplace which she/he has never been to before, everyday. The daily worker usually does not know what firm she or he works for or who owns the workplace.

Future studies should investigate the experiences of the daily factory and sweatshop workers and their impact on the labor process of the sweatshops and factories. In my observations during my fieldwork, I focused on the struggle of daily workers to find a day's work. I had heard of this labor practice before and during the fieldwork many times, yet I did not meet any daily factory or sweatshop worker until the last month of the research. None of the workplaces where I conducted my investigation employed daily workers. In the last month of the project, however, one of my coworker friends from Bağcılar introduced me to a male daily worker, Mr. S.R.F. He was an ironer working daily for different sweatshops and factories. He also worked as a waiter at wedding ceremonies, especially in the summer. Ironically, we met at the wedding ceremony of a mutual friend in Bağcılar.

Mr. S.R.F. had been working as an ironer since 1998. It had recently become increasingly difficult to find a steady job at a sweatshop or a factory. The time spent looking for a job for a couple of weeks was a life and death issue for many apparel workers. Moreover whenever an apparel sweatshop experiences financial difficulties, it is the ironers who are the first to be laid off. Thus, it was more logical for Mr. S.R.F. to work as a daily worker, since the pay was higher than the regular daily wage. Although he could not work everyday, the difference in pay seemed to partially compensate the days he was without work. Furthermore, because he was called to serve at wedding ceremonies in the summertime, he sometimes worked two shifts a day. At the time that we met, Mr. S.R.F. had been working as a daily worker for almost two years. He initially tried his hand at being a jobber reaching daily workers for sweatshops and factories, but ultimately failed to establish a sufficiently large gang of workers for his business operations. His business card, which he no longer used but still kept in his wallet, read, “Our team of forty workers is at your service 24 hours a day, seven days a week.” There were never forty workers in his team. “His” workers would
work for other jobbers whenever they found a better opportunity in terms of work conditions (for example, service positions are certainly preferable to sweatshop jobs).

Furthermore, as a person with leftist tendencies, he was concerned with the ethical problems of the conditions of daily workers. He was well aware of the fact that daily workers cost other workers their jobs and that the reason why it was increasingly difficult for him to find a steady job was the availability of the daily workers in the first place. Thanks to his political orientation, he was not a submissive worker at all. Thus, he tended to resist the illegal practices of the management. He had in the past sued some of his employers due to various problems such as irregular payments, poorly paid overtime, and overtime above the legal limits. Human resources departments of some factories screen workers’ records and contact their previous employers to question them about the reasons behind the worker's discharge. As a married worker with children, Mr. S.R.F. had had problems with ten different sweatshops and factories in the last ten years. This was another reason why he had to work as a daily worker. Blacklisting the “problematic” workers is an option for the employers regardless of the extent of informality in their employment practices. Mr. S.R.F.’s occupational career is just another example of the ups and downs in an ordinary worker’s experiences in the apparel industry.

Employers who look for daily workers do not reach individual workers themselves; instead, they use middlepersons to find a sufficiently large group for their daily operations. Factories with a workforce of a couple hundred workers employ up to twenty daily workers a day. Thus, daily workers do not account for the core segment of the workforce. Close deadlines and bottlenecks on the assembly line are two major factors that motivate employers to resort to this labor practice. Furthermore, particular positions require workers working with dangerous chemicals. These positions are routinely assigned to the daily workers. For instance, in the quality control-ironing-packaging sections of the apparel factories, the garments dirtied with the grease of the sewing machines are exposed to stain-removing chemicals. The area used for this operation is usually separated from the rest of the section with a curtain, since the chemicals are carcinogenic. The employment of daily workers for such purposes eliminates the potential legal problems on the part of the employer.

Daily workers are certainly not welcome by the workers on payroll for two reasons. First, they are expected to produce faster than the regular employees. Thus, they put additional pressure on other workers, who are now expected to catch up with the daily workers. Second, daily workers earn higher wages and the wage disparity creates further antagonisms in the workplace.

Higher wages are associated with the precarious nature of the work. Although most of the salaried workers consider becoming daily workers, they know, on second thought, that it would come with a significant risk that simply isn’t worth it. Daily workers who perform better than average are sometimes, albeit rarely, offered a regular position at factories. A steady job with social benefits certainly provides better work conditions and compensation for the worker in the long run. In other words, most of the daily workers practice this kind of labor because they have to, not because they want to.

78. Hsiung’s observations (1996) about the tensions between workers in the “satellite factories” in Taiwan, who were paid piece-wage and time-wage, verify that this is a common industrial practice in different national contexts.
Mr. S.R.F. was rather concerned about the growing scope of this labor practice in the apparel industry. Although he himself was a daily worker, he was eager to help me in my efforts to document the characteristics of this particular labor practice. Thus, he took me to a meeting place for woman daily workers in Güneşli, a neighborhood in the western part of Bağcılar. The meeting place was a corner on a busy street. The corner was named after the jobber who had the largest team: The Havva Hanım Stop (Havva Hanım Durağı). This woman jobber made the daily arrangements in order to assign her team members to different firms. After I introduced myself to the jobbers, I began to wait with the workers and the jobbers in order to make visual observations, conduct short interviews with the workers, and listen to the conversations between “customers” and jobbers. To my surprise, none of the jobbers reacted in a negative manner. Some of them were even interested in taking my advice on how to “legalize” their business. Their relaxed attitude verified once again the lack of government regulations on the employment conditions in the apparel industry.

Factory managers and sweatshop owners phoned the jobbers some time in advance in order to “reserve” the workers. However, many firm representatives, usually foremen of the related departments, and sweatshop owners also came to the “market” without any prior arrangements...
when they needed daily workers due to emergency situations. They usually tried to strike a deal right on the spot with the jobbers, while they did not communicate with the workers at all. These attempts sometimes did not succeed. Some of the firm representatives and sweatshop owners failed to find a sufficient number of workers, either because some workers did not want to go to workplaces they had not worked at before, or because workers were already reserved by other factories and sweatshops.

As mentioned above, wages for daily workers are higher than the industry's average. A daily ironer earns forty Turkish Liras a day (approximately $26 a day), while a daily thread-cleaning woman worker earns twenty-five Turkish Liras a day (approximately $16). The corresponding figures for an average factory worker are respectively about twenty-five and seventeen Turkish Liras. However, fringe benefits of daily workers are not paid and, by definition, they do not have any job security. Jobbers usually earn ten Turkish Liras (approximately $6) as commission for ironers. Jobbers working with women workers earn five Turkish Liras (approximately $3) per worker. Thus, the earnings of the jobbers depend on how many workers they work with.

A jobbers' revenue is a source of envy for daily workers. Thus, many of them attempt to organize their own gang. Unsurprisingly, three male and four female jobbers that I met were all former daily workers. However, they had not worked as daily workers for a long period of time. After they learned the details of this “business,” they used their friendship ties with their fellow daily workers as their “initial capital.” The few successes at the beginning in terms of “servicing” workers for employers built up the trust of sweatshop owners and factory representatives, and those who were lucky continued in this line of work. As was common practice, although the meeting point where I was taken was named after a particular jobber, there were three or four other jobbers at The Havva Hanım Stop as well. These jobbers were in a strange, intense competition to present themselves as trustworthy subcontractors to employers and to establish a team ready to work anytime, anywhere. They gossiped about the clumsiness of other jobbers in terms of their failure to provide safe work conditions for their workers, in order to convince the women to work for them instead.

During the two weeks that I conducted observations, hundreds of women workers came to this corner everyday between 6:30 am and 9:00 am. At any given time during these hours, around fifty women would be waiting for that day’s work. For an outsider, it was impossible to distinguish between workers and jobbers. Jobbers did not guarantee a position for tomorrow, as workers did not want to bind themselves to a particular jobber. Thus, everyday was a new struggle for daily workers to find a job, while the challenge for jobbers was to supply their “customers” with the desired number of workers.

Jobbers did their best to stabilize this constant fluctuation, yet the competition among them prevented them from acting together. Based on my short interviews and visual observations, most of these women workers were from the Thracian part of Turkey in the Marmara region. This was not surprising, since Güneşli neighborhood had a significant migrant population from this region. Unlike factory and sweatshop workers and homeworkers, most of whom were from the Black Sea, Eastern Anatolia, and Southeast Anatolia, these women regionally represented a unique segment in the labor force of the apparel industry. Jobbers were also predominantly from the same region.

As patriarchal domination is somewhat more relaxed within this community, these women had the “freedom” to work as daily workers. Some of them were middle-aged women who would not
commit to working 26 or 28 days a month. Some were Turkish migrants from Bulgaria who did not have Turkish citizenship and were not eligible for formal employment. Yet others had been unemployed for a long period of time and saw this labor practice as an opportunity to contribute to their family budgets.

Woman daily workers are exposed to sexual abuse more often than salaried workers. Their mistreatment begins at the meeting place. I overheard a few jobbers ask for “nice looking women.” In addition to this difficulty, some of the residents of the neighborhood consider them a source of unfair competition in the job market. For instance, in my second week at The Havva Hanım Stop, a man in a suit, who was probably a white-collar worker on his way to work, stopped in front of the women and began to yell at them. He was apparently aware of what these women were doing at 7:00 am in the morning on this busy corner of his neighborhood:

The Man protesting the workers: You people are going to steal my job. I’ll lose my job because of you. What do you think you are doing here?

One of the women workers: You’re the one who has a job, and you stand there yelling at us! Do you think we like working like this?

The Man protesting the workers: If you refuse all together to work for two weeks, you can enforce your will upon these men [he pointed to the factory representatives]. You could do it, but you will never act together. Don’t expect me to feel sorry for you!

After he left, still in an angry mood, the women began to talk among themselves. Although they initially disliked this reaction and expressed their frustration, they gradually accepted that he was right. Yet the conversations here and there within the group slowly faded away without any particular consequence or a decision for collective action.

In other words, the mistreatment and even sexual abuse experienced by the woman daily workers was not limited to the work conditions. They sometimes had to wait for two hours in order to find a post that day. In many cases, workers were not provided enough space in the cars and vans that transported them to the factories. Factory representatives tried to squeeze as many workers in their cars as possible. Once, I saw six women being squeezed into the backseat of a small hatchback car. When one of the relatively older women felt suffocated and tried to get out of the car, the factory representative told her sarcastically,

You can leave whenever you want.
4.5 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE TARGET FORMS OF INDUSTRIAL LABOR

These observations aim to illustrate the differences in the work conditions of workers employed in different forms of industrial labor in the apparel industry. In this section, I will present the questionnaire data concerning the workers target to the research in a comparative manner in order to substantiate my observations about similarities and differences in the target work organizations.

4.5.1 Basic Demographic Indicators

The median age in Turkey in 2007 was 28.3. The average and median age of the workers working for the target work organizations is slightly lower than this figure, excluding homeworkers. Women workers are on average younger than male workers at the target factories and sweatshops. However, homeworkers are significantly older than all other workers employed at factories and sweatshops.

Table 4.8 Basic Demographic Indicators for Target Labor Practices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Center Factory</th>
<th>Independent Sweatshop</th>
<th>Follower Sweatshop</th>
<th>Homeworkers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sample Size</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures do not include some of the workers who are younger than sixteen years of age. There were two and three children respectively at the Independent and Follower Sweatshops. At the Center Factory, all workers were given the questionnaires and no worker was under sixteen years old. Thus, the figures in the chart above represent the age distribution at these workplaces. Mandatory primary education in Turkey was extended from five to eight years in 1997. This policy shift seems to have had some impact on the age distribution of apparel workers. In other words, regardless of the economic difficulties of working class families, most of the families are willing to financially support their children until they are fifteen. Thus, the extension of mandatory education to eight years has had a positive impact on the reduction of child labor in the target workplaces. Sweatshop owners complained about the extension of mandatory education to eight years, especially since they primarily recruited children as sweepers, since children easily accepted the authority of the sewing machine operators and foremen.

79. Turkish Statistical Institute, Address-Based Population Registration System, 2007
Table 4.9 Gender Distribution, Marital Status, and Fertility for the Target Workplaces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GENDER DISTRIBUTION, MARITAL STATUS, AND FERTILITY</th>
<th>Center Factory</th>
<th>Independent Sweatshop</th>
<th>Follower Sweatshop</th>
<th>Homeworkers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample Size</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Women Workers</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Women to the Workers in the Workplace</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Status of Workers: Single Workers/All Workers</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Status of Female Workers: Single Female Workers/All Female Workers</td>
<td>0.645</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Women Workers Who Have Children to All Married Women Workers</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Male Workers Who Have Children to All Married Male Workers</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Year of Marriage</td>
<td>1998.1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1996.66</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Year of Marriage for Female Workers</td>
<td>1996.8</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>1995.1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Number of Children (for Married Workers Who Have Children)</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Number of Children (for Married Female Workers Who Have Children)</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One of the striking characteristics of the apparel industry is the relatively equal gender distribution of workers, except for those who are home-based. Especially in Turkey, where Islamic conservatism has been rising for decades, women still account for the majority of the workforce of the apparel industry, although homeworkers’ gender status and position vis-à-vis the men of their households do not improve even when they join the labor force.

The majority of male workers at the target workplaces were married, while the majority of women workers were single, except for in the Independent Sweatshop. The average fertility of women workers is lower than the national average, which was 2.1 in 2008. Moreover, the average number of children male workers have is below the national average, yet male workers have more children and get married later than women workers.

---

80. Turkish Statistical Institute, Newsletter, n. 180, October 14, 2009.
### Table 4.10 Occupations of the Spouses of Male Workers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupations of the Spouses of Male Workers</th>
<th>Center Factory</th>
<th>Independent Sweatshop</th>
<th>Follower Sweatshop</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N: 80</td>
<td>N: 13</td>
<td>N: 10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory Worker</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweatshop Worker</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction Worker</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee at a Private Company</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shopkeeper</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driver</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This difference is possibly the outcome of the high number of housewives among the spouses of male workers at the target workplaces. The largest category of paid employment for the spouses of male workers is the factory and sweatshop jobs. The Independent Sweatshop has the highest ratio in this category with thirty percent, while the spouses of only twelve percent of the male workers at the Center Factory worked at a factory or sweatshop.

### 4.5.2 Migration

More than half of every category of workers employed in different forms of industrial labor migrated to Istanbul between 1980 and 2000. These two decades witnessed the boom of the apparel sector in Turkey. These workers began to work in the apparel industry at a time when the sector was experiencing phenomenal growth. One of the findings that did not meet the expectations I had had prior to the research was that the early migrants accounted for a relatively higher percentage of the factory workers than of the sweatshop workers.
Table 4.11 Migration Period of the Workers at the Target Workplaces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migration Period</th>
<th>Center Factory</th>
<th>Independent Sweatshop</th>
<th>Follower Sweatshop</th>
<th>Homeworkers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sample Size</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration Period: ISI (1960–1980)</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration Period: First ELG (1980–2001)</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration Period: Second ELG (2001–2008)</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

My hypothesis regarding the relationship between migration time and the distribution of workers in different workplaces was that the relatively favorable migration conditions and the longer duration of residence in Istanbul for the early migrant households would offer their members better access to the networks in the labor market. Thus, I expected this privileged access to be used by the workers from early migrant families, and for them to have more favorable jobs at the factories, rather than at sweatshops or in home-based work networks. However, as the chart above illustrates, this is far from being the case. Approximately thirty-five percent of Bağcılar’s households had spent more than two decades in this district, while only sixteen percent of the workers (and their families) at the Center Factory migrated before 1980.

As I will elaborate in the last chapter, one of the reasons for the relative absence of the early migrants at the Center Factory is simply the gradual positive social mobility these migrants enjoyed after their migration to Istanbul. A significant portion of these migrants were able to enclose public property in their neighborhood and built shanty settlements from the 1960s to the early 1980s. As they gradually replaced their one-story shacks with multi-story apartment buildings, the later migrants became their tenants. This process was conceptualized by İşik and Pınarçöglü (2001) as “poverty in rotation” (nöbetleşe yoksulluk).81 “Poverty in rotation” removed this segment of the district from the ranks of the working class. Thus, the early migrants are simply underrepresented not only in the sweatshops but also in the target factory with respect to their share in Bağcılar’s population. In other words, a significant portion of the early migrants in the target industrial basin enjoyed significant upward mobility. They own businesses as shopkeepers or sweatshop owners, moved up in the job market by getting more favorable jobs, or simply live on the rents of their worker tenants. In short, early migrants are relatively underrepresented in all of the target work organizations, including the Center Factory. While my hypothesis regarding the distribution of occupational positions among groups of different migration periods is refuted, the general argument about the upward social mobility of early migrants is supported by the research data. Keeping with this conclusion, workers from late migrant families are unsurprisingly underrepresented within the ranks of the property owners in Bağcılar.

81. See Erder 1996 for a detailed case study on rural-to-urban migrants’ political struggle in the realm of squatting activities. Also, see Erder 1995 for a debate about the changing characteristics of the urban poor in Turkish cities. See Şenyapılı 1996 for an analysis of unlicensed housing in Turkish cities after the 1980s.
Table 4.12 Homeownership of Workers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HOMEOWNERSHIP</th>
<th>Center Factory</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Independent Sweatshop</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Follower Sweatshop</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Homemakers</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Home Ownership</td>
<td>0.468</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Ownership for Male Workers</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Ownership for Female Workers</td>
<td>0.472</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Ownership (Migration Periods)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISI (1960–1980)</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELG I (1980–2001)</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELG II (2001–2008)</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the 2006 Municipality Survey in Bağcılar, 47.9 percent of households are homeowners. The ratios for the target work organizations are close to this figure, except for the Independent Sweatshop. Gender differentials are also negligible in the Center Factory and the Independent Sweatshop. The reason for a significant gender gap in the Follower Sweatshop is the fact that seven respondents at this workplace were the sweatshop owners’ brothers and each of them owned his own apartment. Unsurprisingly, earlier migrants have a higher ratio of homeowners than the later migrants.

Table 4.13 Landownership in the Hometown Before and After Migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Landownership in the Hometown Before Migration and Now</th>
<th>Center Factory</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Independent Sweatshop</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Follower Sweatshop</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Before Migration</td>
<td>Sample Size</td>
<td>Now</td>
<td>Sample Size</td>
<td>Before Migration</td>
<td>Sample Size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Anatolia</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>0.593</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Anatolia</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Sea</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>0.669</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Anatolia</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As with homeownership, the ratio for landownership in the hometown is lower for the workers at the Independent Sweatshop than for the workers at the Center Factory and the Follower Sweatshop. Workers from the Black Sea region enjoy the highest rate of landownership in the Center Factory and the Independent Sweatshop. The timing of migration has no significant relationship with the rate of landownership in the hometown.
Table 4.14 Landownership in the Hometown (Migration Period)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Landownership in the Hometown</th>
<th>Center Factory</th>
<th>Independent Sweatshop</th>
<th>Follower Sweatshop</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Migration Period</td>
<td>Sample Size</td>
<td>Sample Size</td>
<td>Sample Size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISI (1960–1980)</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELG I (1980–2001)</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELG II (2001–2008)</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In other words, workers generally tend to hold on to the land in their hometown. Workers who migrated to Istanbul more than four decades ago still keep their land in their hometown. It is interesting to see that most of these workers do not earn an income from the land they hold in their hometowns.

Table 4.15 Method of Procurement of Agricultural Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How do you Procure your Agricultural Income?</th>
<th>Center Factory</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Independent Sweatshop</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Follower Sweatshop</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I receive it, when I go to my hometown in the summer</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My share is sent in kind from my hometown</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My share is sent in cash from my hometown</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No income from my land in my hometown</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>0.416</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No income from my land in my hometown (% among landowners)</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No land in my hometown</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>0.479</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although workers keep their land in their hometowns, only a minority of the landowning workers receive an income from this property. In other words, although the majority of workers own some land in their hometown, the vacant land seems not to attract the interest of anyone who might want to buy it for agricultural (or other) purposes, or conduct sharecropping.
Table 4.16 Agents Who Work the Land in the Hometown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who Works your Land in your Hometown?</th>
<th>My Relatives</th>
<th>Hired Workers</th>
<th>Sharecropper</th>
<th>My Land is vacant</th>
<th>No Land</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Center Factory</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Anatolia</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Anatolia</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Sea</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>114</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Anatolia</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Sweatshop</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Anatolia</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Anatolia</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Sea</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Anatolia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follower Sweatshop</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Anatolia</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Anatolia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Sea</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rate of land vacancy in the hometown is the highest for the factory workers. If the land is used for any reason, it is usually the relatives who take care of it. Sharecropping is the most common among Central Anatolian workers in the Center Factory and Southeast Anatolian workers at the Independent Sweatshop, though both respondent groups are not large enough to make generalizations about the related trends concerning workers from these regions.

The most important and positive impact of the duration spent in the city on the assets of the workers is homeownership. Workers tend to keep their property in their hometowns regardless of the timing of migration. The most significant source of agricultural income for the workers at the target workplaces was hazelnut cultivation in the Black Sea region. Approximately thirty-six percent of the Center Factory workers and fifty-three percent of the Independent Sweatshop workers from the Black Sea region had some form of income from their land in their hometown. However, a minority of between twelve and twenty percent of the workers actually derive benefit from their property, either in cash or in kind. The rest completely depend on their wages for their subsistence. These findings in general do not support the well-established belief in Turkey that workers in big cities receive the economic support of their extended families who live back in their home villages or towns.
4.5.3 Residential Mobility

Given the importance of homeownership for the workers, their residential provides useful insight into the differences between workers at the target workplaces. Not surprisingly, tenant workers have moved around in Istanbul more frequently than those who are homeowners.

Table 4.17 Frequency of Intra-City Migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of Intra-City Migration</th>
<th>Sample Size (All Workers)</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Sample Size (Tenants)</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Factory</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>1.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Sweatshop</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follower Sweatshop</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tenant workers have moved on average approximately twice in Istanbul since they and/or their families migrated to Istanbul. However, most of this residential mobility took place within the vicinity of their workplaces.

Table 4.18 First District after Migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First District after Migration to Istanbul</th>
<th>Center Factory</th>
<th>Independent Sweatshop</th>
<th>Follower Sweatshop</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N: 238</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N: 44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISI Basin (Zeytinburnu, Fatih, Kağıthane, Cevizli, Eminönü, Okmeydanı, Eyüp)</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELG Basin I (Bağcılar, Halkalı, İkitelli, Sefaköy, Esenler, Küçükçekmece, Güngören, Bahçelievler, Gazişehir)</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELG Basin III (Avcılar, Altınyurt)</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Districts</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current District of Residence</td>
<td>N: 232</td>
<td>N: 43</td>
<td>N: 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISI Basin (Zeytinburnu and Eyüp)</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELG Basin I (Bağcılar, Küçükçekmece, Halkalı, Bahçelievler, Güngören)</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELG Basin III (Altınyurt, Güvercintepe, Tahtakale)</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although there are various districts to which people initially migrated in Istanbul, the current district of residence for most of the workers is in the ELG Basin I. Between seventy-two and eighty-six percent of the workers settled in the districts located in the ELG Basin I shortly after their migration to Istanbul. The variety of current residence is even smaller with a higher level of spatial concentration in ELG Basin I in a fewer number of districts. Almost all workers at the Independent and Follower Sweatshops resided in Bağcılar or neighboring districts during the fieldwork. The reason why the Center Factory recruited a large number of workers from Altinşehir, Güvercintepe, and Tahtakale, which are relatively new districts on the outskirts of Istanbul, is that these districts...
have a significant population of migrants from Iğdır, who were able to build their own houses in these peripheral areas of the city. The residential mobility is associated with the physical mobility of workers in the city.

### 4.5.4 Occupational Mobility

Workers at the Center Factory had worked at a smaller number of workplaces in the past. Women workers at the sweatshops changed their workplaces more often than the women workers at the target factory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.19 Number of Previous Jobs in the Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Center Factory</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>How Many Textile Workplaces Have You Worked At Before?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Standard Deviation</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This high occupational mobility could possibly be associated with a higher level of familiarity with different districts in Istanbul, as these workers had worked in and commuted to different districts in the city and thus gained the self-confidence they needed to visit the different districts of Istanbul.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.20 Duration of Employment in the Apparel Industry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Center Factory</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>How many years have you been working in the apparel sector?</strong> *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Standard Deviation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>When did you start working at this workplace?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Standard Deviation</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The total number of years spent at the current workplace and at the previous five workplaces

The average number of years worked in the apparel sector reveals that apparel workers generally work at a particular workplace between two and five years. In other words, it is possible to argue that workers have a high spatial and occupational mobility within their district and industrial basin and a low spatial and occupational mobility in the city. Moreover, the figures for the Independent Sweatshop can be argued to be representative of the industry in terms of the high turnover rate of its workforce. Even if this is not the case, the occupational mobility of the workers is so high that workers completing their occupational career in a single workplace account for an exceptional
category within the workforce of the apparel industry. This high occupational mobility raises the question of the methods used by workers to find new jobs.

### Table 4.21 Methods of Job Hunting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How did you find this job?</th>
<th>Center Factory</th>
<th>Independent Sweatshop</th>
<th>Follower Sweatshop</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sample Size</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An acquaintance working at this workplace helped me get this job</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My relative informed me about this job</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A friend in my neighborhood informed me about this job</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I saw a poster on the wall of the workplace</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My neighbor informed me about this job</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper Ad</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A friend at my neighborhood coffee house informed me about this job</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The neighborhood head (Muhtar) informed me about this job</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A private employment agency informed me about this position</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The chart above provides some clues about the employment networks in the apparel industry. Worker friends are an important source of referral for new workers. This ratio is highest in the Independent Sweatshop and lowest in the Follower Sweatshop. In other words, there seems to be a positive correlation between the turnover rate of workers at a workplace and the significance of the friendship networks for employment. Workers at the Independent Sweatshops are largely unable to use the kinship networks in the labor market, while this is substituted with the network among friends. As the Center Factory and Follower Sweatshop could afford to implement a conscious policy of segmentation, the ratio of workers who recommended their relatives to the employer was larger in comparison to the Independent Sweatshop. The share of related workers at these workplaces reflects not only the preferences of the management in their recruitment practices but also the desire of workers to work with their relatives in the same workplace. Unsurprisingly, workers at the Independent Sweatshop have the lowest rate of related coworkers.
Table 4.22 Number of Related Co-Workers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Related Co-Workers</th>
<th>Number of Related Co-Workers</th>
<th>Percentage of Related Co-Workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Factory (N: 254)</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative of the Highest Frequency (Siblings)</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Sweatshop (N: 52)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative of the Highest Frequency (Siblings)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follower Sweatshop (N: 23)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative of the Highest Frequency (Cousins)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It seems that some workers were successful at networking with their friends in their past workplaces. In the case of the Independent Sweatshop, almost half of the workers, including myself, found their jobs through an acquaintance at this sweatshop. The significance of friendship-based networks for the workers at the Independent Sweatshop also reveals the weakness of their ties with their provincial, ethnic, and religious communities. In addition to the relatives and acquaintances at the target workplaces, the second most important channel of networking is neighbors and friends in the neighborhood. These friends and neighbors recommend them to their current or previous employers.

Workers who cannot get help from their relatives in the apparel sector or friends in their neighborhood account for the third category. These “freelancers” find their jobs by wandering around in their district and asking for jobs at different workplaces, large and small. Thus, posters usually hung on the façade of the buildings serve a significant purpose. In the Independent Sweatshop, acquaintances provide a major link for new workers, while posters are the second most important mechanism for the recruitment of laborers.

4.5.5 Conclusions of the Comparative Analysis

The first conclusion of this comparative analysis is that characteristics of the workforce at the Center Factory, Independent Sweatshop, and Subsidiary Sweatshop signify particular similarities in terms of migration origin, timing of migration, average age of workers, and marital status. In other words, regardless of the characteristics of the workplace in terms of the level of formality in employment practices, it is possible to argue for the existence of a relatively homogeneous workforce in the factories and sweatshops of the apparel industry along with these basic demographic parameters. The gender distribution is more or less even. The average worker in the apparel industry is in his or her late twenties. The number of children that she or he has is below the national average. Women workers’ spouses are mostly apparel workers, while the spouses of male workers are primary housewives.

A minority of workers benefit from assets in their migration origin. However, geographical differences are noteworthy: Workers from the Black Sea Region benefit from different forms of income from their assets in their home province the most while Southeast Anatolian workers, most
of whom are Kurdish, benefit from such resources the least.

An apparel worker has on average worked in more than three workplaces before his/her current position, since his or her late childhood. The high volatility in the labor market of the apparel industry is the single most important dynamic of this sector, which shapes the characteristics of its labor process. Migration origins of workers are representative of the resident population of the target industrial basin. Moreover, most of the workers migrated to Istanbul between 1980 and 2000, when they were children. In other words, different migration waves in terms of the origin and timing of migration are fairly represented in the workforce of the apparel industry. Distinct characteristics of the workers at the Independent Sweatshop contribute to our knowledge of the characteristics of the workforce in the apparel industry in general. Variables regarding home ownership, financial and direct support from places of migration origin, and job mobility reveal that workers at the Independent Sweatshop are in a disadvantaged position compared with the workers at the Center Factory and the Follower Sweatshop.

I should emphasize here once again that the supply chain, which the Center Factory and the Follower Sweatshop took part in, represents the industrial relations for a smaller portion of the enterprises in the apparel industry. In other words, workplaces such as the Independent Sweatshop certainly outnumber workplaces such as the Center Factory and possibly workplaces such as the Follower Sweatshop. Thus, the quantitative data for the Independent Sweatshop and the Family Sweatshop, I believe, is more representative in terms of the characteristics of the labor force of the apparel industry in Istanbul than the data for the Center Factory and the Follower Sweatshop.

This data provides some tentative conclusions about the “allocation” of workers to different labor practices. Workers at the Independent Sweatshop have the highest average number of children, the lowest rate of homeownership, highest ratio of spouses working as industrial workers, the lowest ratio of land ownership in the hometown, and the lowest ratio of agricultural income from the land in the hometown. Moreover, they moved more often within Istanbul than the workers at the Center Factory and the Follower Sweatshop. They also changed their jobs more often than other factory and sweatshop workers subject to this project. The average duration of employment at the Independent Sweatshop is also significantly shorter than at other target workplaces. Only nineteen percent of the workers had relatives at the Independent Sweatshop. Almost half of these workers found their jobs through connections they had established in the past at their previous workplaces. One of the key hypotheses was that origin and timing of migration allocated workers to different labor practices. The data at hand, however, demands further analysis. Particular conditions of workers’ engagement with the urban space play the most important role in their occupational mobility within and among different labor practices. The ability of the worker to connect with provincial, ethnic, and religious networks determines his/her chances of finding a job at factories or relatively favorable sweatshops/HBW-networks. Within the scope of this case study, the parameters referred to in this paragraph, such as homeownership or agricultural income, should be considered assets that enable the worker to join such networks.

Workers at the Independent Sweatshop, in this regard, represent a particular and important segment of the working class in Istanbul, which is mostly disconnected from their provincial, ethnic, and religious communities. This disconnection derives from different reasons for different migration categories in terms of timing and origin of migration. The share of workers whose families migrated to Istanbul between 1980 and 2000 was the lower at the Independent Sweatshop than
it was at the Follower Sweatshop and the Center Factory. In other words, early migrants and late migrants account for a larger portion of the workforce at the Independent Sweatshop than they do at the Follower Sweatshop and the Center Factory. Workers from early migrant families at the Independent Sweatshop suffered from their families’ failure to join “the enclosure movement” and squat on public property in the 1970s.\(^{82}\) Workers from late migrant families at this sweatshop were unable to establish strong connections with their provincial, ethnic, and religious communities.\(^{83}\) Just as late migrants suffer from being relatively disconnected from urban networks, some portion of early migrants eventually lost their regional, religious, and ethnic connections. Moreover, Kurdish workers who migrated to Istanbul as a result of either internal displacement or the duress of the continuous violence in their home provinces, have not successfully established networks based on provincial and ethnic affiliations.

The segment of the workforce employed at workplaces similar to the Independent Sweatshop is responsible both for the high turnover of the total workforce among enterprises and for the high turnover of enterprises in the sector. As the homeworkers, these sweatshop workers constantly change their jobs, sometimes for “rational” reasons, such as slightly higher wages at another sweatshop in the neighborhood, or sometimes for “irrational” reasons, such as extreme boredom, which any worker is likely to experience in the labor process. Since there is nothing much to gain by working at a sweatshop for a long period of time in terms of benefits and social rights, then why not take some time off a couple of weeks a year?

All in all, the high circulation in the workforce for small- and medium-sized workplaces such as the Independent Sweatshop brings about two structural dynamics. First, the high turnover of the workforce of such individual enterprises makes it impossible for employers to conduct long-term planning. Second, as workers have nothing to lose but a job without benefits, their employers find themselves in a vulnerable position as a result of the individual reactions of the workers, who can quit their job any time they want. This is the limited “freedom” that workers, who put up with degraded work conditions and low wages, possess.

The above analysis can be used in an exercise to draw the conceptual borders between sweatshop labor and the factory system. The inductive exercises in this project have so far prioritized a number of parameters to distinguish between different forms of industrial labor such as the following:

1. The form of remuneration (piece-wage versus time-wage)
2. The organizational content of work (individualized versus collective)
3. The location of production (domestic versus public spaces)
4. The content of employment contract (wage-based contracts versus order-specific contracts)
5. The organizational content of command relationship (networks versus hierarchies)

---

82. See Buğra 1998 for a debate on the development of squatter settlements in Turkey.
83. See Erder 1996 for the decreasing social significance of solidarity networks among the provincial migrant communities in Ümraniye, Istanbul.
It is relatively easy to see the differences between home-based work versus factory system and sweatshop labor along these lines, as they differ from each other on the basis of each of the parameters suggested above. However, as far as the conceptual relationship between factory system and sweatshop labor is concerned, most of these parameters are not useful. Thus, it is certainly a challenge to draw a line categorizing sweatshop labor and the factory system. Both forms of industrial labor use time-wage. They entail collective work organizations based on the assembly line. Furthermore, both factories and sweatshops use public spaces. Rather than order-specific, discrete contracts, workers are actually employed for relatively long terms, except for daily workers. The general structure of the work organization of both forms is basically hierarchical, rather than network-based. Networks are established within the supply chains among these autonomous workplaces.

Thus, the level of formal employment and the size of the workforce appear as the conventional parameters to distinguish between sweatshop labor and the factory system as two different forms of industrial labor. Following this “recipe,” if a large-scale workplace predominantly utilizes formal forms of employment, then that workplace should be regarded as a factory. Furthermore, if an industrial establishment relies on informal labor practices and employs a small workforce, then it is a sweatshop. This perspective is widely accepted by the workers and employers in this sector. If somebody in Istanbul refers to a “factory,” the presumption is that workers are employed at a large-scale workplace and paid at least the minimum wage with fringe benefits.

However, the investigation of the organizational characteristics of the Center Factory and the three sweatshops provides two additional dimensions for conceptual analysis, in order to distinguish between these two forms of industrial labor. Regardless of the level of formality in the employment practices, all of the sweatshops subject to our inquiry suffer from two organizational problems: insufficiently small orders and a high turnover in the workforce. On the one hand, to have a reliable workforce requires being able to take sufficiently large and uninterrupted orders. On the other hand, in the absence of such a workforce, it is impossible to find long-term customers who provide large and uninterrupted orders. This vicious cycle generates a dysfunctional assembly line and limits employers’ control over the workers. This dilemma is what keeps sweatshops from changing, developing, and growing. Similarly, the target factory was able to overcome this vicious cycle by finding reliable customers in overseas markets and by using a reliable workforce to establish control on the shop floor.

Thus, it is possible to define the factory system in the apparel industry as a category of work organization on the basis of two conditions. In an industrial establishment:

- If the planning of the upcoming orders can be made before the ongoing order is completed, and
- If the turnover rate of the workforce is kept under control to the extent that it does not lead to a significant disruption in the functioning of the assembly line and that turnover rate can be used as a disciplinary mechanism rather than a disruptive dynamic for the labor process,

84. Except for sock producers in Yüzyıl neighborhood, sweatshops in this industrial basin are almost always located outside the domestic spaces. For more on the relationship between sweatshop labor and domestic space in Taiwan, see Hsiung 1996.
then that work organization can be regarded as a “factory” regardless of its scope of production, the size of its workforce, or the level of formality in its employment practices.

If one of these conditions is absent, then we are dealing with a “sweatshop,” even if the work organization in question is a collective and hierarchical one located in public space and using the time-wage as its primary form of compensation. As the reader probably realizes, I consciously abstain from using the binary of formal-informal employment in this categorization. Two factors render the question of formality relatively unimportant.

First, there are different levels of formality and, for that matter, different levels of informality. Thus, for a conceptual debate, this distinction is not useful. Second, the focus on the level of informality prioritizes the role of the state in labor-capital relations. However, at least in the case of Turkey, the state certainly abstains from intervening in informal labor practices. Thus, it is a futile exercise to categorize different workplaces on the basis of the level of formality in their employment practices. Whenever informal labor practices become the norm for employment practices in an industry, the formal employment practices signify one of the multiple means for labor control, rather than a standard for the industry. Thus, under the current circumstances in the Turkish apparel industry, formal employment should be regarded as a particular means of labor control. Most of the workers at the Center Factory felt quite lucky to have a job at this workplace. Social security benefits in particular as well as other amenities made employment at the Center Factory a privilege.

**Table 4.23 Analytical Categories for Sweatshop Labor and the Factory System in the Apparel Industry**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Predictability in Orders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Predictability in Labor Procurement | High         | Ideal-Typical Factory | 1) Family Sweatshop with the Potential to Become an Ideal-Typical Sweatshop  
2) Former Subsidiary Sweatshop that Lost its Ties with an Ideal-Typical Factory |
|                  | Low          |                       |
|                  | 1) Dysfunctional Factory  
2) Sweatshop with the Potential to Become an Ideal-Typical Factory | Ideal-Typical Sweatshop |

This exercise generates six categories in an industry with a high turnover of enterprises. High predictability in orders and labor procurement characterize an ideal-typical factory such as the Center Factory. The absence of these factors characterizes an ideal-typical sweatshop such as the Independent Sweatshop.

If there is a high turnover rate in the workforce, while the orders are still predictable, then the factory probably experiences serious organizational problems, which can in the long-run generate

---

85. For a detailed debate on the conceptual inadequacy of the formal/informal binary, see Beneria and Floro 2006.
problems with its customers as well. The Center Factory began its journey as a sweatshop in Zeytinburnu. Initially, it did not primarily employ İğdir-migrants, and it enjoyed direct contracts with its German customers. The predictability in orders eased the employment of the hemşehrıs of one of the partners of the business. The enlargement of the workforce also necessitated the employment of a segment of workers culturally affiliated with the firm owners. The scope of production increased parallel to the low turnover rate in their workforce.

The Follower Sweatshop is the perfect example of the “stable workforce-unpredictable orders” configuration. The recruitment strategy was inherited from the old subcontracting relations with the Center Factory. Unless the owners of this sweatshop are able to find a similar customer in the near future or drastically change their employment strategy, they will experience dire financial problems. The Family Sweatshop is another organizational variant of the same configuration. The employment of family members helped this sweatshop to survive its first year. As the productive scope grew, thanks to the new relations with the export-oriented factories and medium-sized sweatshops, the owners of this sweatshop willingly left family members aside with the expectation of higher productivity. If they manage to use their hemşehrıs and their Kurdish compatriots successfully in their sweatshop, if their connections are extended to the final customers in foreign countries, and, finally, if they can organize their compatriots in extensive supply chains, then they have some prospect of growing their productive scope as much as the Center Firm in the future. If they are able to establish close relations with large apparel firms owned by their compatriots in the future, then they could grow at a steady pace, as the Follower Sweatshop did in the past.

To recapitulate, factory system and sweatshop labor cannot be distinguished from each other on the basis of a static categorical distinction line. Even if we are to talk about categories, it is impossible to ignore that those categories represent different phases of growth or decline of the individual industrial establishments, rather than stable organizational structures.
QUESTION II: URBAN SPACE AND REDUCTION PROCESS: A TALE OF TWO NEIGHBORHOODS

Although the previous chapter provides some tentative propositions about methods of labor control in different labor practices via the manipulation of identity affiliations, it fails to investigate the formation of the relationship between different identity affiliations. This process takes place prior to the exposure of workers to the labor process. Thus, while the analysis of the segmentation of the workforce within different labor practices gives a description of the division lines within the working population, it does not explain the reasons for segmentation. Employers manipulate the subjectivities, insofar as they are already formed outside and before the labor process. Moreover, the static analysis of the workforce for different labor practices falls short of satisfactory answers to the question of how individual workers are “allocated” to different labor practices. This is because there are no “static” segments of the workforce pertinent to different labor practices. For instance, sweatshop workers begin to work at factories. Women factory workers become homeworkers. Thus, the investigation should be extended to the relations among workers outside the labor process in order understand such shifts in the workforce.

Since the previous chapters illustrate the importance of the turnover of workers among enterprises and labor practices, this chapter will investigate the relationship between this dynamic and segmentation of labor within the labor process. In particular, three factors will be investigated: the spatial clustering of the resident population on the basis of ethnic and provincial affiliations, residential mobility of Bağcılar’s inhabitants, and homeownership.

The investigation of these factors bears the following conclusion: On the one hand, identity affiliations are strong enough to prevent the emergence of an urban culture and/or class consciousness among workers to develop collective resistance against their employers. On the other hand, it is weak enough to motivate workers of the provincial and ethnic groups to establish their separate quarters and to generate their local entrepreneurs, who distinctively employ their hemşehris or compatriots. These factors cause a high turnover of workers among enterprises and indirectly render the sweatshop labor and home-based work viable labor practices, since the high worker turnover effectively disrupts the growth of individual enterprises.

The last part of this chapter will investigate the political consequences of this conclusion: The political vacuum created by relatively weak ties among members of the same identity affiliation is partially the outcome of contradictory interests among early and late migrants. Successful segments of the early migrants enjoyed positive social mobility, as they could legalize their squatters and build apartment buildings on the same plot for their squatters. As this segment gradually became sweatshop owners and landlords of the late migrants, they developed a distinct class consciousness. The most visible reflection of this is the religious conservative discourse, the rhetoric of which has been effectively used by the successful early migrants to mobilize late migrants. This ability to mobilize the latter under the rubric of Islamic brotherhood has in turn enabled the early migrants to make their mark in local politics during a time of fading provincial and ethnic ties.
5.1 İĞDIR QUARTER OF HALKALI NEIGHBORHOOD

5.1.1 The Relationship between Factory Owners and the Neighborhood Community

Before the analysis of the causes and effects of the heterogeneity of the human geography in Bağcılar, the first section of this chapter will provide some of my observations on the neighborhood that provides the Center Factory a significant portion of its workforce. This neighborhood is an exceptional case in many ways, as we will see in the coming sections. This section will help us to gain a deeper insight into the relationship between the question of control at the Center Factory and the role of provincial and ethnic identity affiliations. It will also help to contextualize the extent of social heterogeneity of the resident population in Bağcılar.

Bağcılar is populated by various groups in terms of timing and origin of migration. This heterogeneity signifies the presence of multiple identity groups based on regional, ethnic, and religious affiliations. The data and some of my observations in the previous chapters supported the assumption that heterogeneity comes with the segmentation of the labor force. An essential characteristic of the labor process within the modern factory system is the homogenization of the workers through the deskilling of workers and the simplification of processes in the work organization. As there are strong technical limits to deskilling and simplification in labor-intensive industries, the labor control in such industries is necessarily non-technical in content.

In the case of home-based work, the bargaining power of homeworkers is damaged by extensive distribution channels employing large numbers of workers in different districts. The geographical scope of distribution channels and the absence of information dissemination urge homeworkers to compete with each other. In the case of sweatshop labor and the factory system, since the management has no means of external pressure, such as the conveyor belt which moves the assembly line at the desired pace, workers unsurprisingly attempt to work as slowly as possible. Thus, the proper functioning of the assembly line requires competition among workers. Most of the time, workers find themselves racing with others on the assembly line. Thus, workers in the same work unit of the assembly line occasionally try to collaborate with each other in order to slow down the pace of the assembly line. Moreover, the pace of the assembly line can be hypothetically manipulated by the workers, so long as the majority takes part in the act. However, I did not observe this kind of a reaction by the entire assembly line except for the Independent Sweatshop workers’ attempt to slow down the line when their payment was delayed. This protest lasted only fifteen minutes. The question then is why workers never develop such a collective consciousness, although they, unlike homeworkers, are in close interaction with each other.

We have so far looked at the factors causing a high turnover of enterprises in the industry, highly dispersed production activities, and diverse conditions of production. Each of these factors is associated with the conditions of labor procurement by industrial establishments. Thus, manipulation of identity affiliations by the employers is broadly the answer that pertains to the target factory for this project. As workers with a particular migration origin are favored over the rest of the workforce, they act as the agents of the employer on the shop floor and the control is actually in the assembly line. This special relationship between the favored group of workers and their employers, however, requires strong cultural affinity, which substantiates the common origin
of migration or common ethnic and religious affiliations.

These connections need to be reproduced in the everyday lives of the workers. Employers must have a strong influence on the relationships of those favored workers, within their own community. The heterogeneity of the population in Bağcılar makes it difficult for such a tightly connected group to emerge. Thus, it is not surprising that, although the Center Factory is in Bağcılar, the “core” workforce, i.e. workers of Iğdır-origin, reside mostly in a neighborhood outside Bağcılar: the Iğdır Quarter of the Halkali neighborhood in Küçükçekmece.

While I was working at the factory, I resided in this low-income neighborhood which is at the western border of Bağcılar. Eleven percent of the workers in the sewing section and thirteen percent of the workers in the factory resided in this neighborhood. In other words, the “core” workforce of the Center Factory was defined not only by their identity-affiliation based on migration origin, but also by the location of residence. A significant portion of these workers live in the same neighborhood. Although Halkali is formally a neighborhood, it is very large in size; it is almost as big as the entire district of Bağcılar. Iğdır-migrants reside in a particular quarter of this neighborhood, which borders the district of Bağcılar. It is, geographically speaking, the equivalent of all the neighborhoods of Bağcılar. It is bordered by the highway that connects the E5 and E6 highways. Unlike the neighborhoods of Bağcılar, this quarter is more like a ghetto.

Map 5.1 Iğdır Quarter of Halkali

The white area in the map above roughly illustrates the Iğdır Quarter of the Halkali neighborhood. According to the most recent census, conducted in 2007, the Halkali neighborhood has an approximate population of 75,000. The neighborhood head (muhtar) had 100,000 residents on file. The Iğdır Quarter has approximately 30,000 residents and almost all of them are migrant families from Iğdır. Migrants from Bitlis, an Eastern Anatolian province with a Kurdish majority population, and migrants from various Black Sea provinces rank as the second and third provincial
and regional groups in Halkali neighborhood. These groups live in other relatively mixed quarters of the neighborhood.\textsuperscript{86}

Although my intention prior to my research was to reside in a representative neighborhood of Bağcılar, my observations at the factory convinced me that this would not be sufficient to understand the interaction between urban space and labor practices in the apparel industry. Thus, I decided to reside in the Iğdır Quarter of the Halkali neighborhood in order to conduct observations about the differences between the diverse human geography of Bağcılar and that of this quarter. In addition to the significant share of the workers residing in this neighborhood within the workforce of the factory, two factors were influential in my decision to extend my observations to this neighborhood.

First, similar to the owner of the firm, these workers and the majority of the residents of this neighborhood were from Iğdır and shared the same religious belief, a Jaferi division of the Shia sect. They also regarded themselves primarily as Azeri Turks. In other words, they differed from the ethnic and religious majority of Turkish society, yet they did not regard themselves as a religious or ethnic minority. Because of their differences from mainstream society, their community ties were particularly strong. Second, the father and one of the brothers of the owner of the firm lived in this neighborhood, although this quarter is a low-income area in the city. Thus, to reside in this neighborhood gave me the chance to observe relations among workers outside the factory. These workers undoubtedly had close relations outside the factory, in their own neighborhood. In this particular context, the religious and regional identity, rather than the occupational identity as workers, established the core of those relations.

Before 1985, this neighborhood was mostly vacant, waiting to be developed by rural-to-urban migrants. As a result of chain migration and cooperation in the form of cheap or interest-free credit to build their own houses, the neighborhood came to be populated predominantly by Iğdır migrants. The community gradually built a mosque practicing the Jaferi belief. Migrants from different villages in Iğdır also founded various cultural associations. These cultural groups also contributed to the social dynamics of the neighborhood. The mosque community later founded an independent association and took it upon themselves to organize religious ceremonies for the community. In the 1990s, the Iğdır community began to be associated with this part of the neighborhood, which would later be called the “Azeri (or Shia) Quarter.” Since the majority of Turkey’s population is of Sunni Islamic belief, the religious identity of the residents of this quarter gave rise to a close cultural affinity within the community. Now, the quarter has invisible but clear borders with the rest of the neighborhood.

In my first visit to this quarter, I met with one of my close friends from the factory, U.R.F., in order to spend some time together on a sunny Sunday. After I met him at the bus stop, we walked to the main street of the quarter. The street was closed to traffic for a religious ceremony, the mourning for the Holy Twelve Imams. When we entered the street, I was able to glimpse from afar a group of people, all of whom were dressed in black. There was a very strong rhythm of beats, although I could not understand the source of the noise. As we approached the group, I realized that the members of the group were making that rhythmic noise by beating their chests. They

\textsuperscript{86} I am grateful to Turgut Yakın, the neighborhood head of Halkali, for the information he provided about the regional distribution of migration origins of the households in Halkali neighborhood.
were all young men, most of them almost in a trance. The fact that I could hear the beating even before I could see them was impressive. The main street was decorated with black flags symbolizing the pain and suffering of the Jaferis experienced by the historical religious figures of the Shia. The audience of the ceremony was comprised of the residents of the neighborhood. Everybody was in a silent and serious state. Witnessing this led to a moment of realization, in which I understood the profound link between the workers residing in this neighborhood and their employer. The connection between the rich and poor residents of this neighborhood was simply beyond “the wage-nexus.”

The father of the firm owner was an important figure in the community: He was the head of his village association. Moreover, he was one of the major financers of these religious activities. For instance, Shia believers celebrate Nevruz, the Feast of Spring. Its preparations in the Iğdır Quarter began well before the date of celebration. A field of approximately two hectares within the quarter was allocated for the ceremony. Seats were brought to the ceremony place and tables for the village associations and a podium were set up in the meeting area days before the ceremony. The family owning the Central Firm was involved in the preparations. Thus, it was not surprising that the father of the firm owner was also the head of the preparation committee. He gave the opening speech at the celebration. He made regular donations to the mosque and he was an active participant in such social activities in the Iğdır Quarter.

I should remind the reader once again that this was a low-income working-class neighborhood; yet Center Firm’s annual sales for 2005 amounted to over $75 million. Each of the family members must have been multi-millionaires. In fact, they could have lived wherever they chose to. However, the father of the family chose to live in an apartment in a multi-storey building at a relatively central location in the quarter. Other apartments in the building were vacant. Unless my friends had pointed this out, I would not have noticed that this building belonged to an important family in the community.

The positive image of the family in the neighborhood community was closely linked with the family’s relations with the mosque community: The financial support from the family helped to maintain good relations with the neighborhood community. In this religious quarter, in which there was not one single liquor shop, the ties between the firm owner family and the neighborhood community were established on the basis of the role of this family to help express the religious identity publicly, and hence to support the social presence of the community in the larger political and cultural framework of the city. For instance, the mayor of the district, who was a conservative Sunni, came to the neighborhood mosque regularly for Friday prayers, as he also came to Nevruz celebrations in 2008 and praised the piousness of the Iğdır community.

The mayor was a member of the Sunni-conservative Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), which has been the ruling party in government since 2001. Given that Sunni-religious conservatism in the Turkish context generally implies a negative perception of the Shia belief, it was surprising for me to see the mayor making a great effort to maintain close relations with the community of this neighborhood. He was taking a political risk by making himself a potential target for criticism from the Sunni conservatists. This complex power network was the result of the active interaction of the Shia-Iğdır entrepreneurs with the Shia-Iğdır religious leadership. It also motivated the district mayor to develop close relations with the neighborhood’s religious elite.
Close relations between the family owning the Central Firm and the community were certainly not limited to the religious ceremonies. Some of the residents of the neighborhood were their relatives as well. Some of them had emigrated from the same or neighboring villages in Iğdır. Most of them were given at least one chance to work at the factory. Some of them quit their jobs, worked at other places or tried to initiate their own business, failed, and came back to the Center Factory once again. In most cases, they were not denied a second chance.

For instance, another close friend of mine, E.N.N., had five brothers. His father had migrated to Istanbul in the 1960s. Being a Turkish nationalist and a supporter of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), he was a union-buster in Zeytinburnu, a primary location for the apparel industry until the 1990s. The family later moved to Halkali, as the Iğdır community began to gather in this neighborhood. While he worked at different various jobs, as a professional driver or security staff, for example, his children began to work at apparel factories and sweatshops. Eventually E.N.N., his brothers, and his father ended up at the Center Factory. Later, however, in 2004, in an attempt to realize their own ambitions and dreams, they decided to set up their own sweatshop. They failed and once again returned to the Center Factory. E.N.N., two of his brothers, and his father were working at the factory during the participant observation. His father was the night watchman. Two months after the participant observation, he once again quit his job at the factory in order to open a small grocery shop in their neighborhood.87

U.R.F.’s father, Mr. V.E., had been an ironer since the 1970s. He had not acquired the skills to operate the sewing machines, nor had he ever worked for a job with fringe benefits. His wife, who was a distant relative of the owner family, was constantly trying to convince him to work at the Center Factory. She also used her kinship ties to find a job for her son, U.R.F., at the Center Factory. It seemed to me that U.R.F.’s father found it demeaning to work for the owner family, since he had come to Istanbul before they did. However, his occupational choices proved to be a failure, while the owner family proved to be an impressive success. Although he preferred working at sweatshops in relatively more difficult conditions and for lower wages, ironically Mr. V.E. once mentioned that the father of the owner family had given him some pocket money after a Friday prayer a couple of years ago. He seemed to appreciate this gesture.

To recapitulate, the Center Factory employed a significant number of workers in a labor process which aimed to deskill the workers and to strip them off of their craftsmanship. However, given that the most significant processes were highly labor-intensive, the assembly line did not suffice to alienate workers from their skills. Nor did it successfully establish a mechanized form of labor control. Thus, the firm owner family resorted to a complex set of measures to arrange the social relations in the factory. One of these measures was to “deploy” their hemşehris in the factory. However, close relations with the hemşehris came with a price: it required close involvement in the social and cultural dynamics of the Iğdır Quarter. The father of the family was probably content with living in his community. He probably would not have wanted to live in a bourgeois district of Istanbul, where the residents had a different cultural background. Moreover, to financially support the religious rituals was the duty of any believer. Thus, these efforts should not be directly taken as a sacrifice, since the owner family did not see it that way. All in all, however, the outcome of these intense relations created a sense of belonging among their hemşehris who worked at their factory.

87. The grocery store was located in the initial location of the Follower Sweatshop.
Without this link, the organizational dynamics at the Center Factory would probably have been much more similar to the organizational anarchy at the Independent Sweatshop.

5.1.2 Outsiders of the Neighborhood

Although I emphasized the religious, provincial, and ethnic homogeneity in this neighborhood, “outsiders” were active in the social mapping of the community as well: migrants from the Nakhchivan region of Azerbaijan. One of my neighbors in the Iğdır quarter was a Nakhchivani family. Despite their religious and ethnic affinity with the rest of the community, they had a somewhat negative perception of their experience in Istanbul.

It was a tremendous challenge for me to establish connections in this neighborhood and to socialize with its residents. As members of this close community, homeowners were reluctant to rent their apartments to me, given that I was not only a single man, but also a stranger. I would like to express my gratitude for the support of my coworker friends at the Center Factory in this regard. When I finally persuaded Mr. H.C.K. to let me rent his basement for a few months, thanks to a favorable recommendation from Mr. U.Y., the older brother of E.N.N., I was not very optimistic that I would have the opportunity to become acquainted with my neighbors. I knew that Iğdır migrants were, like Nakhchivans, Shia, and that they spoke the same dialect of Turkish as the Nakhchivans. I later realized that they had a negative perception of the Azerbaijani migrants in general despite these similarities.

My next-door neighbors lived in a single-story shack, an uncommon form of dwelling in Istanbul these days. They were very hospitable and invited me over to dinner several times, probably because my landlord informed them that I was there for research-related purposes. Having spent many nights in my cold and dark basement with cockroaches and centipedes, I was rather eager to get out of the micro-ecology of my apartment and to get to know my neighbors.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many Azerbaijanis migrated to Turkey. A large portion of those who migrated from the main provinces of Azerbaijan eventually returned to their country. Nakhchivan, however, has no land connection with “mainland” Azerbaijan and suffers from Armenia’s blockade of the region. Thus, deprived of the economic development which is true for mainland Azerbaijan, most of the Nakhchivans have no other option but to work in Turkey.

Because they share the same religious and ethnic background as the Iğdır Quarter community, many of the Nakhchivans moved to this area. Initially, the Nakhchivani migrants were on very good terms with the Iğdır Quarter community, as the Iğdır migrants welcomed them thanks to their common ethnic and religious affiliations. However, religion and ethnicity were obviously not enough to eliminate the cultural gap due to separation for more than eighty years after the First World War. Nakhchivans grew up in a socialist cultural environment. Their view of religion was at best liberal, if not leaning towards agnostic or atheist. Moreover, gender relations were relatively better amongst the Nakhchivans than they were amongst the families of Iğdır origin, in which a strong patriarchal order predominated.

This family was no exception to this stereotypical image of Nakhchivani migrants. They had been living in this neighborhood for the last five years. The father of the family, Mr. H.A., was a highly qualified machinery technician. He had worked in Siberia and other parts of the Soviet Union
for many years. The mother of the family, Ms. G.U., was a college professor at the geography department at the University of Nakhchivan. Their daughter had a college degree from the same university, while their son, Mr. E.L., had been a teenager when they left for Turkey, and was unable to attend high school in Istanbul. It was a very interesting experience for me to talk with this family living in a squat about international politics, Marxist theory, and human geography. To Mr. H.A., Haydar Aliyev, "the founder of modern Azerbaijan," was no different than Pinochet. As he put it, "In Azerbaijan, we are undergoing a process similar to that undergone by Chileans in the 1970s. It's simply fascism."

At dinner, Ms. G.U. was not convinced that I believed she was an academic. She went to the trouble of fetching her diploma from their bedroom in order to prove to me that she actually had a PhD. This was simply one of the saddest experiences for me in the entire research project. She worked at a sweatshop a few blocks away for half the wage Turkish workers would work for. Their daughter was certainly not content to work at the same sweatshop with her mother, yet her diploma was not recognized in Turkey. Nor did she have work permit in Turkey. Moreover, the visas of all the family members had expired months ago. Mr. E.L. was the only one who seemed to have adapted to their new "home," since he could not remember their life in Nakhchivan very well. Once again, the timing of migration was the key factor accounting for the inner stratification of the working people even in such a close community.

Because of their visa status, they could not work at the Central Factory. Sweatshop owners were quick to take advantage of the Nakhchivani migrants’ situation, thus pushing them further into dire poverty. Whenever I spent time at the central coffeehouse next to the neighborhood mosque, I would see Mr. H.A. sitting alone. He was apparently not very fond of socializing with the coffeehouse regulars. His five-year-plan was to finally complete the construction of their house in Nakhchivan and then go back. This was one of our most common topics of conversation. However, whenever he passionately talked about his plans to "go back," I had the gut feeling that this was one of those dreams that would never come true—the dream of returning to a home that did not exist anymore.

The strong religious identity both characterized this Quarter and excluded "the others." Although this family shared the same religious and ethnic background as the rest of the community, they were still "the outsiders," because they were from Nakhchivan, not from Igdir. Even though Nakhchivans and Igdir migrants speak the same language, believe in the same religion, and share the same ethnicity, the border between Nakhchivan and Igdir is not just a political invention anymore. Having been physically separated for some eighty years now, the Nakhchivans and the people of Igdir are now culturally divided.

5.2 YENİMAHALLE

5.2.1 A Complex Human Geography

Although my initial intention was simply to observe the extra-workplace activities of the factory workers in the Igdir Quarter, my observations and experiences supported the argument that the labor control in a labor-intensive industry requires the presence of complex ties outside
the workplace. However, this argument certainly needs further elaboration: “factory towns” were far from exceptional cases in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century in the United States or Germany. Even in the highly capital-intensive sectors, companies that had a solid financial base and a favorable place in the market often chose to establish close relations with their workers for the sake of “workplace peace.” Having lived in an old factory town, Binghamton, New York, for six years, I was certainly aware of the importance of the social and cultural links between employers and workers in industrial relations. The surprise was to see an equivalent to the historical factory towns in the middle of Istanbul in the present time. Close social relations both within the working population and between them and their employers provided mutual benefits for both parties of this relationship. The deal has been mutually beneficial and, hence, “square.”

However, it should not be forgotten that the same quarter was also the meeting point for complex identity affiliations in the middle of a metropolis. Thus, close relations between workers and their employers of the same identity affiliations were also the outcome of the struggle of this community to survive among millions of people in Istanbul. In other words, unlike historical factory towns, what made this quarter its socially homogeneous was the very heterogeneity of its surrounding neighborhoods and districts. In other words, this neighborhood obviously represents an extraordinary case generated by the ordinary conditions of Istanbul’s urban space. The working class neighborhoods in Istanbul are usually much more heterogeneous in terms of identity groups. This fact points to a major challenge for any researcher in his or her analysis of the characteristics of human geography and its impact on industrial relations. Thus, in the next section, I will present data concerning the characteristics of the resident population in Bağcılar in general and in Yenimahalle in particular.

5.2.2 Residential Mobility and Heterogeneity in Population: Political Domination of Property-Owners and the Failed Ghettoes

The provincial origins of migration of the residents in different neighborhoods of Bağcılar provide useful information regarding the make-up of the resident population.
The coloring on the map above illustrates the most populous provincial groups in the neighborhoods of Bağcılar. For instance, migrants from Samsun constitute the most populous migrant groups in four adjacent neighborhoods in Bağcılar. It is obvious that particular provincial groups have a strong tendency to live in the same region of the district. However, this first impression should be further investigated in conjunction with the share of these provincial groups within the population of these sub-district regions. Despite the concentration of particular provincial groups in particular zones of Bağcılar, the relative share of groups of different migration origin is distributed in a relatively homogeneous manner.

The ratio of the most populous groups in terms of migration origin to the total number of
households in a neighborhood varies between 0.07 and 0.15. The highest ratio is in the Yüzyl Neighborhood. This is not surprising since, as mentioned above, most of the migrants from Çorum are in the same trade (sock and hosiery production) and they use their apartments as small-scale production places. Thus, in this case, production and living spaces are mostly enmeshed with each other.

If a provincial group is the most populous one in more than one neighborhood, those neighborhoods are either adjacent to each other or in the same zone of the district. This spatial clustering of provincial migration groups once again reveals the tendency of migrant communities to live in the same neighborhoods of Bağcilar. It is possible to analyze the significance of the tendency. The two charts below illustrate the results of a two-step exercise to this end.

The first step is to calculate the ratio of the total number of households of the provincial groups in those neighborhoods in which a particular group comprises the majority population group, to the total number of households in those neighborhoods. If these provincial groups comprise the majority population group in adjacent neighborhoods or in neighborhoods in the same region of Bağcilar, it is more realistic to take those neighborhoods as the unit of analysis, in what I refer to as a zone of population clustering. Even if a provincial group is the majority group in a particular neighborhood or a zone of population clustering, it does not account for more than fifteen percent of the total neighborhood population or zone of population clustering. In other words, in none of the neighborhoods of Bağcilar does a particular provincial migration group have a dominant position in the population of its respective neighborhood or region.

The second step of this exercise is to compare the number of households of the provincial groups in the neighborhoods in which those groups comprise the majority group of the population, to the total number of households of those provincial migration groups in Bağcilar. Once again, if a provincial group is the majority population group in multiple neighborhoods, it is useful to calculate the total number of households of those provincial groups in all neighborhoods. This ratio gives a sense of the extent of population clustering of said provincial groups in Bağcilar. This exercise generates another interesting result. Provincial groups, which account for a significant portion of Bağcilar’s population, are usually not concentrated in a particular zone in Bağcilar. Except for Bitlis, Çorum, and Ordu migrants, all other populous provincial groups are more or less homogeneously distributed amongst different neighborhoods of the district. None of them have more than one third of their total population in one neighborhood or one particular region.
Certainly, ethnicity can be regarded as an equally important motivation for the residents of Bağcılar to establish autonomous communities. The two largest ethnic groups in Bağcılar are Kurds and Zazas. Interviewees for the Bağcılar Household Survey were asked the local languages that the respondents could speak. Given the still lingering stigma associated with the native tongues of Kurdish and Zaza citizens in Turkey, some deviation from the actual figures would not be surprising. Furthermore, language proficiency cannot be taken as the primary indicator of the ethnic identity. For instance, especially young Kurdish residents who were born in Istanbul might not be able to speak Kurdish. However, first, given that people are not so strongly biased against provincial origin, it is possible to check the significance of the deviation between declaration of ethnic identity and the actual distribution of ethnic groups: The responses to the question concerning local languages reflect the actual distribution of ethnic groups in a relatively representative manner. Second, the primary concern here is the level of concentration of ethnic minorities in different neighborhoods of Bağcılar. There is no reason to assume that the deviation from the actual distributions is heterogeneously distributed. Proper figures revealing the ethnic minorities in Bağcılar certainly require a more thorough investigation in future studies.
According to the data at hand, the average ratio of Kurdish residents in a particular neighborhood is 4.5 percent of the total Kurdish population in Bağcılar, with a standard deviation of three percent. For Zazas, the same ratio is again 4.5 percent with a higher standard deviation of five percent. Göztepe, Fatih, and Yenimahalle neighborhoods account for approximately forty percent of the total Zaza population in Bağcılar. However, the distribution of Kurdish residents is fairly
homogeneous. Thus, for the Kurdish households, ethnicity does not seem to be an important factor in the decision to reside in a particular neighborhood. The situation is different, however, for the Zaza population, as three adjacent neighborhoods account for almost half of the Zaza population in Bağcılar. Zazas constitute approximately one percent of the total population of Bağcılar. Most of the Zaza population is from Tunceli and Erzincan. Thus, provincial origin of migration and the relatively smaller size of the community also seem to account for the population clustering of Zazas in these neighborhoods as much as the common ethnic background does. However, in the case of the Kurdish population, it is difficult to argue for a similarly strong tendency to establish ethnicity-based communities. Once again, provincial background seems either equally as important as, if not more important than ethnicity in households’ decision to reside in a particular neighborhood.

Accordingly, we can reach three conclusions: First, there is a strong tendency on the part of provincial migration groups to cluster in the same area of Bağcılar. However, this trend is limited to a certain degree. Even in the case of Bitlis migrants, more than forty percent of this provincial group is dispersed in different areas of Bağcılar. Most of the provincial migration groups are more or less homogeneously dispersed in different neighborhoods of Bağcılar. Second, this tendency seems to be more important than the ethnicity-based community-making, especially in the case of the Kurdish households. Third, despite the tendency of provincial communities to reside in the same area of Bağcılar, the total share of these groups in the population of their respective neighborhoods and areas is usually relatively small. Migrant households from a particular province do not have their own “quarters.” Even though a particular provincial group might have a significant share in their neighborhood’s population, they share the same neighborhood with households who migrated from other provinces, unlike İğdır migrants in their quarter in Halkali. In other words, the collective decision of hemşehris to live in the same neighborhood or in the same region of Bağcılar can be regarded as a “failing project of ghetto-making” with the exception of Bitlis, Ordu, and Çorum migrants and the Zaza community.

In fact, the population concentration of these communities in particular zones of Bağcılar in general does not amount to “ghettos” in terms of cultural and political domination. In the case of migrants from Çorum, their occupational specialization in sock and hosiery production seems to be a strong factor in the concentration of their population. Bitlis and Ordu migrants are, however, not specialized in a particular trade. Some Bitlis migrants are vendors in neighborhood bazaars, while a significant portion of them are sweatshops workers like migrants from Ordu. In the case of the Zaza community, their ethnic identity is bolstered by their common provincial origin. In other words, Çorum migrants are the only provincial group that has both common occupational specialization and spatial concentration in terms of location of residence.

I resided in Yenimahalle after I began my observation at the Independent Sweatshop. None of the provincial groups account for more than ten percent of the population in this neighborhood. The regional distribution of migration origin is also compatible with the distribution for Bağcılar and

---
88. Whether the population diversity in Bağcılar is representative of other industrial districts of Istanbul is certainly an open question. For example, Sema Erder’s case study in Pendik (1997) illustrates significant tension between later and early migrants. Prospective studies in other districts of Istanbul will certainly extend our knowledge of the diversity of the population in terms of ethnic, provincial, and religious affiliations. However, the conclusion I have reached regarding the industrial basin encompassing Bağcılar and its neighboring districts is that it is generally characterized by heterogeneity in identity affiliations, rather than spatially separated communities of particular identity-affiliations.
the Independent Sweatshop: Eastern Anatolian and Black Sea-originated migrant families constitute more than seventy percent of all households in Yenimahalle who migrated to this neighborhood from other geographical regions of Turkey.

Chart 5.2 Geographical Origin of Migration (Yenimahalle)

![Chart 5.2 Geographical Origin of Migration (Yenimahalle)](chart.png)

Source: Bağcılar Municipality Survey, Courtesy of Municipality of Bağcılar, 2006

The failure of provincial, ethnic, and religious groups to establish their own quarters bears two important implications: First, the diversity in provincial, ethnic, and religious origins acts to segment workers within sweatshops and factories. Employers successfully manipulate differences amongst workers in terms of gender, ethnicity, religion, and provincial origin of migration. Workers are thus rendered unable to mobilize against their employers on the basis of their common identity as workers. Second, unlike in Halkali, the same affiliations paradoxically retard the emergence of solidarity between employers and workers of the same identity group. ‘Divide and rule’ is the basic strategy of employers to control the workers. The downside of this strategy is that employers are unable to predominantly employ their hemşehrıs or compatriots, since the workforce is composed of workers of diverse migration origins. Accordingly, it becomes impossible for employers to establish a long-lasting relationship of trust with workers of a particular identity affiliation. This limits the growth of the organizational scope of garment sweatshops. Residential mobility, especially among tenant workers, similarly delinks workers from each other and prevents the emergence of a particular form of urban politics based on class-consciousness. However, it also contributes to the geographical fragmentation of identity groups.

5.2.2.1 Intra-District and Intra-City Residential Mobility

The heterogeneity in the migration origins of the resident households is coupled with a high residential mobility within and to Bağcılar. The average duration of residence in Bağcılar is thirteen years, with a standard deviation of less than one year (0.84). Approximately sixty-four percent of the households have been residing in Bağcılar for less than twenty years. Forty percent of the households have been residing in this district for less than ten years. The phenomenal growth of the
population in Bağcılar is thus the outcome of this massive population inflow to the district. In other words, the majority of the households in Bağcılar are the first generation inhabitants of the district.

**Chart 5.3 Duration of Residence in Bağcılar**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duration of Residence (%)</th>
<th>Households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-2 Years</td>
<td>Bağcılar (N: 149486)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-5 Years</td>
<td>Yenimahalle (N: 6752)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-9 Years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-19 Years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 20 Years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Response</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bağcılar Municipality Survey, Courtesy of Municipality of Bağcılar, 2006

Migration to Bağcılar is coupled with very high intra-district population mobility. The average number of years spent in current residences in Bağcılar and Yenimahalle is 8.5 and 8 years respectively. The standard deviation of the distribution for the neighborhoods of Bağcılar is 0.7 years. More than forty percent of the residents have been living in the same building for less than five years. Sixty-five percent of the residents have been living in their current residences for less than ten years. Approximately only ten percent of the residents have been living in the same building for more than twenty years.

**Chart 5.4 Duration of Residence in the Current Building**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duration of Residence (%)</th>
<th>Households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-2 Years</td>
<td>Bağcılar (N: 149486)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-5 Years</td>
<td>Yenimahalle (N: 6752)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-9 Years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-19 Years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 20 Years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Response</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bağcılar Municipality Survey, Courtesy of Municipality of Bağcılar, 2006
Thus, we can conclude that the duration of residence in Bağcılar does not necessarily signify long-term residency in a particular building or neighborhood. The intra-district population mobility is certainly much higher than the migration Bağcılar receives. This, I believe, partially accounts for the provincial and ethnic heterogeneity of the neighborhoods in Bağcılar.

The high intra-district residential mobility should also have a negative impact on the establishment of close neighborhood relations. Tenants account for thirty-nine percent of the households in Bağcılar and thirty-six percent of the households in Yenimahalle. Tenants certainly account for the high pace of residential mobility in Bağcılar. This segment of the population is mostly composed of workers. They have a short amount of time to get used to their neighborhoods before they move to another apartment in another neighborhood or on a different street. The neighborhood culture based on common cultural traits and class consciousness is thus seriously disrupted. A “civic culture” emphasizing a collective response to common urban problems cannot develop in the presence of such residential mobility.

The intra-city population movements account for a significant portion of the resident population in Bağcılar. Forty-three percent of the residents of Bağcılar moved to this district from other districts of Istanbul. For the majority of Yenimahalle’s households who moved to the district from different parts of Istanbul, the place of former residence is predominantly the districts neighboring Bağcılar.

**Chart 5.5 Intra-City Migration to Bağcılar**

When we look at the data on intra-city migration to Bağcılar a little closer, it is possible to argue that the population mobility mostly takes place within the industrial basin of Bağcılar. Approximately sixty percent of the resident households moved to their current building either from another neighborhood of Bağcılar or from a district within the same industrial basin (Başçelevler, Esenler, Gaziosmanpaşa, Güngören, and Küçükçekmece). This industrial basin is not only the most populous region of Istanbul, but also the center of Istanbul’s labor-intensive industries. Thus, workers follow either the jobs or the low-rent tenements in different districts of this industrial region.
Forty-three percent of the households in Yenimahalle, moved to this neighborhood from another neighborhood of Bağcılar or a different district of Istanbul. In other words, the (mostly rural-to-urban) inter-city and intra-industrial-basin migrants constitute a large majority of the resident population. Thus, while workers are unable to establish permanent relations with their neighbors due to their short duration of residence in a particular neighborhood, they are also unable to establish long-term relations in their workplaces or work organizations.\(^\text{89}\)

High residential mobility is a major reason for the high turnover of the work force among individual enterprises. Furthermore, such mobility not only yields neighborhoods of mixed identity affiliation, but it also disrupts the development of a common urban culture enhancing class-consciousness. In short, this residentially mobile working population “circulates” among sweatshops and home-based work networks. In contrast to the residentially mobile segment of the population, landlords, most of whom are early migrants, shape local politics. They can act as the champions of a conservative urban culture under the rubric of religious conservatism in the absence of a working class culture.

5.2.2.2 Homeownership and Social Fragmentation

Whether the trend of high residential mobility is a structural characteristic of the human geography of Bağcılar is a relevant question. This question can be answered by means of an analysis of home ownership in this district.

---

\(^{89}\) As Özbay (1999) points out, the migration literature on Turkey has overemphasized inter-city and rural-to-urban migration. Since 1975, urban-to-urban migration in Turkey has become more significant than rural-to-urban migration (İldıryumu and Sirkeci 1999). As this data illustrates, intra-city migration is at least as important as inter-city migration in terms of its role in characterizing the industrial labor force. Moreover, the intra-city migration in Istanbul should be conceptualized as a population movement within individual basins of industry, rather than a haphazard flow among distant districts of the city. See Tekeli 1998 for a discussion on the relevant parameters for the analytical framework of the analysis of domestic migration in Turkey.
The rate of homeownership in Bağcılar in general and Yenimahalle in particular is lower than than it is in Istanbul as a whole, the latter being 57.9 percent (TUIK 2000). Thus, the residential mobility in Bağcılar seems as though it will continue to be high in the future as well. However, households also tend to buy their apartments rather than remain as tenants. This supports the argument that the population mobility for Bağcılar will be lower in the future than it is now.

Unfortunately, there is no reliable data on where the landlords who rent out their apartments in these areas live themselves. As mentioned in the second part of this study, one of the sources of income for 5.2 percent of Bağcılar’s households and 4.8 percent of Yenimahalle’s households is housing rent. Moreover, based on my observations, I would argue that the rate of absentee landlordism is relatively insignificant in Bağcılar. Most of the landlords come from the early migrant families who were able to build their squats in the 1970s and the 1980s, and then later erect multi-storey apartment buildings on the plot of their squats. Their initial aim was to provide housing for their children and themselves; however, this strategy ultimately turned out to be an important source of income for them, as the migration to Bağcılar continued non-stop throughout the 1990s. Thus, it is a relatively safe to argue that a minority of households, constituting between five and ten percent of the total population, own multiple apartments and enjoy rent as a significant source of income, while approximately thirty-five percent of the population comprise their tenants. This inequity contributes to the social heterogeneity in Bağcılar.

Source: Bağcılar Municipality Survey, Courtesy of Municipality of Bağcılar, 2006

I believe that the division between landlords and their tenants has a significant influence on the local politics in Bağcılar. Households owning multiple apartments come from a similar cultural background as their tenants. They share the same public spaces. However, their conditions of livelihood are different. The third chapter provided data on the average earnings of households in Bağcılar and the average rent. More than sixty percent of the households have only one working individual. The declared household income of half of the resident population is less than 750 TL, while the average rent for an apartment is 309 TL. As tenants transfer a significant portion of the total income of their household to their landlords, the property-owning segment of the population is able to subsist on the rent from their tenants. Thus, tenants and landowners are in antagonistic class positions. The presence of the landlords in the cultural and social scene certainly eliminates the possibility for the emergence of a “working class culture” in the neighborhoods of Bağcılar. In other words, although industrial districts of Istanbul “look” like working class neighborhoods, the property-owner minority has a tremendous influence on the local culture.91

The most visible outcome of this influence of the property owners in Bağcılar on the local politics is the significance of religious conservatism in this district. Bağcılar was one of the first

---

91. Erman’s critical literature review about the literature on squatter settlements (2001) is, in this regard, heuristic. The totalistic perception of urban sociologists and historians about the social characteristics of the industrial districts in Istanbul is a notable obstacle that prevents the observer from becoming aware of the social tensions within these urban areas. Also, see my “Büyük Anakronizm: KentSEL Dönüşüm-Göc İlişkisinde Mimari Analizin Rolü” (2009) for a critical review of the architecture literature on the urban transformation of Turkish cities.
districts in which the predecessor of the current religious conservative party in government (AKP, Justice and Development Party) won the municipal elections. Religious conservative parties have been in charge of the municipality since 1992, when Bağcılar became an independent electoral district in Istanbul. In the last municipal elections in 2009, AKP received 49 percent of the votes, while another (and more radical) religious conservative party (SP, Felicity Party) received thirteen percent of the votes. Sixty-three percent of the district's population voted for these two religious conservative parties.

The religious political discourse seems to have provided a common ground for the property-owners of Bağcılar, who belonged to different provincial and ethnic backgrounds. The conservatism of the property owners found a discourse in the religious stance of the predecessors of AKP and AKP itself. From another perspective, Bağcılar was also one of the first districts of Istanbul from which the political message of religious conservatism was able to spread and reach the residents in the peripheral districts of Istanbul. In other words, I do not believe that it would be an aberration to argue that religious conservatism became popularized and urbanized in Turkey as a result of the first electoral victory of the religious conservative movement in Bağcılar. Thus, an analysis of the social dynamics behind the continued electoral success of religious conservatism in Bağcılar provides useful insight into the nation-wide characteristics of this political movement.

Religious conservatism fulfilled three major functions for the property-owners in Bağcılar. First, the emerging property-owning middle class of this district came from different regions of Turkey with diverse cultural and ethnic backgrounds. Religious conservatism provided this segment of the population with a common political discourse. Second, since one of the ideological pillars of religious conservatism is the idea of Islamic brotherhood, the emphasis has been on the religious affinity between property-owners (early migrants) and workers (late migrants), rather than the structural antagonism between these groups. Third, along with these two functions, the social discourse of Islamic conservatism took on a new shape similar to that of the “Protestant Ethic”: Hard work is praised and toil is celebrated. In such a cultural environment, it is only in the haven provided by religious practices of various sorts, such as wearing a headscarf or attending the Friday prayers, that workers have been able to find a language of their own to express their daily problems about work, compensation, and social benefits. Such religious practices are highly encouraged by employers and the well-established (property-owning) residents of the neighborhood. Thus, the electoral success of religious conservatism in Turkey since the 1990s can be investigated within this web of social relations between early and late migrants and among early migrants to Istanbul. Particularly in the case of Bağcılar, the electoral victory of the religious conservative party in the municipal elections of 1994 was one of the key successes that significantly contributed to the overall rise of Islamic conservatism in Turkey.\[92\]

To recapitulate, working class districts in Istanbul generated their own property-owning class as a result of land rent and informal labor practices. Owners of the Center Factory, Independent Sweatshop, and Follower Sweatshop as well as the organizer of the target HBW-shop experienced upper social mobility thanks to their entrepreneurial activities in their respective neighborhoods or districts. In Istanbul, “absentee employers” have no chance of surviving in the apparel industry.

\[92\] See Tuğal 2009 for a similar argument.
Having social affinities with the workers is the key to entrepreneurial success. Thus, employers in labor-intensive industries and property-owners tend to live in the same environs as their workers and tenants.

However, new trends reflecting the transformation of the relations between the rising middle class of the working class districts and the workers are clearly emerging. Although many members of this new entrepreneurial and renter class still reside in their original locations in Istanbul in order to maintain their relations with the working communities there, prosperity has certainly led them to pursue new aspirations. One reflection of these new aspirations is their changing tastes in housing. Hence we now find construction sites of luxurious gated communities just a couple of blocks away from the Independent Sweatshop.

**Picture 5.2 A Luxurious Building Complex in Bağcılar**

For instance, at the time of this study, the building complex in the picture above was located next to the working class residences of Bağcılar. An outer circle of adjacent shops on the first floor completely enclosed the entire complex. These shops were apparently intended as a “gate” to keep out unwelcome intruders. It had a courtyard for the private use of its residents, which also included a swimming pool and a playground for children.

I had the opportunity to speak with real estate agents marketing some of these newly emerging building complexes, which yielded a striking visual contrast to the rest of Bağcılar’s cityscape. There were seven such projects in Bağcılar at the time of my interview. The real estate agents described their customers in three categories: individual investors, the local elite of Bağcılar, and
the industrialists who run businesses in Bağcılar. The local elite and the industrialists in particular wanted both to be close to Bağcılar’s community and to enjoy their prosperity in their private lives. These complexes were intended to provide both amenities. As one of the agents put it, “It’s better to be the big fish in a small pond, than the small fish in a big pond.”

All of the apartments in the housing complex above had already been sold during construction. The most recent buyers were two sweatshop owners who bought two apartments each. Both of them made changes on the plan during construction and joined the two apartments they had each bought in order to have larger interior space in their residence. Each of these four apartments was sold for 400,000 Turkish Liras (approximately $260,000). Although this particular complex had a swimming pool, the real estate agents did not expect the prospective residents to use it, as most were conservative families.

Thus, it appears that the spatial and cultural proximity of sweatshop owners, property owners, and workers in Bağcılar will continue to be important in the near future as well, since the first two groups are determined to keep their connections in this district. As they have grown prosperous, they have evidently begun looking for solutions that will enable them to live the middle-class lifestyle they have aspired to, while at the same time being present in the urban setting of their enterprises. Such building complexes answer both demands; however, only time will tell if these newly built environments will lead to a qualitative change in the relations between the prosperous and the working segments of the population in Bağcılar.

The use of religious rhetoric in local politics by early migrants has one significant impact on the segmentation of the workforce into different labor practices. This rhetoric created a common discursive terrain for workers of different migration origins (except for Alevi). Thus, religious conservatism ameliorates the strong emerging tendency of sweatshops and home-based work networks recruiting workers solely from one ethnic or provincial origin.

5.2.2.3 Heterogeneity and Fragmentation in Bağcılar

The available data presented here reveals the presence of multiple layers of heterogeneity in the human geography of Bağcılar and Yenimahalle. First, migration origins of the households in Bağcılar and within individual neighborhoods point to significant heterogeneity of the resident population. Forty-nine percent of the respondents of the Bağcılar Municipality Survey stated that the closeness to relatives and hemşehris was one of the reasons why they chose to reside in Bağcılar. This figure rises to sixty percent in Yenimahalle. However, despite this tendency to establish provincial communities, streets and neighborhoods are occupied by households of different provincial origins and ethnic and religious groups. This overall trend applies to Kurdish households as well, while Zaza households have a higher concentration in three neighborhoods of Bağcılar. This heterogeneity provides a lesser opportunity for the employers to establish identity-based affiliations with workers and to employ a reliable workforce based on such connections. From the perspective of workers, the diversity in migration origins clogs the channels of communication and makes it harder for a particular working class discourse to characterize the culture of their neighborhood.

93. See Keyder 1999 for the post-ISI transformation of the urban housing market in Istanbul. See Öncü 1999 for the cultural transfusions between the urban culture of the late migrants to Istanbul and “Istanbulites.”
Second, one of the reasons for the heterogeneity in population is the high residential mobility within Bağcilar and within Bağcilar's industrial basin. Less than thirty-five percent of the households in Bağcilar have been residing in their current apartment for more than ten years, while more than forty-five percent of the households in Bağcilar have been residing in their current apartment for less than five years. This short average duration of residence in a particular apartment or neighborhood is strongly associated with the short duration of employment at various industrial establishments of the apparel sector. All in all, while workers of different identity affiliations live together in the same neighborhoods or districts, they do not have enough time to get to know each other in the short time that they live there, before moving to a new neighborhood or district.

Third, the relatively short duration of residence at a particular apartment and in a particular neighborhood is partially the outcome of the low ratio of homeownership. Furthermore, findings indicate that a significant portion of the population, between five and ten percent, comprises the landlords of the rest of the community. Differentials in income between tenants and landowners lead to a significant variation in living standards and occupational positions of the households in Bağcilar. Moreover, the property-owning segment of the resident population clearly intervenes in the local social dynamics for the sake of establishing and consolidating their property rights in the community.

These conclusions also support another argument which is that this property-owning group has been the most enthusiastic supporter of religious conservatism in Bağcilar. Their cultural affinity with the working residents enabled them to exert political influence on the latter. In the absence of a unique neighborhood culture based on close social relations with neighbors, hemşehriler, or compatriots, thanks to the high residential mobility, religious conservatism substitutes for Bağcilar’s would-be urban culture. In other words, this political and social discourse provides the ground for a minimalist civic culture. As the major contributors to the making of this culture are the property owners of Bağcilar, they use it both to substantiate their class position in their district and to prevent the emergence of any possibly radical political discourse among workers in Bağcilar. Thus, relations between workers and property owners should be further investigated for a comprehensive analysis of the sociological dynamics behind the electoral success of religious conservatism in Istanbul (and for that matter, in Turkey) since the 1990s.

All in all, this heterogeneity in Bağcilar makes sweatshop labor and home-based work both viable and necessary. As workers do not have the cultural ties to unite and collectively resist informal labor practices, these labor forms are viable. Furthermore, the same heterogeneity accounts for the homogenous distribution of workers of different identity affiliations, migration origins, and, to some extent, migration periods into different labor practices. In fact, I believe this analysis answers the question of how workers are “funneled” to different labor practices. Heterogeneity of identity affiliations is “homogeneously” distributed in the urban space of Bağcilar. High residential mobility further causes perpetual scrambling of a significant portion of the tenant population every five years. Finally, and importantly, the tension between early and late migrants is ameliorated by means of religious conservative rhetoric. This discourse further frames the role of the identity affiliations in different labor practices.

The same heterogeneity, however, also contributes to disorganization within the work organizations. This very chaos disables the entrepreneurs from enforcing discipline in their work
organizations. Accordingly, the growth of the productive scope of their enterprises is limited by the high worker turnover and the organizational problems in the labor process. In other words, the inability of sweatshop owners to rely on a long-term relationship with a particular segment of the labor force is a major obstacle to the prospects of growth in the production capacity.

In the absence of provincial, ethnic, and religious ghettos, the labor force for sweatshops comes from diverse origins, once these enterprises grow beyond the size of a family sweatshop. As mentioned above, the average duration of work for a worker at a sweatshop is relatively short. For instance, on average, workers began to work at the Independent Sweatshop in 2006. On average, they began their careers in 2000 and had had four jobs by 2008. This implies that an average sweatshop worker changes his or her workplace every two years. This high volatility is certainly beneficial to the sweatshop owners as it answers their immediate concerns, such as getting away with not paying their workers’ fringe benefits. However, this pattern has an indirect impact on employment practices, in the form organizational limitations to the establishment’s growth in productive scope and the rise in the number of small-scale production places.

5.2.3 Politics in a Complex Human Geography

I moved to Yenimahalle when I began to work at the Independent Sweatshop. Different provincial and ethnic groups lived together in this neighborhood without a common civic culture. In this context, provincial identity-affiliations and homeownership characterize the dynamics of the local politics. The most recent election for the neighborhood head of Yenimahalle provides clues for us to understand the significance of these two vectors. I will present the related dynamics as a tension between the community of the neighborhood mosque, who were the property owners of the neighborhood, and the two provincial groups of the neighborhood. These provincial groups were socially organized in their coffeehouses.

A mosque was being built during the participant observation in the neighborhood. Although it was still under construction, its lounge began to serve the prospective mosque community. Mosque lounges are usually common meeting places for the elderly. The mosque lounge in Yenimahalle was not an exception in this regard. Old men were the regulars of the lounge on the construction site. Reading newspapers and talking about the good old days, they would give an outsider the impression that this lounge was simply a place of ultimate peace and dignity. This first impression would not tell us about the power dynamics regarding the politics of the neighborhood. The next thing to catch the eye of the outside observer, however, would be the short distance between the mosque and the office of the neighborhood head (muhtar).

In Turkey, all neighborhoods are official units of administration. Each neighborhood elects a head, who is responsible for taking the records of the residents, providing the copies of those records to the residents for official and occupation-related purposes, and helping government officials to locate particular neighborhood residents, such as those who have legal problems. In small neighborhoods, the neighborhood heads usually know the residents in person. In other words, they are the representatives of the state at the local level.
The neighborhood head of Yenimahalle, M.I., was a regular of the mosque lounge. In the later phases of the project, I was informed that he was also one of the major financers of the construction of the mosque. His contribution had most certainly paid off in the most recent elections. He had faced two opponents, who were supported by local leftist organizations with branches in the neighborhood. Both of these organizations propagated for particular democratic demands. For instance, at the time of the project, neighborhood heads charged the residents an approximate amount of $2 for every document they issued. In a neighborhood like Yenimahalle, which has a population of more than forty-five thousand people, this amounted to an important financial resource. The socialist candidates promised that this income would be transferred to a neighborhood fund in order to finance community-related services and to help the poor. Another promise was to establish a neighborhood assembly, which would consist of household representatives. This assembly was intended to directly intervene in social problems of the neighborhood such as crime, prostitution, and drug use. However, the votes between these two leftist candidates were divided and they lost. The current neighborhood head received 5,800 votes. The socialist candidates together got 4,900 votes. In other words, although these groups pursued highly organized campaigns and knocked on the door of almost every household in the neighborhood, they could not beat the neighborhood head in the elections. Where did his political power come from?

While the failure of the left-wing groups to agree upon a single candidate certainly helped the current neighborhood head to achieve his electoral victory, equally as important was the latter’s strategy of financially supporting the construction of the mosque. The significance of the mosque lounge in neighborhood politics was partially a consequence of the power of family elders, some of whom were the ISI migrants who owned multiple apartments in the neighborhood. In addition to their connections with their tenants, these property-owning elders also provided housing for their married sons and, hence, exerted significant influence on their sons’ political opinions. Accordingly, they were prominent members of their ethnic, religious, or provincial community.

Thus, it is no wonder that the current neighborhood head donated a significant sum of money and maintained his close relations with the mosque community. He had migrated to Istanbul in 1958, when he was sixteen years old. He worked at a textile factory in Bakirköy, which neighbors Zeytinburnu, the industrial center for the apparel industry during the ISI period. He was a factory worker until 1972, except for some brief intervals, during which he worked as a construction worker in his hometown, Sivas, a Central Anatolian city. In 1972, he migrated as a guest worker to Germany and worked at a factory in Stuttgart until 1978. When he returned to Turkey, he settled in Bağcılar. Back then, Bağcılar was largely unoccupied. It had only begun receiving the first waves of mass migration from Anatolia. It was easy to enclose public land. In general, land was also affordable, especially for M.I., who had worked hard in Germany to save up money for this prospective construction business. The only inhabitants of “the Village of Bağcılar” were the local farmers who had been living there before Anatolian migrants began to create their “City of Bağcılar.”

In 1983, migrants from Erzincan, most of whom were Zazas, and migrants from Kars (both Eastern Anatolian towns) decided to have somebody elected for the neighborhood head position, since they were not content with the head of the neighborhood at the time. As Bağcılar was still in its early development, all rural-to-urban migrants were eager to enclose some land for their
shacks in order to later build an apartment building on the occupied plot. Bağcılar was still legally composed of a number of villages and it did not have its own municipality. Thus, neighborhood heads had significant authority over the master plan of the growing district. Neighborhood heads, in some cases, drew the street grid, decided which particular plot would be on the prospective street corners, and allocated the disputed plots to the new residents at their discretion.

Erzincan and Kars migrants wanted to have the lead in this competition, yet they could not agree on a particular candidate. Thus, they offered the candidacy to M.I., who was expected to play a neutral role in the office. As a contractor, he had already established trust in the community. Despite his hesitations about politics, he reluctantly accepted the candidacy. Since then, up until the time of this writing, he has won five elections against strong opponents. Certainly, his long-standing connections with the early migrants have played an important role in his political career.

M.I. was from Sivas, the province where the most populous provincial group in the neighborhood too was from. His hemşehris from Sivas had most likely voted for him in the previous election as well. Residents from Erzincan were mostly Zaza and Alevi, and so the Sunni conservatism of the neighborhood head was politically not appealing for them. Accordingly, they supported one of the candidates with leftist-tendencies. The other leftist candidate was from Kars. Thus, he probably had the support of migrants from Kars. This was an interesting coincidence: One quarter century later, M.I. was being opposed by candidates of the same provincial groups who had supported him three decades ago, albeit with a different ideological orientation. However, these groups made the same mistake yet again: They were as divided as they had been three decades ago.

M.I., in contrast, had managed to build deeper relationships with the prominent members of his community over the years. He was not particularly close to any provincial or ethnic group, but his religious conservatism provided him the basis for a close dialogue with different communities in the neighborhood. As he had built his political career from the position of reluctant construction contractor to the indisputable neighborhood head over the last three decades, he also symbolized the coalition between the property owners in Yenimahalle, who shared the mosques as their place of socialization. Their political alliance was much stronger than their identity-affiliations.

The second highly visible public space in Yenimahalle (or in any urban neighborhood in Turkey, for that matter) is the coffeehouse. Coffeehouses are the meeting places especially for particular provincial groups. Regulars know each other and most of the customers are regulars. There is a strong sense of identity affiliated with different coffeehouses. Coffeehouses are also places for networking for workers. Owners of small-sized sweatshops spend time at coffeehouses together with their workers. Moreover, workers also let each other know about open positions at their workplaces. Thus, workers who struggle in the informal labor market depend very much on their friendship circles at the coffeehouses. I spent some of my spare time after work at two coffeehouses for Kars and Erzincan migrants, probably two of the oldest provincial groups of the neighborhood. According to the records of the Bağcılar Municipality Department of Machinery and License, there were 477 coffeehouses in Bağcılar in 2008. Bağcılar has 2,735 streets. In other words, there is at least one coffeehouse for every six streets in Bağcılar.

The coffeehouse community is usually more diverse than the mosque community in terms of age, occupation, and income level. The provincial identity is the single most important cultural tie among “the regulars.” The primary activities at the coffeehouses are playing cards and
backgammon. People do not talk much, except for when they talk about the game. Playing cards mentally isolates the players from the rest of the world. Each table becomes an autonomous social space, independent from the rest of the coffeehouse. Thus, although one could (and I did) expect to observe lively conversations and heated debates about politics or the community, this was hardly the case in my experience. People did not talk about their jobs, families, or problems at the coffeehouse, unless it was necessary. The seeming reason for this enthusiasm about playing cards is the bet on the table bill. This could be as much as the daily wage of an apparel worker. Thus, concentration on the game was a must.

More importantly, however, is that, while at the coffeehouse, workers sought to distance themselves from the problems of their lives more than anything else. It was simply amazing to watch people playing cards for as long as ten hours on a sunny Sunday in a coffeehouse filled with cigarette smoke. They did not want to talk about their problems or concerns. Moreover, to reveal their concerns to others would have been regarded simply as a sign of weakness. “Too much talking” was certainly a cause for potential harm to one’s masculinity. TV was the most important means of initiating conversation about politics. Whenever a particularly controversial issue made the headlines, some would react by yelling or cursing at the politician on the screen. Others would make sarcastic comments about those that reacted. Then, players would return to their games and briefly share their opinions with other players at their table.

However, more controversial issues having to do with ethnicity-related tensions or strict ideological differences hardly ever gave rise to such reactions. Such intense political issues were usually in a “no-touch” zone. Yet coffeehouses play an important role in local politics. As I mentioned in the previous section, a primary factor which shaped the decisions of the worker residents in the mayor and neighborhood head elections was common identity affiliations together with acquaintances’ promotion of particular candidates by word of mouth, rather than ideological propaganda. It is at the coffeehouses that male residents receive information on the background of, and their friends’ and acquaintances’ opinions about, the candidates. For instance, the owner of the coffeehouse for Kars migrants was the neighborhood head candidate of one of the left-wing organizations. In addition to the support of the left-wing organization, his close connections with his hemşehris thanks to his coffeehouse assured him 3,500 votes. However, the mosque community apparently had the upper hand in the political wrestling match for this highly regarded post.

5.3 URBAN SPACE AND THE PROLIFERATION OF LABOR PRACTICES IN ISTANBUL

This chapter provided a number of tentative conclusions concerning the relationship between the heterogeneity of identity affiliations and the multiplicity of industrial labor practices in Istanbul’s apparel industry. The diversity of ethnic, religious, and provincial groups in Bağcılar generates two dynamics that sustain the multiplicity in labor practices. First, heterogeneity generates segmentation among workers within the labor process. Thus, they fail to unite and show resistance. Accordingly, informal labor practices remain viable. Second, since this diversity does not lead to the formation of separate quarters for each identity group, employers cannot develop special relations with workers from particular identity affiliations. The organizational result of this failure is the high worker turnover among sweatshops and home-based networks. Thus, sweatshops and home-based work
networks cannot go through the organizational evolution that the Center Firm had gone through. Accordingly, large-scale production facilities cannot replace these labor practices. Sweatshops remain sweatshops in the absence of prospects for further growth.

The data at hand also gives some hints about the characteristics of small entrepreneurs of Bağcılar. They are men of their district. As early migrants, they successfully enclosed some urban land for themselves and became landlords of latecomers. In the absence of a common civic culture as in the İğdır Quarter, they did not have the aspiration to become the next Mr. Self-Made Man. They rather tried to preserve their petty interests by establishing a political alliance with other successful early migrants. Unlike tenant workers, they are “sedentary.” Thus, they have a great amount of influence on the neighborhood community. Although they are in close relationships with their compatriots and hemşehris, more than anything else they act as agents for their class interests. The common ideological ground for this position is religious conservatism. Since it acts as a unifying civic culture, workers tend to adopt it, as they suffer from weak social ties with their compatriots and hemşehris. Religious conservatism becomes the urban culture, when ethnic and provincial connections fail to provide strong ties within identity affiliations.

These conclusions help us to understand the characteristics of social relations between workers and their employers and among workers within the labor process. Characteristics of the segmentation of labor in the urban setting both render informal labor practices viable and prevent the transformation of this multiplicity into organizational uniformity. It renders them viable, because workers do not have a common civic culture based on class-consciousness. It prevents their transformation into the factory system (or any other particular uniform labor practice) because characteristics of this segmentation pertinent to Istanbul make ethnicity-, province-, and religion-based ghettos exceptional cases in the human geography of this city. Thus, the symbiosis between workers and owners of the Center Firm in the İğdır Quarter does not take place in Bağcılar. The heterogeneity in the workforce results in a high rate of worker turnover. This hampers the “organizational evolution” of small-sized work organizations.

The fourth and fifth chapters are intended to analyze the social dynamics shaping the organizational characteristics of target labor practices from within and without the labor process. As for the relations among capitals, characteristics of the relationship between capital and labor are contextualized within the urban setting. Organizational dynamics cannot be investigated with a mere focus on the shop floor tension or with a limited investigation of the characteristics of supply chains. Social relations in the urban space are endogenous to the making of different labor practices.
QUESTION III: RELATIONS OF WORKERS WITH THEIR COMMUNITY AND THE REDUCTION PROCESS

“Yeah, I know what DIKS is. It’s a big textile firm, right?” U.R.F. was one of my closest friends at the Center Factory. He apparently had never heard of DISK (Revolutionary Workers Unions Confederation) before, the second largest union confederation in Turkey. “DIKS” (not DISK) was a textile firm for him. Nor was he aware of TÜRK-İŞ (Worker Unions Confederation of Turkey), the largest union confederation in Turkey. When I asked him about this union confederation, he replied in an astonished tone, “Turkish?”

Most of the young workers in the clothing industry are disconnected from labor politics and its history. However, this does not mean that they do not think about their experience in the labor process. The discursive differences between politically motivated intellectuals (or activists) and workers unfortunately yield an enormous communicative gap severing connections between pro-labor political movements and the workers. Thus, it is a major challenge to frame workers’ thinking patterns with regard to their individual experiences of work and social life. In this chapter, I want to share some of the ideas I exchanged with my coworkers in order to provide some hints about their discourse regarding the labor process, their everyday life problems, and their relations with their community.

6.1 POLITICS, WORK, AND SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS: MR. U.R.F.

U.R.F.’s father migrated to Zeytinburnu, Istanbul, in 1974. Until 1979, he worked as a storage worker for a textile firm. After he got married in 1979, he began to work at another factory, again as storage staff. In the same year, once after a strike broke out, U.R.F.’s father supported the employer’s decision to lock-out. As a reward for his loyalty, he was re-employed at the same factory after the strike was over, but, when the factory moved to another district in 1982, he was laid off. From then to the year 2008, he had worked at more than ten clothing factories and sweatshops as an ironer.

Less preferable than the sewing section, the ironing section is characterized by particularly harsh work conditions as well as easy-entry jobs. My conversations with the ironers confirmed that they believed theirs to be a dead-end trade, since being an experienced ironer did not privilege them whatsoever. In the sewing section, though, workers take less skilled positions such as sweepers and then become overlock and sewing machine operators. Most of the ironers, thus, expressed their regret in deciding to become an ironer. Although they wished to transfer to the sewing department, it was almost impossible after one reached his mid-twenties to find a job as a sewing machine operator.

Suffering in this vicious cycle, U.R.F.’s father had never had a job with social benefits. This means that throughout his employment history he was paid less than formally employed workers. Although he was an early migrant to Istanbul, he was not able to save money in order to buy an apartment. Nor could he build a squatter settlement in his neighborhood, probably because he did not have an extended family in Istanbul, who could have cooperated with him in the struggle.
to enclose a plot for the entire family. Thus, U.R.F.’s family was an ideal-typical wage-laborer household. They did not receive any support from their relatives in their hometown. Their only source of income was the wages of the family members. They were also seriously suffering from the duress of rent for their apartment.

U.R.F. had four siblings. He had one older and one younger brother and neither of them had a permanent job, as they frequently quit their positions. When I asked U.R.F.’s big brother the reason why he could not find a satisfactory job, he said that he did not want to be “chained in a prison all his life.” This was apparently a reaction to proletarianization. The cost of his attitude was, however, the extra burden on his family members—U.R.F.’s father, U.R.F.’s two sisters, and U.R.F. himself—who endured the same conditions with enormous patience. Another problem the family had to deal with was U.R.F.’s little sister’s health conditions, as she suffered from Down’s syndrome. Her mother was, thus, obliged to stay home and take care of her.

My curiosity about U.R.F.’s worldview grew stronger after I met his family members. U.R.F.’s big sister got married at the time of the project and her younger sister would probably get married within a couple of years. The family would then depend entirely on the income supplied by U.R.F. and his father. As the family did not have any assets such as an apartment, a car, or even a small plot of land in a distant district of Istanbul, U.R.F. grew up in a family that had no particular strategy for upward mobility.

At the age of seven, U.R.F. began to work as a shoe polisher on the streets of his neighborhood. He collected used paper and sometimes stole things such as a few pounds of coal from people’s cellars in order to sell them to a garbage collector:

> When you are a kid, you don’t have fear. You don’t fear being sworn at, humiliated, or beaten. You have the power to turn the world upside down.

U.R.F. began to work at sweatshops at the age of eleven and had thus far worked at more than ten clothing sweatshops and factories. His first workplace was a small sweatshop where shifts were unbearably long for a little child. He remembered very well the time when the father of one of his friends the same age as him asked the sweatshop owner to let his child come home after the regular shift. The sweatshop owner refused the request, and the father simply took his child home. That was the first time U.R.F. realized the relationship between his work conditions and his class status: “The kid just left, and there I was, still fucking working overtime.”

He did not have a job with social security benefits in his teenage years, nor did he try particularly hard to find one. In this period of his life, he developed close friendships with some other workers his age and began to act in conjunction with them when it came to employment-related decisions. This was nothing exceptional, as many teenage male workers develop close friendships with a few other young workers in their early years in the apparel sector. They gradually begin to make decisions together about where and how long to work. If one of them has a problem with the foreman, all of them quit their jobs, since the sweatshop offers almost nothing but a meager salary. They then set out to look for jobs together once again in “gangs.” Young workers are often oppressed by older workers and foremen. Friendship for a young worker is, thus, sometimes more important than the job itself. Single young male workers also have a relatively lighter burden to shoulder than married workers, if their siblings contribute to their household income as well.
After spending a few years following his friends from one sweatshop to the next, U.R.F. began to take on a bigger share of family responsibilities, as his brothers lost their work discipline. Until his twentieth birthday, when he did his mandatory military service for one year, he had gradually become a disciplined textile worker. The childish sense of timelessness and the associated feeling of freedom were slowly replaced by a more mature sense of rigid time: The day began and ended with work. Time was still not experienced in the scope of months or years. It was still the day that mattered for U.R.F., yet his family needed money and the guilt of not toiling to provide for their future—as vague as that future might be—kept him working day in and day out.

He conscribed for his mandatory military service when he was twenty years old. The convention in most working class families is to let the young man rest for a month or two upon his return. However, because of his family's economic hardship, he began to work as soon as he was back in the neighborhood. For almost a year, he found himself in an erratic psychological state, much like he had been in his teenage years. His first job was at a factory which paid his salary regularly and provided fringe benefits, yet he could not “hold on”; The weight of the military discipline he had received apparently made workplace discipline unendurable.

Moreover, military service is a particularly important point in men’s lives in Turkey, since the family of the male worker expects him to take greater responsibility for his family upon his return, since the boy is believed to have grown into a man. Thus, U.R.F. felt the need to find a decent job and, feeling guilty because he quit his last position, he very quickly started looking for another job, but failed. Despite his determination, depression had apparently sunk in; Several times that year, he worked at a sweatshop until lunchtime, had his lunch, and left the place without informing anybody. Nor was he lucky: He was not able to find a formal position with fringe benefits, since, as he put it, “You got to know people.”

Observing the psychological state U.R.F. was in, his mother intervened. They were distant relatives with the family which owned the Center Factory. As U.R.F.’s attitude towards work had begun to resemble that of his brothers’, U.R.F.’s mother literally took U.R.F. and his brothers to the factory and introduced them to one of the brothers of the firm owner in 2005. He gave them a position in the sewing section. U.R.F.’s brothers quit their jobs the same month. U.R.F. had been working at the Center Factory ever since.

With his new job at the factory, discipline settled in: He stopped hanging out at the coffeehouses in the neighborhood. The last time he had had two beers, he had gotten aggressive, started yelling on the street at night, and gotten beaten up by the young men in the neighborhood. Thus, he quit drinking, as he came to believe that alcohol made him lose control. He had never been a heavy drinker anyway:

> Sometimes, I ask myself: I don’t drink, I don’t smoke, I don’t go to the coffeehouse. Well, then, what do I do?

As an experienced sewing machine operator, he was given a variety of tasks and used as “emergency help” by the foremen, whenever a bottleneck disrupted the assembly line. Once, when a few sweepers did not turn up for work, we even worked side-by-side as sweepers. Taking the organizational responsibility off my shoulders, he managed different parties of pieces all day,
yet he would later complain that he hated being a sweeper, since “to deal with people [was] much more difficult than to work on the sewing machine.”

Sweepers need to be in constant contact with the machine operators, since sizes and patterns continuously change and sweepers link all the machine operators together. Like most machine operators, U.R.F. preferred to work in isolation and to keep verbal communication with other workers to a minimum in order to enjoy daydreaming while he worked. Although I was working at the clothing workplaces for my research and so talking to workers was my primary objective, even I occasionally preferred daydreaming to constantly talking to other workers: The practice of work urges the worker to daydream.

Being a disciplined worker, however, does not eliminate one’s problems outside the workplace. If one’s work is an experience which requires no “thinking,” then one’s problems outside the world of factory labor require one to be clever and to act as cleverly as possible. For instance, workers at the Center Factory received their salaries from an ATM within the factory. The ATM account provided monthly credit of approximately $200 for each worker. The annual interest rate was a phenomenal figure of more than a hundred percent, while the annual inflation rate was less than ten percent during the project. Thanks to the lack of solidarity among workers, it was an uncommon practice to borrow money from co-workers. The bank owning the ATM at the factory certainly took advantage of this situation by charging astronomical interest rates.94

One month prior to the participant observation at the factory, U.R.F.’s mother got sick. His father did not have health insurance, and his mother was unable to benefit from U.R.F.’s health insurance. U.R.F. therefore took her to a private hospital and bought her the prescribed medicine. In order to cover these expenses, he needed to withdraw $200 as credit from the ATM. His monthly salary was approximately $400 paid in two installments every two weeks. He paid back the debt; however, his family still expected him to give them money. U.R.F. usually gave $300 of his monthly salary to his mother and took the rest as his pocket money. His contribution to the family budget went directly to the landlady, who was his mother’s sister, as the monthly rent.95

Since he was too embarrassed to tell them he had run out of money, he lied and told them that salary payments at the factory had been delayed for a week. He was looking for a solution to overcome this crisis. Lucky for him, that month was the time for tax returns. However, the exact date was unknown to the workers. The payment was made by the firm, not directly by the government. That payment was delayed, either because the state department did not make the payment to the firm on time or because the management probably chose to keep the money for a while for accounting-related purposes. Thus, everyday of that month was torture for U.R.F. who waited for the money every single moment of the workday.

94. Aware of the workers’ need for credit, banks sent their representatives to the cafes or kiosks around the factory, where workers hung out during their lunch breaks, to sell credit cards. All of my friends had at least one credit card, which they were paying a monthly fee for, whether they used it or not. One of my friends had five credit cards and the total annual fee for his cards was equal to half of his monthly salary. Workers were willing to pay these enormous fees, since they would do anything but borrow money from their coworkers.

95. Although one would expect the aunt to have some pity on this family, U.R.F.’s mother and aunt were on extremely negative terms. They stopped talking to each other two years ago. Thus, U.R.F.’s family later moved to another apartment in the same neighborhood. This time, the landlord was not an extended family member. He was not even somebody from the same hometown. The rent was lower and they were on much better terms with the landlord.
In addition to such financial concerns, his family and his acquaintances began to expect him to get married. Marriage is a serious concern for all young workers, not only in terms of finding a good partner, but in terms of financing the costs of the ceremony as well. The father would expect the prospective groom to have a steady job and some attractive assets, the most important of which would certainly be an apartment or even a family building:

Everyone keeps asking me when I’m going to get married. Don’t they know that this is no joke? They won’t stop asking, I swear. Don’t they know that the first thing the girl’s father is going to ask me is if I have my own house? Who in his right mind would give his daughter to me anyway?

U.R.F.’s concerns were further evidence to my observations on the stigma of being a renter; if U.R.F. was to spend more than fifty percent of his salary on rent, how would he be able to take care of his wife?

U.R.F.’s mother was also eager to get him married as soon as possible; she was convinced that the responsibility of marriage was the only thing that would keep U.R.F. working. Marriage, she expected, would distance him from the kind of psychological state his brothers were in. Thus, she always spoke of her wish for U.R.F. to marry. She had asked him to talk to the girls at the factory:

She tells me to fall in love with a girl. With what money? When I say this, she says even people without money can love each other. How can you fall in love with someone because you’ve been told to?

U.R.F. is not the only victim of such pressure. Many co-workers of mine, both male and female, asked me about my marriage plans soon after we had been introduced. This question was almost as typical as the questions about your age, hometown, and education. In the case of U.R.F., however, this question became something beyond that of peer pressure. I want to provide verbatim some of his statements on various occasions as responses to or independent of my questions:

UB: Do you plan to get married?
U.R.F.: Everyone asks me that. Well, no: I don’t. I swear I can’t figure if people are just making fun of me when they ask this question. I simply can’t say anything to them. What am I supposed to say?
UB: Hey, don’t get me wrong. I meant to ask if you had long-term plans for the future.
U.R.F.: No, I don’t. I don’t have any plans. I mean… This doesn’t mean life doesn’t mean anything to me, but I don’t have any long-term plans. I mean, we just have normal lives. We go to work in the morning and come back at night. I mean, I don’t think anything. I mean, I don’t even think of making plans. I don’t think of it at work. I mean, it’s weird (He laughs). For example, you know Mr. S.I.I. at work. He ran into me the other day and asked, “U.R.F., when are you going to get married?” And I said, “I don’t think about marriage, I think about this pile that I’m working on right now…”
U.R.F. [On another occasion, in the middle of a conversation about the neighborhood] Utku, you know, it’s on everyone’s tongue, “Aren’t you gonna get married?” No
questions about me or how I’m doing. I don’t get why they keep asking that. Is it ‘cause they care about me? Or just to make fun of me?

UB: A bit of both I’d say,

[UB: This conversation took place after work around midnight at a coffeehouse in the middle of the neighborhood. While we were drinking tea and conversing, some of U.R.F.’s or our common friends were passing by and we greeted each other. One of his friends sat with us for a while; he was an apparel worker who had gotten married a few years earlier to an Azerbaijani woman. Three years ago his wife had run away, back to her home country, and he had been in depression ever since. He was obviously drunk, but he lied to us about having overtime that night and said he was on his way back from work. He had not had a regular job since his divorce. After the man left for home, U.R.F. began to talk about him.]

U.R.F.: Look at that guy! He married that woman, and now he’s nothing but a scumbag. He’s drunk, with his red eyes, fooling around. He’s been like that for three years now. Look, sometimes people have money, but they’re not decent. Some are poor, but their hearts’ are bountiful. Take Sabancı [UB: Sakıp Sabancı, one of the richest industrialists in Turkey]: He had everything, but he complained that he couldn’t give one of the million cars he owns to his son [UB: Sakıp Sabancı’s only son suffered from a health problem similar to that of U.R.F.’s little sister.]

How did U.R.F. deal with these problems? He obviously did not have any ordinary habits that would ameliorate his daily pressures, such as drinking with friends or playing cards for the bill at the neighborhood coffeehouse. These activities cost a significant amount of money. He had had a mild addiction to the lottery and used to spend approximately twenty Turkish Liras every week for lottery tickets until a few years ago, but then he gave that up as well.

A way to kill time on the weekends was to visit different city quarters and to go shopping for clothes. On Sundays, he went with his close friends to city centers in the area such as Bakırköy. He had been to middle-class city centers such as Taksim only once or twice, because hanging out at those districts was too costly for a worker. Thus, other, more affordable centers such as Bakırköy or Şirinevler, which were in the same region as Bağcılar, provided recreational activities in the form of shopping. U.R.F. and his friends usually spent their Sundays walking around these areas, watching the people and gazing at shop windows, and sometimes buying affordable clothes. He saw his consumption patterns as a weakness though. He was not really keen on “looking good.” Buying clothes for himself was how he treated himself after a stressful week. However, big purchases were always a matter of regret. Having recently bought an expensive cellular phone, he regretted it in the following months:

Who the hell am I to go buy this phone? I can’t believe I paid all that money for this thing. I can’t believe I literally have to work an entire month to pay for it. [UB: The phone cost him 650 Turkish Liras, slightly more than his monthly salary.]

Despite all of these vacillations between regret and pleasure, U.R.F. still had a real passion that he could afford without feeling guilty: U.R.F. believed that there was a treasure in the village in his hometown, Iğdır. Although his mother and sisters made fun of them, his father and U.R.F. were determined to find that treasure one day. In fact, he was actually certain he knew the exact spot
where the treasure was buried: between the neighboring village and his own. However, since he was afraid of being noticed by others and of thus revealing the location, he had not yet set out on this campaign. He had just taken pictures of a stone on the spot which was engraved with fascinating symbols.

U.R.F. showed me these pictures several times and asked a lot of questions about the possible meaning of the symbols. Moreover, his father later asked me to bring them a metal detector from the United States, though he changed his mind shortly after. As a regular topic of discussion with his father, treasure hunting was a relatively harmless (and economical) sport. Although he had also got in touch with dealers selling treasure maps, fortunately, he had not spent money much on such maps.

Since U.R.F. kept asking me for help in getting the scripts on these pictures translated, I consulted a friend of mine who was an archeologist, and asked him about the possible archeological heritage of the area. His advice was quite discouraging: His guess was that these symbols were from a pre-historic period, and most probably had nothing to do with any precious relics. Moreover, there were a myriad of sites my friend was familiar with in the region where these symbols appeared, and in some, relics were actually buried. However, the abundance of these relics made them almost worthless in the eyes of treasure hunters. Although this news did not cause U.R.F. to lose his enthusiasm for treasure hunting altogether, it was unexpected.

This interest in treasure hunting was probably a way for U.R.F. and his father to momentarily put off thinking about their usual problems. Apparel workers are, for the same reason, involved in activities that are not highly regarded by their communities: Male workers play cards for the bill, while single women workers secretly chat with boys on the Internet (something that is “not approved of” by the community, but also an activity that would not defile their honor). U.R.F. was a disciplined worker, because he had learnt in his early twenties how difficult it could be to find a job as decent as his position at the Center Factory. Treasure hunting was his little escape, though he had never actually searched for a treasure. In truth, it was just a subject of conversation with his father and friends, rather than a passion.

In addition to his interest in treasure hunting, U.F.K. had another strange “habit”: skipping work once in a while without informing the foreman, even though he had no other plans on that day. His close friends and the foreman probably knew that skipping work without excuse was his strange routine. Although his foreman had yelled and humiliated him in front of a large group of workers several times, his satisfactory job performance and possibly his family being distant relatives of the employer kept him, to some extent, in a relatively safe position. Why did he take a day off once in a while without letting the foreman know, and thus risking his position at the Center Factory?

Sometimes, I think to myself and say, “I’m not going to work today.” That’s what I did the other day. Of course, it blew up pretty bad [He laughs]. [The foreman] yelled at me and Mr. O.Y.Y. [UB: the manager] called me to his office. It was a bad idea and Mr. O.Y.Y. was right. I feel bad right now, because I skipped a day of work for no reason at all. I feel like I left them in the lurch, but I don’t know why I did it. When I skip a day, I feel free, like I don’t depend on anybody. I feel independent. I feel like I can do whatever I want. It’s not all about having a good life. Money is not the real issue here. Ok, we live in
harsh economic conditions, but what matters here is what I think, what I feel. What can I do? If I don’t feel like working this week, I hang out. If I don’t have money, I stay at home.

Under the pressure of family responsibilities and without clear plans for the future in terms of upward social mobility, U.R.F. fought his problems in two different time spans. On the one hand, the pressure put on him to marry called for a plan regarding his career and his chances to save money for a better future. On the other hand, the daily pressure to provide for his family put him in a temporal framework set by the urgency of his daily problems: Weeks and sometimes even days mattered in his struggle to make ends meet. What is more, the labor process at the factory made him perform according to the rhythm of the work organization; the crisis in the assembly line, conflicts with the foremen and other workers, and the overall difficulty of the actual task itself isolated U.R.F. from all his other concerns. The assembly line had its own temporality.

U.R.F.: Monday morning. There I am, at work again. Then, it’s evening. Before I know it, I’m already back home sleeping.

UB: For example, if you want to go somewhere after work, do you plan it during work hours or do you plan it right after your shift?

U.R.F.: No, I don’t plan anything beforehand. For example, I might tell you that I’ll meet you tomorrow, and I might not turn up. I mean, I never stop and say “Oh, I’m going to do this tomorrow.” I don’t think like that. I guess I live like a vegetable [He laughs].

UB: That’s alright, I guess. Maybe if you made plans and couldn’t stick to them, then that would upset you?

U.R.F.: Yeah. Like, they say they’re giving us our tax return tomorrow. Say I made plans and I wasn’t paid, then I’d be upset. So I just don’t think about it. If the money were to arrive in the evening, that’d be great. All I thought about before was the treasure in my village. Now, I don’t even think about that anymore. I mean, that was like a sort of adventure for me. Do you remember the things I showed you? [UB: the pictures of the symbols]. That was the only thing that mattered to me and I wiped that out of my head, too. Soon it will all be gone.

UB: Last semester, I was teaching all these different courses five days a week. Of course it was nothing like the thing we do at the factory, but I kinda understand how you feel, having to go to work everyday. I actually got a better grasp of how you feel after I began working here. When the shift ends, I feel so relieved.

U.R.F.: But what you’re trying to do here does mean something [UB: He refers to the research]. I mean, it’s great. It really sounds wonderful. But I don’t have anything like that in my life. I don’t have any plans for the future. But look at you, you’re doing your research. I don’t even have anything to be curious about. But I’m not tired of life. As of now, I don’t have anything to think about, but maybe I’ll have something in the future. Now, I just do whatever I want to do at that moment. If I feel like going shopping, I do. Sometimes, I think of useless things. Sometimes, I think to myself, “What the hell am I doing here? Couldn’t I get a better job?” Then I ask myself, “Is there such thing as a better job? Everything’s fucked up as it is anyways.” First you think that some other job might be better than yours. Then, you see how fucked up that one is too. Sometimes too much money corrupts you, sometimes poverty does. Everything in this life is a problem.
UB: You’re right.

U.R.F.: I mean… I just think about this stuff sometimes. Then, they all go away. I sing a song and everything is alright [he laughs].

For U.R.F., “Union is a good thing. Union means that you don’t work for more than eight hours. Your salary is paid on time and you have benefits.” He had never worked at a unionized workplace. He had not even heard of the names of the biggest union confederations. He had realized his class position in his early teens, when the relatively well-to-do father of his friend took his son from the sweatshop, and he still had to work until 11:00 pm. However, his father, like the large majority in the neighborhood, was a supporter of ultra-nationalist politics, which was historically against labor unions and progressive labor politics. U.R.F. participated in a couple of ultra-nationalist demonstrations against the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) and even met some people at those political events. He also used to go to the district locale of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), but the social relations between the regulars had made him uncomfortable. He then quit going. How does this worker see the notion of surplus-value?

UB: Do you think that you have a good job here?

U.R.F.: Yes. For example, at this factory, you have your salary paid on time. You have bonuses twice a year. Your benefits are paid. These are good conditions. If you don’t want to work with these conditions, then that’s your choice. You get what you deserve here. Or, at least, that’s what I want to make myself believe.

UB: Ok, you just said that you get what you deserve here, and then you said that’s what you want to believe. How come? Can you make yourself believe you have a good job?

U.R.F.: For example, I work. I mean, I go to the factory. I have family problems, other problems… When I am under that roof, I tell myself, “Forget all of that and just focus on your work.” When I’m out the factory, I say, “Leave everything behind, under that roof.” If a person doesn’t let the problems in his private life influence his work, then he can work well. But maybe I’m just kidding myself.

UB: There is a concept I want to ask you about. For example, think about how an employer pays for the electricity, other costs, fabric, etc. And the machinery.

U.R.F.: Yeah, he pays for the machinery only once.

UB: Yeah. And then when you add it all up, including your salary, there is still a gap between these costs and the price of the final merchandise. Where does the rest come from?

U.R.F.: Well, I’ve thought about that before. Ok, so we make the garments, right, we do the sewing job. He [UB: the employer] sells a pair of jeans for a hundred bucks, so I make hundred bucks. He pays me twenty bucks. Twenty bucks is mine. All he gives me is twenty bucks. Look at the money he makes here! [He laughs]. I thought about that at the jean sweatshop I was talking about. Remember? The place where the kid’s father didn’t let him work because of overtime. I thought about that, when I was working there as a sweeper. We made about a thousand pairs of jeans a day. And all he gives me was about half the money he’ll earn by selling just one pair. I mean, he doesn’t even give me the money for one single pair of jeans.
UB: Don’t you think that’s unfair?

U.R.F.: Yes, it is.

UB: Then how do you handle it?

U.R.F.: Because you have to. What else can you do? You can either take it or leave it.

UB: I wonder if the other workers give this much thought?

U.R.F.: Sure they do. That is, they wonder why they aren’t paid more, like a thousand bucks a month.

UB: No no, I mean the thing we’re talking about.

U.R.F.: Hmm… No, they don’t, because they’re all idiots [He laughs]. Now I think I’m a smartass, but I’m an idiot too [He laughs] Sometimes, I ask myself, “What the hell am I doing here?” I could have had another occupation. I could have got an education. I look at the sewing machine at work. That is, I could have a better occupation; I could have done better things. I ask myself, “What the hell am I doing here? Is this my destiny?” Of course, you can’t call this your destiny. You have to find a way out, line your pockets. [He means illegally.] I can’t do that, either. I don’t want dirty money.

UB: Yeah, if you’re lucky, things sometimes turn out ok. But why don’t people unite?

U.R.F.: Meaning, people fighting for their rights?

UB: Yes, indeed.

U.R.F.: You know why, because nobody trusts anyone. Nowadays people just mind their own business. All this meaningless stuff. Everyone’s gone cyber-mad, over fourteen [UB: Herkes sanalçı olmuş, en az ondört.]

UB: What’s that supposed to mean?


UB: I still don’t have a clue what you’re talking about.

U.R.F.: I mean everyone’s into this cyber thing, the internet. If you’re over fourteen, you’re into it. I mean, even young kids have been sucked into this cyber world. People lock themselves up in their rooms, do stupid things, meaningless things. They do stuff on their computer. People have to feed their faces but still, you have them sitting in front of computers. They eat their fill and then just go on the internet. This is what I think of the virtual, cyber world. But it really does me no harm. So, everything is just ok.

UB: So the problem isn’t just about you earning a meager wage, but also that when you earn less, you are obliged to work, eh?

U.R.F.: For example, you know I told you about that kid at that jean sweatshop. His father had this 4-5 storey building. He didn’t have to make his kid work. But, if he’d been suffering from [economic] hardship, his kid would have had to work there. I told you before, if I had money somewhere, I would defy everyone. Seriously… Everyone needs a father like that, one who has money. Do you see? His father came in and told the sweatshop boss that no kid of his was gonna be working overtime. I said to myself, “See, this guy has money and his kid doesn’t have to work overtime.” The man just took his kid and left. See the difference between a rich guy and a poor guy?
UB: So how are things between your father and your brothers?

U.R.F.: Not good of course …

U.R.F. theorized the notion of surplus-value in his early years as a teenage textile worker at a small sweatshop. Then, he stopped thinking about it. He believed that the contract between employer and worker was just, because there was a contract. In other words, the injustice would arise only if the terms of contract were not executed. This notion of employment, however, conflicted with his clear understanding that he produced more than what he received in compensation. Caught in such an analytical dilemma, “reality” reminded U.R.F. of his weakness as a worker vis-à-vis his employers. In one of our last conversations during the project, he said that he had decided to pray more often.

6.2 BIG PLANS, BIG TIMES: MR. M.L.

While we were having a couple of beers on one of the few empty plots in Yenimahalle, F.M.F.F. and M.L. had a heated debate about the politics in their neighborhood. M.L. and I had met thanks to a mutual friend in Bağcılar. He helped me find the job at the Independent Sweatshop as an undercover agent. With his Che Guevara tattoo on his arm, he certainly made a difference not only in his workplace, but also in his neighborhood. His workmate at the Independent Sweatshop, F.M.F.F., was the one who drew that tattoo on M.L.’s arm. M.L. was a Marxist, actively involved in one of the left-wing groups in his neighborhood. F.M.F.F. was an anarchist.

F.M.F.F. had just finished his long monologue on why he disliked the leftists in Yenimahalle. He did not like the music genre which was popular among leftists. He did not like their “seriousness.” For F.M.F.F., “Capitalism was theorized after it came into existence, so it should reflect something of human nature. [Thus] it is not artificial at all.” According to F.M.F.F., what revolutionaries in his neighborhood were trying to do was just old-fashioned:

I first began to listen to Hard Rock and Metal. I learned about anarchism and Marxism from the Metal music I listened to… I had this friend who went to Mayday and saw this girl in Converse shoes and wearing locks in the cortege of the Turkish Communist Party. He thought she looked cool and he joined the party next day. Leftists don’t understand the importance of such things. They want everybody to like the things they like.

The discussion turned into a heated debate when F.M.F.F. attacked the cultural codes of the leftists. M.L. kept asking questions like “What’s wrong with our songs?” or “Why can’t you get along with us?” At some point, F.M.F.F. sarcastically commented:


F.M.F.F. was born in Istanbul. His family migrated from Amasya, an Eastern Black Sea province. He had been in a Buddhist circle for a while. When we first met, he was in the tattoo business. His
tools were not of high quality and he was saving money to buy better ones. Then, he would be able to make more money.

M.L. was not taking F.M.F.F. too seriously in this conversation. F.M.F.F. was simply an interesting guy for him. As a matter of fact, twenty minutes after this dialogue, M.L. fell asleep on the grass, while F.M.F.F. and I carried on talking. It had been a busy day at the sweatshop and all of us were very tired. As a respected member of his community, he was too self-confident to take F.M.F.F.’s comments as attacks challenging his ideological stance (or his masculinity). Although he had luckily never been sentenced to prison, he had been in gun fights before. As he had a reputation in the neighborhood for being a tough guy, now and then his hemşehris would come to him to get “help with some personal business.”

His criminal record was one of the reasons why he had never taken a job at a factory. He had worked at several sweatshops, never longer than a year. M.L.’s family had moved to Istanbul from Erzincan, an Eastern Anatolian town, in 1988, when he was thirteen years old. His father was in Germany as a worker between 1982 and 1988, while M.L. and his family were in their village in Erzincan. When his father visited his village, M.L.’s grandfather did not allow him to go back to Germany, since his grandfather had problems with M.L.’s uncle and he needed M.L.’s father to help solve these problems in the village. Although M.L.’s father came back to Turkey, he soon took his family to Istanbul and bought some land in Yenimahalle in order to build an apartment building with the money he had saved in Germany. After they migrated to Istanbul, M.L.’s father opened a bakery with some partners from Bitlis, another Eastern Anatolian town, but problems with the partners ruined the business within a couple of years.

When M.L.’s father died in 1994 and his big brother migrated to Saudi Arabia to work at construction sites, M.L. took the responsibility for the family. Since their migration to Istanbul, he had been working at apparel sweatshops. He got married in 1998, but soon after decided he wanted a divorce. He got married for a second time in 2003. He met his second wife, a Turkish Sunni woman, at a sweatshop. Her family did not approve of the marriage, since M.L. was Zaza and Alevi. His wife quit her job after they got married and, according to M.L., his mother-in-law constantly put ideas into her head, no matter how hard he tried to provide a good life for her. They had a daughter, and soon after, she left and returned to her family’s home. In a last attempt to win his wife back, he tried to talk to his father-in-law and, once the conversation turned into a fight, M.L. stabbed his father-in-law in the leg. He had seen neither his wife nor his daughter ever since, though he still bore hope of getting his daughter back in the future.

Although his father had planned to have a multi-storey building built on the plot he bought with the money he had saved up in Germany, they had had problems with the contractor. The family ended up with a two-storey building with four apartments and a shop on the ground floor. M.L., his two older brothers, his mother, and his younger brother all stayed in different apartments of the same building. His apartment had all of the necessary home appliances, remnants of his wife’s trousseau, such as a big refrigerator, which was not even connected to the ground line. How did these traits in M.L.’s personality interact with his identity as a worker?

Unlike U.R.F., M.L. never took leave of absence. Being a diligent worker, his performance was much appreciated. However, M.L. had never worked at a sweatshop for a long time. He simply “got bored” and needed to have a little rest now and then. Saving some money for eight or nine
months a year, he usually quit his job in the summer, in order to either go to his village in Erzincan or hang around the neighborhood and have his vacation there.

This is a common occupational pattern for many young male workers. Before they get married, they simply quit their job for one or two months a year because of the harsh work conditions. They enjoy the luxury of being taken care of by their mothers. They know they will not have this opportunity once they have their own family. They also know that to be a disciplined worker, especially at a sweatshop, does not lead to an increase in compensation in the long-run. Nor does his salary enable the worker to save a substantial amount of money. The only possible benefit is the right to fringe benefits, as “old timers” of a sweatshop can conventionally demand from the sweatshop owners, yet this is never a very solid promise. Thus, to work at a sweatshop interruptedly for years is simply not worth the torture. If it is possible to put some money aside in the winter, an unmarried male worker might prefer to spend the nice summer days at his neighborhood coffeehouse, rather than at a hot and dusty sweatshop.

During and after my observations at the Independent Sweatshop, M.L. and I hung out many times in the neighborhood. He quit his job at that sweatshop one month after I completed my observations. While I was concerned about his job prospects, he himself seemed not to care about his next job. There were quite a few sweatshops in his neighborhood. He knew the owners of many of them personally. Thus, finding a new job would be no serious problem. Moreover, unlike many other workers, he had the luxury of owning his apartment, so he did not have to pay rent. Although he was not on perfect terms with his brothers, his mother would cook a hearty meal for him from time to time. In other words, he was partially emancipated from the constant crisis of the daily life problems that an ordinary apparel worker experiences.

His seemingly careless attitude towards his future, however, should not deceive the reader. He had his own plans, but they were as unrealistic as U.R.F.’s. For instance, at the time of the project, the government offered low interest credit for farmers in order to alleviate the depression of the prices for agricultural produce during the project. M.L. was planning to go back to his village and pretend he was farming in the village in order to draw the credit. What he planned to do with the money instead was to build additional stories to their building and to rent the new apartments out. Furthermore, the shop in their building was rent by a mechanic. However, since the mechanic did not have a proper work permit, he had recently moved to another neighborhood where he could hide and be safe from tax agents. M.L. was in a constant and unsuccessful effort to convince his brothers to open a sweatshop of their own.

For two months after he quit his job at the Independent Sweatshop, he worked as a bouncer at a night club in Okmeydanı, one of the first squatter settlements in Istanbul in the ISI Basin, which is much closer to the metropolitan center of Istanbul than Bağcilar. Thanks to his political connections, he knew people in that district. Like many pubs in working class neighborhoods, this club employed B-girls and needed men to protect them from the customers’ excessive sexual abuse. Having worked there for a couple of months, once again bored and dissatisfied, he came back to “the industrial life.” When I formally completed the project, he was working at a sweatshop in a neighborhood next to Yenimahalle.

These “grand projects” were not M.L.’s only attempts to find an alternative to his occupational career. In 2000, he was offered the position of foreman at a sweatshop. As a successful organizer,
he helped the production capacity of the sweatshop grow swiftly to the point that the owner had to hire a second foreman. The latter man was a supporter of Hizbullah, a religious fundamentalist and illegal political movement. He persuaded the sweatshop owner to separate the tasks between men and women in order to block the visual and physical contact between male and female workers. His motivation was to turn the sweatshop into an “Islamic” workplace. Alevi belief is antithetical to the Sunni orientation of a rigid gender separation in workplaces. Thus, M.L. felt that the new organization was against both his political and religious beliefs. Furthermore, as productivity fell as a result of this rigid system, the owner put the blame both on M.L. and the other foreman, although it was the other foreman’s idea to have a gendered assembly line in the first place. He quit his job, as he felt that he had lost the ideological struggle in this sweatshop.

He once worked as a subcontracting agent for a factory as well. As elaborated in detail in the previous chapters, these agents provide close supervision during the labor process in order to assure the quality of the output. Some firms hire them on their payroll, while some of them grant commission on the basis of the number of pieces that the subcontracting agents distribute to the sweatshops. M.L. worked for a commission with an approximate rate of two percent. For instance, to earn an amount of 1,000 TL (approximately $600), he needed to manage orders worth 50,000 TL. For simple designs, this amounts to more than 30,000 pieces. This is usually larger than a single sweatshop can finish in a short period time. Moreover, terms are usually quite short in the apparel sector. Thus, subcontracting agents need to deal with multiple sweatshops most of the time. He realized that he could not bear the risks involved in taking such huge orders. Cunning sweatshop owners did their best to decrease the quality of the products for faster output:

Once, one of the sweatshop owners delivered this party with many defective pieces. I took the pieces back and told him to fix them. Three days later, he called and asked me to go pick up the finished apparels, but they were in no better shape than before. I went crazy. He had wasted two weeks of my time and I just didn’t know what to do. I told him that I would not work with him anymore and that he would not get his money. He said, “Don’t you have any mercy?” And I told him, “You don’t have mercy yourself, given that you tried to fuck me over with this shit”....

The work hours of middlemen are simply too long. The foremen assume the burden of sweepers and overlock machine operators... Being a sewing machine operator is still the best option, since the only burden you have to bear is that of yourself and your machine.

M.L. was certainly an outstanding character in his neighborhood, but then again, it is hard to come across a sweatshop worker in Yenimahalle who has no striking personality traits. They all respond to and cope with chaotic social relations in the neighborhood, relationships with their family and community, and the routine of the labor process in different ways. Sweatshop workers lie, cheat, run away, and sometimes get violent in order to evade the crises of their everyday lives, to make long-term decisions, and to endure the labor process.

However, in addition to the characteristics of his/her labor process and his/her neighborhood, the variety of these problems urges the worker to adopt different mentalities and even different forms of temporality, which I will elaborate on in the Conclusion. The complexity of social relations rendered the labor process a haven for the worker no matter how painful it was.
6.3 TIME, SPACE, AND BOREDOM: MS. A.Y.A.

My first week at the Center Factory was a difficult experience for me, not only because I was not used to the job or the social environment. Nor was it only about my undercover position. It was the extreme boredom caused by the nature of the job. Counting hours or even minutes, I was by no means a “professional” researcher, but just another ordinary inexperienced worker, looking forward to the end of the workday. Eventually, I got used to it. I somehow even began to like the strange feeling of being distanced from everything that was important in my life, although I did not enjoy a single minute of working in the assembly line at any of these workplaces, except those moments during which I conversed with my coworkers. Working on an assembly line means joining the rhythm of the entire work organization. As long as the worker can keep up with the rhythm, he or she is mesmerized in a mental state that separates him or her completely from the concerns of his or her life outside the workplace.

My coworkers had similar feelings about their work experience. On the one hand, boredom was a constant pressure that made the work experience difficult to endure. As Mr. M.U., a middle-aged sewing machine operator at the Center Factory, who had been working in this sector for almost three decades, once commented spontaneously in the restroom:

I wish I were a woman. At least I could stay at home and expect my husband to take care of me. This is torture, just torture.

Or during one of my conversations with Mr. T.M. and Mr. M.E., two experienced sewing machine operators at the Center Factory,

UB: [After making a series of mistakes, in an apologetic manner] I can’t focus, I keep drifting off, daydreaming all the time.

Mr. M.E.: Me, too… I dream that I’m free, I’m out of here… Could you do jail time? This place is kinda like a prison. Even the military is better. At the end of the day, you can get off your base from time to time. But here, it’s like a prison. You’re stuck inside, trapped by the walls. If they say, “We’re working overtime,” then you can’t get out until 11 pm.

UB: [To Mr. T.M.] What do you daydream about?

Mr. T.M.: My brain cells for daydreaming are dead. I lost my capacity to daydream a long time ago.

Both Mr. M.E. and Mr. T.M. were sincere in their statements, since a worker experiences both. Mr. M.E. was an astute observer of his surroundings. He eventually developed an interesting habit of keeping a mental record of the restroom routines of his male coworkers within his work unit. The practical motivation for this mental exercise was to figure out who “the free riders” of his line were, since a worker frequently deserting his position for the restroom routine meant that his coworkers in his unit would take his responsibility in the meantime. All in all, he was so successful in his observations that he was able to tell me which worker in his work unit would use the restroom, right before that worker would stand up and leave for the restroom.
In short, it was certainly impossible to daydream or to focus on any such mental activities for a shift of fourteen and a half hours. The routine nature of the tasks gives the worker the opportunity to distance himself or herself from the task at hand, while it also takes away the capacity to concentrate on a particular idea for a long period of time. The mental activity takes the form of discrete, short, and unrelated thoughts, which sporadically burst and slowly fade away. While some workers such as Mr. M.E. were able to develop esoteric skills, such as making mental records of the restroom routines of the workers or counting the number of patrols of the foremen in a workday, these were certainly exceptional cases. For instance, as a person of mediocre mental capacity unlike Mr. M.E., although I could or did daydream on the assembly line for long hours, I could not at first attempt conduct even very basic mental activities for research-related purposes, such as counting the male or female workers on the assembly line. I sometimes made three or four attempts before I could conduct such a simple mental exercise, that is, counting the number of objects or people surrounding me.

This mental slackness was not the outcome of the high pace of the work only. The source of the difficulty also lied in the routine nature of the task. Thus, concentrating on a particular thought or a mental exercise such as counting the sewing machines on the assembly line or listing the research-related activities for the day was enormously difficult for me. In other words, the nature of the work not only mentally separates the worker from the extra-workplace social dynamics, but also diminishes his or her capacity to pursue complex mental exercises except for unstructured daydreaming of discrete ideas.

My conversations especially with women workers helped me realize the content of mental practices during the workday and revealed what they thought about their work. For instance, Ms. S.Z.A., an experienced serger operator at the Independent Sweatshop, commented on how the routine of the work had “killed her intelligence”:

**UB:** When did you get your first job?

**Ms. S.Z.A.:** I’m twenty-eight years old, you know, I must be getting old [UB: She gives me a sarcastic smile]. We migrated from Sinop [UB: a province in the Black Sea Region] twelve years ago and I’ve been working at sweatshops since then….

**UB:** How do you feel after having worked in this sector for such a long time?

**Ms. S.Z.A.:** Of course I’m not happy with it, but, you know, other jobs don’t pay better either, take shop clerks for example. But, the problem with this job is it’s simply killing my intelligence. The shifts are too long. I can’t do anything except work. I can’t think of anything when I work. Sometimes, I bring something to read, put it on my lap, and try to read it. It doesn’t work. I sometimes even count the number of lines on the fabric we sew. Luckily, I’m having a two month vacation soon.

**UB:** How come?

**Ms. S.Z.A.:** Well, I’m just having a vacation. That’s it…

**UB:** But how are you gonna go on vacation? Nobody’s going on vacation soon.

**Ms. S.Z.A.:** I’m gonna quit.

**UB:** Oh, I get it. What are you going to do, on vacation I mean?
Ms. S.Z.A.: I'm gonna go to my hometown and rest.

UB: Then?

Ms. S.Z.A.: I don't know... I'll come back and look for a job, I guess.

UB: Why do you want to quit? At least you got a job here.

Ms. S.Z.A.: I'm bored, too tired. I don't wanna work here anymore. I'm having problems here.

UB: [She was most possibly implying the problems she was having with her coworkers. However, I ignored that implication] That's right. There is too much overtime. I can't handle it anymore either.

Ms. S.Z.A.: When you do overtime, you work for the boss. You don't get what you deserve. [UB: She suddenly stopped.]

UB: So?

Ms. S.Z.A.: I think I've said enough already...

UB: That's alright, I guess. I haven't seen the foreman around for a while.

Ms. S.Z.A.: I mean, I don't know. I wish we had the same rights that people in the European Union have. Don't you think that would be great?

UB: I guess so... So what are we supposed to do?

Ms. S.Z.A.: Our politicians should do something. I don't know. How should I know?

UB: I don't know either. Ok, You really seem to be sick and tired of this. Tell me, what do you think about, when you’re working? For instance, I keep checking the time and looking forward to lunchtime or the end of the workday.

Ms. S.Z.A.: [UB: She smiles with an appreciation of my sincere complaint.] I don't use my watch anymore. It was more difficult in the past. You'll get used to it. A watch doesn't help. It's easier for me now than it was before.

The reader should keep in mind that at least three quarters of the women workers at the factory and the sweatshops wore headscarves, a symbol of religious conservatism. Ms. S.Z.A. was not an exception. The strong bias regarding women wearing headscarves is that they act in a docile manner vis-à-vis men as they abide by the rules of Islamic doctrine on the generic superiority of men over women. This bias is at some level well justified, since the decision to wear a headscarf certainly comes with a conservative worldview that preaches the virtue of docility.

Moreover, the headscarf fulfills the function of concealing the individual differences among women workers. It reduces them into “well-behaved women, who seldom make history.” In other words, the headscarf plays a particular role in the industrial disciplining of women workers as much as in the preservation of patriarchy at home. The symbolic role of the headscarf is to shape gender roles at the workplace between men and women and disconnect these two groups from each other. As the headscarf homogenizes the cultural diversity among women workers, it also contributes to the segmentation of workers along with gender lines, which are already very strong thanks to the well-established patriarchal order in Turkish society.
However, the women workers wearing headscarves whom I met during the project were by no means less open-minded than other workers. Their political views were as diverse as others. They were also as critical about their work conditions as other workers were. In other words, the fact that they are conservative in their appearance does not necessarily mean that they harbor conservative opinions concerning their gender roles or that they have a conservative perception of their work experience. Here is an interesting conversation I had with a woman worker who wore a headscarf:

Ms. F.A.: What's your name?
UB: Utku.
UB: It means “victory.”
Ms. F.A.: Hmm, ok. So are you a revolutionary?
UB: [As this question came from a woman worker wearing a headscarf, I was quite surprised and did not know how to respond to the question.] Well, I don’t know. It depends on what you mean by “revolutionary.” If it means that you demand progressive social change, yeah, maybe, I am a revolutionary. I don’t know. I’ve never thought about it.
Ms. F.A.: My boyfriend is a revolutionary. That’s what I meant.
UB: [Still in great surprise] Alright, so… Is he affiliated with a political party or something?
Ms. F.A.: He is a student at Akdeniz University. [UB: With a tone of pride] He is a revolutionary, an Atatürkist!
UB: [I finally figured out that what she meant by “revolutionary” had nothing to do with the socialist ideology, but the official state ideology in Turkey: Atatürkism or Kemalism. Some of the supporters of this political discourse call themselves “revolutionary” as well, since one of the ideological pillars of Atatürkism is the opposition to religious conservatism. Since this reaction came from a woman worker wearing a headscarf, which is one of the most powerful visual symbols of religious conservatism in Turkey, I was taken aback by what she had told me.] I think it’s a good thing that your boyfriend is interested in politics.
Ms. F.A.: I believe everybody should be a revolutionary at some level.
[UB: Our conversation was interrupted for approximately fifteen minutes as a result of the sudden appearance of the foreman. Then, the previous work unit sped up. We were in a rush to keep up with them. Once we had finally caught up with them, she began talking to me once again.]
Ms. F.A.: Does your mother wear a headscarf?
UB: No, she doesn’t. But I am not so happy about the bias against women who wear the headscarf.
Ms. F.A.: That’s true, but I defend the revolutions of Atatürk and secularism. I don’t believe that women should be allowed to enter universities with their headscarf. [UB: The constitutional court in 2006 affirmed the dress code for universities, which prohibited female students from entering the university campuses with headscarves. This has been a
The “headscarf issue” has been a controversial issue for years in Turkey. At the factories and sweatshops, women workers are free to wear their headscarves. In the apparel industry, they are even implicitly encouraged to do so. However, my overall impression is that many of the young women workers wearing headscarves were curious to find out what others thought about their decision to do so.

Thus, regardless of the subject we were talking about, and although I had never asked a direct or indirect question about this choice, many young women workers initiated conversations about how they decided to wear the headscarf. They were also curious to find out what I thought, because they held me in high regard as they knew that I was a college-graduate. A.Y.A., a twenty year old worker at the Center Factory whom I worked with for a week, was one such worker:

A.Y.A.: Utku Abi, does your mother wear a headscarf?
UB: No, she doesn’t. How about yours?
A.Y.A.: My mother wears a headscarf. Actually, I never used to wear a headscarf until recently… I was planning to wear a headscarf after I got married, but then I read this book, “The Long Path After Death” [Ölümden Sonraki Uzun Yol], which is about the sufferings of human being’s after death. Even if you are a believer, you’ll suffer from the pain because of your sins in this life. I was really worried. Women have more important responsibilities than men…

Ms. S.P.Y. [Another girl in the same work unit, who did not wear a headscarf, overheard our conversation, laughed, and intervened in a cheerful manner]: Yeah, I began to read the same book as well, but I got so depressed I couldn’t finish it.

UB [to A.Y.A.]: How did your parents react?
A.Y.A.: My father wanted us [UB: A.Y.A. and her sister, who also worked at the sewing section] to wear headscarves when I was thirteen years old, but we didn’t want to. Then, when I decided to wear a headscarf…
UB: When?
A.Y.A.: Three years ago… He didn’t want us to wear headscarves until we got married. I don’t know why he changed his mind. I also began to pray, when I decided to wear a headscarf. But I’m depressed right now, because I broke up with my lover.
UB: Sorry, what?
A.Y.A.: My boyfriend… He never used to pray. Then, I convinced him that praying was the right thing to do. Now we’ve broken up, but he still prays.

Stories from the history of Islam were a common subject of conversation among young women workers, especially at the Center Factory, while the content of the story was always interpreted and reinterpreted by the audience. For instance, Ms. H.R.M. was a talkative sweeper who was able to work and talk with the woman sewing machine operators at the same time. She was one of “the storytellers” in the sewing section of the factory. Her stories were usually about the lives
of holy persons in Islam and Jaferi belief. While she was working at the next line, she was telling the story about the murder of the third Caliph of Islam, Hz. Ali, the holiest person for Jaferis together with the Prophet Mohammad, to the women workers in my work unit. His murderer was in a great dilemma before the incident. His lover exerted psychological pressure on him, threatening to end her relationship with him, urging him to commit this crime which would be of great historical significance. The moral of Ms. H.R.M.'s story was the sinful essence in the character of women. However, the surprise and underlying meaning of the story for A.Y.A. was the power the lover held over the murderer:

A.Y.A.: So you mean, the murderer killed The Holy Ali because of his love for his girlfriend?

Women are mostly excluded from the public spaces in their neighborhoods. They are under constant surveillance by the men of their households as far as their physical mobility is concerned. On a regular day, they cannot go to coffeehouses, pubs, night clubs, the mosque lounge, or even the mosque. As F.M.F.F., my anarchist coworker at the Independent Sweatshop, commented in response to my question on whether he had a “real” life outside the sweatshop:

Yeah, I’ve never thought about it. I really don’t have a life outside the sweatshop. I work here for twelve hours a day and then go to sleep. Work is torture, but, if you ask the girls here the same question... they actually like spending all their time at the sweatshop. They see this place as a better environment than their home. You know what? I’d never really thought about it. That is really interesting!

The workplace experience is significantly different for women and men: Although they get bored, complain, and are put under extreme pressure (I saw women workers burst out crying many times, because they could not catch up with the speed of the assembly line), women workers, especially young single women, seemed to try to make the most out of their work experience. They daydreamed and, unlike men, they talked about their dreams. This difference in their reactions to the work experience and their verbal communication in their daily activities help them to abstain from a rigid distinction between work and life. In other words, women workers are already under enough pressure from their families. Thus, control in the workplace is not conceptualized as a form of oppression significantly different from the one experienced at home. Thus, although they suffer from the same routine of the labor process that male workers experience, they, unlike men, do not perceive their work experiences in a binary between freedom and oppression. Routine is inescapable, whether they work or not.
6.4 **DIFFERENT TEMPORALITIES IN A SINGULAR LIFE COURSE: CONFLICTING CONCEPTIONS OF TIME IN MULTIPLE SPACES**

The selected reflections of the life stories and work experiences of my coworkers in the previous chapter have been provided in order to reflect particular inconsistencies in their patterns of thought and actions in their everyday lives. Workers of high discipline take a day off without informing their foremen. Workers who are involved in radical politics can become the most industrious employees of their workplaces. How is it possible to account for such divergences in the lives of apparel workers? I believe the answer to this question lies in the diversity of the workers’ social environments. As these environments provide different problems, workers need to deal with them with distinct mindsets. One way to categorize these ways of thinking is to illustrate them along with the differences in the conception of time by workers, which they adopt in different social environments. Workers adopt different conceptions of time in regard to their position within the labor process, their methods to resolve everyday life crises, and their relations with their community.

First of all, the notion of time in the labor process is certainly the focus of any study of the capitalist labor process, given that surplus value is extracted from the individual labors based on the differentials in the time of production between herself and her employer. Routinization of the work is the rule for the capitalist labor process. However, my observations during the fieldwork convinced me that there are also significant organizational differences, which characterize workers’ perception of time in the labor process.

A factory worker’s perception of the rhythm of the assembly line is different from that of a sweatshop worker. The chaos at the Independent and Follower Sweatshops led to a form of interaction among workers on the assembly line much different from that seen to exist amongst the workers at the Center Factory. Moreover, in contrast to these two groups, a homeworker organizes her time in a seemingly more relaxed manner, in between her domestic duties and her work responsibilities. However, the distant monitoring of the production network certainly limits the extent of the temporal flexibility of the labor process. Because of these differences, it is difficult to understand the common characteristics in these diverse experiences without an analysis of the sense of time that the worker experiences outside the labor process. The mere analysis of the labor process in an industry with multiple labor practices such as the apparel sector would help only to reveal differences. Thus, if the aim is to identify similarities in workers’ experiences with regard to the labor process, then it is necessary to investigate the conception of time for workers outside the labor process as well.

Second, workers’ immediate concerns outside their work experience have to do with their everyday life problems. Workers are workers, because they have no other choice. They live in a constant struggle to make ends meet. Financial crises constitute a routine in their everyday life, but this routine is by no means similar to their experience at their work organization. They need to deal with the daily crises in the most astute manner, by coming up with a different creative solution each time. The quality of this struggle is different from a worker’s experience in the labor process, no matter how different his/her work conditions are compared to that of other workers’. Thus, the everyday struggle of survival outside the labor process leads to certain acts and decisions of the worker along with a different notion of temporality.
The notion of crisis is embedded in the psyche of the worker so deeply that it is no wonder why he or she adopts habits and behavioral patterns that would simply appear “irrational” to an outsider. Even if the worker saves some money in winter, that money is in one way or another spent on activities to heal his/her physical and mental depreciation. Thus, if he/she is a sweatshop worker, he/she takes one month off in summer, although this “luxury” costs him/her more than one month’s earnings. He/she spends his/her money on cheap cosmetics and garments or expensive cellular phones. The contradictory patterns of spending reflect a particular mentality: The worker knows that he/she cannot enjoy upper mobility in his/her life course. Once today’s crisis is over, there is no need to think of the future.

Third, a worker also has to reproduce, to fulfill his/her duties towards his/her community, and to carry out the necessary actions in order to complete his/her long-term service to the capital. However, any sort of labor process mentally detaches the worker from these concerns. It makes it difficult for him/her to make well-elaborated, long-term plans. Moreover, the worker’s daily struggle to make ends meet shapes his/her mentality and the way he/she perceives the “routine” crises of his/her everyday life as a collection of discrete and unrelated events. Thus, his/her mental agility to fix such crises costs him/her the very ability to analyze the long-term consequences of his/her daily life strategies. In other words, the same pattern of thinking also results in “irrational” habits, spending patterns, and occupational decisions. In fact, both the labor process and the worker’s daily problems render him/her unable to make proper plans for the long-term objectives in his/her life.

Thus, in the cases of U.R.F., M.L., and A.Y.A., other people made all the important decisions on their behalf. U.R.F. was told to fall in love. A.Y.A. was told first to begin wearing a headscarf immediately and then to wait until she got married to do so, while M.L. was told to get married again. Most of the workers tolerate these pressures, not because they are weak, but because they know that their family and community have the “wisdom” that they themselves do not have. They are told to do certain things at the right time. They are given tasks, which are threaded together to make up the life story of a worker. When one talks to an old worker, he/she does not tell you about his/her trade or his/her experiences on the assembly line, although he/she would have spent years working at a sweatshop or at home for an average of more than twelve hours a day. The date of her/his marriage, her/his first baby, the purchase of her/his apartment will be his or her life story. Are these long-term decisions actually planned ahead of time? Certainly not. These decisions are moments in the worker’s life, which together would look like elements of a conscious strategy for an outsider. However, there is no such strategy from where the worker stands, as the marriage story of Mr. H.S.N., a worker in our friendship circle at the Center Factory, illustrates:

I really liked her. She was all shy, never spoke to a man in the sewing section. When I asked her out for a date, she told me to ask her mother’s permission. So I asked my mother to get permission from her mother, and she did. I wasn’t aware that “that permission” was meant to be an arrangement for our prospective marriage. When I finally figured that out, I went mad at first. I couldn’t date her, if I didn’t marry her. But that frustration, I guess, provoked me more and I said to myself, “If they don’t let you do it your way, you do it their way.” And that’s how I ended up married.

Plans are superimposed on the workers’ psyches. Thus, they follow a path in the long run, but they do not know exactly where the path will take them. This trajectory is certainly not intended to
enable the worker to enjoy upward social mobility. It is rather composed of tasks enforced by the community. The crisis is a normal state for the worker: U.R.F.’s mother gets sick this month. Next month, his brother quits his job yet again. The following month, he receives his overtime payment a few days late. The bank looks forward to charging extremely high interest rates in such moments of desperation. The landlord expects to be paid on time. Workers handle these problems by mentally separating momentary events of crisis from each other: The event about the medical condition of U.R.F.’s mother is perceived and conceptualized as a separate instance from his debt crisis. M.L. is called upon by his hemshehrs to join in a neighborhood fight. He has to visit the police station once every month in compliance with the court order about the incident concerning his fight with his father-in-law. His sister is beaten up by her husband and comes back to her “father’s house,” the house of her father who passed away many years ago. Such incidents are obviously related with each other, yet the worker chooses to perceive of them as unrelated instances. The observer has to put all of these pieces together, as if putting together a jigsaw puzzle, since the worker chooses not to establish any analytical connection between these incidents him- or herself.

The worker does not establish these connections, since it is neither desirable nor possible for the worker to see his future as “a project.” However, he is still expected to accomplish particular duties: The collective memory, the mores, and the conventions of his community shape the worker’s long-term decisions. They are to be followed, even if their real meaning or function is not thoroughly understood. U.R.F. complained about and did not understand why there was such unendurable pressure on him to get married, which seemed “inevitable”. When I met him in the last days of the summer of 2008, I was glad (I suppose?) to hear that he was seeing a girl from the factory. He had his own suspicions, but he was also excited about this experience. M.L. wanted his daughter back and, when he got his daughter back, he would send her to the ranks of the revolutionary guerillas to fight against the oppressive state. However, he knew that he would not get his daughter back. Following the advice of his mother, he went to his village in the summer in order to meet the girl who would be his third wife. When we see a worker who gets married, has children, and is growing old, we might think that these are the major accomplishments planned through a linear notion of time. However, the temporality in effect cannot be conceptualized with such a geometric metaphor. It is the time of the family, community, and society that urges the worker to act in particular ways.

In other words, workers are exposed to three major problems throughout their lives: the challenges of the labor process, everyday life problems, and the long-term planning of their life courses. The worker deals with each of these challenges with a different notion of time. I name these different states of minds as temporalities of crisis, compliance, and unthinking.

The temporality of crisis urges the worker to be an astute strategist in order to solve his or her daily problems. The world outside the labor process is the space of irregularities and uncertainties. For a daily worker, this means finding that day’s work; for a homeworker, it means receiving the piecework; and for a sweatshop worker, it means maintaining good relationships with worker friends at other sweatshops in order to be able to find his/her next job… All of these challenges have to do with the labor process, but the mindset with which the worker deals with these problems, is fundamentally different from his or her mental state in the labor process.

The temporality of compliance, however, urges the worker to be a conservative. The history of their community has convinced them that workers who fail to appreciate the values of their community are simply doomed. Girls who had affairs with men had to quit their job, but the same
did not apply to men. Men who got married with women from a different country or community were abandoned by their wives. Even most radical-sounding men want to marry conservative girls, since they have been told that atheist girls always want more. Workers who stopped hanging out at the coffeehouse in their neighborhood were disconnected from their networks in the job market. Workers do not always think they know the proper conduct of behavior in life, since they only know how to deal with daily crises and the rhythm of the labor process. They hand over their capacity of judgment to their community in return for the protection their community has to offer. The family, the neighborhood, and the friends make the important decisions on their behalf. They respect and obey. They survive.

Without understanding these two notions of time, it is impossible to analyze the temporality of unthinking, which specifically pertains to the capitalist labor process. Establishing a bridge between the first two temporalities, we can say that the temporality of the labor process requires the worker lend not only his time but also his sense of time to the work organization. The worker wishes for the workday to end as soon as possible, yet she does not count the hours or the minutes. The worker gradually dives into a psyche in between daydreaming, extreme focus on the work, and make outs on the assembly line. As the labor process is arranged along a linear notion of time, his perception of time becomes much more an eclectic collection of discrete moments. What he wants is a break from the pressure of the assembly line in order to continue daydreaming. Is daydreaming a form of escape? Probably.

However, the more interesting point here is that both daydreaming and mental concentration on work urge the worker to submerge himself in the temporality of the work organization. It is linear for the sweater, since she runs the assembly line. It is circular for the interim ironer, who is attached to the main assembly line through his minor auxiliary line reprocessing the same piece several times within a circular process. It is momentary and discrete for the sewing machine operator, who waits for pieces and lets pieces flow through his table. For a pieceworker, it is in the form of ups and downs in between the deadlines that the jobber schedules for her. Regardless of the differences in the conditions of the labor process, however, the worker leaves his control over his conception of time aside. It is a mental state of unthinking, a state of bliss for those suffering from the antagonism between temporality of crisis and temporality of compliance. As one homeworker put it, piecework “is not an important contribution to the family budget, but it helps you relax.”

The worker endures the capitalist labor process only when he or she can adapt the temporality of unthinking. The same labor process is the very cause of the temporality of crisis, since it strips him of the necessary resources for a decent living. It steals his time, which is essential for him to “think” about his choices in life. Deprived of this chance and under the duress of the temporality of crisis, he adopts the temporality of compliance for decisions related to his life course. The labor process generates a major contradiction in the existential positioning of the worker by contributing to the emergence of these two antagonistic forms of temporality. However, once the worker finds himself in this maze, he comes back to the labor process and its temporality, since it will mentally save him from this contradiction. The temporality of unthinking is, thus, not a form of resistance in the labor process. It is not an escape from the duress of the labor process. It is rather the emancipation from the antagonism between temporalities of compliance and crisis. It is an escape not from the duress of the labor process but from the social life outside the labor process.

In an almost paradoxic manner, this is especially true in the case of homeworkers. Homeworkers are involved in the labor process inside their homes. Thus, conventional wisdom says that she
would not see piecework as an activity essentially different from her domestic duties. However, homeworkers see piecework as an activity qualitatively distinct from everything else that they do. They are relaxed when they work. They are stressed out when the deadline for the piecework at hand is tomorrow. All in all, when they work, they forget about the monthly bills (concerns conceptualized within the confines of temporality of crisis) or the problems in their marriage due to the erratic behaviors of their husbands (a course of action taken within the confines of temporality of compliance). Even though they do not work on an assembly line, the deadlines give them the necessary discipline and urge them to concentrate on their work by forgetting everything else. Thus, it is no wonder why homeworkers have common work hours, although there is no scheduled time for home-based work.

Coming back to the first question, why did U.R.F. not even know the names of the unions? Why was he acting strangely in terms of his consumption patterns? Why did he take the day off once in a while, though he was determined to be a disciplined worker and he could not afford to lose his job?

Common sense tells us that the worker is not allowed to act together with other workers. He is intimidated by the state and his employers. He is constantly indoctrinated by mass media, his family, and his community. All of these are unquestionably true. However, conclusions should follow these facts: If a worker has unconventional habits that are not approved of in certain ways by the authority of work, state, and community, then this should be regarded as the reflection of their “oppressed” feelings which could not be expressed in a political discourse. As U.R.F. was not aware of the unions, he was not given any chance to express his problems in the language of resistance, due to the absence of venues of political struggle for a decent life.

I do not see such a straightforward relationship of social and political oppression and the disinterest of workers in politics or with their unconventional/unapproved acts/habits: A worker’s psyche belongs to different social realms. He acts in these realms with different temporalities. Each temporality requires him to think through different modalities. One act necessitated by one form of temporality is dysfunctional for another. “Inconsistent behavior” derives from this incongruity. Thus, inconsistencies in the worker’s decisions are the outcome of the multiplicity of conditions that he must accommodate simultaneously. Insofar as the conditions of work, everyday struggle, and relations with the community are distanced from each other, it is more difficult for the worker to adopt a consistent set of behavioral and mental patterns in his or her life.

In the case of homeworkers and daily workers, the temporality of the labor process is even more distant from the temporalities of community relations and everyday struggle. A daily worker finds her job on the basis of an almost completely erratic struggle with other workers, jobbers, and “customers.” A homeworker never knows if she will get piecework the next month, the next week, or the next day. However, she is expected to follow the routine of her job. The homeworker has to meet the deadline and the daily worker has to work even faster than the workers on payroll. In the case of women, the gap between temporality of crisis and compliance is much larger than it is with men. Even when they are laid off, they must both contact multiple employers in order to find a job, while they must also stay within the confines of their gender role. They are expected to abstain from talking to men but at the same time to bring money to their parents or husbands. As they comply with the conventions of their community, they fail to find solutions to their everyday-life crises. In this chaotic matrix, it is no wonder why workers struggle to manage contradictory ideas, behaviors, and beliefs. It is not the irrationality in the worker’s behaviors, but the irrationality of his
or her living conditions. It is not a distorted form of resistance, but a way to compromise amid all the contradiction in a worker’s life. This perspective helps us understand the modality of resistance in workers’ lives against the labor process in the following ways.

First, since the lived experience in the labor process provides a mental escape from problems regarding everyday life crises and long-term plans, the worker subjectivity perceives his/her work organization to be in equal measure haven and torture chamber. Thus, it is a futile attempt to lecture the worker on the notion of surplus value and to expect him/her to adopt a new political perspective concerning his/her work experience with the assumption that, if he or she comprehends this notion, he/she will perceive every aspect of his/her life through a different lens. Workers already know what surplus value is. They simply don’t care about it, as they have to fight on multiple fronts.

Second, I gave a great deal of room in this study to illustrating that the behaviors and ideas of workers suffer from severe inconsistencies between their general orientation regarding work and community and their actual responses to such orientations. However, I also argued that these seeming inconsistencies from the perspective of the outside observer reflect a delicate balance of different states of mind to deal with the problems on those multiple fronts. Thus, if we see a worker spend his entire monthly salary on a cell phone and then regret this decision, this is not an act of resistance or “irrationality,” but a byproduct of the balance established among different strategies in his basic struggle of survival. These strategies are reflected by and bear different notions of time.

Last, workers do resist being exploited in the labor process, but in their own ways. The most important form of resistance is the high turnover of labor among enterprises within the apparel industry. I think I provided ample evidence to illustrate this particular characteristic in this sector. As Mr. M.M. knew, it was them that needed him—he did not need them. Although nobody stops apparel enterprises from hiring daily workers, such enterprises limit that segment of workers in their workforce, as they need to work with a reliable group of workers. Workers know that they can inflict some damage when they make the bold decision to quit their job. In the absence of unionization or other alternative organizational forms for institutional labor politics, this is the best workers can do. As they do not have any strong incentives to keep their jobs at particular sweatshops or in particular home-based work networks, this is also the only way that they can at least keep their dignity. Although such individual acts can by no means substitute for organized and institutionalized labor politics, their significant impact on the general structure of the apparel industry should not be underestimated.

On the one hand, the high turnover rate results in some competition for labor, especially among medium-sized enterprises such as the Independent Sweatshop. I think this limited competition has some positive impact on wages. At the end of the day, there is no structural barrier that would prevent sweatshop workers’ wages from falling to the rates of piece wages for homeworkers. Even in the case of homeworkers, the “freelancing” homeworkers fulfill the function of raising the piece rate to some extent as a result of the competition they cause between HBW jobbers.

On the other hand, as we saw in earlier chapters, the same high turnover rate also has a significant impact on the characteristics of the labor process and the scope of work organizations. The volatility in the workforce makes it difficult for the management to undertake proper managerial planning. The related ups and downs in productivity put significant limits on the growth of individual enterprises. In other words, the seemingly irrational acts of individual workers to change their workplaces or networks determine the average size of individual capitals in the
apparel industry. At this point, it is also possible to answer the question posed in the first part of this study: Why does the apparel industry remain a competitive sector despite the high turnover rate of enterprises? Workers’ individual actions should be taken as a major reason for this particular characteristic of the industry that not only determines the average sizes of capitals but also shapes the connections among different individual capitals in integrated supply chains.

It would certainly not be a realistic argument to claim that workers are aware of the impact of their individual decisions on the structure of the apparel industry. The point of emphasis here is rather that the very inconsistencies between the notions of time pertinent to work, everyday life problems, and community make it possible for the worker to take the risk of quitting his/her job with a striking carelessness about the long-term consequences of this decision. Thus, if we investigate the factors accounting for the multiplicity of labor practices in Istanbul’s apparel industry from the position of the working class, two dynamics should be taken into consideration.

The first one is the diversity of identity affiliations in the working class districts of Istanbul. This heterogeneity results in multiple forms of homogenization of individual labors into abstract labor. This human geography makes it impossible for an enterprise to employ a large and reliable workforce for a long period of time. Thus, sweatshops and home-based networks, not factories, characterize the industrial scene of Bağcılar.

The second dynamic is related to the high turnover rate of workers in the industry. This factor can be explained only partially by the employers’ desire to keep the average duration of employment per worker short in order to save resources, which would otherwise be spent on fringe benefits and other compensation-related payments. Since most of the workers are employed informally, this is a relatively unimportant dynamic. As informality is the rule in this sector, entrepreneurs would like to keep their workforces employed for as long as possible in order to have the cutting edge against their competitors. Thus, the primary reason behind the high turnover rate of workers is the very initiative of workers to change their jobs in order to have a slightly higher salary or simply to have a short break. The motivation behind this initiative begged an explanation, given that most of the workers have nothing to lose but their chains, that is, they have no significant savings, no rent or agricultural income from their village. In order to provide a satisfactory explanation of this incongruity, I presented the diversity of problems in a worker’s life.

The usually incoherent responses to these problems establish a complete analytical circle in workers’ interactions with the labor process. Workers are deprived of political and legal rights to fight for higher wages and better living conditions. They respond to this vulnerability with individual and seemingly erratic acts in their employment-related decisions. Such individual acts collectively contribute to the chaotic nature of the apparel industry. Accordingly, the average size of individual capitals is severely limited. Sweatshops and home-based work networks shape the industry. These forms of industrial labor resort to informal employment practices. The informality leaves the worker with no motivation to keep working for a particular work organization for a long period of time (or to act with other workers for their collective rights). Workers establish a balance between the discipline of the labor process, the chaos of their everyday crises, and the conservatism of their communities. This balance results in the high turnover rate of workers. The high turnover of workers in individual enterprises contributes to the multiplicity of labor practices in the apparel industry.
7 CONCLUSION

This book investigated the current characteristics of the apparel industry in Istanbul with a three-layered analysis of the local conditions, focusing on the urban transformation of Istanbul and the social dynamics behind the multiplicity of labor practices in the apparel industry.

Capitalist relations of production generate contrasting tendencies both to the homogenization and heterogeneity of industrial labor practices. It is possible to take Capital as reference for the analysis of these tendencies. Different theories in the twentieth century, which are inspired by Marx’s magnum opus, help us to turn the themes in Capital into operational arguments for the industry-specific analysis of the variety in labor practices.

The first challenge was to understand the reasons behind the proliferation of labor practices despite the homogenizing effect of competition. In order to provide the reader with a general analysis of the markets for the apparel industry, I began with the theories specifically dealing with the question of the equilibration of the rate of profit. This is one of the major themes in the third volume of Capital. The analysis revealed that profit rates should be equilibrated for the sustainability of the market structure. However, this process leads to a tendency in the inter-sector profit rates to fall. Thus, there is an inherent contradiction between the systemic need for the equilibration of the profit rates through competition and sustainable accumulation. This contradiction generates different political reactions aiming to obstruct the mobility of capital and, hence, the equilibration of the rate of profit.

In the case of the apparel industry, these barriers to capital mobility have been progressively losing their importance at the global level, especially since the 1980s with the globalization of international trade relations. Turkey has been a part of the Customs Union within the European Union since 1996 and Turkish apparel producers have been in direct competition with their European counterparts. Moreover, most of the significant barriers on international trade of textiles and garments were effectively abolished with the expiration of the Multi Fibre Arrangement in 2005. Thus, the Turkish apparel industry operates in a globally competitive environment with pressure on profit rates. Extensive competition certainly bears monopolistic tendencies. Thus, the implication of such a market environment is the domination of a particular labor practice that generates the highest surplus product for the individual enterprises in relation to alternative labor practices. Accordingly, the first question at hand was the sector-based conditions of the multiplicity of labor practices despite the presence of global prices for clothing.

In the case of the Turkish apparel industry, the same competitive market comes with a high turnover rate of enterprises in the industry. Enterprises in this industry usually begin their journey as small-sized family sweatshops. Successful enterprises adopt different labor practices in accordance with their financial growth. The growing scope of production eventually turns these establishments into first medium-sized sweatshops and finally factories. However, large-scale enterprises have a short average longevity. Accordingly, as they lose their ground in the sector, new enterprises follow a similar organizational evolution and replace them. This high circulation of enterprises in the apparel industry is the outcome of three dynamics.
First, as the apparel industry is an easy-entry sector, the level of competition is high. Thus, large-scale enterprises need to find creative solutions to meet the challenge posed by small- and medium-sized enterprises. Most of them fail to keep up with the competition and lose their top position in the industry. Second, in the last decade, both intensified global competition due to the expiration of the Multi Fibre Arrangement as well as the government’s policy for appreciated domestic currency, eliminated most of the labor-cost advantages for the industry. Thus, the pressure on large-scale enterprises to reach cheaper sources of labor has recently been intensified to a great extent. Third, especially in the case of Istanbul, domestic migration has been reshaping the urban demography in conjunction with the geographical expansion of the city. Accordingly, enterprises that traditionally rely on a particular district for their labor forces find themselves in a tough position, as their competitors successfully recruit late migrants for lower wages in the new peripheral districts. All in all, high circulation of enterprises in the apparel industry accounts for one of the major dynamics behind the simultaneous presence of multiple labor practices, even though both small and large enterprises operate under similar pressure of prices and profit rates. This analysis provides some answers concerning the multiplicity of labor practices in the target sector. However, the investigation of the characteristics of the market does not help us to understand the content of this multiplicity. Nor does it provide any specific information about the competitive advantages of different labor practices for enterprises of different sizes.

Thus, the second part of this book investigated the characteristics of supply chains in the apparel industry. As individual enterprises adopt different labor practices thanks to the competitive market environment and their own individual growth, they are also embedded in complex and relatively hierarchical supply chains which shape the cooperative relations among individual enterprises. Thanks to the high levels of informality in this sector, it is a challenge to investigate the content of the subcontracting relations between small- and large-scale enterprises.

The second volume of Capital provides an outline of the dynamics shaping the relations among different industrial sectors. Different forms of capital circuits need to be in harmony. Institutional, political, and technical barriers apply to the circulations of commodity, money, and productive capital in a differential manner. Unless constraints over a particular circuit of capital enable the circulation of the two other forms of capital, capital accumulation is in crisis. Conditions of this sought-for harmony shape the characteristics of industrial cooperation and, hence, the characteristics of the supply chains.

Theoretical contributions in the last decades offer diverse perspectives of how this harmony is established (or fails to be established) in the current global economic context. It is possible to categorize these contributions in two groups. The first group of theories argues that contemporary industrial relations are characterized by “low centralization and high concentration” of capital. The current importance of finance capital is argued to have led to a major restructuring in industrial relations. The invention of new financial instruments and the high mobility of finance capital provided new leverages to control the production-oriented small capitals for industrial operations. Thus, ownership of productive capital has a lesser value now than it did in the past. Subcontracting relations thus should be conceptualized as the reflection of the domination of mobile money capital over immobile productive capital.

The second group of contributions argues for the exactly opposite configuration: high centralization and low concentration of capital. On the one hand, this perspective calls for the
I observed two different forms of subcontracting relations in Istanbul’s apparel industry. The first and most common one is based on arm’s length relations among different agents in the supply chains. Discrete contracts most of the time signify the beginning and the end of the relationship between agents. The upper echelons of the supply chains almost always consist of retail chains in high-income countries, which generally establish indirect relations with industrial enterprises through their subcontracting agents. Depending on the size of such enterprises, they subcontract their operations to smaller enterprises on similar terms. Since the clustering of the numerous small- and medium-sized enterprises in particular districts is necessary for the survival of this subcontracting relationship (and this form of supply chains), it is not surprising to see a strict division of space among large-scale and small-scale industrial facilities in the research setting. This form of subcontracting relations corroborates the relevance of the argument of “high centralization-low concentration” in industrial relations.

The second form of subcontracting relationship is based on close connections between mother company and its satellite enterprises. The supply chain is a vertical structure, rather than a horizontal network. The mother company owns a group of production facilities and tends to internalize all aspects of garment production, except for sewing. Sewing is the most labor-intensive part of the entire production process and the major responsibility of the subcontractors. The target mother company in this project also employed the largest sewing section of the supply chain. This section in the Center Factory not only finished the large-scale orders, but also established the rhythm for the entire supply chain. This form of subcontracting relations reveals the relevance of the argument of “low centralization-high concentration” in industrial relations.

However, this subcontracting relationship between the Center Factory and its subsidiaries came to an end in the recent years. The primary reason for this change in the management strategy of the Center Firm is its ongoing project to transfer its major production facilities to another country in Africa. As I argued in the first part, large-scale enterprises usually come to a cul-de-sac in terms of growth prospects, especially when the enterprise reaches a threshold of roughly $65 million in annual exports. Owners of the Center Firm astutely solved this structural problem under the duress of appreciated Turkish currency and the competition by the East Asian competitors, which have significant wage-cost advantages. Thus, the current relationship between Center Firm and its subsidiaries increasingly began to resemble conventional subcontracting connections.

Meanwhile, the conventional “arm’s length subcontracting” has been undergoing a significant transformation as well: Customers of the small- and medium-sized production facilities have recently begun to establish close control over the labor process of their subsidiaries, mostly due to their lack of trust in the latter. Although this close supervision by no means leads to a long-term
relationship between subsidiaries and customers, the content of the organizational arrangements in the short-term subcontracting relationship in the apparel industry becomes at some level more similar to the subcontracting model used by the Center Firm.

All in all, the argumentation of the second volume of Capital implies that the sustainability of the multiplicity of labor practices in a particular industry depends on the intensified organizational connections among these labor practices. In the case of Istanbul’s apparel industry, the intensification of such organizational connections among factory system, home-based work, and sweatshop labor amounts to the constant redefinition of the borders between these labor practices. The internalization of distinct capital- and labor-intensive processes in the Center Factory is one of the forms of this transformation. The Center Factory was a space of production for eclectic processes. It was the center hub for the entire supply chain as much as an industrial facility. Relations of the target sweatshops with their customers in regard to the operational issues would have been growing closer, if these sweatshops had not already been under the direct surveillance of their customers. Certain labor-intensive processes that would disrupt the capital-intensive processes in the factories are assigned to the home-based work networks.

However, as we saw in the last part, the connections between homeworkers and their employers by no means point to a haphazard connection. The city-wide networks establish effective coordination among HBW organizations and the work organizations that homeworkers work for. I called this relationship a “distanced control-distanced association.” All of these connections reveal themselves in the spatial division of labor. A geographical binary between large-scale work organizations in industrial neighborhoods and small-scale work organizations in residential neighborhoods characterizes the urban scene of the research setting, Bağcılar. Thus, from the perspective offered in the second volume of Capital, the multiplicity of forms of industrial labor in Istanbul’s apparel industry is the outcome of the formation of the circuit of productive capital. Different labor practices constitute integral elements of this circuit. Within this circuit, enterprises of the same labor practice develop similar organizational characteristics, while the complementariness among labor practices let them keep their organizational autonomy.

This analysis helps to identify the relations among different labor practices within individual supply chains. However, it does not say much about the organizational differences among these practices. In other words, while the analysis of supply chains does partially answer the question as to how different labor practices can complement each other in a competitive environment, it does not clarify the roles that different labor practices assume in the division of labor of the supply chains. Thus, the last and longest part of the book investigated the organizational characteristics of different labor practices in this industrial environment. The question of labor control was therefore the central theme. The first volume of Capital suggests that the homogenization of individual labors in the form of abstract labor is a universal tendency embedded in the core of capitalist relations of production. In other words, workers employed in an individual work organization are stripped of their individual characteristics and even their skills, no matter how valuable they are for the organization. Although the apparel industry is very much dependent on the skills of the workers, this generic trend still pertains to it. Sewing machine operators, who are “the artisans” of the sector, have gradually been losing their privileged position in the sector because of a variety of factors, such as the choice of the Turkish industrialists in the apparel sector to use less skilled labor with low productivity. Also, a subtle trend for simpler designs in the industry brings the opportunity
to employ less skilled workers. Workers are also “penalized” for their skills, as in the case of home-based work. Workers can use their skills, only if those skills are sold for below-average industry-wide wages.

However, this tendency to strip the workers of their skills does not cause uniformity within labor practices in terms of organizational principles. Although sewing machine operators in a factory can be assigned to multiple tasks, the gender-based division of labor among positions on the assembly line is still intact. Moreover, the same tendency does not account for uniformity among labor practices, either. Homeworkers pursue particular tasks that factory or sweatshop workers cannot conduct. Sweatshop workers cannot easily adapt to the discipline of the factory system. In other words, although sweatshops, home-based work networks, and factories in the apparel industry pursue very similar or identical operations, it is possible to notice distinct work organizations and different personas.

The first two parts of the book alone provide some answers to the variety in work organizations. The dynamic market structure creates sufficient room for all these labor practices, as new enterprises adopt them. Subcontracting relations establish inter-enterprise organizational links, in which every labor practice fulfills a distinct function. For instance, the Center Factory is the organizational hub of its supply chain as much as it is a space for production. Moreover, it is a showcase for the customers, as legal requirements in terms of workers’ workplace safety and social rights are met completely, which is an exceptional case for this industry. Home-based work networks are specialized in tasks that the conventional assembly lines cannot carry out. Sweatshops fill in all other organizational gaps with their varying sizes, organizational diversity, and flexibility. The analysis of these dynamics certainly explains how it is possible for different labor practices to coexist, yet it does not answer the question of why they actually do coexist.

The last part approached this question with a three-layered analysis. The first section specifically looked at the organizational characteristics of the target labor practices with a focus on the content of labor control. The factory system is usually regarded as the Mecca of the standardization of tasks, labor processes, and, hence, workers in particular categories. In theory, workers should be stripped of their cultural traits, ideological differences, and personal attributes in an ideal-typical factory. However, this was far from being the case at the Center Factory. The labor force was segmented along the lines of workers’ provincial origins.

The hemşehris of the owner family of the Center Firm accounted for a significant portion of the workforce. Moreover, departmental concentration of the hemşehri workers was in the sewing section, the department which required both skilled labor and a complete assembly line. Skilled labor-intensive positions and skilled capital-intensive positions were open to workers of different identity-affiliations. Consciously or unconsciously, the management pursued a strategy that eliminated all possibilities for workers on the assembly line of the sewing section to take collective action. Thus, despite the limitations of this case study, one of my strongest convictions about the organizational arrangements in this factory is that the recruitment strategy of the management proved to be a success in the long-run.

However, the same organizational principle regarding the employment of workers who have ethnic, provincial, or religious affiliations with the employers, does not apply to sweatshop labor and home-based work in a straightforward manner. This is, I believe, another surprising finding of this project: If the factory system is widely regarded as a space for production, in which workers
are expected to leave their identities aside for the sake of uniformity in the work organization, another conventional argument is that sweatshops and home-based work organizations run on the manipulation of these affiliations. Once again, my observations support a counter-intuitive argument.

Employment of the relatives or hemşehris generates a relationship of reciprocity beyond the wage-nexus. As the employer buys the loyalty of his workers, he also needs to pay back his workers certain “extra-compensation benefits.” The first and most important benefit in this regard is the long-term employment of the worker. Another is the tacit agreement on tolerance of the worker’s low productivity. The last one is especially important in the case of employment of close relatives such as siblings, children, and parents: close relatives are by no means workers only. They would ask for their share of the surplus in the long run. In other words, loyalty has a price and only employers who have sustainable relations with their customers and/or a prospect of rapid growth can afford to pay this price.

Thus, employment of workers having similar identity-affiliations with their employers is the case for the smallest and largest enterprises in the apparel industry (for distinct purposes). We already saw that the employment of hemşehris at the Center Factory was the primary means to segment the labor force in the factory. In the case of the Family Sweatshop, however, the employment of family members was the major means of survival in the chaotic market environment. Although this form of employment is by no means a small fraction of the labor force of the apparel industry, it signifies a “temporary” strategy in the overall evolution of a successful apparel enterprise. The Family Sweatshop will either be a medium-sized atelier employing up to a hundred workers, or it will simply vanish like many others which fulfill the temporary needs of larger enterprises or fill in the gaps during industry-wide crises. Thus, even though a snapshot of the industry in terms of employment practices certainly reveals the extent of the workers employed at such family sweatshops, the longevity of such individual enterprises is generally short. Mr. Survivor will either break the chains of the discrimination he suffers due to his Kurdish identity, and become the next Mr. Independent or Mr. Self-Made Man, or he will go back to the ranks of the working class. His success will most possibly cost his relatives their jobs. The employment of relatives, hemşehris, or compatriots at a medium-sized sweatshop is possible only if the sweatshop has a long-term relationship with a close customer, as in the case of the Follower Sweatshop.

All in all, employment of workers of close identity-affiliations in small sweatshops signifies a particular management strategy with motivations completely different from the strategies used by the factory management. However, medium-sized sweatshops are in most cases unable to use a labor force sharing identity-affiliations with the employers. And, I believe, such sweatshops characterize Istanbul’s apparel industry and maybe employ a larger number of workers than those employed by family sweatshops and factories put together. Two organizational dynamics give merit to this argument. First, as the competitive conditions shape the mindsets of the sweatshops owners, they tend to employ unrelated workers due to productivity-related concerns. Second, once unrelated workers begin to be employed, the assembly line appears as the only organizational arrangement for the discipline of workers. To establish an assembly line usually requires the employment of a number of workers larger than the number of immediate family members. These two factors reproduce each other. As the family sweatshops grow, related workers either simply quit their jobs or take managerial positions in the sweatshop.
In the case of home-based work, however, it is not even possible to think of the employment of workers of a similar identity-affiliation by the jobbers. The gist of organizational success in this case is to have access to the largest labor pool possible. Friendships, migration origins, and ethnic and religious identities are all left aside in order to reach the most vulnerable women in the city. The only caveat for this organizational dynamic applies to the most successful mobile jobbers, who are able to connect hundreds of homeworkers in different districts of the city. These jobbers usually need a reliable "core" workforce in case of organizational emergencies. They regularly employ their friends, relatives, hemşehris, and compatriots in their organizational base, which is usually in their neighborhood. However, this practice does not account for the employment of a large segment of the workforce in the network.

To recapitulate, in Istanbul’s apparel industry, employment practices take three major forms in terms of recruitment strategies. Large enterprises can afford to segment their labor force with the employment of a significant number of workers sharing identity-affiliations with their employer. Family sweatshops are family sweatshops, but they do not last long, unless they become a medium-sized sweatshop with the consequence of the employment of unrelated workers. Such medium-sized ateliers, which, I argue, constitute the backbone of this industry, however, are unable to provide the special benefits for a privileged segment of the workforce. Thus, they suffer from a high turnover rate in their workforce. In the case of home-based work networks, this high turnover rate is the very reason for the existence of this labor practice.

The high worker turnover rate is a chronic problem for most of the non-family sweatshops in the apparel industry. As the provided questionnaire data has already demonstrated, the highest worker volatility was observed at the Independent Sweatshop. Mr. Independent recently launched an aggressive growth strategy by employing a highly educated English-speaking coordinator, who began to establish direct connections with customers in overseas markets. However, the chaos on the shop floor significantly disrupted this master plan. Performance was low and the representatives of the customers had to monitor the labor process closely. Thus, I argue that the employment of a loyal segment of the labor force on the shop floor is the single most important factor that determines whether a medium-sized enterprise can successfully join the ranks of “the top players” of the apparel industry or not.

This problem signifies a managerial vicious cycle. First, the Independent Sweatshop lacked the resources to grant a great number of its workers the necessary privileges in order to keep them loyal to their employer on the shop floor and to reduce the worker turnover rate. Second, if the Independent Sweatshop cannot pursue such an employment strategy, then it cannot sustain relations with big customers in overseas markets. This vicious cycle prioritized the question of the factors behind the high worker turnover rate in the apparel industry. Differences in the conditions of labor procurement for enterprises yield a distinct limit to the organizational uniformity in and among labor practices. In other words, in terms of labor control, organizational multiplicity is the result of dynamics which are beyond the control of employers. Thus, the analysis of labor control pertinent to the target labor practices needed to be supplemented with the analysis of the reasons for the high labor turnover rate among enterprises in this sector. This question necessitated the analysis of the social conditions of workers inside and outside the labor process. Accordingly, the second and third sections of the last part of the book presented the research data and my observations on the workers’ point of view regarding work, employment, and their life course.
The second section provided data about the human geography of the research setting. The major production facility of the Center Firm was originally located in Zeytinburnu, the veteran district of the apparel industry in the import-substituting industrialization period until the 1990s. Although the Center Firm could have continued its operations in this district, the management decided to move their major production facility to a western neighborhood of Bağcılar near the Iğdır Quarter of Halkalı. This choice enabled the firm to recruit a significant portion of its workforce from this neighborhood. As the owner family had strong cultural ties with the local community, a symbiotic relationship was established between workers of this neighborhood, sweatshop owners located in this neighborhood, and the firm owners.

In moments of crises, such as shop floor resistance or financial problems, workers and sweatshop owners from Iğdır supported the management by breaking the resistance and accepting late payments. In return, the management did not abandon them, until the recent global growth strategy was launched. The vicious cycle of distrust, which kept the Independent Sweatshop in a constant crisis of survival, was broken with this “square deal” of loyalty. Workers from Iğdır kept their jobs, sweatshop owners enjoyed steady growth, and the factory management pursued large-scale operations faster than their competitors. As Mr. Self-Made Man successfully walked the thin line between the inefficiency of affiliated workers and the skepticism of foreign customers about his managerial performance, he completed his personal metamorphosis from an ordinary sweatshop worker to the top industrialist of his sector. The community ties in the Iğdır Quarter accounted for the key element in this success story.

Mr. Independent operated in Bağcılar from the very beginning of his career. He was a successful foreman, manager, and businessman. He was able to grow the production capacity of his enterprise by ten times in just a couple of years in the 1990s. However, the growth had its “natural” limits thanks to the human geography of Bağcılar. He had no special relations with any provincial, ethnic, or religious group in Bağcılar. His hemşehris from Siirt were all scattered in different neighborhoods of this district. They did not have a close ethnic, religious, or provincial identity. The high turnover rate in the workforce further deteriorated with his reluctance to establish direct relations with foreign customers, while Mr. Self-Made Man began to work closely with a partner who had connections in Germany. Mr. Independent’s business was only one of the other thousands of sweatshops of Bağcılar. His independence as many others became an obstacle, while his efforts to politically organize entrepreneurs of the same kind turned out to be a futile attempt at the İTKİB election due to the complexity of the relations embedded in the supply chains of Istanbul’s apparel industry.

Whether Mr. Survivor can be the next Mr. Self-Made Man or not depends on the collective consciousness of his Kurdish compatriots. If the Kurdish urban identity takes the form of close communitarian relations in the next decade, if his compatriot sweatshop owners begin to work with each other in ethnicity-based networks, and if the discrimination against Kurdish workers is further intensified, Mr. Survivor has a shot at successfully applying an aggressive growth strategy in this sector. However, the same heterogeneity in the population of Bağcılar that debilitated Mr. Independent seems to put similar constraints on the managerial prospect for Mr. Survivor as well. As the Municipality Survey data illustrates, different provincial, ethnic, and religious groups in Bağcılar generally fail to establish close communities. “Failed ghettos” characterize the urban scene of Bağcılar. Sweatshops are the product of Bağcılar’s human geography, inasmuch as Bağcılar
is the product of the sweatshops. In fact, the mapping of identity affiliations in the research setting provides interesting insights on the viability of different labor practices. However, this analysis still has gaps in terms of the workers’ individual responses to multiple modalities of labor control.

In order to evaluate the connections between the human geography of the target worker neighborhoods and industrial practices, the last section illustrated some of my observations about a few of my co-workers’ perceptions of their community, work experience, and time. M.L. and U.R.F. were the children of their neighborhoods. U.R.F. was a factory worker. He knew what it meant to be a sweatshop worker. Fortunately, he was given a choice. In the tight web of his community relations, a web of religious affiliations, ethnic identity, and the common destiny of his hemşehris in a chaotic urban setting, he chose to be a docile worker. M.L., however, was a sweatshop worker. As many others, he was a loner both in his neighborhood and sweatshop.

M.L.’s neighborhood was divided not only along the lines of migration origins, ethnicities, and religions, but also by the tension between property owners and their tenants. Property owners were, however, not predators, but shepherds. They not only keep their flocks under close surveillance, but also let them move in between apartments, neighborhoods, and jobs. The love between the shepherd and his flocks is always mutual. Close social interactions between property owners and their tenants/workers prevented the working class residents of Yenimahalle from uniting in action for political goals, such as the neighborhood head elections. The same tension also shaped the mindset of the property owners: Their immediate aim was to make sure that their petty commodity continued to generate rent for them. They were the “petty bourgeoisie” in the literal meaning of the term. They would not make Mr. Self-Made Men, since they did not have the mentality to make their own “square deal” with the residents of their neighborhood. They were the product of their neighborhood as much as the sweatshops. The sweatshops at the street corners of Bağcilar were populated by loners like M.L. and shepherds like Mr. Independent. M.L. could move in between ranches and pastures, but he could not escape the “wild life.” Mr. Independent could take good care of his flocks, while he could not let his flocks go to the next pasture where the grass is always greener.

Under these circumstances, it is no wonder that religious conservatism characterized the political scene of the working class neighborhoods of Istanbul. Islamic conservatism provided an amenable ideological means for the rising middle class to establish ideological control over the workers of their neighborhood. Bağcilar has never been a homogeneous working class district. The early migrants gradually became the property owners of their neighborhoods, while late migrants were and are the tenants and workers of the early migrants.

In the context of this connection between early and late migrants in big cities of Turkey, religious conservatism in Turkey became an urban ideology and a mass movement. In other words, religious conservatism ceased to be just a rural reaction to urbanization or an anti-Republican sentiment, insofar as the property owners in the working class district chose this ideological position as the common ground for their coalition against the working class. Early migrants originally had nothing in common in terms of identity-affiliations except for their Sunni belief. Religion provided an ideological ground for property owners, which enabled them to act together, to manipulate the workers together, and to plunder the urban rent together. Sweatshop labor as a labor practice is one of the multiple outcomes of this political coalition. In other words, sweatshop labor is one
of the means by which the early migrants systematically secure the urban rent. It is the reflection of the narrow-mindedness of the rent-seeking coalition of property-owners, who come together on the basis of religious conservatism as their political ideology. I hope prospective studies of the historical conditions of the emergence of religious conservatism in Turkey since the 1980s will further investigate this connection.

However, despite all these differences, M.L., U.R.F., A.Y.A., F.M.F.F. and many others share the same scars and contradictions in their personality. I attempted to present my observations with an inchoate analysis of their sense of time. The analysis of workers’ notion of time provides a useful means to understanding their self-perception and their attitude towards the labor process. My experiences during the participant observation convinced me that workers experience different temporalities in a singular lifetime. An ordinary apparel worker spends more than eleven hours at his or her workplace on an ordinary workday. The sense of time experienced in the labor process is significantly different from the sense of time outside the labor process. I call this “the temporality of unthinking.”

The rhythm of the work environment separates the worker mentally from his or her concerns in other spheres of his or her life. In the meager time left to him/her outside the work experience, the worker struggles with the contradictions between the short-term problems of and the long-term plans for his or her life. A worker needs to live as if he or she has no tomorrow in order to have the mental flexibility to overcome his or her “routine crises.” This carelessness is reflected in the form of reckless consumption patterns or erratic decisions to take unexcused absences or to simply desert the workplace. This attitude is by no means a sign of irresponsibility or irrationality. Without this attitude, the worker would not be able to preserve the mental flexibility necessary for him or her to solve unexpected problems. This carelessness is experienced in what I call “the temporality of crisis.”

Long-term plans are, however, not in the domain of this mode of thinking. Most workers made or will make their most important decisions in life such as marriage through a seemingly haphazard process. These decisions are superimposed on them through different channels by their community. They realize that they have to have a reliable job, a reliable partner, and an apartment, and that they must acquire these at the time deemed right for such decisions. They usually comply with the signals of their community and construct their life course accordingly. The wall a woman serger operator builds is made of brick. A male sewing machine operator builds a concrete wall. But it is still a wall, and nothing but a wall—it is hardly ever a house, hardly ever a “complete” project. I called this sense of time “the temporality of compliance.”

The spatial configuration of these experiences shapes the personality of the worker. A sweatshop worker has his workplace and home in the same neighborhood. A homeworker experiences the temporality of unthinking and compliance at her apartment in isolation from her coworkers. A factory worker has a clear-cut notion of the lines between these temporalities. These differences generate different personas not only in different labor practices, but even within the same labor practices. Workers at the cutting house were the most talkative and fun people I had ever met. I had never met anybody in my entire life as serious as ironers.

But, all in all, once the temporality of crisis and compliance are distinguished from each other, it is not difficult to see why workers come back to the soothing arms of the capitalist labor process,
that warm and tender cocoon of exploitation. The temporality of unthinking is not only the toil, but also the opportunity to escape from the dilemmas between short-term crises, which the worker always solves, and long-term structural problems, which the worker can never evade. Thus, I believe, we may need to reconsider the direct confrontation of the laborer with fixed capital in a different context. This direct confrontation at once generates the worker’s problems outside her work experience and mesmerizes her. The labor process is the opium of the working class.

In the case of U.R.F., the temporality of compliance was embedded in almost every minute of his life. Religious ceremonies, his vibrant community, and his close relations with his neighbors shaped his perception of the world and his own life. As his community began to superimpose its plans on him, he resisted for a while, but then he gave up. He became a docile factory worker. He was going to have a successful marriage no matter what.

In the case of M.L., however, the community was too dispersed, too political, and too heterogeneous. The apparent lack of direction was not only the outcome of his conscious political resistance to capitalist exploitation, but also the result of his loneliness in the midst of thousands of his hemşehris in his neighborhood. As the temporality of compliance was pierced in many directions, he had less motivation to enjoy the temporality of unthinking. As the spatial separation between temporality of unthinking and compliance was of lesser significance, it was more difficult for him to see the differences between his experience at his sweatshop(s) and his neighborhood.

For this very reason, a sweatshop worker changes his job quite often. Hence the Independent Sweatshop had a higher worker turnover rate than the Center Factory and the Follower Sweatshop. As M.L.’s workplace is mentally located in between his domestic and civic spaces, the lines between temporalities of unthinking, crisis, and compliance are enmeshed with each other. As he is distant in his relations with his community, he was not given the proper missions, one of which is to be a docile worker. In this mental vacuum, the temporality of crisis prevails. The carelessness of the sweatshop worker results in a fight with the foreman here, a verbal dispute with a coworker there, extreme boredom at another sweatshop on a hot summer day. He takes some time off, as he, deep down, knows, as Mr. M.M. did, that they need him—he doesn’t need them.

This high turnover rate of labor eliminates any chances for eager “proto-capitalists” to fulfill their dreams of becoming the Mr. Self-Made Men of the future. Factories are, thus, an exception in the apparel industry, as employers can never trust their workers, who, they complain, always act in an erratic manner in their occupational decisions. An interesting outcome of the high worker turnover rate in this industry is its contribution to the dynamic and competitive nature of the industry and its role in limiting the organizational growth of the apparel enterprises. I think these individual responses altogether put a huge amount of pressure on sweatshop owners. In my interviews with the sweatshop owners during the pilot project in 2007, almost all of them complained about how disloyal the workers were: “They would quit their job here just for a few bucks more at another sweatshop.”

The question is of course why they should not. As the social and political environment has been shaped specifically to clog any venue for collective action, how else can homeworkers and sweatshop workers be expected to act? Homeworkers work for different home-based work networks. Sweatshop workers work at multiple sweatshops even within a single year. Thus, their recklessness at the individual level results in a collective reaction to the exploitation of the capitalist
labor process. Although it is difficult to call this a reflection of class consciousness, potential means whereby these reactions might be turned into an element of institutional labor politics can be investigated further by the students of collective worker resistance.

Following the analysis of the reasons behind the high turnover rate of the workforce in Istanbul’s apparel industry, the last part of this work investigated contradictions in the worker’s psyche in regard to his or her perception of time. Differences in their very experience of time result in different categories of workers being employed by different forms of industrial labor. A homeworker’s notion of time and use of time is so different from a sweatshop worker’s that it is not possible to even think of one form of homogenization of the individual traits of workers into a single form of “variable capital.”

Thus, the argumentation of the first volume of Capital should be reinterpreted with a new reading of the narrative focusing on the social dynamics both before and after the exposure of the worker to the labor process as independent and interactive instances. Quite a few Marxian perspectives such as Labor Process Theory investigate the post-exposure processes only. Thus, they fail to organically link these processes with the social dynamics that turn human beings into appendages of organizational structures, which operate on the basis of the temporality of unthinking. Social dynamics, which bring the worker to different forms of labor process, already result in different personas well before the work-related experience of the workers. The heterogeneity in the urban space is reflected in a great multiplicity of reduction processes. This multiplicity accounts for the diversity in labor practices.

Worker’s experiences inside and outside the labor process teach her through different forms of temporality how to develop an anti-accumulationist ontology in a world of accumulation. She relies on a notion of anti-accumulation, since it is the only way to compromise the contradictory experiences in her everyday life outside the labor process, in the labor process, and in her community. The precondition for handling these contradictions is the dismissal of any hope for prospective accumulation. Once the poison of accumulation is inserted into the veins of the worker, she tries to join the ranks of her exploiters, most likely fails, and turns out to be the disgrace of her community. Thus, her community teaches her to give up any aspirations for accumulation, to follow the mores of her community, and to have an incomplete life within a complete life course. The only common feeling that she experiences with her comrades, who take on the personas of their labor practice, is this very ontology.

These observations on how workers perceive their work experience and their relations with their community complete this survey about the social dynamics behind the multiplicity of labor practices in Istanbul’s apparel industry. Now, focusing on urban space, we can read the dynamics behind the multiplicity of labor practices in Istanbul’s apparel industry from micro- to the macro-level.

First, urban sprawl not only generated new districts but also caused significant spatial heterogeneity of identity groups within neighborhoods of the working class districts. The exceptionally homogeneous neighborhoods became a labor reserve for a few factories, while the rest of the city was the seedbed for all alternative forms, which are in a state of constant organizational change along with the changes in the configuration of population. People are different in terms of their identity affiliations. Also, people move within the city. The dynamism
of the human geography of the city is a primary factor that constantly generates new relations in production and prevents one of these forms of relations from becoming the dominant one.

Second, these changes in population for periods no longer than two decades create new zones of industrial clustering. In these zones, each of the new and experimental forms of labor are put “in practice” within complex supply chains. Each form creates its own workspace and urban space, while the organizational characteristics evolve along the inflow of new population as either intra-city or rural-to-urban migrants change the human geography. Moreover, urban sprawl slowly shifts geographical centers of industrial production. Accordingly, some of the old labor practices are left aside and new ones are adopted in their stead. The organizational change of the HBW networks, I believe, is the perfect example for this argument.

Third, coming back to the major themes in the second chapter, these “tectonic” shifts in the urban space have a say in the characteristics of competition. Competition is by and large a useless concept for understanding industrial relations, unless its conditions are specified in terms of the local context and industrial sector. In the case of Istanbul’s apparel industry, competition kills all of the agents, strong and weak. The domestic competition does not gradually lead to monopolistic tendencies within the last three decades, since the marketplace of the apparel industry has never been a sphere exempt from “exogenous” effects. Pools of workforce and zones of industrial clustering have constantly been shifting in Istanbul since 1980. In such an environment, multiple organizational arrangements, production places, forms of subcontracting, and forms of employment coexist and pertain to capitals of different sizes.

These assertions verify the relevance of the arguments specified in the introduction: The transformations of and in the urban space amount to the simultaneous volatility of capitals and labors in this sector. The volatility of capitals amounts to a high turnover rate of enterprises inside and outside the sector. The volatility of labors takes place via a high turnover rate of workers among enterprises and labor practices. It is possible to express this particular conclusion as a generic principle for any industrial sector: The extent of turnover of capitals and labors in a particular sector determines the extent of uniformity/heterogeneity of its labor practices. Also, heterogeneity in labor practices reflects a high turnover of capitals and labors in the subject industrial sector. If the analysis of the mobility of labor and capital is contextualized with the investigation of “the mobility of places” in the urban space in terms of production places/networks, supply chains, and zones of industrial clustering, then different layers of analysis can be successfully superimposed on and synthesized with each other.

This analysis generates particular suggestions for pro-labor politics. In the context of Istanbul’s working class districts, capital suffers from high volatility of enterprises in their respective sector and high worker mobility among individual enterprises as much as labor does. Accordingly, this weakness on the part of capital can be exploited via alternative strategies of political mobilization. Workplace-based political mobilization seems to have been successfully countered by capital with the use of non-factory forms of industrial labor. Thus, the focus of political theory and practice should shift to the contextual conditions of the intra-city mobility of capital and labor.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Izmir University of Economics and SUNY Cortland.


New York: Macmillan.


--------. 1996. İstanbul’a Bir Kent Kondu: Ümraniye. İstanbul: İletişim.


Internet Sources:

Turkish Statistical Institute, 2009:
www.tuik.gov.tr

International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc., 2008:
http://www.isda.org/

World Trade Organization, 2009:
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2009_e/its09_merch_trade_product_e.htm#clothing
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2009_e/its09_merch_trade_product_e.htm#clothing

National Productivity Center, 2009:
http://www.mpm.org.tr/verimlilikgostergeleri/

Assembly of Turkish Exporters, 2009:

Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade, 2009:

Istanbul Textile and Ready-Made Clothing Exporters Association, 2009:

Visual Sources:

Milliyet Gazetesi, 5.12.200444